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Abstract
There has been a great deal of cross-border takeover activity in the EU over the 
past years. This is fortunate since the Commission views the increase of such 
activity and the ensuing restructuring of firms as vital to implement its aim of 
making Europe the most competitive economy by 2010. The Commission is 
concerned, however, by the fact that most Member States still have legal, cultural, 
or other structures, which either impede or reduce the occurrence of takeovers. 
The Commission is also concerned that the level of protection afforded to offeree 
shareholders in the context of takeovers differs from one Member State to 
another. Indeed, the offeree shareholders in some Member States enjoy a far 
better protection than their counterparts in other Member States. This thesis 
analyses these two aspects of takeover regulation from the point of view of the 
UK and France. The latter countries have had a significant impact upon the 
drafting of the Directive on takeover bids, as well as of numerous individual 
European countries’ takeover regulations, due to their solid experience with 
national takeover regulation. It is therefore believed that the comparative analysis 
of the takeover regimes of these two jurisdictions will offer a better understanding 
of both the Directive on takeover bids and other European countries’ takeover 
regulations. Such comparative analysis is further believed to offer an insight into 
how the level of growth of a particular market and the different ownership 
structures impact upon the rules governing takeovers.
This thesis begins by explaining the regulatory framework of takeovers in the UK 
and France as well as the ownership structures prevailing in these two 
jurisdictions. It subsequently analyses in a comparative manner the role of the 
offeree management and the equality of shareholders in these two countries. This 
thesis concludes with the gradual convergence of takeover regulations in the UK 
and France and throughout Europe more generally.
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Introduction: Theory and Structure
EU Member States1 are increasingly subject to cross-border takeover activity. 
This is because many companies seeking to expand operations in the EU consider 
acquiring an already established company. However, most MS still have 
structures which either prevent takeover bids2 from occurring or render them less 
attractive for the offeror. Most of these structures exist due to the conflicts of 
interests as between the offeree management and the offeree shareholders in the 
context of takeover bids. On the other hand, the offeree shareholders in some MS 
are treated more equally than those in other MS. This derives from the fact that 
some MS better protect the offeree shareholders as against the offeror, whose 
interests conflict with those of the offeree shareholders. These conflicts of 
interests constitute the two topics that all national systems of takeover regulation 
need to address.
So far as the conflicts of interests between the offeree management and the 
offeree shareholders are concerned, the relation between the latter are generally 
analysed by reference to a non-legal agency relationship3. An agency relationship 
exists ‘whenever one individual depends on the action o f  another. [...] The 
individual taking the action is called the agent. The affected party is the 
principal'4. Viewed from this perspective, there is indeed a principal/agent 
relationship between the management of the offeree company and the offeree 
shareholders. This relationship is frequently marked by conflicts of interests. 
Indeed, the duty of managers is to maximise the return to shareholders. However, 
managers do not always act in the interests of their principals. For much of the 
benefit of each manager’s performance inures to shareholders and no single 
manager receives the full benefit of his work5. Consequently, a manager will 
always be tempted to put his own interests ahead of those of the shareholders and
1 Hereafter the MS.
2 In this thesis, the terms ‘offeror’ and ‘bidder’; ‘offeree’ and ‘target’; and ‘offer’ and ‘bid’ are used 
interchangeably.
3 The term ‘agency’ used here derives from the economic literature and does not have a legal sense.
4 J. Pratt and R. Zeckhauser, ‘Principals and Agents: An Overview’ in Pratt and Zeckhauser (eds), 
Principals and Agents: The Structure o f Business (Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 
1985), p. 2.
5 L. A. Bebchuk, ‘The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension’
(1982) 95 Harv L. Rev. 1028, p. 1030.
1
thus will impose agency costs on the latter. Indeed, as early as 1776, Adam Smith 
called attention to the conflicts of interest between owners of joint stock 
companies and their managers. Although he did not use the language of agency 
costs6, he was in a sense the original agency theorist7. He noted
‘Being the managers o f other people’s money than their own, it cannot well be expected, that 
[the managers o f widely held companies] should watch over [public investors’ wealth] with the 
same anxious vigilance with which the partners in private copartnery frequently watch over 
their own'*.
The law may serve to alleviate the above type of conflicts. Indeed, corporate and 
other law gives shareholders certain powers to protect their investment against 
expropriation by managers9. For instance, the law usually provides shareholders 
with the right to vote on important corporate matters, including the election of 
directors; and the right to sue the company for damages. The extent of legal 
protection afforded to shareholders differs across the countries. In addition to the 
law, a number of corporate governance mechanisms also help to reduce the 
conflicts of interests as between the offeree management and the offeree 
shareholders. Such mechanisms range from independent and active boards, 
incentive compensations, directors’ fiduciary duties, to institutional investors, and 
to the managerial labour market and the capital markets.
When the above methods fail to reduce the agency problem between managers 
and shareholders, the market for corporate control comes into play. Indeed, 
Jensen (1986) observes that "the external takeover market serves as a court o f  last 
resort10 that plays an important role in protecting shareholders when the 
company’s internal controls [...] are slow, clumsy, or defuncf n . Pursuant to the 
‘efficient capital market hypothesis’12, if the managers of a company are pursuing
6 These costs include the monitoring expenditures by the principal, the bonding expenditures by the 
agent, and the residual loss; see M. C. Jensen and W. H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’ (1976), pp. 5-6, available at SSRN.
7 M. C. Jensen, ‘Self Interest, Altruism, Incentives, and Agency Theory’ (1994), p. 12, available at 
SSRN.
8 A. Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, Vol. 2 (1776); see ibid, p. 12.
9 R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, ‘Agency Problems and Dividend 
Policies Around the World’ (1998), p. 6, available at SSRN.
10 Note that the author uses the term ‘last resort’ because of the concerns over takeover efficiency.
11 M. Jensen, ‘The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence’ (1986), p. 10, available at SSRN.
12 Hereafter the ECMH.
2
goals other than profit maximisation and deviate from shareholders’ interests,
then the actual value of the firm, as measured in its share price, will be lower than
its potential value under a different management. If the gap between the actual
and potential value becomes too great, other market participants will be tempted
11to make a hostile bid and remove the incumbent management . The lower the 
stock price, relative to what it could be with a more efficient management, the 
more attractive the takeover becomes to those who believe that they can manage 
the company more efficiently14. In the words of Rappaport (1990), the market for 
corporate control ‘represents the most effective check on management autonomy 
ever devised"15. It should be noted, however, that the ECMH works only if there 
is a correlation between the share prices and the managerial performance16. This 
may not always be the case, however, since share prices also contain a large
17random element . Furthermore, the ECMH demands a highly developed stock 
market and a favourable legal and cultural environment as regards the use of 
hostile takeovers18.
The problem with takeovers, however, is that, due to the risk of losing their job, 
directors tend to defeat hostile bids by deploying a number of defensive measures. 
The success and efficiency of a hostile bid as a means to reduce the above agency 
problem therefore depends on the extent to which a jurisdiction allows such 
measures. Countries across the world are divided in their views as to the role of 
the offeree board in the face of a bid. Advocates of the ‘managerial resistance’ 
view argue that resistance by managers is a way to secure the best possible terms 
for shareholders who may not have the ability to deal effectively with the bidder,
13 Note, however, that a recent study of die UK by Franks and Mayer found little evidence that 
targets of hostile bids performed poorly prior to the bid; see J. Franks and C. Mayer, ‘Hostile 
Takeovers and the Correction of Managerial Failure’ (1996) 40 J. Fin. Econ. 163, p. 164. In fact, 
companies subject to a hostile bid do not perform worse than the average listed firm on the London 
Stock Exchange; see J. Franks, C. Mayer and L. Renneboog, ‘Managerial Disciplining and the 
Market for (Partial) Corporate Control in the UK’ in J. McCahery, P. Moerland, T. Raaijmakers and 
L. Renneboog (eds), Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity (OUP, 2002), pp. 
442-443.
14 H. G. Manne, ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’ (1965), 73 Journal of Political 
Economy 110, p. 113.
15 A. Rappaport, ‘The Staying Power of the Public Corporation’ 68 Harv. Bus. Rev, 96 (1990), p. 
100.
16 Hereafter the ECMH.
17 i. e. events unrelated to managerial performance.
18 J. M. Garrido and A. Rojo, ‘Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: Solution or 
Problem?’ in Hopt and Wymeersch (eds), Capital Markets and Company Law (OUP, 2003), p. 429.
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due to their collective action problem. Indeed, the use of defensive measures may 
result in a revised offer from the initial offeror19, or in a competitive bid from an 
alternative offeror, which would result in a higher final takeover premium for the
onofferee shareholders . This view is shared by Sudarsanam (1995) who argues that
01the management performs a co-ordinating role on behalf of such shareholders . 
Similarly, Lipton (1979) argues that any uncoerced decision against acceptance of 
a bid can only be made at the board of directors level22. The US system is a 
typical illustration of this view. Indeed, defensive measures are viewed in the US 
as a necessary management response to takeover bids, subject to the requirements 
of the ‘business judgment rule’23. According to Delaware courts, it is the board of 
directors that manages the company and their power includes, with some 
qualifications, the power to decide whether or not to accept a takeover bid24. As a 
result, offeree directors can take actions to resist a hostile takeover, provided that 
they act in good faith and with reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to 
corporate policy and effectiveness exists, and that the defensive measure is 
‘reasonable in relation to the threat posed* . Offeree directors can, for instance, 
adopt poison pills or take into account the impact of the bid on the offeree 
company’s employees in order to defeat an unwelcome offer. Only when a bid is 
inevitable that the offeree directors are prohibited from resisting the bid and are 
required to obtain the best price available for the offeree shareholders . In the
19 Empirical evidence suggests that the offeree board’s resistance to an offer generally results in an 
increase in the offer price and in the offeree’s share prices.
20 D. Henry, ‘Directors’ Recommendations in Takeovers: An Agency and Governance Analysis’ 
(2002), p. 4, available at http://mfs.rutgers.edu/conferences/10/mfcindex/files/MFC- 
003%20Henry.pdf.
21 P. S. Sudarsanam, ‘The Role of Defensive Strategies and Ownership Structure of Target Firms: 
Evidence from UK Hostile Takeover Bids’ (1995) 1 European Financial Management 223, p. 226.
22 M. Lipton, ‘Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom’ (1979) 35 Bus. Law. 101, p. 114.
23 Indeed, the UK and the US have adopted significantly different approaches to this matter. While 
the UK practice prohibits the use of defensive tactics, the US perceives a need for such defences. US 
corporate law has permitted the growth of a number of anti-takeover defences of a type which are 
virtually never adopted in UK listed companies. In addition, most US States have enacted anti­
takeover statutes which enable companies to adopt internal rules aimed at fending off hostile bids; 
see R. Sappideen, ‘Takeover Bids and Target Shareholder Protection: The Regulatory Framework in 
the UK, United States and Australia’ (1986) 8 J. of Compar. Bus. and Capital Mkt. Law 281, pp. 
299-302. On the ‘business judgement’ rule, see J. H. Farrar, ‘Business Judgement and Defensive 
Tactics in Hostile Takeover Bids’ in J. H. Farrar (ed.), Takeovers: Institutional Investors and the 
Modernization o f Corporate Laws (Auckland; Oxford: OUP, 1993), Ch. 11.
24 M. Kahan, Jurisprudential and Transactional Developments in Takeovers (New York, 1998), p. 
685.
25 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
26 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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latter circumstance, the locus of power shifts from the directors to offeree 
shareholders.
By contrast, advocates of the ‘managerial passivity’ view argue that, given the 
conflicting interests between managers and shareholders in the context of 
takeovers, it cannot possibly be assumed that the management will act in the best 
interests of shareholders. Managers might decide to obstruct a bid whose 
acceptance would be value-maximising in order to retain their independence, or 
facilitate an acquisition by a rival bidder offering a lower price to shareholders but 
a better deal for the management. Proponents of this view are therefore in favour 
of sidelining the management and giving shareholders the power to decide on the 
fate of a bid. Proponents of this view are split, however, in their views as to 
whether soliciting rival bids 27 is desirable. Advocates of the ‘pure passivity’ view 
suggest that offeree directors should refrain from taking any defensive measure,
OSincluding soliciting rival bids . In their view, managers should only carry out the 
company’s ordinary business and issue a press release urging shareholders to 
accept or reject the offer29. By contrast, advocates of the ‘modified passivity’ 
view argue that offeree directors should be able to solicit rival bids. For, in their 
view, this rule compels the initial offeror to pay at least the premium that other 
potential buyers are willing to pay and thus ensures that shareholders obtain a 
higher price . They further argue that the auctioneering rule ensures that the 
offeree company is taken over by a firm which values it more highly and 
therefore ensures that the resources in question are allocated to a more efficient
- i  i
use . It should be noted, however, that the drawback of the ‘managerial passivity’ 
view is that this view regulates only certain forms of management entrenchment.
27 This is referred to as auctioneering.
28 The arguments put forward to support this view include the fact that even resistance that 
ultimately elicits a higher bid is socially wasteful. For the higher price received by offeree 
shareholders is exactly offset by the bidder’s payment and thus by a loss to the bidder’s shareholders. 
Accordingly, shareholders as a group gain nothing. The increase in the price is simply a transfer 
payment from the offeror’s shareholders to offeree shareholders; see F. H. Easterbrook and D. R. 
Fischel, ‘The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer’ (1981) 94 
Harv. L. Rev. 1161, p. 1175.
29 Ibid, p. 1201.
30 L. A. Bebchuk (1982), supra n 5, p. 1041. See also R. Gilson, ‘Seeking Competitive Bids Versus 
Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense’ in F. Easterbrook and D. Fischel (eds), Management's 
Fiduciary Duty and Takeover Defenses (1993), p. 271.
31 S. Deakin and G. Slinger, ‘Hostile Takeovers, Corporate Law and the Theory of the Firm’ in 
Deakin and Hughes (eds), Enterprise and Community: New Directions in Corporate Governance 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), p. 7.
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Indeed, the ‘managerial passivity’ view only regulates post-bid defences, to the 
exclusion of pre-bid defences. As a result, managers can embed defences in pre- 
bid decisions . This in turn may deter potential offerors from launching a bid and 
thus reduce the likelihood of takeovers.
Both the UK and the French takeover regimes have endorsed the ‘managerial 
passivity’ view. For both regimes sideline the offeree management and give 
decision-making in the hands of the offeree shareholders. At the same time, both 
regimes have endorsed the ‘modified passivity’ view. Indeed, the City Code on 
Take-overs and Mergers33 facilitates the entry of second bidders by requiring all 
offers to be kept open for a minimum of twenty-one days after their initial 
posting34’ and by requiring any information given to one offeror to be given 
equally to another offeror even if that other offeror is less welcome . Likewise, 
the General Regulation of the Conseil des Marches Financiers requires a 
minimum offer period of twenty-five days and the Regulation NO 2002-04 of 
the Commission des Operations de Bourse embodies the principle of equality of 
information38.
It should be noted in this respect, however, that, although both the UK and France 
have opted for the ‘managerial passivity’ view, hostile takeover bids are less 
common in France than in the UK. Indeed, except in the UK, hostile takeovers are 
rather rare in Europe in general. This is mainly due to the different ownership 
structure of continental European countries as compared to the UK. Indeed, in the 
UK and the US, share ownership in listed companies is generally diffuse and most 
listed companies are controlled by professional managers. As a result, the main 
conflict of interest in the context of takeovers in the UK and the US is that 
between professional managers and offeree shareholders. If the professional
32 J. Arlen and E. Talley, ‘Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of Shareholder Choice’ (2003), p. 18, 
available at SSRN.
33 Hereafter the Code.
34 Code, r. 31(1).
35 Code, r.20(2).
36 CMF regs, r.5-2-2.
37 Hereafter the COB.
38 COB regs, r.4.
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managers underperform in running the company, then a control change is likely to 
take place by way of a takeover bid.
By contrast, in most continental MS, a single large shareholder, or a group of 
shareholders, retains a controlling stake in listed companies. The controlling 
shareholder generally takes an active interest in running the company, by 
choosing the management and directly taking executive positions . In this 
situation, there is no risk of unaccountability by managers to the shareholders, 
since the directors are usually appointed by the controlling shareholder(s). There 
is however a risk that the controlling shareholder may not run the company in the 
interests of the minority shareholders. In other words, the main conflict of interest 
in the context of takeovers in continental MS is the legal expropriation of the 
minority by the controlling shareholders40. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer (1998) note that restricting such expropriation is the real challenge to 
corporate governance in most countries41. This type of expropriation cannot be 
remedied via hostile bids, due to the illiquidity of the shares of such listed 
companies.
The risk of such expropriation exists for instance in France, where the presence of 
large controlling shareholders in listed companies creates a conflict of interests 
between controlling shareholders and the minority. In this respect, probably the 
most important development in French company law has been the recognition by 
the legal scholars and the courts of a fiduciary duty of loyalty of controlling 
shareholders vis-a-vis minority shareholders42. The presence of large controlling 
shareholders in French listed companies does not mean, however, that takeover 
bids do not occur in France. On the contrary, France actually ranks second after 
the UK in terms of the level of takeover activity. However, takeover bids in 
France are not usually used as a means to effect control changes in listed 
companies. This is because control changes in French listed companies usually
39 M. Pagano and A. Roell, ‘The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring,
And the Decision to Go Public’ (1998) Quarterly Journal ofEconomics 187, pp. 187-188.
40 R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, ‘Investor Protection and Corporate
Valuation’ (1999), p. 4, available at SSRN.
41 R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, ‘Corporate Ownership Around the World’, WP
No. 6625 (1998), available at SSRN, p. 29.
42 See e.g. D. Schmidt, Les Conflits d'lnterets dam la Societe Anonyme (Paris 1999).
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occur by way of private negotiations. As a result, takeover bids in France are 
usually used as a means to de-list an offeree company whose control has already 
been acquired via a private control transaction43.
It should be noted that the fact that the conflicts of interests between the offeree 
management and the offeree shareholders is prevalent in the UK does not mean 
that the UK takeover regime has no provisions designed to solve the type of 
conflicts of interests which is prevailing in France. Indeed, the Listing Rules 
contain a number of requirements for companies applying for listing which have a 
dominant shareholder. These include the requirement that the applicant for listing 
must be capable at all times of operating and making decisions independently of 
any controlling shareholder, and that all transactions and relationships in the 
future between the applicant and any controlling shareholder must be at arm’s 
length and on a normal commercial basis. The rationale behind this requirement is 
to eliminate the influence of the controlling shareholder44.
So far as the conflicts of interests between the offeror and the offeree shareholders 
are concerned, the reason behind the disjunction between offerors’ goals and 
shareholders’ goals is that, offerors tend to keep their acquisition costs at a low 
level. To this end, in cases where there is already a controlling shareholder in the 
offeree company, they may wish to pay a premium to the controlling shareholder 
only, to the exclusion of the minority shareholders. This would allow the offeree 
company to offer a higher premium for the controlling shareholder, with a view to 
inducing him to sell his stake. In cases where there is no existing controlling 
shareholders, offerors may wish to acquire control of a company by way of 
market purchases made at different prices for different sellers, rather than by way 
of a public offer. All takeover regulations in the EU, including those of the UK
43 In other words, the problem in such jurisdictions is that private ownership frees firms from the 
discipline imposed by the market for corporate control; see W. S. Schulz, M. H. Lubatkin, R. N.
Dino and A. K. Buchholtz, ‘Agency Relationships in Family Firms: Theory and Evidence’ (2001) 12 
Organization Science 99, p. 100. However, if large shareholders are non-managers and are simply 
external shareholders, such as institutional shareholders, then the latter problem would not arise. 
Indeed, in a recent UK study, Sudarsanam found that the presence of large institutional shareholders 
was an important factor in ensuring bidder success in hostile takeovers; see P. S. Sudarsanam, 
(1995), supra n 21, p. 223.
44 E. Wymeersch, ‘Do We Need a Law on Groups of Companies?*, in K. J. Hopt and E. Wymeersch 
(eds), Capital Markets and Company Law (OUP, 2003), p. 589.
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and France, aim at ensuring the equal treatment of offeree shareholders. By 
mandating terms on which bids have to be made, equality rules prevent 
individuals in privileged positions to have an unfair advantage over those who are 
less well situated.
Takeover regulations in the EU further aim at ensuring undistorted choice by 
offeree shareholders. Indeed, offerors tend to structure offers in a discriminatory 
fashion45, with a view to acquiring the offeree company by paying a price per 
share which is inferior to the value of the firm which they wish to increase. By 
doing so, offerors wish to obtain all the profits of the value of a firm. Although 
offeree shareholders should reject such offers, they usually tend to accept them. 
This is because, following a successful discriminatory offer, the value of the non­
tendered shares often trade at a discount. The discounted value of the non­
tendered shares results from the fact that the newly acquired company may be 
operated for the benefit of the acquiring group, which may divert earnings away 
from the offeree company and its shareholders. As a result, offeree shareholders 
are rushed into selling as many of their shares as possible into the discriminatory 
offer, for fear of staying as a minority in the company, with the offeror as the 
controller. Thus, even if  each shareholder prefers the offer to fail and even if most 
shareholders do not view the takeover as being in their collective interest, 
individual shareholders nevertheless feel compelled to tender. This phenomenon 
is referred to as a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’46. The latter is further exacerbated by the 
lack of co-ordination among shareholders due to the large number of shareholders 
in most listed companies and the short period of the takeover bid47. As a result, 
offerors who structure their bid in a discriminatory fashion may acquire control at 
a discount. Rules designed to prevent shareholder coercion aim at ensuring that an 
offeree company should be acquired if and only if its shareholders view selling
45 e.g. two-tier offers where offeree shareholders must decide whether to tender. If they resist 
tendering, they risk the worst outcome, in which their shares are all taken in a low-valued, back-end 
merger because the other shareholders did tender and the offer succeeded. If they tender, they are 
assured of receiving the moderate outcome consisting of a prorata share of the higher-valued, front- 
end tender offer. The best outcome is available only if all or most shareholders resist tendering so 
that the offer fails; see R. Comment and G. A. Jarrell, ‘Two-Tier and Negotiated Tender Offers: The 
Imprisonment of die Free-Riding Shareholder’ (1987) 19 J. Fin. Econ. 283, pp. 287-288.
46 This is also referred to as the ‘pressure to tender’, or as ‘shareholder coercion’.
47 G. A. Hune, ‘Protection of Minority Shareholders in Cases of Takeover, with Special Reference to 
the German and European Law’ (2003), p. 17, available at http://www.frg.eur.nl/rile/emle/ 
Theses/hune.pdf.
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their company as a value-maximising course of action48. If the shareholders judge 
the offer price to be lower than the independent offeree company’s value, then the 
offer should be rejected49.
It should be noted in this respect that a number of scholars do not support the 
equal treatment of shareholders. For instance, Javaras (1964) argues that, unlike 
the political arena, the overriding principle in company law should be the 
maximization of profits rather than of equality50. Others argue that some issues 
should be solved through the market forces, and in particular through the ability 
of investors to diversify, rather than through equality rules. For instance, Demott 
(1983) argues that ‘i f  the market can even out apparent inequality by 
diversification, then the costs o f  unneeded regulation to promote equality might 
well be thought socially wasteful’51. Other scholars particularly reject the idea that 
the non-controlling shareholders should participate in the premium paid for the 
controlling shares in circumstances where a controlling shareholder disposes of 
his shares. For instance, Easterbrook and Fischel (1982) argue that any attempt to 
require sharing simply reduces the likelihood that there will be any gains to 
share52. In addition, Hahn (1990) argues that there is no basis for a sharing rule 
since minority shareholders had already given up control before the change of 
control and need no further protection53. Furthermore, Partlett and Burton (1988) 
argue that shareholders may very well contract to be treated unequally as regards 
the premium for corporate control if that is the price of entry of a large investor 
who it is perceived will contribute to overall shareholder welfare54.
48 L. A. Bebchuk, ‘The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy’ (1988) 12 Del. J. 
of Corp. L. 911, p. 915.
49 L. A. Bebchuk, ‘Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers’ (1985) 
98 Harv. L. Rev. 1693, p. 1701.
50 G. B. Javaras, ‘Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Controlling Shares: A Reply to Professor 
Andrews’ (1964) 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 420, pp. 425-428.
51 D. A. DeMott, ‘Current Issues in Tender Offer Regulation: Lessons from the British’ (1983) 58 
NYU L. Rev. 945, p. 983. Note that Brudney (1983) notes that Demott’s suggestion depends on the 
degree to which shareholders are able to diversify their investments; see V. Brudney, ‘Equal 
Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and Reorganizations’ (1983) 71 Calif. L. Rev. 
1072, p. 1072.
52 F. H. Easterbrook and D. R. Fischel, ‘Corporate Control Transactions’ (1982) 91 Yale L. J. 698, p. 
716.
53 D. Hahn, ‘Takeover Rules in the European Community: An Economic Analysis of Proposed 
Takeover Guidelines and Already Issued Disclosure Rules’ (1990) 10 Int. Rev. of Law and Econ. 
131, p.144.
54 D. F. Partlett and G. Burton, ‘The Share Repurchase Albatross and Corporation Law Theory’ 
(1988) 62 Aust. L.J. 139, p. 145.
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The degree of equality afforded to offeree shareholders depends on whether a 
jurisdiction takes the ‘managerial resistance’ or the ‘managerial passivity’ view 
with respect to the issue of defensive measures. Indeed, ensuring equality of 
offeree shareholders is more important in jurisdictions which have decided to 
sideline the management. For in such jurisdictions equality rules act as substitutes 
for the absence of an active management to protect the offeree shareholders. The 
UK and France constitute examples of such jurisdictions. In particular, as will be 
seen in the following chapters, the neutrality rule embodied in the Code lies 
behind the strict regulation of the offeror’s behaviour in the UK.
Scope of the thesis
This thesis deals with the UK and French takeover regimes. The reasons for 
choosing the UK and France are two-fold: First, these two countries have a solid 
experience with national takeover regulation. Indeed, the UK City Code was 
enacted as early as 1968. Similarly, France had already in 1972 enacted takeover 
regulation as part of the stock exchange’s self-regulatory apparatus. As a result, 
both countries have a long-standing experience with takeovers. Secondly, the 
European Commission has finally adopted a Directive on takeover bids in 200455, 
with a view to harmonising certain aspects of European takeover regimes. Indeed, 
the harmonisation of European takeover regulations is, for the Commission, a sine 
qua non for the attainment of its broader objective, namely the creation of an 
integrated capital market by 2010.
The Directive is a framework Directive and establishes general principles 
governing takeovers without attempting detailed harmonisation. It is based on two 
policy objectives, these being the protection of investors 56 and the 
‘europeanisation’ of firms. As far as the first objective is concerned, the Directive 
aims at providing a set standard of protection throughout the EU for minority 
shareholders of listed companies in the event of a change of control and at
55 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
takeover bids; OJ L142/12,30/04/2004. Unless otherwise stated, referrals in this thesis to the 
‘Directive’ means the Directive on takeover bids.
56 Recital No. 2.
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providing for minimum guidelines for the conduct of takeover bids. As far as the 
second objective is concerned, the Commission views takeover bids as a useful 
instrument to achieve the restructuring of European firms, which is indispensable 
for their international competitiveness . Indeed, this view of the Commission is 
also shared by legal scholars such as Wymeersch (2002), who argues that 
European legal harmonisation is vital in order to prevent individual MS to use 
their legal systems to erect or maintain barriers to market access, with a view to 
protecting their own enterprises from takeovers58.
The UK and France have had a significant impact upon the drafting of the 
Directive. Indeed, the Directive is essentially modelled on the UK’s system. This 
is not surprising, due to the UK’s comparatively vast experience in takeover 
regulation and the widespread acceptance that the City Code has been remarkably 
successful59. Accordingly, there are many similarities between the Code and the 
Directive. Given that the current French takeover regulation is also modelled on 
the Code, it is also possible to find parallels between the Directive on the one 
hand and the French takeover regime on the other. It is therefore believed that the 
comparison of these two takeover regimes will offer a better understanding of the 
provisions embodied in the Directive and of the harmonisation efforts taking 
place outside the Directive. Furthermore, the comparison of these two takeover 
regimes will provide an opportunity to call into question the efficiency of the 
Directive.
It should be noted that this thesis deals with the conflicts of interests as between 
the offeree management and the offeree shareholders, and as between the offeror 
and the offeree shareholders. There are other relationships in the context of 
takeover bids which give rise to conflicts of interests. These are the relationship 
between the offeror and its shareholders, and the relationship between the offeror 
and the stakeholders. The relationship between the offeror and its shareholders is 
outside the scope of this thesis. This is because the latter relationship is not dealt
57 This is made explicit in the ‘Bangemann memorandum’ of 1990.
58 E. Wymeersch, ‘Takeover Regulation in Europe: The Battle for the 13th Directive on Takeovers’ 
(2002) 15 A.J.C.L. l,p . 8.
59 S. Kenyon-Slade and M. Andenas, ‘The Proposed Thirteenth Directive on Takeovers: Unravelling 
the UK’s Self-Regulatory Success?’ in Andenas and Kenyon-Slade (eds), EC Financial Market 
Regulation and Company Law 149 (1993), p. 149.
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within the UK or French takeover regulation per se, but rather by general 
company. Reasons of space do not allow, however, a comparison of the numerous 
company law provisions which exist in the UK and France and which relate to 
this specific relationship. This thesis also excludes the relationship as between the 
offeror and the stakeholders, though it briefly deals with the relationship as 
between the offeror and the employees of the offeree company in the chapter on 
the comparative analysis of the UK and French regimes as regards the issues of 
defensive measures and equality in the context of takeover bids. The reason for 
not dealing with this relationship thoroughly is because the ‘stakeholders’ 
encompass too many constituencies and reasons of space once again rule out their 
detailed examination. It should be added that only companies whose securities are 
traded on a public market fall within the scope of this thesis.
Structure of the thesis
This thesis is comprised of seven chapters and proceeds in the following 
sequence:
Chapter I starts with the description of the regulatory framework prevailing in 
the UK and France as regards the regulation of takeovers. To this end, it provides 
an overview of the rules governing takeovers and of the takeover regulatory 
authorities in these two countries. This chapter further examines the relationship 
of the takeover regulatory authorities with other bodies which are, or may become, 
involved in takeovers.
Chapter II provides an overview of the main features of the capital markets and 
the ownership structure of listed companies in the UK and France, in terms of the 
level of concentration of share ownership and the identity of shareholders. This 
chapter also provides an insight into how the market for corporate control 
operates in these two jurisdictions.
Chapter III and Chapter IV examine the role of the offeree board under the UK 
and the French regimes, respectively. For this purpose, each of these chapters
13
starts with a description of the rules governing directors’ actions. These chapters 
subsequently give an overview of the permissible pre-bid and post-bid defences in 
the UK and France, respectively.
Chapter V and Chapter VI examine the operation of the equality principle 
under the UK and French regimes, respectively. In particular, they describe the 
operation of the principle within the offer; as between shareholders selling within 
the offer and those selling outside the offer; and in circumstances where control is 
either acquired in the market or transferred from an already existing controlling 
shareholder.
Chapter VII provides a critical analysis of the differences between the UK and 
French takeover regimes as regards the topics discussed in the preceding chapters. 
In doing so, this chapter also refers to the provisions of the Directive on takeover 
bids, with a view to identifying the impact of the latter upon the takeover regimes 
of the UK and France.
This thesis ends with a conclusion, which summarises its main findings and 
assesses the harmonisation efforts in the field of takeovers, which take place in 
the EU. The conclusion further attempts to anticipate the future developments in 
this area of law.
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Chapter 1 The UK and French Regulatory Framework 
Concerning the Regulation of Takeovers 
Introduction
The rules governing takeovers and the takeover regulators in the UK and France 
are prompted by similar concerns and work towards the same aims, namely to 
ensure that takeovers are conducted in an orderly fashion and that offeree 
shareholders are protected and treated equally. This is so in spite of the 
' differences between these two jurisdictions regarding the nature of the rules 
governing takeovers and the scope of the regulators’ powers. Indeed, the 
regulation of takeovers in France is mainly statutory. It should be noted, however, 
that, prior to the recent French regulatory overhaul that will be explained in more 
detail below, the French takeover system had contained an element of self­
regulation in the form of the CMF. However, the creation of the Autorite des 
Marches Financiers60 and the resulting abolition of the CMF have resulted in the 
removal of an important fraction of France’s self-regulation.
In contrast, the UK takeover regulation contains many self-regulatory elements 
and its main takeover regulator is self-regulatory. Despite its essentially self- 
regulatory nature, the UK takeover regime can no longer be characterised as 
entirely self-regulatory, however. This is because, as will be seen below, the UK 
takeover regulator has received the support of a number of organisations which 
are backed by statute. This change is believed to have occurred as a result of the 
failure of self-regulation to live up to the requirements of effective investor 
protection61. It can therefore be said that the UK currently has a mixture of 
statutory and self-regulatory takeover regime.
This chapter provides an overview of the regulatory framework in the UK and 
France. Section I describes the rules governing takeovers in the UK and France. 
Section II describes the takeover regulators in these two countries. Finally,
60 Hereafter the AMF,
61 C. Mayer, ‘Regulatory Principles and the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000’ in E. Ferran 
and C. A. E. Goodhart (eds), Regulating Financial Services and Markets in the Twenty First Century 
(Oxford: Hart, 2001), p. 26.
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Section III examines the relationship of the takeover regulatory authorities with 
other bodies which may be involved in takeovers.
1.1 Rules Governing Takeovers
1.1.1 The UK
i) History
The regulation of takeovers in the UK dates back to 1959. Indeed, in the late 
1950s, a number of takeover bids involved defensive measures which left 
shareholders in a company without a clear choice between opposing proposals. 
Such measures included the issue by offeree boards of shares to friendly third 
parties during the course of an offer, with a view to frustrating offers. Concern 
over such measures led to the creation of the Notes on Amalgamations of British 
Businesses63, which were produced in 1959 under the auspices of the then 
Governor of the Bank of England. The Notes recognised for the first time that 
takeover tactics required guidance64. Subsequent takeover bids involved instances 
where shareholders were not treated alike. In particular, controlling interests were 
purchased in companies at a considerable premium over the market price, without 
providing the remaining shareholders with an opportunity to share in the premium. 
This in turn led to a revision of the Notes in 196365, with a view to establishing 
the principle that a person who buys shares in the market or by private treaty shall 
offer similar terms to the remaining shareholders. The Revised Notes proved 
insufficient, however, especially after 1963, when a great deal of takeover activity 
took place. Indeed, the Revised Notes failed to check what many regarded as 
undesirable practices. Hence the decision in 1967 of the then Governor of the
62 For an overview of these bids, see A. Johnston, The City Takeover Code (OUP, 1980). Note that 
some of these bids are referred to in the chapter on the regulation of defensive measures in the UK.
63 Hereafter the Notes.
64 M. Blanden, ‘The City Regulations on Mergers and Takeovers’ in J. M. Samuels (ed.), Readings 
on Mergers and Takeovers (London, 1972), p. 201.
65 Hereafter the Revised Notes.
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Bank of England to reconvene the City Working Party, with a mandate to draw up 
a Code. The latter was published in March 196866.
ii) Current framework
There is comparatively little legislation in the UK regulating the conduct of 
takeover bids. The real strength of the control of takeover bids lies in the system
£7of self-regulation rather than the legislation . Indeed, the great bulk of regulation 
in relation to takeovers is to be found in the Code. The objective of the Code is to 
ensure fair and equal treatment of shareholders during takeover bids and to 
provide an orderly framework within which takeovers are conducted . To this 
end, the Code contains a substantial number of principles and rules relating to 
takeover bids. The particularity of the Code is that it is a self-regulatory 
instrument, a code of conduct. Its rules were developed by the Takeover Panel, 
which, as will be seen below, is a self-regulatory body. As a result, the Code has 
not the force of law. This is in line with the fact that the self-regulatory approach 
has historically been a distinctive feature of financial services regulation in the 
UK69. Because of its self-regulatory nature, the Code meets all the criteria usually 
found in self-regulatory systems, namely the informality of operation; the speed 
with which decisions can be taken; the ability to adapt the principles to changing
70market circumstances; and the lower costs . In particular, the speed with which 
the Code can be amended to meet changing circumstances is an incomparable 
advantage over the lengthy legislative process under a statutory code.
66 For an analysis of the events leading to the publication of the City Code, see A. Johnston (1980), 
supra n 62, Chs 1-2; and E. Stamp and C. Marley, Accounting Principles and the City Code 
(Butterworths, 1970), Ch. 1-2.
67 T. P. Lee, ‘Takeovers-The United Kingdom Experience’ in J. H. Farrar (ed.), Takeovers, 
Institutional Investors and the Modernization o f Corporate Laws (Auckland; Oxford: OUP, 1993), 
p. 192.
Code, Introduction, 1(a).
69 E. Ferran and C. A. E. Goodhart, ‘Regulating Financial Services and Markets in the Twenty First 
Century: An Overview’ in E. Ferran and C. A. E. Goodhart (eds), Regulating Financial Services and 
Markets in the Twenty First Century (Oxford: Hart, 2001), p. 5.
70 N. Gunnigham and J. Rees, ‘Industry Self Regulation: An Institutional Perspective’ (1997) 19 
Law & Pol. 363, p. 366.
17
It should be noted that a number of statutory rules are also applicable during 
takeover bids. For instance, the Companies Act 198571 applies when the minority 
requests to be bought out by the bidder who has obtained acceptances from the 
holders of ninety per cent of the shares for which the bid is made. The same Law 
also applies where the bidder compels the remaining ten per cent shareholders to 
transfer their shares to it. Furthermore, Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993, 
which contains rules on insider dealing, applies when there are suspicions of 
insider dealing in the context of a takeover. Indeed, bid situations give rise to 
opportunities for directors and other persons who have inside information to profit 
by market dealings before the information is published. Moreover, the Financial
noServices and Markets Act of 2000 applies in the context of takeovers, as it 
contains rules prohibiting market abuse, of which insider dealing is an example. 
As a result, the above legislation affecting takeovers supplements and reinforces 
the Code in relation to related matters73. It should be added that, in addition to the 
above statutory rules, the UK Listing Authority’s Listing Rules74 are also 
applicable in the context of a takeover where the parties to the takeover have their 
shares listed on the London Stock Exchange.
1.1.2 France
i) History
Takeover bids were long ignored by the French legislator, until the early 1960s 
when the occurrence of two takeover bids75 made it necessary to have a regulation 
specific to takeovers. The first regulation resulted from an exchange of letters in
71 Hereafter the CA 1985.
72 Hereafter the FSMA. The latter has replaced, inter alia, the Insurance Companies Act 1982, the 
Financial Services Act 1986, and the Banking Act 1987.
73 R. R. Pennington, ‘Corporate Takeovers Through the Public Markets-United Kingdom’ in P. J. 
Kozyris (ed.), Corporate Takeovers Through the Public Markets (The Hague; Boston: Kluwer,
1996), p. 304.
74 Note that, as from May 2000, the function of competent authority for listing, together with the 
responsibility for the Listing Rules, has been transferred from the London Stock Exchange to the 
FSA.
75 These were the share-exchange offer in 1960 by Compagnie Fran$aise des P6troles for the shares 
of Omnium Fran?ais des Pdtroles, and the cash offer in 1964 by the US bank Lazard for the shares 
of Compagnie Franco-Wyoming Oil Company.
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196676 between the Minister of the Economy and the Chambre Syndicate11, which 
resulted in the approval by the former of the procedure laid down by the latter. 
This procedure had an informal nature and was intended to monitor cash offers 
and prevent market abuses. At the same time, the procedure avoided to hinder 
cash offers, which were believed by the then market authorities to animate the
78financial market . The 1966 regulation proved inadequate, however, as it did not 
provide a solution to a number of problems which often appear during a takeover 
battle. In addition, it only concerned cash offers, to the exclusion of share- 
exchange offers. As a result, a new regulation was introduced between 1970 and
701974 . However, the new regulation also proved inadequate, especially following
the hostile bid in 1977 by the SNCDV for the shares of the CNM. The latter bid,
which turned into a protracted battle as a result of successive counter-offers,
proved to be uncontrollable within the existing framework. As a result, a reform
in 1978 resulted in the adoption by the COB of two general decisions concerning
80cash and share-exchange offers as well as the price guarantee procedure , and in
the introduction of provisions concerning cash and share-exchange offers in the
81General Regulation of the Chambre Syndicate .
Subsequently, in 1989, the French government decided to overhaul the takeover
87regulation with a view to giving it a firmer statutory basis . This decision was 
taken as a result of the increase in the number of takeovers, the disturbing features 
of some takeovers, and the need to adapt the French takeover regime to the 
imperatives of the Community law. The 1989 reform merely laid down the 
general principles applicable to takeovers, leaving the market authorities to set out 
the conditions and the procedure. Hence the adoption by the Conseil des Bourses
76 Letters of 4 April, 6 July and 29 November 1966.
77 This was created by the Law No. 66-1009 of 28 December 1966 and is the predecessor of the 
Conseil des Bourses de Valeurs, which in turn is the predecessor of the Conseil des Marches 
Financiers (hereafter the CMF).
78 P. B6zard, Les Offres Publiques d ’Achat (Paris: Masson, 1982), p. 25.
79 This consisted of the adoption in 1970 by the Chambre Syndicate of a new regulation and the 
adoption by the Commission des Operations de Bourse of a code of good conduct.
80 General Decisions of the COB of 25 July 1978, modified by the regulation No. 86-01 of 13 March 
1986.
81 Title VI, ch. 2.
82 Law No. 89-531 of 2 August 1989 on the security and transparency of the financial market.
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de Valeurs%3> of its General Regulation, and by the COB of its Regulation No. 89- 
OS84. The reform process continued in 1992, when Book V of the CBV’s General 
Regulation was amended. This amendment had the effect of strengthening the 
rights of minority shareholders by requiring the offeror to bid for all the shares of 
an offeree company, as opposed to the previous rule under which the offeror was 
required to bid for only two-thirds of the offeree company. In 1996, the French
Of
Parliament adopted the Financial Activities Modernisation Act , which 
transposed into the French law the EU Directive on investment services86, and 
which merged the CBV and the Conseil du Marche a Terme into one single entity, 
namely the CMF87. The rationale underlying the latter merger was that the 
traditional distinction between securities and derivatives markets no longer
oo
reflected the economic reality of the transactions and the operators . The 2001
O Q
Law on the New Economic Regulations conferred new powers on employees 
during the currency of takeovers; increased the powers of the COB and the CMF; 
and recognised the validity of shareholder agreements during the currency of 
takeovers. Though presented as an historic reform, the Law of 2001 did not bring 
about major changes to the previous framework, however. Finally, the Law of 
2003 on Financial Security90 has merged the CMF and the COB to create a single 
securities regulator, namely the Autorite des Marches Financiers91, whose 
functions include the regulation of takeovers.
83 Hereafter the CBV. The latter was created by the Law No. 88-70 of 22 January 1988 to replace 
both the Compagnie Nationale des Agents de Change and its Chambre Syndicate.
84 Thus, the CMF adopted a General Regulation and the COB adopted regulation No. 89-03, which 
has now been replaced by regulation No. 2002-04.
85 Law No. 96-597 of 2 July 1996.
86 Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field; OJ 
L 141, 11/06/1993 P. 0027-0046.
87 Law of 2 July 1996, art. 27.
88 C. Merkin and B. Saint Mars, ‘Le Conseil des Marches Financiers’ in T. Bonneau et al. (eds), La 
Modernisation des Activites Financieres (GLN Joly, 1996), p. 80. For more information on the 
background to the creation of the CMF, see E. Fayet, L ’Autorite Professionnelle de Marche: du CBV 
au CMF, Thesis, Paris V (2000).
89 Law No. 2001-420 of 15 May 2001.
90 Law No. 2003-706 of 1 August 2003 on financial security.
91 Hereafter the AMF.
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ii) Current framework
The main sources of regulation for public takeovers in France are the General 
Regulation of the CMF92 and the Regulation No. 2002-04 of the COB93. The 
Code of Commerce also contains some provisions relating to defensive measures, 
such as the rules relating to capital increase and the rules relating to the shares 
held by subsidiaries in the capital of their parents94. The existence of both 
statutory and self-regulatory rules indicates that the French takeover regime 
cannot be characterised as being entirely statutory or entirely self-regulatory. 
Indeed, it is a mixture of statutory regulation and self-regulation95. The self- 
regulatory element lies in the fact that the primary regulations, namely the CMF 
and the COB Regulations, were laid down by professionals. The statutory element 
lies in the fact that these regulations find their basis in the statute and they are 
subject to the approval of the Minister of the Economy.
It should be noted that, although the AMF has taken on the functions previously 
carried out by the COB and the CMF, it has yet to publish its own set of 
regulations. At the time of writing, the AMF has not yet introduced its own 
General Regulation, which will replace both the CMF’s General Regulation and 
the COB’s Regulations. This new General Regulation is likely to be introduced in 
autumn 200496. Until then, the separate regulations of the CMF and the COB will 
remain in force. References in this thesis are therefore to the old Regulations, 
namely the CMF’s General Regulation and the COB’s Regulation No. 2002-04.
It is noteworthy, however, that the AMF’s new General Regulation will not 
fundamentally change the existing takeover regime in France. This is because the 
AMF has recently published a draft General Regulation. The latter’s analysis
92 Note that references in this thesis are to the November 2002 edition of the CMF’s General 
Regulation. The rules applicable to tender offers are contained in Book V of the latter.
93 Note that, unless otherwise stated, references in this thesis are to this Regulation of the COB (JO 
of 27 April 2002).
94 Note that the French machinery regulating tender offers also includes Book IV of the Code of 
Commerce relating to competition; and the EC Merger Regulation No. 139/2004 of 1 May 2004.
95 A. Viandier, ‘Les Offres Publiques d’Achat en Droit Fran?ais des Marches Financiers’ in Les 
Prises de Participations: L ’Exemple des OP A, Colloque, Centre d’Etudes Juridiques Europ£ennes, 
Gendve (Payot Lausanne, 1990), p. 413.
96 Consultation Publique sur le Projet de Reglement General de I ’AMF, Communiqud de Presse, July 
30, 2004, available at AMF website.
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shows that the provisions relating to tender offers have not received any changes, 
save for minor changes which in no way affect the discussions that follow. 
Indeed, the draft General Regulation does not even propose changes to some 
provisions that this author was expecting the AMF to amend, with a view to 
clarifying them97, or to rendering them compatible with the Directive on takeover 
bids98. Although the draft General Regulation is currently subject to consultation, 
its provisions which regulate tender offers and which are relevant to this thesis 
have been reproduced in the Annex to this thesis, with a view to showing the new 
numbering of such provisions.
1.2 Takeover Regulatory Authorities
1.2.1 The UK
The regulation and policing of the conduct of takeovers and mergers in the UK 
fall under the remit of the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers99, which was created 
in 1968. The Panel forms part of the UK regulatory system of securities 
regulation100. However, unlike other constituent parts of that regulatory system, it 
is a self-regulating body in the sense that it connotes ‘a system whereby a group 
o f people, acting in concert, use their collective power to force themselves and 
others to comply with a code o f  conduct o f  their own devising'101. The Panel’s 
objective is to ensure equality of treatment and opportunity for all shareholders in 
the context of takeover bids. It should be noted, however, that the Panel is not
i  fyyconcerned with the merits of an offer . In the view of the Panel, these are 
matters for the company and its shareholders. The Panel is simply concerned with 
the quality of the information provided by the parties to a bid. Thus, unlike the
97 e. g. Rule 5-2-9 of the CMF’s General Regulation, which, as will be seen below, needs 
clarification.
98 e. g. Rule 5-5-2 of the CMF’s Regulation, which concerns the price of mandatory bids, or Rule 4 
of the COB’s Regulation No. 2002-04, which stipulates an obligation of notification for non-routine 
managerial actions.
99 Hereafter the Panel.
100 G. K. Morse, ‘The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers- Self Regulation or Self Protection?’ 
(1991) J. Bus. L. 509, p. 509.
101R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Ex parte Datafm [1987] 1 All ER 564, p. 567.
102 Code, Introduction, 1(a).
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French regulator which will be examined below, the Panel does not assess the 
price of offers falling within its scope.
The Panel consists of representatives from a number of financial organisations 
and professional associations in the City of London. Its members include 
individuals appointed by the Governor of the Bank of England, the Association of 
British Insurers, the Association of Investment Trusts Companies, the Association 
of Private Client Investment Managers and Stockbrokers, the British Bankers’ 
Association, the Confederation of British Industry103, the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales, the Investment Management Association, the 
London Investment Banking Association, and the NAPF 104 . The wide 
representation of interests on the Panel indicates that the Code represents the 
collective opinion of those professionally involved in the field of takeovers as to 
good business standards and as to how fairness to shareholders can be achieved105.
The general administration of the Panel is carried out by the Executive. The 
latter’s duties include the conduct of investigations and the monitoring of dealings 
in the context of takeovers106. As the courts put it, the Executive acts ‘as a sort o f  
fire brigade to extinguish quickly the flames o f  unacceptable and unfair 
practice’ 107. The Executive comprises a Director-General and a number of 
assistant directors who are usually seconded to the Panel by the banks, the law 
firms, or the accounting firms to which they belong. The mix of permanent staff 
and secondees is one of the great strengths of the Panel. For whilst the permanent 
staff provides the essential continuity, the secondees offer their practical 
experience of current practice and thinking108. The fact that there is a willingness 
on the part of various employers to release their high-quality members of staff to 
the Panel for a couple of years is an indication of the importance which is 
attached to the work of the Panel109.
103 Hereafter the CBI.
104 Code, Introduction, 2(a).
105 Code, Introduction, 1(a).
106 Code, Introduction, 2(b).
107 R v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Guinness pic [1990] 1 QB 146.
108 T. P. Lee (1993), supra n 67, p. 196.
109 D. Calcutt, ‘Company Law Lecture-The Work of the Takeover Panel’ (1990) 11 Co. Law. 203, p. 
204.
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Despite its self-regulatory nature, the Panel has a number of sanctions at its 
disposal to enforce its decisions. First and foremost, the Panel can resort to private 
reprimand and public censure. In particular the public censure acts as a powerful 
deterrent. For it can affect the profit and loss account of a company, and adversely 
affect the career of an individual110. Secondly, and more importantly, the Panel 
can avail itself from the sanctions available to some regulatory authorities. This is 
logical since, as will be seen in more detail below, the Panel is tied in, statutorily, 
with the work of other financial regulatory bodies, such as the Financial Services 
Authority111 or the London Stock Exchange112. The Panel may thus report the 
offender’s conduct to the regulatory authorities concerned with investment
i n
business so that the latter exercise their powers to impose disciplinary sanctions 
or, in appropriate cases, to take legal action114. It should be noted, however, that, 
although the sanctions are a useful stick to wield, the Panel works best through 
prevention115. This is done by encouraging parties to a takeover to consult the 
Panel in advance of taking any action.
It should be added that the rulings of both the Panel Executive and the full Panel 
are subject to appeal. Indeed, the rulings of the Executive may be appealed to the 
full Panel116. The full Panel meets, on average, about six times a year to hear 
appeals or references from the Executive. The procedure before it is informal and
117legal representation in the strict sense is not normally allowed . Furthermore, an 
appeal lies from the Panel to the Appeal Committee on disciplinary matters or on
liftmatters concerning the jurisdiction of the Panel . The Appeal Committee meets 
less than once a year on average. Furthermore, Panel rulings are subject to judicial 
challenge. However, despite the existence of an appeal procedure and of the 
possibility to challenge Panel rulings before the courts, the Panel’s rulings are 
usually complied with. The rationale behind this is two-fold: First, the 
government threatens to introduce legislation and to create a statutory body in the
110 T. P. Lee (1993), supra n 67, p. 194.
111 Hereafter the FSA.
112 D. Calcutt (1990), supra n 109, p. 206.
113 e. g. the DTI, the FSA, or the Bank of England.
114 Introduction, 3(d).
115 M. Blanden (1972), supra n 64, p. 213.
116 Code, Introduction, 3(c).
117 Code, Introduction, 3(e).
118 Code, Introduction, 3(f).
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field of takeovers, should the City fail to voluntarily comply with Panel rulings. 
Secondly, most companies receiving a ruling from the Panel are members of a 
body which is itself a member of the Panel. They, therefore, indirectly subscribe 
to the Panel and its rules, and so are unlikely to wish to challenge its decisions119. 
For otherwise they would be liable to be in trouble with their own authority120.
1.2.2 France
i) Duality of takeover authorities under the old system
Until recently, takeovers in France were governed by two bodies, namely the
COB and the CMF. The COB was the oldest institution of its kind in Europe. It
was set up in 1967121 as an independent administrative authority having public 
100law prerogatives . Its creation formed part of a series of State interventions in 
the economic field, which were intended to encourage long-term investment in 
securities and to facilitate the financing of companies123. Drafters of the COB’s 
founding Ordinance were inspired by the example of the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission. Their main focus was on improving the information 
provided to investors with a view to attracting investors to the stock exchange124. 
Indeed, the COB’s duty was to ensure the protection of investors, the adequacy of 
the information provided to the latter and the proper operation of the securities 
market125. Like all administrative authorities, the COB did not have legal 
personality. As a result, investors who were prejudiced by a decision of the COB 
had to bring an action against the State.
The COB was composed of nine members. Three of the members represented the
t
principal judicial institutions , one represented the Bank of France, one
119 T. P. Lee (1993), supra n 67, p. 194.
120 G. K. Morse, ‘Controlling Takeovers-The Self Regulation Option in the UK’ (1998) J. Bus .L. 58, 
p. 59.
Ordinance No. 67-833 of 28 September 1967, supplemented by Decree No. 68-23 and Decree 
No. 68-30 of 3 January 1968 relating to the administrative and financial organisation of the COB.
122 Constitutional Council, Dec. No. 89-260 DC, 28 July 1989, JO 1 August 1989, p. 9676.
123 N. Decoopman, La COB et le Droit des Societes (Economica, 1979), p. 17.
124 S. Loisy, Prix et Contrepartie dam les Offres Publiques, Thesis, Paris V (1998), pp. 6-7.
125 Ordinance of 1967, art. 1 (now repealed).
126 These are the Conseil d ’Etat, the Supreme Court, and the Cour des Comptes.
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represented the CMF, and three were designated by the Speaker of the Senate, the 
Speaker of the National Assembly and the chairman of the Economic and Social 
Council, for their financial and legal expertise as well as their experience in the 
field of public offering. In addition to the above members, a representative of the 
Ministry of Economy had to be heard before any decision was taken by the COB, 
save for individual decisions127. The rationale behind having a representative of 
the Ministry of Economy was to broaden the institutional composition of the COB
and to increase the weight of the executive power. The latter argument was seen,
1 ^ 0
however, as being in contradiction with the independent nature of the COB . 
Indeed, Vauplane, Germain and Bomet (2001) believed that the fact that the 
French market could not entirely free itself from the influence of the executive 
power constituted a paradox of the French market129.
The COB’s main power for our purposes resulted from its ability to approve or 
disapprove the information memorandum published in connection with a cash or a 
share exchange offer. Indeed, the offeror who would file an offer document with 
the CMF was further required to file an information memorandum130 with the 
COB. This memorandum, which was prepared by the sponsoring bank(s) on 
behalf of the offeror, was intended to inform the investors of the proposed 
transaction, the offeror’s organisation, its financial situation, and the evolution of 
its activity131. The approval of the memorandum by the COB meant that the 
essential elements shareholders needed to know in order to decide whether or not 
they would participate in the transaction were contained in the memorandum. As 
the courts put it, the COB’s approval was a substantial guarantee of the right of 
investors to honest and complete information132. The COB’s approval was not a 
seal of quality, however. In other words, the COB’s approval was not an approval 
of the merits of the offer. Nor was it an assessment of the situation of the offeror 
company or an authentication of the financial and accounting elements contained
127 e.g. where the COB decides to carry out an investigation; approves or withdraws its approval 
from a portfolio management company; issues an injunction; or imposes a pecuniary sanction.
128 N. Decoopman ‘La Commission des Operations de Bourse’, in Th. Bonneau, La Modernisation 
des Autorites Financieres (GLN Joly, 1996), p. 112.
129 H. Vauplane, M. Germain and J. P. Bomet, Droit des Marches Financiers (Litec: 2001), p. 122.
130 Referred to in France as the ‘note d’information’.
131 Code Mon&aire et Financier, art. L. 412-1.
132 CA Paris, 28 March 1988 (1988) Gaz. Pal., p. 308.
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in the memorandum. The COB’s control was a mere verification of the pertinence
1 ^and the coherence of the information disseminated to the investors .
In the event of non-conformity of the information embodied in the memorandum 
with the COB’s requirements, the COB could refuse its approval, which would in 
practice prevent the offer from taking place. Given the COB’s power to approve 
the information memorandum was a discretionary administrative act, offerors 
whose memorandum was disapproved could subsequently challenge the COB’s 
decision before the Paris Court of Appeal. However, without going that far, the 
COB could simply accompany its approval with a warning aimed at warning 
potential investors on the quality of the information disseminated by the offeror134. 
The warning was intended to draw the attention of investors to certain factual 
elements which were essential for an estimation of the risks likely to derive from 
the subscription or acquisition of shares by the investors during an offer, or to
1<1C
more specific elements concerning the structure of the companies concerned . In 
the event of an offer carried out without the COB’s approval, the COB could 
impose financial sanctions against the offeror, amounting to as much as ten 
million French Francs or, when profits had been realised, up to ten times their 
amount136. The COB could also apply to the courts for a suspension of the offer 
until the regularisation of the situation.
The CMF, on the other hand, was a professional market authority. It was 
entrusted with an administrative public service duty, namely to control the 
financial markets137. Unlike the COB, the CMF was a body subject to private law 
and had a legal personality. The CMF was composed of sixteen members, who 
were appointed by the Minister of the Economy. Of these sixteen members, 
fourteen were appointed after consultation of professional or union organisations.
133 CA Paris, 19 May 1998, No. 97/26141, Bucket c/Fermiere du Casino municipal de Cannes 
(1998) Bourse et Produits financiers 651, p. 651.
134 See e.g. the cash offer by Remy & Associes for die shares of Benedictine where the COB 
approved the information memorandum with a warning, on the grounds that the memorandum did 
not contain sufficient information about the situation and the evolution of the activity of the offeror 
company; see COB Report (1988), p. 80.
135 e.g. ongoing litigation.
136 The amount of financial sanctions imposed by the COB in 2001 was €269,662.49; see (2002) 2 
Bull. Joly, p. 176.
137 Bulletin COB, No. 260, July-August 1992, p. 6.
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The Minister was not bound, however, by the opinions put forward by the latter 
organisations. Of these fourteen members, six represented the brokers, one 
represented the commodities market, three represented the issuers, three 
represented the investors, and one represented the employees of both the 
brokerage firms and the market operator138. The governor of the Bank of France 
as well as a commissaire du gouvernement could also participate in the 
deliberations of the CMF. Because of the presence of a commissaire du 
gouvernement, as opposed to the representative of government within the COB, 
Vauplane, Germain and Bomet (2001) were of the opinion that, despite its self- 
regulatory nature, the CMF continued to be under the authority of the
139government .
The CMF’s task was to regulate, through the enactment of its General Regulation, 
the French securities market. Its main power for our purposes resulted from its 
ability to adjudicate upon the admissibility of offers. Indeed, all tender offers in 
France had to be filed with the CMF, which was responsible for controlling their 
terms and in particular their price. The CMF would do so on the basis of 
‘customary and objective criteria o f  evaluation and the characteristics o f  the 
offeree company,14°. Following its adjudication, the CMF would require the 
offeror to review either the proposed price or exchange value, or the threshold 
below which the offeror reserved the right to withdraw its offer, if there was 
any141. This power of the CMF served to ensure that minority shareholders 
received a fair price in an offer.
The duality of the securities regulators was increasingly criticised, however. As a 
result, the Law of 2003 has introduced a single regulator142.
138 The market operator is a commercial company which ensures the functioning and development of 
the markets. The market operator in France is Euronext-Paris SA. The latter was bom in September 
2000 out of a full merger between the stock exchanges of Paris, Amsterdam and Brussels, and 
represents some 1,900 listed companies with a total market capitalisation of around €2,700 billion; 
see L. Bloch and E. Kremp, ‘Ownership and Voting Power in France’ in F. Barca and M. Becht 
(eds), The Control o f Corporate Europe (OUP, 2001), p. 124.
139 H. Vauplane, M. Germain and J-P. Bomet (2001), supra n 129, p. 197.
140 CMF regs, r.5-1-9.
141 CMF regs, r.5-1-9.
142 Note, however, that legal scholars have been promoting the creation of a single authority since 
1990; see e. g. A. Viandier (1990), supra n 95, p. 415.
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AMF: a single financial regulator
The French financial institutional framework underwent a drastic change in 2003. 
The Law of 2003 on Financial Security has actually merged the two prudential 
institutions -  the COB and the CMF -  and the Supervisory Committee for Asset 
Managers to create a single market authority143, namely the AMF. The regulatory 
overhaul has been likened to the reform in the UK that resulted in the creation of 
the Financial Services Authority in 1997144. However, unlike the UK, France has 
not merged its banking and insurance regulators145 into the AMF.
The rationale underlying the merger was three-fold: First, it was believed that the 
creation of a single authority would increase the competitiveness of the Paris 
financial market place 146 by improving the clarity and efficiency of its 
institutional organisation. Indeed, with the creation of the AMF, professionals and 
investors would have one single port of call. The initiator of a takeover bid would 
need to make one single filing instead of two147. This would not only avoid the 
overlapping of the regulatory responsibilities of the previous institutions148, but 
also remedy the uncertainty created under the previous regime for French 
securities markets participants 149 . Indeed, due to some overlapping 
responsibilities, there was room for conflicting decisions by the two authorities. 
This could in turn result in the creation of two parallel securities laws. The
143 Note that the previous authorities, and in particular the CMF, were against the proposed merger, 
on the grounds that the previous framework was working effectively and that there was no necessity 
for reforming the dual system; see ‘L’Organisation de la Commission des Offres Publiques me 
Laisse Perplexe’, Les Echos, February 7, 2001.
144 ‘New French Regulator Starts Work’, eFinancialNews.com, November 23, 2003, available at 
Lexis-Nexis Executive
145 Respectively the Comite des Etablissements de Credit et des Entreprises d ’Investissement 
(hereafter the CECEI) and the Commission de Controle des Assurances.
146 P. Marini, ‘La Loi du 15 Mai sur les NRE: Un Texte qui Reste k Parfaire’ (2001) 198 Petites 
Affiches 4, p. 6.
147 ‘Spain/France: French Toast’, The Lawyer, February 9,2003, available at Lexis-Nexis Executive.
148 Note that this was seen by Conac as beneficial, on the grounds that it resulted in a competition 
between the two authorities and that it made it possible for one authority to correct the other’s 
mistakes. He had therefore suggested that the dual system should be preserved but that the CMF 
should be placed under the authority of the COB; see P. H. Conac, ‘La Fusion de la COB et du 
CMF’, in Droit Bancaire et Financier, Melanges AEDBF-France, t. Ill (Paris: Banque 6diteur,
2001), p. 68.
149 D. A. Katz, J. R. Cammaker and P. Gachot, ‘Creation of a Stronger French Securities Market 
Regulator’ (2004), p. 1, available at http://www.realcorporatelawyer.com/pdfs/wlrk010603.pdf
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potential for conflict was further exacerbated by the fact that the legislator had not 
created a hierarchy between the two authorities150.
Secondly, it was believed that the merger would render the French system more 
akin to other countries’ systems151. Indeed, many European countries have set up 
a single authority, including the UK which has inspired the French merger 
proposal152. Indeed, as will be seen below, the UK has set up a single regulator in 
1997, which has been entrusted the duties of the self regulating professional 
authorities153. The UK has preserved the Takeover Panel, however, which is the 
professional authority in the field of takeovers and mergers. It should be noted in 
this respect that the creation of a single authority for financial markets further 
contributes to the convergence of regulatory and supervisory structures, identified 
by the Committee of Wise Men154 as a key condition for the success of the 
Lamfalussy approach155 to integrated EU financial markets156.
Thirdly, in conceptual terms, the merger of the COB and the CMF brought an end 
to the legal distinction, which has become artificial over the years, between an 
administrative and a professional form of regulation. Indeed, even prior to the 
creation of the AMF, professionals on the Paris financial market sat on the board 
of the COB. Furthermore, the latter would always carry out broad professional 
consultations before proposing rules for homologation by the Minister of the 
Economy157.
150 M. Charbonnier and H. Vauplane, ‘Le Controle des Entreprises Cotdes, Hors Offres Publiques, 
en Droit Fran?ais’ (1998) 124 Petites Affiches 3, p. 3.
151 L. Bloch and E. Kremp (2001), supra n 138, p. 124.
152 Indeed, Briault notes that there has been a reconsideration of regulatory structures in other 
countries, as a result of the creation of the FSA in die UK; see C. Briault, The Rationale for a Single 
National Financial Regulator, FSA Occasional Paper No. 2 (London, FSMA, 1999), p. 11.
153 Note that the regulation in the UK underwent a fundamental change in 2000, as a result of which 
the previous two-tier regulatory regime for investment business established under the Financial 
Services Act 1986 has been replaced with an integrated regime and a single regulator being the FSA.
154 Final Report o f the Committee o f Wise Men on the Regulation o f European Securities Markets 
(Lamfalussy Reportj, 15 February 2001, p. 38, available at europa website.
155 This approach consists of establishing a new 4-level regulatory approach, with a view to 
changing the current regulatory framework which is considered to be too slow, too rigid, and ill- 
adapted to the pace of global financial market change.
156 Opinion of the ECB of 18 December 2002 on a draft law on financial security (CON/2002/32), p. 
4. Lomnicka notes, however, that there are some dangers associated with a single regulator, deriving 
from its enormous size, its wide scope and its monopoly position; see E. Lomnicka, ‘Reforming UK 
Financial Services Regulation: The Creation of a Single Regulator’ (1999) J. Bus. L. 480, p. 488.
157 ‘Spain/France: French Toast’, supra n 147.
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Pursuant to the Law of 2003, the AMF is an independent administrative authority.
The rationale behind the conferral of a ‘public authority’ status on the AMF is
that the AMF has policing powers that it exercises on behalf of the State. In
addition, all its members are appointed by other public authorities. Despite the
latter, the AMF is not a traditional public authority. This is because, unlike
France’s other independent administrative authorities, the AMF has a legal
personality. It can therefore bring a civil action before the courts through the
intermediary of its chairman. It can also raise taxes directly, and recruit
1professionals using contracts that are subject to private law . Conversely, an 
injured third party will be able to act directly against it before the courts, and not 
against the State, as was previously the case with the COB.
The AMF’s ambit is to safeguard savings invested in financial products, to ensure 
that investors receive material information, and to maintain orderly markets in 
financial instruments159. It sets rules for and monitors transactions involving the 
securities of listed companies, such as initial public offerings160, capital increases, 
mergers. It also monitors companies to ensure that they provide relevant 
information on a timely basis and in an equitable manner to all market 
participants. The AMF further authorises the formation of collective investment 
schemes, such as SICAVs and FCPs161, establishes the principles of organisation 
and operation for market undertakings and clearing and settlement systems, and 
lays down and enforces the stock market conduct of business rules which are 
imposed on persons authorised to provide investment services or advice on 
financial investments. More importantly for our purposes, the AMF ensures that 
takeovers are conducted in an orderly fashion. To this end, it regulates and 
approves tender offers. Indeed, the Regulations require all offer documents to be 
filed with the AMF. The latter will approve them only if the terms of the offer are 
in line with the AMF’s regulations. The foregoing indicates that the AMF 
combines the previous competences of the COB, the CMF and the CDGF.
158 Law of 2003, art. 7.
159 Code mon^taire et financier, art. L. 621-1.
160 Hereafter the IPOs.
161 The SICAVs are open-ended investment companies and the FCPs (Fonds Commun de Placement)
are unincorporated investment funds. The latter constitute the French UCITS and are referred to in
France as the OPCVM (i. e. organismes de placement collectif en valeurs mobilises).
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To carry out the above duties, the AMF is composed of two separate collegial 
bodies, namely the Board and the Disciplinary Commission . The rationale 
behind the creation of two separate bodies is to segregate the prosecutorial and 
disciplinary functions of the AMF. This idea arose out of criticism previously 
directed towards the COB. Indeed, the COB's authority was seriously undermined 
by a ruling of the Paris Court of Appeal163 that invalidated a financial sanction 
that the COB had imposed on some market participants. In this case, the Court of 
Appeal held that the procedure followed by the COB ran counter the ‘right to a 
fair trial’, which is stated in the ECHR164. In the words of the Court, "the 
procedure o f  the COB whereby the COB indicts, formulates the grievances, 
decides upon the culpability o f  a person and finally sanctions, could not be 
regarded as objectively impartial,165.
The Board adopts the General Regulations and takes individual decisions. It is 
composed of sixteen members. These are the chairman appointed by the President 
of the Republic; three high-ranking judges; a representative of the governor of the 
Bank of France; the chairman of the National Accounting Council; three qualified 
persons appointed for their financial and legal expertise as well as their 
experience in the field of public offering; six qualified persons appointed 
following consultation with organisations representing issuers, intermediaries, 
investors, and market undertakings, for their financial and legal expertise as well 
as their experience in the field of public offering; and a representative of 
employee-shareholders designated by the Minister of the Economy following 
consultations with labour unions and employee associations166. The composition 
of the Board thus ensures an appropriate balance between representatives of 
public authorities on the one hand, and representatives of the market and 
employee-shareholders on the other.
162 Code mon&aire et financier, art. L. 621-2.
163 e.g. CA Paris, 7 March 2000, Ste KPMG Fiduciare de France (2000) JCP 6d. E, p. 538.
164 art. 6.
165 R. Salomon, ‘La R6forme de la Procedure de Sanction de la COB par les D6crets du ler Aofit 
2000’ (2000) 5 RD bancaire 312, p. 313.
166 Code mondtaire et financier, art. L. 621-2.
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To enforce its decisions, the Board may issue administrative injunctions. Indeed, 
the Board may order that practices contrary to the legislative or regulatory 
provisions be brought to an end when they create a distortion of the market, 
provide unfair advantages to the persons involved, prejudice the equal treatment 
of investors, or provide advantages to issuers and investors as a result of breaches 
by intermediaries of their professional obligations . In case the person 
concerned does not comply with such injunction, the Board may refer the case to 
the Disciplinary Commission. On the other hand, the chairman of the AMF may 
request the presiding magistrate of the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Paris to 
put an end to an irregularity which has been observed, or to eliminate its effects, 
when such irregularity is likely to affect the rights of investors168. This judicial 
injunction is immediately enforceable and may be accompanied by a penalty to 
induce the person concerned to comply with the order169. Moreover, the chairman 
of the AMF may request the presiding magistrate of the same Tribunal to give an 
order taking temporary possession of funds, valuables, securities or rights 
belonging to persons believed by the chairman to be guilty of wrongdoing. It 
should be added that, in return for this strong delegation of power from the State, 
a representative of the government, appointed by the Minister of the Economy, 
sits on the Board of the AMF. This representative has no power to vote. He can 
request a second deliberation, however, save for the matters concerning the 
sanctions170. The presence of this representative, coupled with the fact that the 
General Regulation of the AMF is subject to the Minister of the Economy’s 
approval171, indicates that the State has influence on the action of the AMF.
It should be noted that, despite the Board’s authority to investigate172 and to 
decide whether to refer a case to the Disciplinary Commission, the latter has sole 
power to conduct the proceeding and to decide what sanctions to impose, if any. 
The Commission is composed of twelve members, none of whom is also a 
member of the Board173. Applicable sanctions are warning, reprimand, temporary
167 Code mon^taire et financier, art. L. 621-14.
168 Code mon6taire et financier, art. L. 621-14.
169 Code mon6taire et financier, art. L. 621-14.
170 Code mon&aire et financier, art. L. 621-3.
171 Code mon6taire et financier, art. L. 621-6.
172 To this end, the Board may conduct on-site and documentary inspections.
173 Code mon6taire et financier, art. L. 621-2.
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or permanent prohibition on carrying out all or part of the authorised services. 
The Commission may further order, either in lieu o f  or in addition to the above 
sanctions, fines up to €1.5 million or ten times the amount of realised profits174. In 
any event, the sanction depends on the level of the infringement committed and is 
proportionate to the advantages or profits derived from the infringement. All 
disciplinary decisions can be challenged before the Paris Court of Appeal175.
1.3 Relationship of the Takeover Regulatory Authorities with
Other Authorities
In both the UK and France, the takeover regulatory authorities collaborate with 
other authorities. It should be noted from the outset, however, that the following 
is not an exhaustive review of all such authorities but only of those authorities 
which often are, or may become, involved in the takeover process.
1.3.1 The UK
The Panel’s status is reinforced through its collaboration with such authorities as 
the Financial Services Authority176, the antitrust authorities, the London Stock 
Exchange, and the courts.
i) FSA: the single financial services regulator
The FSA is an independent body which regulates financial services. Its objectives 
include the maintenance of market confidence, the promotion of public 
understanding of the financial system, the protection of consumers, and the fight 
against financial crime. The FSA has formally endorsed the Code as a relevant 
instrument of self-regulation177. This means that the FSA may, at the request of 
the Panel, take enforcement action against those who fail to comply with the Code 
or a Panel ruling. Such action by the FSA include public censure, the imposition
174 Code mondtaire et financier, art. L. 621-15.
175 Note, however, that appeals against decisions involving sanctions against professional entities 
must be made to the Conseil d'Etat.
176 Hereafter the FSA.
177FSMA 2000, s. 143.
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1 *751of fines, the refusal or suspension of listing of the securities of an issuer , the 
removal of authorisation, the imposition of injunctions, and of restitution orders179. 
More importantly, the FSA prohibits City financial institutions180 from providing 
services in connection with a takeover undertaken by a person whom they have 
reason to believe would not comply with the UK practice and standards in
101
takeovers . The latter provision serves to put pressure on the offeror and offeree 
companies and their directors to comply with the provisions of the Code, by 
depriving them of advisers if they propose to act in breach of the Code182.
ii) Antitrust authorities
Pursuant to the Code, an offer will lapse upon reference to the UK Competition 
Commission183. Such reference occurs where the Office of Fair Trading believes 
that a relevant merger situation184 has been created185, or that arrangements are in 
progress or in contemplation which, if carried into effect, will result in the 
creation of a relevant merger situation , and the creation of that situation has 
resulted, or may be expected to result, in a substantial lessening of competition 
within any market or markets in the UK for goods or services.
iii) London Stock Exchange pic
The London Stock Exchange is the principal stock exchange for the UK. It is a 
public limited company, which is responsible for both the Official List187 and the
178 FSMA 2000, s.75 and 77. The power of the FSA to refuse the listing application of an issuer 
constitutes a strong sanction, in particular where the offeror offers securities as consideration of its 
offer and wishes such securities to be listed.
179 Code, Introduction, 1(c).
180 e. g. the merchant banks and their corporate finance subsidiaries, institutional investors, or 
members of the Stock Exchange.
181 FSA, Code of Market Conduct, s.4-3-1.
182 P. L. Davies, Gower’s Principles o f Modern Company Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 7th ed., 
2003), p. 709.
183 Code, r.l2(l)(a).
184 For the definition of this concept, see the Enterprise Act, art. 23.
185 The Enterprise Act 2002, art. 22(1).
186 The Enterprise Act 2002, art. 33(1).
187 The Main Market has more than 2000 companies, including more than 400 international issuers 
from 60 countries.
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Alternative Investment Market188. The London Stock Exchange itself is listed on 
the Official List since July 2001. Since most takeovers take place between 
companies whose shares are listed on the Stock Exchange, a major element in the 
enforcement of the Code is the sanctions which the Stock Exchange possesses
1 fiOover listed companies . It should further be noted that, in particular where the 
offeror offers securities as consideration of its offer and if such securities are to be 
listed, then the offeror must make a separate application to the London Stock 
Exchange for trading, in addition to drawing a prospectus or listing particulars, 
which are subject to approval by the UKLA.
iv) Courts
Decisions of the Panel are subject to review by the courts. This is because,
although the Panel is not a government administration, it does fulfil functions of a
public, regulatory character190. Indeed, in Data/in, the court held that, although
the Panel is a self-regulatory body without any direct statutory base, ‘it is
supported and sustained by a periphery o f  statutory powers and penalties'191. It
should be noted, however, that, since the Code has generally been regarded as
providing the appropriate means of resolving takeovers within a set timetable and
with a degree of flexibility, its operation has tended to discourage participants
100from resorting to litigation . The Panel’s standing has been reinforced by the 
UK courts’ decision not to interfere with Panel rulings during the course of a bid. 
Indeed, in Datafin, the court held
'In the light o f the special adventure o f the Panel, its functions, the market in which it is 
operating, the time scales which are inherent in that market and the need to safeguard the 
position o f third parties, [...] all o f whom are entitled to continue to trade upon the assumption 
o f the validity o f the Panel's rules and decisions, unless and until they are quashed by the court, 
[...] the relationship between the Panel and the court is historic rather than 
contemporaneous’ 19\
188 Hereafter the AIM. The latter has been created in June 1995 and is a market for smaller, growing 
companies. The AIM has more than 700 companies, including 50 overseas issuers.
189 R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Ex parte Datafin, supra n 101, p. 586.
190 R. R. Pennington (1996), supra n 73, p. 306.
191 R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Ex parte Datafin, supra n 101, p. 574.
192 M&A Litigation -  Findings o f a Survey About Litigation Trends in M&A Activity in the UK and 
Continental Europe (2002), p. 2, available at http://www. herbertsmith.com/uploads/HSpdfs/ 
LitigationSurvey.pdf.
193 R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Ex parte Datafin, supra n 101, p. 579.
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Thus, UK courts intervene, if at all, in retrospect by declaratory orders which 
would enable the Panel not to repeat any error and would relieve individuals of 
the disciplinary consequences of any erroneous finding of breach of the rules. The 
courts will intervene, however, where the Panel has made an error of law, or has 
failed to give persons accused of breaching the Code a fair hearing, or if its 
decision is one which no reasonably and appropriately experienced person could 
have reached194.
The foregoing indicates that, whilst it is theoretically possible for the courts to 
review Panel rulings, there is virtually no litigation in the UK in the context of 
takeovers. Two caveats must be made in this regard, however. First, it should be 
noted that the new UK market abuse regime, which has been introduced in 2001, 
might increase the scope for litigation during bids195. This would be unfortunate, 
for takeovers remain an area where the advantages of self-regulation, particularly 
the absence of opportunities to use litigation for tactical reasons during the course 
of a bid, are still valued196. It should be noted, however, that the FSA will not 
exercise its powers under the market abuse regime during a takeover bid, save for 
exceptional circumstances, provided the Panel itself takes adequate action to deal 
with the misconduct in question. Furthermore, the FSA’s Code of Market 
Conduct expressly provides specific examples of conduct permitted by the Code, 
with a view to providing a legal safe harbour for such conduct197. The FSA will 
also keep itself informed about the way the Panel interprets the Code, which is 
likely to minimise the scope for differences of view between the two regulators in 
relation to a particular conduct. Secondly, it should be noted that, although there 
has traditionally been a less appetite for litigation in the context of takeovers in 
the UK, a survey by the law firm Herbert Smith suggests that there is an 
increasingly litigious attitude being adopted in the UK198. Over two-thirds of their
194 R. R. Pennington (1996), supra n 73, p. 306.
195 Public Takeovers in the UK (2003), p. 2, available at http://www.freshfieldsbruckhausderinger. 
com/ practice/corporate/publications/ pdfs/6563, pdf.
196 E. Ferran and C. A. E. Goodhart (2001), supra n 69, p. 8.
197 These safe harbours apply in relation to behaviour likely to give rise to a false or misleading 
impression, and behaviour which would, or would be likely to, give rise to distortion, but not in 
relation to behaviour based on the misuse of information; see FSA, Code of Conduct 2004, s. 1-7-5.
198 Ibid, p. 2.
37
sample199 said they were likely to consider invoking litigation or threat of 
litigation in a takeover situation in the next three to five years, though the great 
majority believed that merger and acquisition litigation as a feature of public 
transactions would remain less common than in the US200.
1.3.2 France
The following is an overview of the French authorities which are likely become 
involved in a takeover.
i) Minister of the Economy
The State has lost its power to directly control the market, following the decision 
of the legislator to entrust the professionals a large part of the organisation and 
functioning of the markets201. However, the State still plays an important role in 
the supervision of financial markets through the Minister of the Economy. 
Though the latter has, since 1986, no right to oppose a takeover bid which has 
been approved by the AMF, the Minister still has power to approve the General 
Regulation of the AMF202, and to designate a representative to attend the 
meetings of the Board of the AMF203. Moreover, the Minister ensures that 
takeover bids are compatible with the anti-trust regulations204. He does so by 
initiating review and approval proceedings upon notification by the parties205. It 
should be noted in this respect that the French competition law underwent a 
drastic change in 2001. Indeed, the Law of 2001 brought French law into line 
with the law of most MS, by establishing a mandatory notification procedure
199 Their sample was 100 people who have major responsibility in the conduct of M&A deals in their 
respective companies. 86 companies came from the FTSE 250, including 46 from the FTSE 100.
200 M&A Litigation (2002), supra n 192, p. 7.
201 This occurred following the introduction of Law No. 88-70 of 22 January 1988.
202 Code Mon6taire et Financier, art. L. 622-7.
203 This representative has the right to provoke a second deliberation within four days following the 
deliberation of the Board.
204 Note that the reason for not examining the French antitrust authorities separately is 
because, as will be seen below, until recently, the French regulation did not permit the offeror 
to condition its offer to the receipt of satisfactory approvals by the competition authorities.
205 Code of Commerce, art. L. 430-5(3).
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by establishing a mandatory notification procedure where a transaction creates a 
concentration exceeding the turnover threshold stated in the 2001 Law206.
ii) Bank of France
The Bank of France also plays an important role in the French financial
707landscape . Indeed, a representative of the Bank is designated by the governor to 
sit on the Board of the AMF. In addition, the General Regulation of the AMF 
must be submitted to the Governor of the Bank of France for his/her opinion. 
More importantly for our purposes, a person who intends to take over a credit 
institution in France must inform the governor of the Bank of France eight days 
before the filing or the public announcement of his/her offer, whichever is
708sooner . This requirement has been criticised as re-introducing the State’s 
intervention into the French securities law. For instance, Marini (2001) argues 
that this requirement not only harms the competitiveness of France, but also 
jeopardises the confidentiality of such offers due to the time lag between the date 
when the governor is informed and the date when the offer is filed209.
iii) Euronext-Paris SA
As seen above, Euronext is the market undertaking in France. It is in charge of 
suspending trading of the offeree’s shares, and if appropriate, of the offeror’s 
shares, upon request of the AMF, following the publication by the latter of the 
notice specifying the main terms of the offer. Euronext is further in charge of 
delivering the tendered shares, which were delivered to it by the offeree 
shareholders’ market intermediaries, to a custodian selected by the offeror. At the 
same time, Euronext is responsible for transferring the offer price to the offeror’s 
market intermediary, which subsequently transfers it to the sellers’ market 
intermediaries. It should further be noted that, like the FSA, Euronext has a
206 Code of Commerce, art. L. 430-3. Note that, prior to this reform, the French antitrust regime was 
based on a procedure of voluntary notification.
207 H. Vauplane, M. Germain and J-P. Bomet (2001), supra n 129, p. 230.
208 Code Mon&aire et Financier, art. L. 511-10.
209 P. Marini, (2001), supra n 146, p. 5.
39
number of sanctions at its disposal to force listed companies to comply with its 
rules. These include the suspension of all or some of a member’s trading rights.
iv) Courts
Parties to an offer can challenge the individual decisions of the AMF relating to 
takeovers before the Paris Court of Appeal. Litigation is an increasingly common 
feature of hostile takeovers in France . Indeed, a number of significant 
acquisitions recently carried out in France have all resulted in litigation. This has 
for instance been the case for BNP Paribas/Societe Gdnerale, and 
Kingfisher/Castorama. According to a survey by the law firm Herbert Smith, 
litigation is the most frequent means of defence in France against takeover bids211. 
The rationale underlying the latter is that the French legal approach is mainly 
comprised of general rules. This in turn leaves the Paris Court of Appeal with a 
significant role to play in the context of takeovers. As a result of the participation 
of the courts in the regulation of the market through their rulings212, Bdzard 
(1999) argues that the securities regulation cannot be understood without taking 
the judicial decisions into account .
Such challenges do not suspend the decision of the AMF, however, though the 
presiding magistrate of the Paris Court of Appeal may order a stay of execution 
where the decision is likely to have manifestly excessive consequences214. He will 
do so, for instance, where the immediate enforcement of the AMF’s
01 5administrative sanction would prejudice the activities of the company . The 
Court of Appeal may further reform or quash the decision of the AMF approving 
the offer document. It should be noted, however, that the Paris Court of Appeal
210 The reason for this increase partly lies in the rise in recent years of the number of special 
shareholder groups created by the minority shareholders of listed companies, referred to as the 
‘associations’.
211 M&A Litigation (2002), supra n 192, pp. 17-18.
212 G. Canivet, ‘Le Juge et l’Autorit6 de March6’ (1992) Rev. JP comm. 185, p. 198.
213 P. Bdzard, ‘Actualitds du Droit Boursier et des Marches Financiers’ (1999) 76 RD bancaire 203, 
p. 204.
14 Code Mondtaire et Financier, art. L. 621-30
215 Prem. Pres. Paris, ord. 19 June 1991, RG:COB SAE 1/2001, Caisse Centrale de Credit 
Cooperatif (2001) 6 RD bancaire, p. 362.
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has rarely obliged a bidder to revise the terms of its offer216. Likewise, it is very 
rare for the Paris Court of Appeal to quash an admissibility decision of the AMF. 
The Court only did so in the OCP217 and the Schneider/Legrand cases218. In the 
former case, the Court did so on the grounds that the irrevocable covenants 
impeded the principle of fair competition embodied in the then COB Regulation 
No. 89-03. In the latter case, the Court quashed the admissibility decision of the 
AMF with respect to the offer of Schneider for the shares of Legrand, on the 
grounds that the AMF did not sufficiently control the method deployed by the 
offeror to determine the exchange rate. Following these decisions, the Court of 
Appeal rather restricted itself to the control of the grounds upon which the AMF
i odelivers its decision, though such control is exercised vigorously .
The foregoing indicates that there is a close collaboration both in the UK and 
France between the market regulators, in spite of the fact that each of the latter 
maintains its separate identity, autonomous views and reactions .
Conclusion
As the foregoing indicates, both countries present a number of features which are 
unique to them: First, whereas the AMF is statutory, the Panel is non-statutory. 
Some in the UK have advocated that the existing framework should be replaced 
by a statutory regulation, whereby the FSA would also regulate takeovers. Such a 
system would be similar to that in France and in the US, whereby the AMF and 
the SEC respectively regulate all aspects of securities laws including takeovers. In 
particular, pressure from Europe, which relies more heavily on formal, statutory 
regulation, has been of considerable importance in promoting changes to UK’s 
self-regulation221.
216 Public Takeovers in France (2003), available at http://www.freshfields.com/practice/corporate/ 
publications/pdfs/publictakeovers/france2003.pdf, p. 2.
17 CA Paris, 27 April 1993, Mutuelle du Mans Assurance-Vie et autres c/Ste OCP (1994) JCP 6d. E, 
p. 457.
CA Paris, Ire ch., section H, 3 May 2001, ADAM et autres c/ SA Schneider Electric SA et SA 
Legrand (2001) JCP 6d. E., No. 25, pp. 1046-1050.
219 Ibid.
220 Bulletin COB, No. 260, July-August 1992, pp. 8-9.
221 R. Baggott, ‘Regulatory Reform in Britain: The Changing Face of Self-Regulation’ (1989) 67 
Pub. Admin. 435, p. 448.
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It should be noted, however, that, as seen above, some statutory elements have 
already been included in the UK’s takeover regime. Indeed, the UK is no longer a 
‘haven for self-regulation’, as Baggott (1989) once suggested 222. This is 
evidenced by the fact that, although it retains its freedom to set and interpret its 
own rules, the Panel is tied in with the FSA on the sanctions front. It is therefore 
suggested that there is no real difference of nature between the Panel and the 
AMF on the sanctions front. However, this does not exclude the fact that the 
Panel still benefits from the advantages of self-regulation, such as the ability to 
respond quickly to changing circumstances. It is believed that, as long as the 
Panel succeeds in operating as it did to date, the likelihood for government 
intervention to bring an entirely statutory regime is unlikely in the UK.
Secondly, the AMF has considerable power, especially regarding price, in the 
context of takeover bids. Indeed, as seen above, the AMF has power to approve 
the price of offers in a substantive sense. If the AMF thinks the price is 
inadequate, it will likely refuse to approve the offer document, in which case the 
offeror will have to change the terms of its offer, if it wishes its offer to proceed. 
Thus, the market in France is not free from government interference. In contrast, 
the Panel has no authority whatsoever to approve the price of offers. The offer 
price in the UK is set by the offeror and its acceptance or rejection is left 
exclusively to the decision of offeree shareholders.
It should be noted in this respect that there is a debate amongst French legal 
scholars over the legitimacy of the AMF’s power to control the price. Indeed, Baj 
(2001) criticises the AMF’s role in the determination of the offer price, on the 
grounds that, since a public offer is a market operation, its price should be 
determined by the confrontation of buyers and sellers. In his view, an offer should 
fail if and only if its price is inadequate, rather than as a result of a decision by the 
AMF or the courts223. His view is shared by Viandier (1999) who argues that one 
of the raisons d ’etre of takeovers is to acquire control of a company at a price
222 Ibid, p. 438.
223 C. Baj, ‘Offre Publique de Schneider sur Legrand: Reflexions sur l’Annulation de la Recevabilit6 
de l’Offre par les Arrets COB and CMF du 3 Mai 2001’ (2001) RD bancaire et bourse 183, p. 187.
42
lower than its real value224. He therefore suggests that the offeror should be free 
to determine the offer price and the AMF or the courts should not interfere with 
its determination. As a response to the latter criticisms, Daigre (2002) argues, 
however, that the determination of the offer price cannot be left to the arbiter of 
the offeror, as this would harm the interests of the investors as well as the interest 
of the market, which in his view is a form of national interest and hence ‘d ’ordre 
public’ . He therefore concludes that the offer price must be controlled in
accordance with objective criteria, with a view to assessing whether it
0 0  f%corresponds to the real value of the shares . Likewise, Martel (2001) supports 
the interposition of the AMF between the offeror and the market to declare the 
admissibility of an offer. He argues that the admissibility decision by the AMF is 
vital for the sound operation of the market, as factors other than price are also 
taken into account in the admissibility process, such as the nature of the shares, 
the objectives and the agreements relating to the offer. He further argues that, in 
the absence of an admissibility decision by the AMF, offerors in France would
resort to courts to launch offers, in which case it would be very difficult to control
0 0 0their length or their outcome .
It is suggested that the discretion of the AMF should be seen as a substitute for 
the absence of a number of minority protection rules under the French takeover 
regime. Indeed, as will be seen in the chapter on the principle of equality of 
shareholders and the protection of the minority under the French takeover regime, 
there is no rule in France which requires the offer price to be no less favourable 
than the highest price paid by the offeror for the acquisition of shares in the 
offeree company within the three-month period prior to the commencement of the
OORoffer period . Likewise, there is no highest price requirement in France m the 
context of mandatory bids229. The intervention of the AMF is therefore believed 
to be necessary in the latter instances, in order to ensure equality of shareholders.
224 A. Viandier, OP A,OPE et Autres Offres Publiques (Francis Lefevbre, 1999), p. 154.
225 J-J. Daigre, ‘Droit Boursier et des Marches Financiers’ (2002) 12 JCP 6d. E 518, pp. 518-519.
226 J-J. Daigre, ‘Le Prix des Offres Publiques’ (2002) 2 RD bancaire et bourse 55, p. 55.
227 J. P. Martel, La Protection des Investisseurs dans le Cadre des Offres Publiques (2001), p. 3 
available at http://www.amf-france.org/styles/ default/documents/general/3932_l.pdf.
228 Code, r.6(l).
229 For mandatory bids, see below.
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In contrast, the UK takeover regime contains the above minority protection rules 
and therefore does not need the Panel’s ‘tutelle’.
Third, as far as judicial challenges are concerned, there have been major efforts 
not to allow this in UK, at least in the course of a bid. Such efforts have been 
successful, since parties to a takeover usually do comply with the Panel’s rulings. 
In contrast, courts play a greater role in France and this seems to cause no 
problems with the regulation of bids. Several reasons may lie behind the latter: 
First, unlike the Panel, the AMF is a regulatory body which is more representative 
of the Government than the marketplace. This is because a significant part of the 
AMF’s members are appointed by the Government. As a result, unlike in the UK, 
companies may feel more at ease to challenge the AMF’s decisions, as doing so 
would not make them liable in trouble with their own authority. Secondly, 
commercial litigation between merchants in France is held before a Tribunal of 
Commerce, which is a court specialised in commercial litigation. Although the 
magistrates of the Tribunal of Commerce are lay judges, they generally have good 
training in their respective fields. In smaller cities, these lay judges may not have 
significant legal training, but are well-known business people in the local 
community . This indicates that litigants trust these magistrates’ ability to try 
their case. This contrasts the way courts are viewed in the UK. Indeed, according 
to a survey by Herbert Smith, nearly a quarter of the respondents have responded 
that UK judges and courts are not very well equipped to deal with litigation in 
mergers and acquisitions cases231.
230 J. W. Polier, ‘French-American Commercial Litigation’ (2004), p. 1, available at 
http://www.paris-law.com/articles/Fench_comercial_litigation-en.htm
231 M&A Litigation (2002), supra n 192, p. 11.
Chapter 2 The Ownership Structure of Listed Companies and 
the Market for Corporate Control in the UK and 
France 
Introduction
The ownership structure of listed companies in a given jurisdiction plays an 
important role in devising the rules governing takeovers in that jurisdiction. By 
way of example, if a jurisdiction has a concentrated share ownership structure, the 
takeover rules therein will place more emphasis in solving the conflicts of 
interests between the controlling shareholders and their minority counterparts. 
Conversely, if a jurisdiction displays a dispersed share ownership structure, then 
the takeover rules therein will tend to focus more on the relationship between the 
offeror and the offeree management. On the other hand, the market for corporate 
control will be more developed in a country with a dispersed ownership structure 
and with a stock market containing a large number of listed companies than in a 
country with a concentrated ownership structure and a with a stock market 
containing a few number of listed companies. It is therefore believed that 
identifying the state of the capital markets and the ownership structure of listed 
companies in the UK and France is vital to comprehend the topics which are dealt 
with in the following chapters.
This chapter provides an overview of the main features of the capital markets and 
the ownership structure of listed companies in the UK and France, in terms of 
both the degree of concentration of share ownership and the identity of 
shareholders. This chapter also provides an insight into how the market for 
corporate control operates in these two jurisdictions. Section I examines the above 
issues in relation to the UK and Section II examines them in relation to France.
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2.1 The UK
2.1.1 UK Capital Markets and Level of Concentration of Share 
Ownership
The UK market presents a number of features which are substantially different 
than the French market: First, the UK market is characterised by a large number 
of listed companies. Indeed, as of 2002, there were 1701 domestic companies 
listed in the UK. With the inclusion of foreign listed companies, the total number 
amounted to 2120232. The total capitalisation of domestic companies constitutes 
184 per cent of GDP. In addition, the number of new listings is higher in the UK 
than in France. Indeed, only in 2002, 59 new companies were listed on the UK 
markets. With the inclusion of foreign listed companies, this figure amounted to 
68. It is noteworthy in this respect that, on average, UK companies go public at a 
much earlier point in their life cycle. Indeed, the average age of companies at the 
time of their IPO is only 8 years in the UK . The foregoing indicates that equity 
finance seems to be an important source of finance for UK companies and the UK 
market is therefore characterised as a market-based system234.
Secondly, ownership and control are frequently traded in the UK, which ensures 
that UK capital markets are among the most liquid in the world. Indeed, as far as 
the level of concentration of share ownership is concerned, about 81 per cent of 
the largest 100 listed UK firms do not have any shareholder controlling more than 
25 per cent of the voting equity235. In only 16 per cent of these firms a single 
shareholder owns more than 25 per cent of the shares . Furthermore, full 
majority control in UK listed companies is rare, a mere 7 per cent237. It is not
232 These figures are of October 2002; see http://www.londonstockexchange.com/ 
cmsattach/1478.pdf.
233 C. Mayer, ‘Corporate Governance in the UK’, Hume Papers on Public Policy (2000), p. 1.
234 R. Cranston, ‘The Rise and Rise of the Hostile Takeover’ in Hopt and Wymeersch (eds), 
European Takeovers: Law and Practice (Butterworths, 1992), p. 92.
235 Note that this figure dates from 1997; see J. Franks and C. Mayer, ‘Corporate Ownership and 
Control in the UK, Germany, and France’ in Studies in International and Corporate Finance and 
Governance Systems (1997), p. 283.
236 Note that this figure dates from 1997; see ibid, p. 283.
237 E. Wymeersch ‘A Status Report on Corporate Governance Rules and Practices in Some 
Continental European States’ in K. J. Hopt et al. (eds) Comparative Corporate Governance: The 
State o f the Art and Emerging Research (Oxford, New York:, New York: Clarendon Press, OUP, 
1998), p. 1170.
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precisely clear when the Berle-Means corporation has become dominant in the 
UK. Some suggest that, by the 1950s, the divorce of ownership and management 
had proceeded sufficiently to ensure that a wide range of listed companies were 
vulnerable to takeover bids. Chandler (1976) points to the 1970s, however, 
arguing that during the 1970s managerial enterprise rapidly replaced personal 
capitalism. To support his assertion, he cites hiring practices. Indeed, by the 
1970s, only a small percentage of directors had family connections with important 
shareholders, which suggests that top executives were being selected primarily on 
the basis of their managerial qualifications238. It should be noted, however, that, 
as will be seen in more detail below, while most of listed firms in the UK have a 
dispersed ownership, shareholdings in the UK have become to a significant 
degree re-concentrated in recent decades in the hands of the institutions . Indeed, 
a company’s 20 largest institutional investors can be expected to own a majority 
of the shares240.
2.1.2 Identity of Shareholders of Listed Companies
As far as the identity of shareholders of listed companies is concerned, the largest 
shareholders are institutions. Indeed, as of 1998, domestic and foreign institutions 
together owned 80 per cent of the UK equity market241. It should be noted in this 
respect that UK institutions no longer dominate the UK stock market. As of 1999, 
some 29.3 per cent of the stock market was owned by overseas investors, 
compared with 12.8 per cent a decade ago242. It should further be noted that, 
despite their aggregate large stake in the UK equity market, individual 
institutional investors in the UK seldom hold large percentage stakes in individual
238 A. D. Chandler, ‘The Development of Modem Management Structure in the US and the UK’ in 
L. Hannah (ed.), Management Strategy and Business Development: An Historical and Comparative 
Study (London: Macmillan, 1976), p. 46.
239 P. L. Davies, ‘Shareholder Value, Company Law, and Securities Markets Law: A British View’ 
in Hopt and Wymeersch (eds), Capital Markets and Company Law (OUP, 2003), p. 271.
240 B. Cheffins, ‘Putting Britain on the Roe Map: The Emergence of the Berle-Means Corporation in 
the United Kingdom’ in J. McCahery, P. Moerland, T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneboog (eds), 
Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity (OUP, 2002), p. 153.
241 The breakdown of the institutions’ shareholdings was as follows: insurance companies (23.5); 
pension funds (22.1); unit trusts, investment trusts and other institutions (10.6); and foreign investors 
(24); see G. Stapledon, ‘Analysis and Data of Share Ownership and Control in UK’ (1999), p. 3, 
Table 1, available at DTI website.
242 ‘The Institutional Investor Starts to Stir’, The Financial Times, July 23, 2001.
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companies243. This is so even though there are no legal constraints on their share 
ownership. The rationale behind this self-imposed limitation is that the 
institutions believe that large blocks of shares would render them illiquid244.
The high level of institutional shareholding in UK listed companies can be 
illustrated by the ownership structure of Vodaphone, which possesses the 
ownership characteristics of a typical UK listed company. Indeed, more than 85 
per cent of the shares in Vodaphone are held by banks or through nominee 
accounts. The beneficial owners are mostly institutional investors. The only 
significant shareholdings in the company are all owned by institutional investors 
and add up to 17 per cent of the equity. These are a 5.8 per cent holding by 
Mercury Asset Management Limited; a 5.1 per cent holding by Schroder 
Investment Management Limited; a 3.1 per cent holding by Legal and General 
Investment Management Limited; and a 3 per cent holding by Prudential 
Corporation group of companies. The sum of the shares beneficially held by the 
directors is 477,948 out of a total of 3.1 billion outstanding shares245.
UK institutions mainly consist of occupational pension funds, insurance 
companies246, unit trusts, and investment trusts. Amongst the latter, the growth of 
funded pension funds247 has been spectacular. Indeed, in 1963, funded pension 
schemes held a mere 7 per cent of all UK equities. By 1993, their stake increased 
to 34.7 per cent248. Indeed, US and UK pension funds together represent about 72 
per cent of total pension fund assets in the Western world249. A striking feature of
243 J. Charkham and A. Simpson, Fair Shares: The Future o f Shareholder Power and Responsibility 
(OUP, 1999), p. 140.
244 J. C. Coffee, ‘Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor’ (1991), 
91 Col. L. Rev. 1277, p. 1310.
245 M. Goergen and L. Renneboog, ‘United Kingdom’ in K. Gugler (ed.), Corporate Governance 
and Economic Performance (Oxford: OUP, 2001), pp. 184-186.
246 These had £1.1 trillion worth of assets in 1999.
247 These are either defined benefit schemes where the pension formula is defined in advance by die 
sponsor, independently of the contributions and asset returns; or defined-contribution schemes 
where contributions are fixed and benefits therefore depend solely on the returns on the assets of the 
fund. It should be noted that defined-benefit schemes are the most common in the UK; see B. Steil, 
The European Equity Markets: The State o f the Union and an Agenda for the Millennium (London: 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996), p. 186.
248 M. Faccio and M. A. Lasfer, ‘Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance: The Case of 
UK Pension Funds’ in J. McCahery, P. Moerland, T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneboog (eds), 
Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity (OUP, 2002), p. 605.
249 Corporate Governance in Europe, Report of the Centre for European Policy Studies’ Working 
Party (1995), p. v, available at ecgi website.
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UK pensions funds is that they have been more heavily invested in equities than 
most foreign comparators. Between 1963 and 1998, pension funds achieved
A
average annual returns of 12.1 per cent on their equity investments . The 
rationale behind this investment strategy is three-fold: First, long-term assets such 
as equities are suitable investments for funded pension schemes, as the latter have
AM
long-term liabilities . Secondly, pension funds are exempt from the capital gains 
tax. In addition, they can claim back a tax credit when they receive dividends252. 
This in turn is an incentive for them to invest in equities. Finally, strong historic 
equity returns appeared to have encouraged investors to keep their investments in 
equities, despite inflation having fallen over more recent years253.
It is questionable, however, whether UK pension funds’ penchant for equities will 
remain at this high level. Indeed, UK pension funds have cut their asset 
allocations in domestic equities to 43 per cent, from 47 per cent in 2001 and 49 
per cent in 2000254. The reduced weightings have been partly shifted into fixed- 
income investments , with 23 per cent of fund assets being held in that asset 
class in 2002256, compared with 21 per cent in 2001 and 19 per cent in 2000257. 
Some pension funds have even more than doubled their fixed-income holdings in
Af o
the past three years . The most radical change from equities to bonds has been 
made by Boots, which sold its equities investments and moved its £2.3 billion- 
worth of pension fund into triple-A rated bonds, over the years 2000-2002. 
Similarly, ICI, Philips, British Airways and Scottish Power have all raised their 
bond weightings by at least 10 percentage points during 2002. The reasons behind 
the shift from equity to fixed-income include the weakness of the equity market,
250 Institutional Investment in the UK: A Review (March, 2001), p. 28, available at HM Treasury 
website. Hereafter the Myners Review.
251 B. Steil (1996), supra n 247, p. 187.
252 M. Faccio and M. A. Lasfer (2002), supra n 248, p. 605.
253 Institutional Investment in the UK (2001), supra n 250, pp. 31-32.
254 ‘Pension Funds’ Tumbling Equity Weightings’, Funds International, November 30,2002, 
available at Lexis-Nexis Executive.
255 ‘Pension Funds Shift to Bonds’, eFinancialNews.com, January 5, 2003, available at Lexis-Nexis 
Executive.
256 Within bonds, pension funds favour the corporate sector, which offers higher yields than the gilts 
market.
257 ‘Pension Funds’ Tumbling Equity Weightings’, supra n 254. Note that a similar picture can also 
bee seen in continental Europe where the proportion of equities in institutional portfolios has fallen 
from 36 per cent to 30 per cent since the end of 1999.
258 ‘Pension Funds Shun Equities for Bonds’, The Financial Times, December 23,2003.
which saw a drastic fall in the levels of return in 2001 and 2002259; the scandals of 
the past few years in the stock market; the introduction of a minimum funding 
requirement260; the introduction of a new accounting standard261; the fact that 
equities have become a riskier investment because of the rise of the proportion of 
retirees to members; and the desire of companies to lengthen the duration of their 
debt by relying less on bank loans262. It is noteworthy that the investment 
consultants anticipate that bonds will account for approximately 40 per cent of 
fund assets in the next five years. This means that £75 billion-worth of equity 
sales will likely be realised by pension schemes by 2007 .
The next most significant holders are individuals, with an aggregate stake of 16 
per cent264. It should be noted in this respect that, despite the significant decrease 
in ownership by individuals, the growth in institutional shareholdings represents 
an indirect growth in equity investment by individuals, as pensions and life 
insurance are merely a vehicle for long-term personal savings . Other categories 
of shareholders are the corporate sector with 3 per cent; the government with 1 
per cent266; and banks with 1 per cent. It should be noted in this respect that, 
unlike some continental economies and Japan, banks in the UK tend not to be 
significant shareholders in their own right267, though they were to a significant 
degree involved in the business affairs of their clients in the inter-war years due to 
economic problems of the time . Influenced by a strong bias in favour of 
liquidity, banks have dismissed the ownership of shares as an option, on the
259 According to Financial News’ survey, the average return had fallen from 13.5 per cent to -2.2 per 
cent by 2002; see ‘Pension Funds Shift to Bonds’, supra n 255.
260 Pensions Act 1995, ss.56-60.
261 i.e. FRS17. The latter requires funds to match liabilities with assets every year in their financial 
statements to avoid shortfalls; see ‘Pension Funds’ Tumbling Equity Weightings’, supra n 254.
262 ‘Fund Demand to Top Fixed-income Supply: FRS17 Rule Fuels Shifts to Bonds’, European 
Fund Management, March 11,2002, available at Lexis-Nexis Executive.
263 ‘Credit Market: The Evolving Fixed Income Market’, Pensions Week, May 6,2002, available at 
Lexis-Nexis Executive.
264 This figure is of 2000; see V. Grigorov, Y. Chen, O. Schneck and L. Barbier, ‘Ownership 
Structure and Minority Shareholder Rights’, (2000), p. 4, available at 
www.fek.lu.se/grundutb/bredd/ corgovem/Al .ppt.
265 H. Short and K. Keasey, ‘Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance in the United 
Kingdom’ in Keasey, Thompson and Wright (eds), Corporate Governance: Economic and Financial 
Issues (OUP, 1997), p. 20.
266 These figures are of 2000; see ibid.
267 Institutional Investment in the UK (2001), supra n 250, p. 38.
268 F. Capie and M. Collins, Have the Banks Failed British Industry?: An Historical Survey o f Bank - 
Industry Relations in Britain, 1870 -1990 (London, 1992), p. 45.
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grounds of poor marketability and high risk269. It is interesting to note that banks 
did so even though they were and still are free to own shares . This is in contrast 
to the US, which passed laws that deterred big financial institutions from taking a 
close interest in the governance of industrial and commercial enterprises, with a 
view to ensuring a widely dispersed share ownership pattern in US markets. It 
should be noted, however, that most large UK banks have fund management arms 
which manage equities on behalf of pension funds and other institutions. However, 
the shares beneficially owned by banks are few and are mostly the result of debt-
771for-equity swaps .
2.1.3 Operation of the Market for Corporate Control
The UK is the only European jurisdiction with an active market for corporate 
control. Indeed, there are currently around 230 takeovers of publicly listed 
companies per annum in the UK272. Since January 2000, there have been twenty- 
one unsolicited bids for UK listed companies, which, at least initially, were not
77*1recommended . It is interesting to note in this respect that, in the first half of the 
twentieth century, there were no hostile takeovers in the UK. Indeed, as Franks, 
Mayer and Rossi (2004) note, all mergers were the result of an agreement 
between the two or more boards of the merging companies. Mergers were thus the 
result of co-operation rather than competition between companies for a target in 
an auction market274. However, over the years, about 8 to 10 per cent of listed 
companies have been involved as targets of a takeover that was effectively 
published. If one adds the number of transactions that have not materialised or 
were not published, then the relationship to all listed companies increases to about
269 J. Armour, B. R. Cheffins and D. A. Skeel, ‘Corporate Ownership Structure and the Evolution of 
Bankruptcy Law in the US and UK’ (2002), pp. 15-16, available at http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdF 
WP226.pdf.
270 Note that the same reasoning was behind the insurance companies’ then reluctance to play an 
active role in the governance of industrial and commercial enterprises.
271 G. P. Stapledon and J. J. Bates, ‘Reducing the Costs of Proxy Voting’ in J. McCahery, P. 
Moerland, T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneboog (eds), Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence 
and Diversity (OUP, 2002), p. 571.
272 C. Mayer (2000), supra n 233, p. 7.
273 W. Underhill and A. Austmann, ‘Defence Tactics’ in J. Payne (ed.), Takeovers in English and 
German Law (Oxford: Hart, 2002), p. 87.
274 J. Franks, C. Mayer and S. Rossi, ‘Spending Less Time with the Family: The Decline of Family 
Ownership in the UK’ (2004) p. 4, available at SSRN.
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15 per cent to 20 per cent . This demonstrates that markets -  and not the 
majority shareholder - decide a control contest in the UK.
The easiness with which potential offerors can mount hostile bids in the UK 
mainly lies in the high dispersion of share ownership in UK listed companies. 
Another major factor is that the institutions have managed to deter managers from 
taking pre-bid defences which are likely to harm their pecuniary interests. By way 
of example, it is the institutions which further restricted listed companies’ ability 
to issue shares without pre-emption rights. Indeed, as will be seen in the chapter 
on the regulation of defensive measures in the UK, the pre-emption guidelines 
issued by the Pre-emption Group restrain companies’ ability to dis-apply such 
rights. Although the guidelines do not have the force of law, virtually all UK 
public companies comply with them . This is because the institutions threaten 
companies which fail to abide by the guidelines that they will vote down 
resolutions proposed by the directors277. This is a very strong threat for companies 
given the significant voting power that institutional shareholders have through 
their large shareholdings. Indeed, the least popular resolutions proposed by the 
board are those seeking authority to issue shares without pre-emption rights278. 
The power of deterrence of the institutions further stems from the fact that, if 
listed companies take pre-bid defences which are likely to deter value-enhancing 
offers, the institutions would then sell their shares and cause the company’s share 
price to plunge to considerable low levels.
Other types of pre-bid defences have also been subject to the institutions’ 
intervention. For instance, as will be seen in more detail in the following chapter, 
the Association of British Insurers279 has issued informal guidelines with respect
AQA
to share buy-backs, with a view to protecting the interests of shareholders . 
Likewise, the Listing Rules’ requirement that listed companies seek prior 
approval of their shareholders in general meeting where they decide to carry out
275 E. Wymeersch (1998), supra n 237, pp. 1190-1191.
276 G. Knighton, ‘Shareholder Activism’ (2001) 12 P.L.C., p. 38.
277 Ibid, p. 36.
278 J. Charkham and A. Simpson (1999), supra n 243, p. 139.
279 Hereafter the ABI.
280 Own Purchase o f Shares (August, 1993), available at http://www.ivis.co.uk/pages/framegu.html.
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significant transactions281 results from the representations that the ABI had made 
to the Stock Exchange. It should be noted in this respect that the UK is the only 
European jurisdiction that enhances shareholders’ rights by requiring issuers to 
put proposed major transactions to a shareholder vote. Recently, upon proposals 
to abolish this requirement, the Listing Review has highlighted the importance of 
the shareholder vote on such transactions, by stating that 'the threat that 
shareholders could vote down undesired transactions forces companies to 
examine all such proposals in terms o f their impact on shareholders' 
Similarly, it is due to institutional pressure that several companies had 
enfranchised their non-voting shares during 1992-1994.
It should be noted, however, that, despite the foregoing, voting by some 
institutions is mediocre283 and there is no legal obligation for institutional
* )O A
shareholders to vote . In particular, pension funds do not always vote at the 
annual general meetings. The same does not hold true, however, for insurance 
companies. Indeed, in 1996, 87 per cent of insurance companies exercised their 
voting rights whilst only 59 per cent of pension funds did so . The rationale 
behind the low level of voting by pension funds partly lies in the way pension 
funds’ assets are managed. Indeed, most pension funds employ external fund- 
management firms to undertake the investment of their funds , rather than 
managing the funds themselves. In other words, it is fund managers - rather than 
the pension fund trustees - who interact with the management of companies in 
which shares are held. As of 1993, 78 per cent of directly invested UK pension 
funds employed external fund-management firms. Only 14 per cent managed their 
investments wholly ‘in-house’, and 8 per cent used both external and internal
281 Listing Rules, Ch. 10.
282 Review o f the Listing Regime, CP No. 203 (October, 2003), pp. 50-51, available at FSA website.
283 In 2000, only 48 per cent of the votes were registered for AGMs, well below the government’s 
unofficial target of 60 per cent; see ‘The Institutional Investor Starts to Stir’, supra n 242.
284 See, however, Combined Code, Principle E.l (as introduced in July 2003) which states that 
contracts entered into between institutional shareholders and fund managers should reflect the 
principles embodied in ‘The Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders in the UK’, issued by the 
Institutional Shareholders’ Committee.
285 R. Crespi-Cladera and L. Renneboog, ‘United We Stand: Corporate Monitoring by Shareholder 
Coalitions in the UK’ (2000), p. 6, available at SSRN.
286 Note, however, that the government plans to push through legislation that will force pension 
funds to raise the level of expertise of their lay trustees, following criticism that trustees have 
become overly reliant on the advice they receive from fund managers and investment consultants; 
see ‘Pension Fund Trustees’ Role is Facing Overhaul’, The Financial Times Weekly Review o f the 
Investment Industry, March 15,2004.
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managers . These external managers are usually the investment-management 
arms of financial conglomerates, though the fund-management arms of some 
insurance companies are also prominent. The problem with externally managed 
funds is that there are likely to be conflicts of interest between the fund 
management and other arms of financial conglomerates, which are likely to deter 
the fund managers from actively involving in the management of companies in 
which shares are held. By contrast, internally managed occupational pension
7 QQ
funds do not have such conflicts. Furthermore, internally managed pension 
funds have a stronger incentive to monitor. For their objective is to maximise the 
value of funds under management in order to minimise the company’s 
contributions and, possibly, use any pension fund surplus to inflate the company’s 
profits289. The foregoing is line with Guercio and Hawkins’ (1999) argument that 
the level of monitoring by pension funds depends significantly on the way their 
assets are managed290.
The reluctance of external fund managers to intervene in companies where they 
legally own substantial shareholdings, even when this would be in their clients’ 
financial interests, was recently underlined in the Myners Review291. The latter 
underlined the value lost to institutional investors through the reluctance of fund 
managers to actively engage with companies in which they have holdings, even 
where they have strong reservations about a company’s strategy, personnel or 
other causes of corporate underperformance. As a result, it recommended that all 
pension fund trustees should incorporate, into the fund management mandates, the
9Q91994 guidance of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act . The latter 
articulates the duties of fund managers to intervene in companies -  by voting or 
otherwise -  where there is a reasonable expectation that doing so might raise the 
value of the investment. In line with the recommendations of the Myners Review, 
the Government is currently proposing to impose, on all those involved in pension
287 Note that, unlike pension funds, insurance companies’ funds are managed by investment-
management subsidiaries of the various insurers.
288 e.g. Hermes is owned by, and is the principal fund manager for, the UK’s largest pension scheme,
namely the BT pic.
289 H. Short and K. Keasey (1997), supra n 265, p. 27.
290 D. D.Guercio and J. Hawkins, ‘The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund Activism’ (1999) 52
J. Fin. Econ. 293, p. 301.
291 See supra n 250.
292 This is to be found in Department of Labor Interpretative Bulletin 94-2.
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fund management , a statutory duty to use shareholders’ powers to intervene in 
investee companies where this is in a pension scheme’s best interests294. The 
problem with such proposal is that, even if fund managers regularly intervene in 
investee companies, it will be relatively difficult to monitor whether the 
institutions voted after due consideration of the issues involved295. The latter 
problem is also reflected by the European Commission, which argues that, due to 
a lack of time or resources, institutional investors might simply vote in favour of 
any proposed resolution to fulfil such requirement296. The Commission therefore 
believes that it would be undesirable to require institutional investors to 
systematically exercise their voting rights
It should be added that the CLR proposed in its final report that institutional 
investors should disclose to their clients on demand the manner in which they 
have exercised their discretion in voting and on takeovers, with an appropriate 
explanation, and that the Secretary of State should have power to require
0^7
institutional investors to publish such information . The government refused to 
implement the CLR’s proposal, however, on the grounds that there might be
7QO
practical difficulties in carrying it out through company legislation . The CLR 
further proposed to change s.360 of the CA to enable the investors behind the 
nominees to exercise their voting rights directly299. The rationale behind such 
proposal is that, to an increasing extent, the beneficial owners are hidden behind 
nominees, who are registered in the share register on behalf of their clients. The 
problem with such nominees is that they have no incentive to use their powers 
since any advantage from doing so would accrue to the beneficial owners300. The 
problem worsened since the introduction of Crest in 1996, a new computerised
293 It should be noted that, whilst the Myners’ Review proposed that the new duty should apply only 
to fund managers, the Government is minded that the duty should also apply to trustees.
294 Encouraging Shareholder Activism: A Consultation Document (February, 2002), pp. 6-7, 
available at DWP website.
295 P. L. Davies, ‘The United Kingdom’ in Baums and Wymeersch (eds) Shareholder Voting Rights 
and Practices in Europe and the United States (London: Kluwer Law International, 1999), p. 339.
296 Modernising Company Law in the European Union - A Plan to Move Forward, Cm 5553 (July, 
2002), p. 13, available at DTI website.
297 Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report (July, 2001), p. 148, available 
at DTI website.
298 Modernising Company Law (2002), supra n 296, p. 25,
299 Modern Company Law (2001), supra n 297, p. 153.
300 R. C. Nolan, ‘Indirect Investors: A Greater Say in the Company?’, 3CL/CBR Conference,
Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge, Using Law to Promote Competitiveness and Enterprise: 
Will Corporate Law Deliver?, July 4,2002, pp. 2-3.
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system for settling purchases and sales of shares . Indeed, members of Crest can 
hold their shares through a nominee account, rather than registering them in their 
name. The government has agreed with the Review on this issue and has decided 
to amend the law so as to make it clear that companies are able to recognise, if 
they wish, the rights of the beneficial owners, at the request of the registered 
shareholder302.
2.2 France
2.2.1 French Capital Markets and Level of Concentration of 
Share 'Ownership
Unlike the UK market, the French stock market303 is usually characterised as a 
market with a few listed companies and a high level of concentration of 
ownership due to significant family ownership304. Indeed, the French market is an 
illiquid market where ownership and control are infrequently traded, where there 
are complex systems of intercorporate holdings , and where there are many 
holding-company structures controlling large industrial groups . The French 
market is further defined as a hybrid system between a ‘relationship banking’ 
financial system found in some continental jurisdictions and a ‘market-based’ 
financial system found in Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions .
301 J. W. Winter, ‘Cross-Border Voting in Europe’ in Hopt and Wymeersch (eds), Capital Markets 
and Company Law (OUP, 2003), p. 394. Thus, the Crest has replaced the old paper-based process of 
settling share deals, known as the ‘Talisman’ system.
302 Modernising Company Law (2002), supra n 296, p. 23.
303 The Paris Stock Exchange is composed of three regulated markets: the Premier Marche, the 
Second March6 and the Nouveau MarchS. A non-regulated market, referred to as the March^-Libre, 
has also been established in 1996, which replaced the previous Hors-Cote.
304 L. Renneboog, ‘Shareholding Concentration and Pyramidal Ownership Structures in Belgium: 
Stylized Facts’ (1996), p. 5, available at SSRN.
30 Ibid, p. 5. Such intercorporate holdings are present, inter alia, between Alcatel and G6n6rale des 
Eaux; Havas and Canal Plus; Paribas and AXA-UAP; see F. Morin, ‘A Transformation in the French 
Model of Shareholding and Management’ (2000) 29 Economy and Society 36, p. 39.
306 A. E. Murphy, ‘Corporate Ownership in France: The Importance of History’ (2004), p. 5, 
available at http://www.nber.org/books/corp-owner03/murphyl l-6-03.pdf.
307 E. Davis, ‘The Development of Pension Funds: An Approaching Financial Revolution for 
Continental Europe’ in R. O’Brian (ed.), Finance and the International Economy (Oxford: OUP, 
1993), p. 126. Note that, until the mid-1980s, the capital structure of French firms, compared to 
other countries, was heavily biased towards bank financing; see E. Bertero, ‘The Banking System, 
Financial Markets, and Capital Structure: Some New Evidence from France’ (1994) 10 Oxf. Rev. 
Econ. Policy 68, p. 69.
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As far as the state of the French stock market is concerned, it should be noted that, 
prior to the second half of the twentieth century, the French policy tended to 
undermine stock markets. This was because left-wing politicians had little 
sympathy with capitalism, stock markets and securities institutions308. As a result, 
the French industry had not significantly raised funds on the stock market. It is 
only in 1978, when the then Minister of the Economy had introduced a tax rebate 
in favour of tax payers buying equities of French companies, that financing by 
public issues of equity became more important309. Indeed, during the second half 
of 1978, 850,000 taxpayers bought new equities and about half the total of 
investors came to the stock market for the first time310. The market capitalisation
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of listed companies grew by 105.3 per cent during 1975-1999 and the number 
of IPOs increased by 131.2 per cent during 1990-1999312. The latter developments, 
coupled with the creation of Euronext, have served to accelerate the growth of the 
Paris stock exchange. The latter currently ranks first in the euro zone in terms of 
the market capitalisation of listed firms and comes second only to London as the 
most active European stock market in terms of the number of companies listed. 
Indeed, the aggregate number of domestic companies listed on all three regulated 
markets is 737. With the inclusion of foreign listed companies, the total number 
amounts to 874313. There has been a decline, however, in the number of new 
listings. Indeed, only 11 new companies were listed on the French regulated 
markets in 2002, as opposed to 29 in 2001314.
As far as the level of concentration of share ownership is concerned, the 
concentration of direct ownership and voting power is very high in France for 
listed companies, even for the CAC 40 companies, which constitute the creme de
308 M. J. Roe, ‘Political Foundations for Separating Ownership from Control’ in J. McCahery, P. 
Moerland, T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneboog (eds), Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence 
and Diversity (OUP, 2002), p. 126.
309 This tax rebate was introduced by the Law Monory, which allowed investors to deduct their 
investments in shares from taxable income.
310 P. Stonham, Major Stock Markets in Europe (Aldershot: Gower, 1982), p. 85.
311 C. Van der Elst, ‘The Equity Markets, Ownership Structures and Control: Towards and 
International Harmonisation?’ (2000), available at http://www.econ- pol.unisi.it/scdbanc/ 
CONFERENZA/FILE_PDF/l -1 VanderElst.pdf, p. 8, Table 6.
312 It should be noted in this respect that, during the nineties, the equity market of France grew much 
more than that of the UK; see ibid, p. 8.
313 These figures are of December 2002; see http://www.bourse-de- paris.fr/stat/telecharge/ 
asa20031128.pdf.
314 2 have been listed on the Premier Marche, 7 on the Second March6, and 2 on the Nouveau 
March6; see COB, Presentation du 35eme Rapport Annuel de la COB, March 14, 2003.
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la creme of the French economy315. It should be noted, however, that the degree
of concentration of share ownership presents a different picture depending on the
market on which the shares are traded. As of 1995, 184 companies were listed on
the Premier Marche and the percentage of not majority-controlled companies
therein amounted to a mere 36.96 per cent316. Indeed, the three most important
shareholders dominated 53.8 per cent of companies listed on the Premier
Marche , and in only 5 out of these 184 companies could one find a
concentration of less than 10 per cent for the three largest shareholders318. On the
other hand, 203 companies were listed on the Second Marche and 67.5 per cent of
 ^10them were fully controlled by the main reporting shareholder . The aggregate 
holding of the three most important shareholders for the Premier and the Second 
Marches amounted to 71.58 per cent of companies listed on these two markets. In 
only 7 out of 387 companies listed on these two markets could one find a 
concentration of less than 10 per cent for the three largest shareholders.
Several factors lie behind the concentrated ownership of the French market. First, 
the reason underlying the relatively small size of the French stock market and the 
concentrated ownership in French firms may be the absence of strong investor 
protection in the laws and regulations of France . Indeed, La Porta, Lopez-de- 
Silanes and Shleifer (1998) argue that, in countries with good shareholder 
protection, where expropriation of the minority is limited by law, investors pay 
higher prices for their shares, which induces controlling shareholders to reduce 
their stakes321. This in turn results in a more dispersed ownership of listed firms322. 
Secondly, historical reasons may lie behind the concentrated nature of share 
ownership in listed firms. Indeed, Murphy (2003) emphasises the importance of 
history in the evolution of France’s corporate ownership structure, though he 
admits the existence of other variables that help explain the high degree of
315 L. Bloch and E. Kremp (2001), supra n 138, p. 123.
316 E. Wymeersch (1998), supra n 237, pp. 1157-1158.
317 Ibid, p. 1158.
318 Ibid, p. 1158.
319 Ibid, pp. 1157-1158.
320 R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer (1998), supra n 41, p. 29.
321 Ibid, p. 29.
322 Note, however, that Franks, Mayer and Rossi refute this argument by pointing out that this has
not been the case in the UK. In their view, for most of the first centuiy of company law, minority
shareholders in the UK were virtually defenceless; see J. Franks, C. Mayer and S. Rossi, ‘The
Origination and Evolution of Ownership and Control’ (2003), p. 12, available at SSRN.
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concentration of corporate ownership by families in France323. He argues that in 
France, over the last three hundred years, historical factors have produced a weak 
capital and banking structure. These weaknesses led to a reliance on significant 
self-financing, which in turn resulted in the strengthening of the concentration of 
ownership in the hands of individuals and families324. As a result, his argument 
goes, it is not surprising to see French families owning such a large proportion of 
French companies325.
2.2.2 Identity of Shareholders of Listed Companies
As far as the identity of listed companies’ shareholders is concerned, the 
breakdown of shareholding is as follows: foreign investors 36 per cent; financial 
sector 27 per cent; corporate sector326 18 per cent; individuals 11 per cent; and the 
State 6327 per cent328. Thus, foreign institutions constitute the largest category of 
shareholders in France. In 1998, US and British funds together represented over 
10 per cent of the market capitalisation of the Paris stock exchange . To give an 
example, the US investment fund Templeton Global Investors invested FF7.9 
billion of its assets in equities of companies listed in France. Likewise, CalPERS 
(US) invested FF7.2 billion, Commercial Union (UK) FF6 billion, and Fidelity 
(US) FF5.3 billion of their assets in equities of companies listed in France. More 
importantly, foreign investors hold over 40 per cent of the capital of about ten 
largest French companies, such as Accor and Pechiney . In TotalFina, foreign
l 1! 1
shareholders own more than 75 per cent of the shares . Thus, the French stock
323 A. E. Murphy (2004), supra n 306, p. 2.
324 Ibid, p. 3.
325 Ibid, p. 32.
326 i. e. non-fmancial companies.
327 Note that this figure is of 1990; see C. Van Der Elst, (2000), supra n 311, p. 24.
328 Ibid, pp. 23-28. It should be noted, however, that establishing accurately the identity of 
shareholders is difficult since only a few studies have been undertaken. This task is exacerbated by 
the fact that pyramiding and other arrangements separating capital contribution and control further 
complicate the interpretation of data; see B. Steil (1996), supra n 246, pp. 151-152.
329 Les Criteres d ’Investissement des Grands Gestionnaires de Fonds Internationala dans les 
Entreprises Frangaises (1998) 322 Bull. COB 1, p. 10.
330 Ibid, p. 1.
331 C. Van Der Elst (2000), supra n 311, p. 28.
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exchange depends heavily on foreign investors332. The evolutions, which have 
contributed in making the French market attractive to foreign investors, have been 
the under-valuation of the French stock exchange as compared with other foreign 
exchanges; the privatisations; and the adoption by the privatised companies of 
techniques highly appreciated by Anglo-Saxon investors, such as the refocusing 
on core activities and the reduction of costs333. The AMF suggests that the 
increasing presence of foreign investors is likely to change the ownership 
structure of French companies, in that foreign shareholders will substitute the 
traditional controlling shareholder in listed companies, be it another French 
company, an individual, or the State334.
As far as French institutions are concerned, these consist of pension funds, 
insurance companies, and the unit and investment trusts. However, French 
pension funds are currently of minor importance in France. This is because most 
people in France do not have private funded pensions , and the few who do are 
mainly at executive level. Indeed, the vast majority of people rely on the state 
PAYG system, whereby contributions taken in are paid out straight away to fund 
the benefits of those already retired. The rationale behind the large reliance on the 
PAYG system is that relatively underdeveloped capital markets made unfunded 
schemes attractive in the initial postwar period. Over the years, the French 
remained attached to the concept of social solidarity, which underlies their 
pensions system336. The most direct implication for corporate governance of the 
maintenance of a largely unfunded regime has been the absence of substantial 
holdings of equity shares by institutional investors of the kind which have 
developed in most funded regimes . The relative absence of private funded 
pensions further explains the greater presence of foreign institutions in French 
listed companies, as compared with domestic institutions. The insignificance of
332 H. Sherman ‘Corporate Governance Changes Make Inroads in Europe’ in D. H. Chew (ed.),
Studies in International Corporate Finance and Governance Systems: A Comparison o f the US,
Japan, and Europe (Oxford; New York: OUP, 1997), p. 347.
333 Les Criteres d ’Investissement (1998), supra n 329, p. 8.
334 Ibid, pp. 20-21.
335 Indeed, as of 1996, less than 10 per cent of die workforce was covered by a privately funded 
pension scheme, as opposed to 75 per cent in the UK.
36 ‘Ageing World Upsets Calculations’, The Financial Times, May 12, 2000.
337 T. Hadden, ‘Corporate Governance by Institutional Investors?: Some Problems From an 
International Perspective’ in T. Baums, R. M. Buxbaum and K. J. Hopt (eds), Institutional Investors 
and Corporate Governance (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1994), p. 96.
60
pension funds in France also stems from the fact that France places limits on 
pension funds by asset type. Indeed, pension funds in France cannot invest more 
than 65 per cent of their assets in listed equities . Indeed, whereas UK pension 
funds invested 77.6 per cent of their assets in equities and only 13.9 per cent in 
fixed income in 1995, French pension funds invested a mere 13.6 per cent in 
equities and 38 per cent in fixed income the same year339. These restrictions do 
bear a negative impact upon the growth of French pension funds340.
There is, however, a pressure in France to shift to a private funded pension system 
due to the sharp future increase in the proportion of the elderly341. Indeed, persons 
over 60 years-old will by 2040 represent 48.3 per cent of the population342. This 
means a dramatic increase in the ratio of elderly people to working population, 
with a predicted dependency ratio for 2030 of 39 per cent343. Without action, 
France would experience considerable annual deficits, which have been projected 
to reach more than €46 million a year by 2020344. The reason behind the lack of 
reform thus far has been the inability or reluctance of politicians to undertake 
significant reform. In 1995, the centre-right government of Alain Juppd attempted 
to introduce a law on private pension funds345. This law would have introduced 
defined contribution personal pensions, which would have supplemented the 
existing pension arrangements346, namely the state-managed and the employer- 
managed pensions. Both the latter are mandatory and operate on a PAYG basis. 
The socialist government which took power in 1997 never issued the application 
decree, however, which was necessary for the enactment of the law347. Following
338 Survey o f Investment Regulation o f Pension Funds (May, 2001), p. 4, Table 1, available at OECD 
website.
339 K. De Ryck, ‘Asset Allocation, Financial Market Behaviour and Impact of EU Pension Funds on 
European Capital Markets’ in Institutional Investors in the New Financial Landscape, OECD 
Proceedings, 1998, p. 270, Table 4.
340 E. P. Davis, ‘Regulation of Pension Fund Assets’ in Institutional Investors in the New Financial 
Landscape, OECD Proceedings, 1998, p. 372.
341 E. Davis (1993), supra n 307, p. 109.
342 ‘Et Si les Fonds de Pension Avaient Exists?’, L ’Expansion, October 26, 2000.
343 M. Rhodes and D. Natali, ‘Welfare Regimes and Pension Reform Agendas’, Conference on 
Pension Reform in Europe: Shared Problems, Sharing Solutions, LSE, December 5,2003, p. 5.
344 ‘Political Weight Behind Reform’, European Pensions and Investments News, March 12, 2002, 
available at Lexis-Nexis Executive.
345 Law Thomas of 25 mars 1997.
346 ‘France Economy: Government's Intentions on Pension Funds are Unclear’, EIU ViewsWire, 
December 19, 2002, available at Lexis-Nexis Executive.
347 Note that the law was eventually repealed in 2001.
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elections in 2002, the new centre-right government, which defeated the 
socialists , reverted to the policies of the Juppe government. Indeed, the Prime 
Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, claiming that the pensions issue was ‘about the 
survival o f  the republic ’, decided to extend the Juppd reform to the public sector, 
despite extensive protests by public-sector workers 349. The current reform 
introduces funded occupational and personal pensions that will operate on a 
voluntary basis. In addition, it establishes a link between the level of pension and 
the average life expectancy of the population. As a result, the years of 
contributions required to have a full pension will rise from between 37 and 40 
years at present to 41 years by 2012350.
As far as French insurance companies are concerned, as in the case of pension 
funds, the size of their assets remains small. This is because restrictions similar to 
those applied to pension funds are applied to insurance companies. Indeed, these 
cannot invest more than 65 per cent of their assets in equities and cannot hold 
more than 5 per cent of the securities of a single issuer351. However, the major 
French insurance companies - led by AXA and AGF - are quite powerful, 
especially as they tend to concentrate their holdings. As of 1994, the two 
companies together held between 3 and 10 per cent of twenty companies352. As 
far as French unit and investment trusts are concerned, France currently ranks 
first in Europe and second in the world behind the US for the size of its collective 
investment management, which amounts to about $500 billion354. Despite the 
latter, however, French unit and investment trusts invest in equities a far lower 
share of their assets than their counterparts elsewhere in the OECD area . This is 
because French unit and investment trusts cannot invest more than 5 per cent of
348 Note that the socialists were defeated because of their attempt to extend the pension reform, 
which initially only covered the private sector, to the public sector, which constitutes about one-fifth 
of the workforce.
349 ‘The Crumbling Pillars of Old Age’, The Economist, September 27,2003.
350 European Pension Reform and Private Pensions: An Analysis o f the EU’s Six Largest Countries 
(May, 2004) p. 6, available at ABI website.
351 Codes des Assurances, art. R332-3, as amended by Decree No. 2000-142 of February 18,2000.
352 J. P. Charkham, ‘France’ in Keeping Good Company: A Study o f Corporate Governance in Five 
Countries (OUP, 1994), pp. 145-146.
353 i. e. the OPCVM.
354 Creation de Valeur Actionnariale et Communication Financiere, Bull. COB, No. 346 (June, 
2000), pp. 43-44, available at AMF website.
355 A. Goldstein, ‘Privatizations and Corporate Governance in France’ (1996) 199 Banca Naz. Lav. 
Quart. R. 455, p. 474.
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their assets in equities of a single issuer and cannot hold more than 10 per cent of 
the equities of a single issuer356.
As far as banks are concerned, these have some large minority shareholdings in 
listed companies. Most industrial companies like having banks as shareholders 
and often approach them to take an equity stake. Companies see it as an insurance 
policy for protection against takeovers whilst the banks see it as a way of
'icn
cementing a banking relationship . Despite the latter, French banks face high 
legal obstacles to acquire equity stakes in non-financial enterprises . Indeed, 
banks can only own up to 10 per cent of a single non-financial enterprise. In 
addition, their stake must not result in the exercise of a ‘notable influence’. 
Furthermore, their stake in a single enterprise must not exceed 15 per cent of their 
own capital, and their total stake must not exceed 60 per cent of their own capital. 
Moreover, the total annual turnover from non-banking activities must not exceed
' J C Q
10 per cent of net banking revenue . It should be added that there is an 
increasing closeness of banks and insurance companies due to the marketing of 
insurance products through banks and the provision of loans and guarantees by 
insurance companies. Some banks have even bought insurance subsidiaries, such 
as Suez buying Victoria360. This is a matter of considerable interest not only to the 
parties concerned but also to the French prudential authorities.
As far as the corporate sector is concerned, their 21 per cent level of ownership is 
not surprising since, as will be seen in the chapter on the regulation of defensive 
measures in France, cross shareholdings are an integral feature of French listed 
companies. Individuals are the third most important category of owners. It should 
be noted in this respect that the French government has successfully attempted to 
increase individuals’ stake in listed companies, by introducing strong tax 
subsidies and by carrying out large-scale privatisations. Indeed, one of the goals 
of the privatisations between 1986-1988 was to promote ‘people’s capitalism’,
356 Y. Guyon, ‘Les Investisseurs Institutionnels en Droit Fran9ais’ in T. Baums, R. M. Buxbaum, and 
K. J. Hopt (eds), Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1994), p.
388.
357 J. P. Charkham (1994), supra n 352, pp. 145-146.
358 A. Goldstein (1996), supra n 355, p. 476.
359 Ibid, p. 477, Table 5.
360 J. P. Charkham (1994), supra n 352, pp. 126-128.
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and these contributed to increasing the number of French shareholders from 1.7 
million in 1982 to 6.2 million in 1987 . However, the initial dispersion of shares 
has been reduced considerably by subsequent trading. Indeed, the holdings of 
individuals have reduced from 37.6 per cent in 1990 to 11.1 per cent in 1998362. 
Furthermore, as in the UK, individual ownership is declining in favour of indirect 
ownership through the institutions .
As far as the State is concerned, the French State sees itself as having a protective 
role, and its influence is by no means restricted to cases which ‘endanger public 
order, health or national defence’. Indeed, 'the French administration, from Sully 
to Colbert, from Laffemas to Turgot and Necker, has always been 
interventionist’ 364 . In particular after the Second World War, there was 
widespread support for a corporatist system in which the government would play 
a strong direct role in the affairs of large business firms, with a view to avoiding
' l f L C
the deficiencies of the market . The Constitution of 1946 reflected the latter 
view by allowing the State to take over companies where doing so would promote 
the interests of the national community. Following the Second World War, more 
than 300 companies were taken over by the State under the latter provision . 
The state ownership has been reduced, however, when Jacques Chirac came to 
power in 1986367. Indeed, his conservative government disposed of the State’s 
holdings in a number of large banks and non-financial enterprises. Under his two- 
year premiership, 31 banks and financial and non-financial enterprises have been 
privatised368. These included Agence Havas, Cie Generale d’Electricite, Cie de 
Saint-Gobain, Societe Matra, Societe Generale, Cie financiere du CCF, Cie 
financiere Paribas, Cie financiere de Suez .
361 A. Goldstein (1996), supra n 355, p. 463.
362 A. E. Murphy (2004), supra n 306, p. 33.
363 Y. Guyon (1994), supra n 356, p. 386.
364 A. Hamdouch, L ’Etat d ’Influence, Nationalisations et Privatisations en France (Presses du 
CNRS, 1989), pp. 31-32.
365 H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ (2001) 89 Geo. L. J. 
439, p. 446.
366 The preamble of the 1946 Constitution was subsequently incorporated into the current 
Constitution; see B. Mojuy6, ‘French Corporate Governance in the New Millenium: Who Watches 
the Board in Corporate France?’ (2000) 6 Col. J. Eur. L. 73, p. 81.
367 The Privatisation Law No. 86-912 of August 6, 1986.
368 A. Goldstein (1996), supra n 355, p. 463.
369 D. Lacoue-Labarthe, Les Banques en France: Privatisation, Restructuration, Consolidation 
(Paris: Economica, 2001), pp. 60-61, Table 2.5.
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Following the electoral victory of the socialists in 1988, all the remaining 
privatisations from the Chirac’s list were halted, though the government of 
Francis Mitterrand did not renationalise formerly divested firms during its period 
in office between 1988-1993. Beginning in 1993, when the centre-right party 
returned to power, the government of Edouard Balladur has embarked on a 
second major privatisation program . In three years, 9 major state-owned 
enterprises have been at least partially sold371. Following the 1997 election, the 
socialists returned to power. Although they had campaigned against the sale of 
state assets, the globalisation of the economy led the leftist government of Lionel 
Jospm to subscribe to a new program of privatisation , which in the end 
generated an amount surpassing the total amount generated under both Balladur 
and Juppe governments from 1993 to 1997 373. In particular, the Jospin 
government launched the two largest French privatisations ever, namely the $7.1 
billion France Telecom IPO in October 1997 and the subsequent $10.5 billion 
seasoned France Telecom issue in November 1998374. However, the above 
privatisations did not bring about a radical marketisation of the French system 
along British lines375. For, despite these privatisations, the French government 
still retains control in several key sectors, either through golden shares or through 
the noyaux durs. Furthermore, as will be seen below, it continues to object to bids 
which might prejudice the French national interest. As Charkham (1994) puts it,
‘ Colbert*s ghost survives and will not be easily exorcised* .
370 Indeed, 21 companies were privatised under the governments of Balladur and Jupp6, including 
Credit Local de France, BNP, Rhone-Poulenc, Elf-Aquitaine, UAP, SEITA, Bull, Usinor-Sacilor, 
Pdchiney.
371 A. Goldstein (1996), supra n 355, p. 455.
372 B. Mojuy6 (2000), supra n 366, pp. 90-91. The privatised companies included CIC, Thomson 
CSF, Thomson Multimedia, Credit Foncier, Credit Lyonnais.
373 M. O’Sullivan, ‘The Stock Market and the Corporate Economy in France’ (2002), p. 16, available 
at http://www.intech.unu.edu/research/current-research/designing/bartzokas/2000-138/october- 
2002/osullivan-2.pdf.
374 W. L. Megginson and J. M. Netter, ‘From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on 
Privatization’ (2001), p. 4, available at SSRN.
375 H. J. Yeo, C. Pochet and A. Alcouffe, ‘CEO Reciprocal Interlocks in French Corporations’
(2003) 7 Journal of Management and Governance 87, p. 90.
376 J. P. Charkham (1994), supra n 352, p. 154.'
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2.2.3 Operation of the Market for Corporate Control
As far as the market for corporate control is concerned, the prospects of a bidder 
successfully conducting a hostile bid in France is limited in practice. Indeed, for 
the entire decade from 1991 to 2000, French companies were involved in 19 
hostile bids only377. The low level of hostile bids in France is also evidenced by 
the fact that, according to a study by KPMG, in the first half of 2000, whilst the 
value of acquisitions of French companies was $19 billion, the value of foreign 
acquisitions by French companies was $113 billion378. The rationale behind the 
difficulty of conducting hostile bids in France are two-fold: First, control is often 
retained by powerful controlling families and non-financial companies. As a 
result, control changes usually occur as a result of private negotiations, rather than 
by way of transactions in the market. The ensuing mandatory bid is just a 
formality to withdraw the company from the exchange rather than as a device to 
change control. This may not be obvious, for the French statistics classify under 
the same heading the price guarantee procedures, which are mandated after a 
shareholder has acquired full legal control as a consequence of his purchase of a 
controlling block from another shareholder. The frequency of these block 
transactions, and hence of the price guarantee procedure, confirms that, according 
to French tradition, company restructuring takes place by voluntary measures
'XTQrather than via the market .
Secondly, the influence of the State makes hostile takeovers, and in particular 
those by foreign bidders, more difficult. This can be illustrated by the recent 
takeover attempt by Sanofi-Synthelabo - the French drug firm -  for its bigger 
Franco-German rival Aventis. During this battle, Aventis called for a Swiss white 
knight -  Novartis - , which was opposed by the French government. Indeed, the 
French prime minister told Novartis to leave the battle, on the grounds that the 
ability of France to counter bio-terrorism had required national ownership of a 
vaccine producer. The prime minister further told Aventis to stop resisting the
377 M. O’Sullivan (2002), supra n 373, p. 39.
378 Ibid, p. 29.
379 E. Wymeersch (1998), supra n 237, p. 1193.
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Sanofi bid380. Similarly, Generali of Italy’s attempt in 1997 to take over AGF, 
France’s second-largest insurer, constitutes another example of the French State’s 
involvement in foreign hostile bids. Unsuccessful in its search for a French ally 
against the Italian bidder, AGF turned to its German rival, Allianz AG, which 
promised to preserve a substantial degree of autonomy for AGF. In the meantime, 
the French Minister of Economy made maximum use of its three-month review 
period under the French Insurance Code to frustrate Generali’s hostile bid. 
Frustrated by the government’s delay in providing insurance regulatory approval 
for its bid, Generali conceded victory to Allianz. On the other hand, because of 
the Ministry’s concern about the state interests likely to be affected by foreign 
ownership of AGF, Allianz agreed to maintain AGF’s headquarters in Paris and to 
appoint only a minority of the AGF’s directors. This example illustrates well the 
ability of French administrative bodies to delay a non-French bid until a friendly 
white knight appears, in cases where their prior approval is necessary to acquire 
control of an offeree company.
It should be noted, however, that a number of changes are occurring in France, 
which are likely to increase the likelihood of hostile takeovers. First and foremost, 
the French government has outlawed a number of specific control techniques by 
companies. In particular, shares held by a subsidiary in the capital of its parent 
have been restricted. Furthermore, since the publication in 1995 of the Vienot 
Report, listed companies are in a continuous process of unwinding their cross 
shareholdings. Indeed, there has been a decline in non-financial companies’ 
stakes in the 25 largest companies. Over just one-year period between 1998 and 
1999, the corporate sector’s stake in listed companies reduced from 33.5 per cent 
to 30.2 per cent381. The rationale behind this phenomenon is the increasing 
competition in the market for goods and services, which induces companies to 
refocus on their core activities in order to rein in their unit cost .
380 ‘Patent Nonsense’, The Economist, March 27,2004.
381 J. C. Coffee, ‘Convergence and its Critics: What are the Preconditions to the Separation of 
Ownership and Control?’, in J. McCahery, P. Moerland, T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneboog (eds), 
Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity (OUP, 2002), p. 88, Table 4.1.
382 Ibid, p. 44.
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Secondly, the use of golden shares by the French government has been rendered 
difficult by the ECJ’s landmark judgment, which found the French government’s 
golden share in Societe Elf-Aquitaine illegal . The share in question had 
allowed the Minister of Economy to veto the acquisition of more than ten per cent 
of the shares in the company, as well as the sale of the majority of the capital of 
the parent’s subsidiaries. Although the ECJ held that the objective sought after by 
the French government -  namely to ensure the security of the supplies of 
petroleum products -  was deemed to be a legitimate public interest, it concluded 
that the French regulation manifestly went beyond what was necessary to reach 
the objective invoked. This is because the regulation did not provide for specific 
and objective circumstances where such powers could be used. This was held to 
create uncertainty, as the investors could not identify the extent of their rights and 
duties. As a result of the ECJ’s decision, the Minister of Economy eradicated the 
State’s golden share in Elf-Aquitaine.
Finally, the increasing percentage of capital held by foreign institutions, coupled 
with their more active role, are also likely to be favourable to the conduct of 
hostile bids in France384. Until recently, no investment in a French company was 
big enough to deter foreign institutional investors from selling their shares and 
place their funds elsewhere. Indeed, according to a study conducted in 1995 by 
the law firm Burson-Marsteller Eurocorporate with Anglo-Saxon institutional 
investors, only 12 per cent of the latter stated that they vote against the managers 
of French companies where they are shareholders whilst 60 per cent stated that 
they sell their shares in case of disagreement with the management . This 
situation is changing, however. Indeed, foreign institutions in France no longer 
divest when they disagree with the management. Like in the UK, they play a more 
active role. This is illustrated by CalPERS’s proxy fight in 1995, along with 
CREF387, against Elf Aquitaine, with a view to rejecting a resolution designed to
383 ECJ, 4 June 2002, No. C-483/99, Commission CE c/Republique frangaise (2002) Bull. Joly 
Bourse 411, pp. 430-435.
384 ‘Pourquoi les Entreprises Franfaises Sont-Elles Op6ables?’, CDC Marche, Flash, February 23, 
1998.
385 ‘Corporate Governance Seen by Anglo-Saxon Institutional Investors’, 364 Option Finance, July 
17, 1995, p. 12.
386 Les Criteres d ’Investissement (1998), supra n 329, p. 23.
387 This is the pension fund of US lecturers.
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limit shareholders’ voting rights . The increasing interest of CalPERS in French 
listed companies is also evidenced by the application, since 1994, of its proxy 
voting guidelines to France. Indeed, CalPERS particularly urges French listed 
companies to comply with the ‘one share, one vote’ principle, to eradicate their
QQ
cross shareholdings, and to render their boards of directors more independent .
It should be noted in this respect that French institutional shareholders have also 
increased their voice. As an example, the French Asset Management 
Association390 stated that it is not generally in favour of anti-takeover measures391. 
In its recommendations, the AFG recommends the progressive relinquishment of 
shares with double voting rights and of shares with a loyalty premium. The 
increased role of French institutional investors is partly due to the fact that fund 
management companies have been subjected to a number of rules of conduct, 
such as the obligation to act honestly and fairly in the best interests of their 
clients . More importantly, they have been recently compelled to account of 
their voting practices relating to the securities they manage, pursuant to 
conditions which will be determined by the General Regulation of the AMF. In 
particular, if they fail to exercise the voting rights attaching to the securities they 
manage, they will have to explain the reasons of their abstention to the UCITS’ 
shareholders . This requirement falls short, however, of compelling fund
394managers to vote .
The impact of the increased role of both foreign and French institutions upon 
listed companies’ policies has already produced its results. As will be seen in 
more detail in the chapter on the regulation of defensive measures in France, a
388 C. Girard, ‘Une Typologie de l’Activisme des Actionnaires Minoritaires en France’ (2001), p. 2, 
available at http://ungaro.u-bourgogpe.fr/WP/1010101 .pdf.
389 Activisme des Actionnaires: Le Cas Particulier des Fonds de Pension, Bull. COB, No. 354 
(February, 2001), p. 27, available at AMF website.
390 i. e. the Association Fran?aise de la Gestion Financiere (hereafter the AFG). The latter is intended 
to improve accountability to shareholders and/or maximise shareholder value.
391 Recommendations on Corporate Governance, AFG-ASFFI (June, 1998), cl. C.4, available at 
AFG-ASFFI website.
392 Code monetaire et financier, art. L. 533-4(1).
393 Code mon6taire et financier, art. L. 533-4(8).
394 Note that article 58 of the Law No. 96/597 of 2 July 1996 had required pension funds to exercise 
the voting rights attaching to the shares they hold in investee companies effectively. The Law No. 
2003/736 of 1 August 2003 has repelled the latter article, however, and the new provisions relating 
to the rules of conduct no longer contain such requirement; see Code mon6taire et financier, art. L. 
533-40.
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number of listed companies have already eliminated their double voting rights in 
order to comply with the ‘one share, one vote’ principle. Thus, the boards of 
French listed companies are becoming aware of the necessity to eradicate some of 
their pre-bid defences in order to avoid being subsequently challenged by the 
institutions. They are further becoming aware that they can no longer introduce 
whatever pre-bid defence suits them. This is evidenced by the fact that, according 
to a survey of 408 general meetings of listed companies in France, the rate of 
resolutions passed at less than 96 per cent has increased since 1992. Resolutions 
designed to retain authority to increase capital during the course of an offer are 
challenged the most. Indeed, they constitute 18 per cent of the totality of the 
resolutions passed at less than 96 per cent395. This shows that the respect of the
'IQ/'
establishment is no longer a priority for institutional investors and that a culture 
of shareholder activism is developing in France, albeit timidly . All the above 
developments are likely to change the traditional ownership pattern in French 
listed companies and thus facilitate hostile takeovers.
Conclusion
The foregoing indicates that the degree of concentration of share ownership and 
the identity of shareholders, as well as the operation of the market for corporate 
control, vary quite markedly in the UK and France. Indeed, unlike in the UK, 
listed firms in France present a more concentrated ownership structure. This, as 
well as other factors such as the widespread use of intercorporate holdings and the 
influence of the State, make the mounting of hostile bids more difficult in France 
than in the UK. However, as noted above, the pre-eminence in France of conflicts 
between the controlling shareholders and their minority counterparts over 
conflicts between the offeree management and the shareholders minimises the 
need to have recourse to hostile bids as a constraint on managerial behaviour. 
Indeed, the existence of large blocks of shares avoids the problem of separation of 
ownership and control, which is prevailing in Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions. But the
395 Activisme des Actionnaires (2001), supra n 389, p. 27.
396 ‘Les Entreprises Red^couvrent les OPA Hostiles’, 468 Option Finance September 29, 1997, p. 
14.
397 Activisme des Actionnaires (2001), supra n 389, p. 27.
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concentration of ownership and control has its own problems: the development of 
a stock exchange calls for new minority shareholders, and these shareholders 
must be assured that their interests, and not only those of the block-holders, are 
taken into account . As will be seen in the following chapters, the French 
takeover regime contains a number of mechanisms to solve the conflicts of 
interests as between the controlling shareholders and their minority counterparts. 
These include the price guarantee procedure, the abus de majorite, and the 
judicial recognition of a duty of loyalty by the controlling shareholders vis-a-vis 
the minority.
In contrast, shareholdings in the UK are often widely dispersed and quoted on a 
public exchange, which provides a liquid market for those who wish to trade in 
such securities399. This in turn makes the conflict of interests as between the 
management and the offeree shareholders predominant in the UK. As a result, 
unlike in France, firms in the UK rely more heavily on the market for corporate 
control as a means of influencing or displacing managers400. This is logical 
because the major differences in the operation of the market for corporate control 
emerge not from public policy differences, but from differences in corporate 
ownership and control401.
Despite the foregoing, it should be noted that the French model of corporate 
governance seems to be edging closer to its UK counterpart in recent years. This 
convergence is brought about by a number of important forces: First, there is an 
increase in the number of listed companies in France. This demonstrates that 
French firms are relying less on bank financing and more on market financing402. 
As a result, the French economy is beginning to operate in the same way as the 
UK economy and is distancing itself from the German and Japanese models of
398 J. M. Garrido and A. Rojo, ‘Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: Solution or 
Problem?’, in Hopt and Wymeersch (eds), Capital Markets and Company Law (OUP, 2003), p. 433.
399 P. L. Davies, ‘Institutional Investors as Corporate Monitors in the UK’ in Hopt and Wymeersch 
(eds), Comparative Corporate Governance: Essays and Materials (Berlin ; New York : Walter de 
Grayer, 1997), p. 48.
400 E. R. Gedajlovic and D. M. Shapiro, ‘Management and Ownership Effects: Evidence From Five 
Countries’ (1998) 19 Strateg. Manage. J. 533, pp. 538-539.
401 Ibid, p. 538.
402 E. Bertero (1994), supra n 307, p. 76.
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capitalism which had, to some extent, previously prevailed403. Secondly, there is 
an increase in the number of individuals owning equity via collective investment 
vehicles404. Indeed, there is a greater institutionalisation of savings, channelled 
through pension funds and unit and investment trusts. The rationale behind this 
phenomenon is that institutional saving offers some risk pooling, as individual 
investment is collectively invested with that of others under the direction of 
specialist managers.405. It should be added that the recent reform in France on 
funded pensions will likely result in a greater investment by pension funds in the 
French stock market. The increasing control of the stock exchange by the 
institutions will likely change the traditional ownership pattern in the French 
stock exchange, and prevent French listed companies from adopting pre-bid 
defences which are value decreasing. Finally, since the late 1990s, the increasing 
competition for stock exchange listings406 are driving French companies towards 
a different style of governance407, which places emphasis on ‘creating shareholder 
value’. The latter demonstrate that the corporate world’s drive for the cheapest 
capital is likely to level all sorts of playing fields408.
403 F. Morin (2000), supra n 305, p. 37.
404 J. Armour, B. R. Cheffins and D. A. Skeel (2002), supra n 269, p. 8.
405 S. Griffith-Jones and J. Cailloux, Encouraging the Long-Term: Institutional Investors and 
Emerging Markets (NY: UN Development Programme, Office of Development Studies, 1998), DP 
No. 16, pp. 3-5.
406 Note that French companies are increasingly seeking listing on foreign exchanges, and in 
particular on US exchanges. Indeed, at the end of 2000, a total of 18 French companies had ADRs 
listed on the NYSE, and a further 14 had ADRs listed on the Nasdaq.
407 H. Sherman (1997), supra n 332, p. 345.
408 ‘From Slow Start to Relentless Build-Up’, The Financial Times, Januaiy 11, 2000.
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Chapter 3 The Regulation of Defensive Measures in the UK
Introduction
Hostile bids are often unwelcome to the board of an offeree company. This is 
because a successful bid usually results in the loss by directors of their control of 
the company and the benefits that flow from it. There is thus a potential for 
conflicts of interest as between the offeree board and the shareholders in the 
context of hostile bids. Because of the latter conflict, most MS in the EU have 
taken a negative approach towards post-bid defensive measures. This is 
particularly the case in the UK, where the divergence of interests between the 
management and the offeree shareholders is solved in favour of the latter once a 
takeover bid is imminent. Indeed, the imposes a duty upon the offeree directors 
not to take steps to frustrate a bona fide offer without the approval of the 
shareholders in general meeting. By significantly reducing the offeree board’s 
discretion to engage in post-bid defensive actions that keep the offer away from 
the shareholders, the Code thus promotes shareholder decision-making. However, 
the offeree management is relatively free to take pre-bid defences, as the latter are 
not regulated by the Code. Pre-bid defences are nevertheless subject to general 
company law and to the stock exchange rules, which will be described below409.
This chapter analyses the defensive measures -  both pre-bid and post-bid - likely 
to be taken by companies listed in the UK. Section I describes the principles 
governing directors’ actions, both prior to and during a bid. Section II gives an 
overview of the permissible pre-bid defences. Section III examines the meaning 
and rationale of the provisions governing post-bid defences. Finally Section IV 
describes the permissible post-bid defences in the UK. Before proceeding, it 
should be noted that this chapter does not deal with the various types of pre-bid 
and post-bid defences which are available in other jurisdictions but which are not 
permissible in the UK.
409 In particular the Listing Rules.
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3.1 Principles Governing Directors’ Actions
On the one hand, directors must be free to operate the company in the risky 
commercial world, but on the other there must be some supervision on the 
exercise of their powers410. As a result, the law requires minimum standards of 
behaviour from directors, with potentially severe penalties in the event of 
breach411. Some of these standards are embodied in statutes and/or in stock 
exchange regulations, which will be considered whilst dealing with individual 
pre-bid defences. Others are judge-made rules. The latter consist of the duty of 
care and the fiduciary duties. Common law fiduciary duties constitute the major 
weapon by which the law regulates company management, and in particular their 
pre-bid actions. As a result, it is worth mentioning the different components of 
these duties.
Before reviewing the common law fiduciary duties, it should be noted, however, 
that the UK government is currently carrying out a major revision of UK 
company law, which will result in a new Companies Act. Part of this revision 
concerns directors’ fiduciary duties, which have been reformulated and 
incorporated in statute412. Following the introduction of the new Act, the existing 
common law fiduciary rules will be replaced by statutory fiduciary duties, though 
the courts will be allowed to develop the existing rules by reference to particular 
cases413. It is noteworthy, however, that the proposed Act does not contain any 
specific reference to the duties of directors in the context of takeovers.
There are several facets of directors’ fiduciary duties. These are the duty of 
loyalty, the duty to exercise their powers for a proper purpose414, the duty not to 
fetter their future discretion, and the duty not to place themselves in a position in 
which there would be a conflict between their duties to the company and their
410 T. Paton, ‘Codification of Corporate Law in the UK and European Union: The Need for the 
Australian Approach’ (2000) I.C.C.L.R. 309, p. 310.
411 J. H. Farrar, Farrar's Company Law (London: Butterworths, 4* ed., 1998), p. 377.
412 Modernising Company Law (2002), supra n 296, Schedule 2.
413 Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Completing the Structure, URN 00/1335 
(November, 2000), p. 45, available at DTI website.
414 Hereafter the proper purpose duty.
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personal interests415. The most important of these for our purposes are that a 
director must ‘ exercise his powers in the way he believes in good faith is best 
calculated in the circumstances [...] to promote the success o f  the company for  
the benefit o f  its members as a whole,416, and that a director must use his powers 
for the purposes for which they were conferred upon him. These two duties are 
frequently referred to by UK courts whilst dealing with directors’ pre-bid actions.
As far as the duty to act bona fide is concerned, the test is a subjective one in that 
the court must consider whether the director believed he was acting for the benefit 
of the members as a whole417. As far as the proper purpose duty is concerned, this 
must be ascertained largely by reference to the company’s articles of association 
and, relevantly, any affecting legislation418. However, it is not possible to 
determine in advance the limits beyond which directors cannot pass in exercising 
a particular power. As a result, every case depends upon a scrutiny of its own 
relevant facts, though the nature of the power in question affects the intensity with 
which a court reviews directors’ acts. For instance, directors’ power to acquire or 
sell assets are not as easily challenged by the courts as, say, their power to issue 
shares419. Indeed, Prichard J held in a New Zealand case that 'in the case o f  [...] 
the power to issue shares [...] the broad line is comparatively narrow: the 
purpose fo r  which such power is intended is well defined and it is restricted in
It should be emphasised that the proper purpose test is a different and additional 
test from the bona fide test. This is often overlooked by the courts, however, 
which either refer to these two tests interchangeably or give pre-eminence to one
415 e.g. the duty not to use for their own profit the company’s assets, opportunities or information.
416 Note that, in its Final Report, the CLR removed the ambiguities generated by the previous 
reference to ‘the interests of the company’ in the common law formulation by replacing it with the 
words ‘for the benefit of the members as a whole’. By recognising the ‘legitimate interests of 
stakeholders’, the CLR has thus opted for the enlightened shareholder value approach of the 
company, which offers something to both the shareholder value and the stakeholder camps; see P. L. 
Davies (2003), supra n 239, p. 269.
417 S. Griffin, Company Law - Fundamental Principles (London: Longman, 3rd ed., 1994), pp. 248- 
249.
418 B. S. Butcher, Directors’ Duties: A New Millennium, a New Approach? (Boston: Kluwer Law 
International, 2000), p. 114.
419 P. Little, Law o f Company Takeovers (North Ryde, NSW: LBC Information Services, 1997), p. 
528.
420 Baigent v DMcL Wallace Ltd [1984] NZ CLC 96-011.
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of them. For instance, in Punt v Symons & Co Ltd*21, where the directors issued 
shares to create a sufficient majority to enable them to pass a special resolution 
depriving some shareholders of special rights conferred on them by the 
company’s articles of association, Byrne J gave pre-eminence to the bona fide 
test. He held
iA limited issue o f shares to persons who obviously meant and intended to secure the necessary 
statutory majority in a particular interest was not a fair and bona fide exercise o f the power to 
issue shares'.
By contrast, in Hogg v Cramphorn422, where the directors of a company faced 
with a takeover established a trust and issued to the trustees sufficient shares to 
defeat the takeover423, Buckley J gave pre-eminence to the proper purpose test. 
Indeed, he stated that, if exercised for an improper motive - namely to maintain 
the directors in control - the issue could be set aside for breach of fiduciary duty. 
He further held that the directors’ honest belief that their command of the 
majority of the votes in general meeting would benefit the company could not 
justify the issue.
Subsequently, in Bamford v Bamford*24, the court once again relied on the bona 
fide test. In this case, the directors of a company issued 500,000 shares to one of 
the principal distributors of the company’s products. They did so primarily for the 
purpose of forestalling a takeover bid, though by virtue of a power vested in them 
by the articles of association. Harman LJ held that the issue was made in breach 
of directors’ duty to act bona fide in the interests of the company. In his words, 
the directors made the issue 'with an eye primarily on the exigencies o f  the 
takeover war and not with a single eye to the benefit o f  the company\ Thus, this 
case, along with the above-mentioned Punt v Symons, considers that directors
421 [1903] 2 Ch. 506.
422 [1967] Ch. 254.
423 Note that the Code was not adopted yet at the time of this case. As a result, although the case 
involved a post-bid defence, the validity of the latter was judged upon by the courts, by reference to 
the common law.
424 [1970] Ch. 212, CA.
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will be deemed to have exercised their powers validly so long as they exercise 
them honestly425.
In Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd*26, the Privy Council seized the 
opportunity to review the whole question. In this case, directors of a company 
threatened with a takeover issued a large number of shares to a shareholder, with 
a view to rendering the bidders a minority in the company. The directors did so by 
virtue of a power to issue shares 'to such persons on such terms and conditions 
[...] as the directors might th in k fif , vested in them by the articles of association. 
Lord Wilberforce laid down the correct approach as follows:
7/ is necessary to start with a consideration o f the power whose exercise is in question, in this 
case a power to issue shares. Having ascertained, on a fair view, the nature o f this power, and 
having defined as can best be done in the light o f modern conditions the, or some, limits within 
which it may be exercised, it is then necessary for the court, i f  a particular exercise o f it is 
challenged, to examine the substantial purpose for which it was exercised, and to reach a 
conclusion whether that purpose was proper or not. In doing so, it will necessarily give credit to 
the bona fide opinion o f the directors, ifsuch is found to exist, and will respect their judgment as 
to matters o f management; having done this, the ultimate conclusion has to be as to the side o f a 
fairly broad line on which the case falls'.
The above ruling is noteworthy in two respects: First, it clearly distinguishes the 
bona fide and the proper purpose tests, and gives pre-eminence to the proper 
purpose test427. The latter has the advantage of allowing the courts to review 
directors’ acts upon a more objective basis. This, in turn, offers UK courts of a 
more interventionist disposition an opportunity to consider the decision itself 
rather than simply the decision-making process, and thus gives rise to the review 
of business judgments, long considered anathema to the UK judiciary428.
However, a case decided following Howard Smith cast doubt on the pre-eminence 
of the proper purpose test in UK courts. Indeed, in Cayne v Global Natural 
Resources pic*29, Megarry V-C held
425 R. C. Nolan, ‘The Proper Purpose Doctrine and Company Directors’, in B. A. K. Rider (ed.), The 
Realm o f Company Law (Kluwer Law International, 1998), p. 7.
426 [1974] 1 All E.R. 1126.
427 It should be noted that, even following Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum, the bona fide test 
continued to outweigh in some Commonwealth jurisdictions. See Pine Vale Investments Ltd v 
McDonnell [1983] 1 ACLC 1, 294; and Baigent v DMcL Wallace Ltd [1984] NZ CLC 96-011 (High 
Court of New Zealand).
428 B. S. Butcher (2000), supra n 418, p. 119.
429 12.8.82, unreported.
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‘In Hogg v Cramphorn, it was held that the honest belief did not prevent the motive for issuing 
the shares from being an improper motive. [...] This principle must not be carried too far. I f  
company A and Company B are in business competition, and Company A acquires a large 
holding o f shares in company B with the object o f running company B down so as to lessen its 
competition, [...] the directors o f company B might well come to the honest conclusion that it 
was contrary to the best interests o f company B to allow company A to effect its purpose. If, 
then, the directors issue further shares in company B in order to maintain their control o f 
company B for the purpose o f defeating company A ’s plans [ ...] !  cannot see why that should not 
be a perfectly proper exercise o f the fiduciary powers o f the directors o f company B. The object 
is not to retain control as such, but to prevent company B from being reduced to impotence and 
beggary, and the only means available to the directors for achieving this purpose is to retain 
control'.
A subsequent decision by UK courts seemed emphatic as to the dominance of the 
proper purpose test over the bona fide test430. In this case, the incumbent directors 
entered into a long-term management agreement with a third party knowing that 
the shareholders were proposing to exercise their rights to appoint new directors. 
Dillon J held
‘The crucial question is whether it was within the directors’ powers at all to commit the 
company to the management agreement, however much they may have thought it in that 
company’s best interests to thwart the intention o f the shareholders'.
However, a more recent case indicates that the UK courts might back away from 
the ruling in Howard Smith is Criterion Properties pic v Stratford UK Properties 
LLC431. In this case, Oaktree, a US company, and Criterion, a UK pic, were 
parties to a joint venture for investment in real property in the UK. The terms of 
their partnership were subsequently changed, with a view to protecting Criterion 
against a possible takeover and change of management432. The CA upheld the 
High Court of Justice’s433 decision that the agreement was outside the powers of 
the directors of Criterion, on the grounds that the agreement went far beyond 
anything which could be justified for the purpose of deterring an unwelcome 
predator434. At the same time, however, the CA held
‘Had the agreement been so drafted as to be confined to the purpose o f seeing off a particular 
predator, the present dispute would not have arisen .
430 Lee Panavision v Lee Lighting Ltd [1992] B.C.L.C. 22 (CA).
431 [2003] BCC 50.
432 Indeed, Oaktree was given the right to have its interest in the joint venture to be bought out, on 
very favourable terms, in the event of another party gaining control of Criterion.
433 [2003] BCC 50.
434 Indeed, the buy-back right could be triggered not only upon a hostile bid, but even upon the 
departure of the chairman of Criterion due to death or misconduct.
78
This shows that the CA was ready to accept a narrower version of the measure in 
question which, although having an anti-takeover effect, nevertheless had a 
commercial purpose. Thus, the ruling in Criterion goes some way towards 
supporting a restriction on the scope of Howard Smith.
The second noteworthiness of the ruling in Howard Smith is that it lays down a 
second test within the proper purpose test, namely the substantial purpose test. 
Indeed, the Privy Council further held in that case that, although the company 
would benefit from the capital raised from the issue to Howard Smith, the 
dominant purpose behind such issue was an improper one, namely the 
manipulation of voting control in favour of Howard Smith. It should be noted in 
this respect that both the substantial purpose test and the judgment in Cayne & 
Anr and Criterion, which reduce the strictness of Howard Smith by relying on the 
bona fide test, suggest a weakness of the proper purpose test to prevent pre-bid 
defences in the UK435.
It should be noted that fiduciary duties are, as a general rule, owed to the 
company, not to the shareholders individually. This is the much-criticized 
doctrine of Percival v Wright436. In this case, the shareholders of a company 
offered to sell their shares to the chairman of the board and two other directors, 
who agreed to buy them at £12.50 per share. After completion of the sale of their 
shares, the shareholders discovered that, at the time, the board had been 
negotiating the sale of the company, at a price which represented well over £12.50 
per share, and that this information had not been disclosed to them. The 
shareholders claimed that the directors stood in a fiduciary relationship towards 
them, and sought to reverse the sale of their shares on the ground of non­
disclosure. Swinfen Eady J thought, however, that the purchasing directors were 
under no obligation to disclose the negotiations437 to their vendor shareholders. 
He held
435 P. L. Davies, ‘The Board of Directors: Composition, Structure, Duties and Powers’, Company 
Law Reform in OECD Countries: A Comparative Outlook of Current Trends (2000), pp. 10-11, 
available at OECD website.
436 [1902] 2 Ch 421 (Ch.). Note that the Percival doctrine has been incorporated into the new 
Companies Bill; see the Companies Bill, Part 2, Ch. 2,19(2).
437 Note that in the event these ultimately proved abortive.
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‘ The contrary view would place directors in a most invidious position, as they could not buy or 
sell shares without disclosing negotiations, a premature disclosure o f which might well be 
against the best interests o f the company'.
This view was later upheld in Dawson International Pic v Coats Paton Plc43i, 
where Lord Cullen held that the ‘directors have but one master, the company\
The rationale behind the Percival doctrine is that, as a general rule, it is important 
for the well being of a company that the directors are not overexposed to the risk 
of multiple legal actions by dissenting minority shareholders. This doctrine has, 
however, been subject to significant judicial and academic critical comment, 
which resulted in the recognition that directors may in particular circumstances 
owe fiduciary duties to the shareholders individually439. In this respect, it is worth 
mentioning a case of the New Zealand CA, where Woodhouse J described these 
particular circumstances in the following terms
'The standard o f conduct requiredfrom a director in relation to dealings with a shareholder will 
differ depending upon [...] the nature o f the responsibility which [...] the director has assumed 
towards the shareholders [...] Factors that will usually have an influence [...] include 
dependence upon information and advice, the existence o f a relationship o f confidence, [and/ 
the significance o f some particular transaction for the parties' 44°.
An example where shareholders were found to depend on the directors for 
information and advice is provided by the case of Briess v Woolley441. In this 
case, the managing director of an offeree company was authorised by the 
shareholders to negotiate the sale of their shares to a potential offeror. Meantime, 
he purchased offeree shares, knowing that the offeror was proposing to increase 
its offer but hiding that fact from the shareholders. That director was held by the 
House of Lords to stand in a fiduciary relationship towards the offeree 
shareholders. Another example where directors were found to be in direct and 
close contact with the shareholders in a manner capable of generating fiduciary 
duties is provided by the case of Peskin v Anderson442. In this case, the motoring 
services business of the Royal Automobile Club was sold following its de­
438 [1988] 4 B.C.C. 305.
439 Circumstances where directors’ conduct of a company’s affairs will be regarded as placing them
in a fiduciary position towards shareholders usually occur in the context of takeovers; see P. L.
Davies, Introduction to Company Law (Clarendon Law Series, 2002), p. 232.
440 Coleman v Myers [1977] 2 N.Z.L.R. 225.
441 [1954] 1 All E.R. 909.
442 [2001] 1 B.C.L.C.
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mutualisation by scheme of arrangement. All members received a payment of 
£34,131 for their interest in the business. Former members of the Club, who had 
withdrawn their membership prior to the de-mutualisation, brought an action for 
damages against the directors, on the grounds that the latter breached their 
fiduciary duty to disclose the plans relating to the de-mutualisation443. It should 
be noted, however, that, despite the above examples, the courts in the UK are 
unlikely to accept that directors owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders in the 
case of takeovers of listed companies. Instead, they are more likely to hold that 
directors owe a duty of care to shareholders, in particular where the offeree 
directors give advice to offeree shareholders about a takeover bid444. Indeed, in 
Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd*45, the House of Lords held that 
a duty of care is owed by a person possessed of special skill who provides 
information or advice to another whom he knows, or ought to know, will rely on 
his skill and judgment. Thus, an offeree shareholder who relies on a directors’ 
circular which is misleading may have a cause of action for damages against the 
offeree directors on the basis of negligent misrepresentation.
3.2 Permissible Pre-Bid Defences
Companies that have not received an offer but that are potentially at risk of 
receiving one may resort to pre-bid defences. In doing so, the actions of the 
directors are not restricted by the Code, since the latter applies only once a bid is 
imminent. Directors’ actions are however restricted by the fiduciary duties 
described above. Because of the above-mentioned weakness of the proper purpose 
test, however, directors of listed companies may seem to have a significant 
discretion under the UK law to undertake pre-bid actions so as to make their firms 
‘takeover-proof. However, as will be seen below, directors’ pre-bid actions are 
further subject to the statutory company law and the regulations laid down by the 
Stock Exchange. It should be noted from the outset that the following gives an
443 See also Re Chez Nico (Restaurants) Ltd [1991] B.C.C. 736, p. 750, where the directors were 
held to be under a fiduciary duty of disclosure to the shareholders.
444 In particular in documents issued by them in relation to the takeover; see S. Deakin, R. Hobbs, D. 
Nash and G. Slinger, ‘Implicit Contracts, Takeovers, and Corporate Governance: In the Shadow of 
the City Code’ (2002), available at http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP254.pdf (2002), p. 10.
445 [1964] AC 465 (HL 1963).
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overview of only those pre-bid defences whose use is constrained by the statutes 
and regulations. It should also be borne in mind that the following pre-bid 
defences may also be deployed during the course of a bid, provided they are 
approved by shareholders. This would, however, provide little or no protection to 
management, as the outcome would be left in the hands of offeree shareholders.
3.2.1 Disclosure
The disclosure requirements embodied in the statutes and regulations may act as a 
pre-bid defence. For instance, the statutory requirement to disclose beneficial 
ownership of the voting shares when a threshold of three per cent of the share 
capital has been reached, or when the level of interest in the shares has changed 
by an integral percentage point, whilst above the three per cent threshold446, 
serves to alert companies about potential offerors. Likewise, the SARs 
requirement that share acquisitions which result in the holding of fifteen per cent 
of the voting rights be notified to the company and to the stock exchange also 
serves to alert potential offeree companies447.
3.2.2 Non-Voting Preference Shares, Voting Caps, and Shares 
with Double Voting Rights
Companies in the UK may issue common or preferred shares with enhanced, 
restricted448, or non-voting rights. The latter serve to limit the ability of an offeror 
to control the passing of shareholder resolutions. The rationale for allowing the 
issue of such shares in the UK is two-fold: First, such shares serve to effect a 
desired allocation of control in important companies, which thus remain in UK 
hands449. Secondly, it was thought that the imposition of a ‘one-share-one-vote’ 
principle would be unduly restrictive450. Even the CLR has suggested that the 
freedom of companies to issue shares with multiple votes, or none, should not be
446 CA 1985, ss.198-199, as amended by the 1989 Act.
447 SARs, r.3.
448 These limit the number of votes to which a shareholder is entitled, irrespective of his stake in the 
capital of the company.
449 G. O. Barboutis, ‘Takeover Defence Tactics Part II: Specific Defensive Devices’ (1999) 20 Co. 
Law. 40, p. 45.
450 Jenkins Report, para 136. For the background to this Report, see subsection 3.3.2(ii) below.
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restricted by statute and that any limit on their use should be for market 
regulation, not company law451.
Companies are also allowed to list such shares, though the London Stock 
Exchange strongly disapproves of them. To do so, companies must include in 
their particulars a summary of the rights attaching to the shares for which 
application is made, and 'in particular the extent o f  the voting rights [...] and any 
other special rights'1452. It should be noted, however, that differential voting 
structures have become less common in listed companies, as market sentiment has 
turned against them453. Indeed, many companies with separate voting and non­
voting share classes, such as Great Universal Stores or WH Smith454, have unified 
their capital structure by agreement to a one-share-one-vote structure455. It should 
be noted in this respect that the proposed Fifth Directive456, if ultimately adopted, 
would likely put an end to such shares, given its requirement that all companies 
endorse the one-share-one-vote principle.
3.2.3 Issue of Authorised but Unissued Shares
The issue of shares is normally intended to raise capital. However, directors often 
issue new shares to preserve their own control or to ward off a potential takeover 
bid. This is usually done by issuing shares to a friendly shareholder, to another 
company with which the potential offeree company has a close commercial 
relationship, or to a pension fund. The effectiveness of the latter lies in the fact 
that the trustees of a company’s pension fund are generally either employees of 
the company or persons appointed by the directors and will generally be only too 
willing to please the directors457. There are, however, a number of requirements
451 Modem Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Completing the Structure (2000), supra n 
413, p. 87.
452 Listing Rules, Ch. 6, r. 6.B.7.
453 Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Developing the Framework (March, 2000), 
p. 140, available at DTI website.
54 ‘John Laing Gives Shareholders the Vote’, The Financial Times, March 24,2000.
455 G. McCormack, ‘Institutional Shareholders and the Promotion of Good Corporate Governance’ 
in B. A. K. Rider (ed.), The Realm o f Company Law (Kluwer Law International, 1998), p.155.
456 Second Amendment to the proposal for a Fifth Council Directive concerning the structure of 
public limited companies, COM (90) 629 final -  SYN 3, OJ C 7/4, 11/1/91, art. 33.
57 M. A. Weinberg and M V. Blank, Weinberg and Blank on Take-overs and Mergers (London: 
Sweet and Maxwell, 4th ed., 1979), p. 584. Note, however, that the trustees may be sued by the
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that the directors must comply with in order to resort to this defence: First, the 
law requires the board of directors to either be expressly authorised by the articles 
of association or obtain shareholder authorisation in general meeting458. Secondly, 
where the shares are issued for cash, they must first be offered to the existing 
shareholders on a pro rata basis, pursuant to their statutory pre-emption rights459. 
The latter have 'an important effect on under-performing management by limiting 
their access to equity'460.
Listed companies may, however, dis-apply pre-emption rights by passing a 
special resolution each year461, and routinely do so for a rolling five year 
period462. The rationale behind allowing companies to do so is that pre-emption 
rights deny companies access to alternative investors with a greater growth 
orientation who might therefore put a higher value on longer-term higher-risk 
growth opportunities463. However, a Pre-emption Group464, which was founded 
following opposition by institutional shareholders to the dis-application of pre­
emption rights465, issued guidelines which further restrict listed companies’ ability 
to dis-apply pre-emption rights. Indeed, under the guidelines, the issue size is 
restricted to five per cent of the ordinary share capital in any one-year and to 7.5 
per cent cumulatively in any three-year period. In addition, the issue discount is 
restricted to five per cent of the mid-price between the best bid and offer prices466.
The above guidelines protect the existing shareholders from the dilution of their 
financial position in the company. Indeed, in the case of discounted non- 
preemptive issues, the cost of the discount is borne by the existing
beneficiaries of the fund or trust for damages for improper administration of the trust, where they 
reject a bid unwelcome to the directors and the share price plunges, or where they accept the lower 
of two bids.
458 s.80. This requirement goes back to the Jenkins Report; see para 122(h).
459 s.89(l) and Listing Rules, Ch. 9, r. 9.18.
460 Modern Company Law: Developing the Framework (2000), supra n 453, p. 144.
461 Listing Rules, Ch. 9, r. 9.20.
462 Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Developing the Framework (2000), supra n 
453, p. 144.
463 Underwriting Services for Share Offers, Competition Commission, Cm. 4168 (February, 1999), p. 
21, available at Competition Commission website.
464 This was established in 1987 and was made up of the representatives of the Investment 
Committees of the trade associations of the traditional institutions, the Stock Exchange, and the 
corporate sector.
465 G. McCormack (1998), supra n 455, p. 155.
466 Underwriting Services for Share Offers (1999), supra n 463, p. 55.
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shareholders467. At the same time, however, the restriction of the issue discount 
makes it difficult for the management to pursue a strategy of issuing deeply 
discounted shares to new friendly investors as part of an implicit bargain whereby 
the new investors would support the incumbent management.
Boards of listed companies in the UK may also legally put in place poison pills. 
These are shareholder rights plans which entitle their holders to special rights and 
privileges if the issuing firm becomes the subject of a takeover bid468. These are 
likely to make a company less attractive to potential offerors. For the existence of 
such rights makes it more difficult for potential offerors to establish the relative 
value of each class of share capital. More importantly, they make it prohibitively 
expensive for a hostile offeror to take over a company, unless the issuing firm’s 
board of directors redeems the pills469. However, the rules on pre-emption 
rights470; the requirement for shareholder approval for transactions involving 
more than twenty-five per cent of a company’s asset value471; and the directors’ 
proper purpose duty all mean that a board in the UK is hard pressed to craft a pill 
sufficiently poisonous to deter an offeror without shareholders’ approval472. For 
instance, in Criterion Properties, the adoption of a poison pill with a view to 
deterring a particular bidder was held by the CA to constitute an abuse by the 
directors of their powers473. It should further be noted that shareholders in UK 
companies have shown no enthusiasm generally to encourage such pills474.
467 P. L. Davies (2003), supra n 239, p. 279.
468 P. H. Malatesta and R. A. Walkling, ‘Poison Pill Securities: Stockholder Wealth, Profitability, 
and Ownership Structure’ (1988) 20 J. Fin. Econ. 347, p. 347.
469 For these will have the effect of considerably expanding the equity which the offeror must 
acquire.
470 CA, ss.89-95.
471 Listing Rules, Chs.10 and 11.
472 J. Armour, S. Deakin and S. Konzelmann, ‘A Post-Stakeholder World? Reflections on the Recent 
Evolution and Future Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance’, 3CL/CBR Conference, Faculty of 
Law, University of Cambridge, Using Law to Promote Competitiveness and Enterprise: Will 
Corporate Law Deliver?, 4 July 2002, p. 6.
473 [2003] B.C.C. 50, CA.
474 A. Paul, ‘Corporate Governance in the Context of Takeovers of UK Public Companies’, in D. D. 
Prentice and P. R. J. Holland (eds), Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance, (Oxford, 1993), 
p. 140. Even in the US, the overwhelming majority of proposals sponsored by institutional investors 
concern rescission of poison pills; see R. Romano, ‘Less is More: Making Institutional Investor 
Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance’ (2001) 18 Yale Journal on Regulation 
174, p. 196
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3.2.4 Share Buy-Backs
Offeree boards in the UK may carry out share buy-backs if authorised to do so by 
the articles of association or upon shareholder authorisation in general meeting. 
This defence serves to increase the company’s share price and thus to deter 
shareholders from selling their shares to a potential offeror475. However, such 
authorisation cannot exceed a period of more than eighteen months 476. 
Furthermore, only purchases of less than fifteen per cent of any class of the equity 
shares may be made through the market, and this, only if  the price to be paid is no 
more than five per cent above the average of the market values of such shares for 
the five business days before the purchase is made477. By contrast, purchases of 
fifteen per cent or more of the equity shares must be made by way of either a 
tender or a partial offer to all shareholders of that class on the same terms478. 
Listed companies must further comply with the informal guidelines issued by 
institutional investors’ trade associations, if they wish to avoid infuriating the 
institutions. These guidelines contain stricter requirements than the statutes and 
the stock exchange regulations. For instance, the ABI guidelines require listed 
companies to seek authority from the general meeting every twelve months and to 
limit their repurchase to a maximum of ten per cent of their issued capital per 
year. The ABI guidelines are designed to protect the interests of shareholders by 
putting a limit on the increase in gearing which occurs as a result of any share 
buy-back. Notwithstanding the above restrictions, only in 1995-1996, £1.4 billion 
worth of share buy-backs were conducted in the UK market by listed 
companies479, and seeking permission from the shareholders at a company’s 
AGM has become a routine practice even if there is no immediate intention to use 
it.
It should be noted that, until recently, companies were required to cancel the 
shares repurchased. However, a reform in 2003 gave companies power to hold
475 Creation de Valeur Actionnariale (2000), supra n 354, p. 6.
476 ss.l59ff.
477 Listing Rules, Ch. 15, r.15.6.
478 Listing Rules, Ch.15, r.15.7.
479 B. Pettet, ‘Share Buy-Backs’, in B. A. K. Rider (ed.), The Corporate Dimension: An Exploration 
o f Developing Areas o f Company and Commercial Law (Bristol: Jordans, 1998), p. 243.
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such shares in treasury for resale at some later date480. This represents a 
significant shift from the old regime. Thus, companies in need of fresh capital 
may henceforth sell shares from treasury481 in small lots, as and when it suits 
them, without the costs of a new issue of shares482. This in turn gives companies 
greater flexibility in managing their share capital and helps them reduce their 
overall cost of capital 483. Allowing companies to hold treasury shares is 
particularly useful for companies with substantial cash. For such companies are 
likely to be subject to a bid from a raider willing to strip the company out of its 
assets. Such companies may thus purchase their own shares and subsequently 
resell them to friendly third parties without resorting to shareholder approval. By 
doing so, they may dilute a potential offeror’s stake in the company and thus alter 
the balance of power within the company. However, the aggregate nominal value 
of treasury shares cannot at any time exceed ten per cent of the nominal value of 
the issued share capital of the company. If that maximum is exceeded at any time, 
the excess shall be automatically cancelled. Furthermore, companies holding 
treasury shares cannot exercise any rights in respect of treasury shares, including 
the right to attend and vote at general meetings484. Moreover, companies holding 
treasury shares cannot pay any dividend in respect of treasury shares485.
It should further be noted that share buy-backs might have the effect of increasing 
one’s stake in the company so as to trigger the Code’s mandatory bid rule. In such 
circumstances, that controlling shareholder usually seeks a waiver from the 
mandatory bid requirement. The PIRC486’s Shareholder Voting Guidelines advise, 
however, that waivers should not be approved if there is the potential that a 
controlling shareholder’s stake could increase beyond fifty per cent487. Guidelines 
issued by such institutional investors as PIRC should not be underestimated. It
480 The Companies (Acquisition of Own Shares) (Treasury Shares) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/1116. 
Note, however, that, as under the old regime, companies may cancel the repurchased shares and 
return cash to their shareholders. Furthermore, they may use such shares to launch a counter-offer on 
the offeree company.
481 Note that the law prohibits the sale of treasury shares whilst a company is subject to a takeover 
bid.
482 K. Birkett, ‘Treasury Shares: Worth the Wait?’ (2003) 14 P.L.C. 10, p. 10.
483 Treasury Shares, A Consultative Document (September, 2001), p. 2, available at DTI website.
484 Ibid, p. 6.
485 Ibid, p. 7.
486 This is a UK body which advises institutional shareholders on matters of corporate governance. It 
was established in 1986 by a consortium of UK local-authority pension funds.
487 Part 5, p. 15.
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does not necessarily follow, however, that all shareholders will inevitably follow 
these guidelines. Indeed, shareholders of Colt Telecom were called upon in 2001 
to vote at an extraordinary meeting on a waiver of the mandatory bid rule to allow 
Fidelity's holding to rise above fifty per cent without making a mandatory bid for 
Colt. PIRC was opposed to the deal and accordingly advised opposition to the 
waiver of the mandatory bid rule, on the ground that Fidelity would achieve 
majority control of Colt without paying a premium to the existing shareholders. 
Nevertheless, most Colt shareholders voted in favour of the resolution, given that 
the company needed the extra cash to support its business plan and there was no
i n n
alternative fundraising option on the table .
3.2.5 Cross Shareholdings
This technique, whereby a company has an interest in another company which, in 
turn, has an interest in the former, allows companies to form strategic alliances 
with others. Such shareholdings may be used by companies to internalise their 
transactions with the providers of a critical input in circumstances where there are 
high asset specificity and transaction frequency489. They may also be used to 
make it more difficult for an offeror to buy a controlling stake in a company. 
Despite the latter risk, the law does not regulate this defence on the grounds that 
many cross-holdings are advantageous for all the shareholders concerned and that 
it would not be right to prohibit them all490. In addition, any provision would 
necessarily be complex and arbitrary491. Furthermore, companies would easily 
ward off bids by pre-emptively acquiring shares in potential predators, which 
would render them immune from takeovers492. Moreover, it is believed that, as a 
result of the compulsory disclosure requirements, investors and prospective
488 L. Vaughan-Adams, ‘Colt Telecom May Face Opposition from Shareholders Over Fundraising 
Plan’, The Independent, November 19,2001.
489 S. Thomsen and T. Pedersen, ‘Ownership Structure and Economic Performance in the Largest 
European Companies’ (2000) 21 Strateg. Manage. J. 689, pp. 693-694.
490 Jenkins Report, para 153.
491 In particular, there would be considerable problems of definition if, for instance, two companies 
simultaneously were to obtain holdings of, say, 20 per cent in each other. Indeed, it is difficult to 
determine in such a case which company should lose its voting rights; see ibid.
492 R. Nolan, ‘The Veil Intact’ (1995) 16 Co. Law. 180, p. 180.
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investors become aware of the existence of cross and circular holdings493. As a 
result of the latter rationales, UK companies can resort to cross shareholdings 
without shareholder approval.
However, the law prohibits a company from being a member of its holding 
company494. The weakness of this prohibition lies, however, in the fact that it 
does not prohibit company B, which already holds a non-controlling interest in 
company A, from continuing to hold shares in company A following the 
acquisition by company A of a controlling interest in company B. In other words, 
if company B owns shares in company A and company A buys all the shares in 
company B and turns it into a subsidiary, company B may continue to hold shares 
in its parent. This issue can be illustrated by the case of Acatos & Hutcheson pic v 
Watson495, where Acatos & Hutcheson pic wished to acquire all the issued share 
capital of a company called Acatos Ltd, whose only asset was a 29.4 per cent 
shareholding in the acquiring company itself. Lightman J held that the proposed 
transaction was not contrary to s.23, on the grounds that s.23 does not prohibit a 
company -  in the present case Acatos Ltd - from acquiring shares in another 
company -  in the present case Acatos & Hutcheson pic - which subsequently 
becomes its holding company, and the company which is now a subsidiary496 may 
continue to hold shares in its parent.
3.2.6 Other Permissible Pre-Bid Defences
Other pre-bid defences commonly used in the UK include the distribution of 
exceptional dividends; the conclusion of shareholder agreements 497 ; the
493 If such holdings are used by the directors to pursue policies which are oppressive, the outside 
shareholders may resort to the ‘unfair prejudice’ remedy embodied in s.459 of the CA 1985; see 
ibid.
494 s.23.
495 [1995] BCC 446.
496 i. e. Acatos Ltd.
497 Most recently, Paul Reichman, the founder and 8.9 per cent shareholder of the property company 
Canary Wharf concluded a pact with Brascan, a 9 per cent shareholder, with a view to thwarting the 
bid made by a consortium for the shares of Canary Wharf. The pact consisted of backing the other’s 
bid, and if both fail, of not selling their shares to ‘certain types of transactions’ until a certain date; 
see ‘Canary Bid Pact Facing Takeover Panel Threat’, The Evening Standard, December 30,2003.
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introduction of change of control clauses498 in documents; the granting of large 
termination compensation packages to senior executives499; and the disposal of 
strategic assets to make the offeree company less attractive. Since the object of an 
offer is to gain control over the assets of a company, the latter defence is likely to 
deter potential offerors from making an offer500. However, boards of listed 
companies must seek prior approval of their shareholders in general meeting 
where such disposals classify as ‘significant transactions’501. A disposal will be 
classified as such where its size relative to that of the listed company proposing to 
make it presents a percentage ratio of twenty-five per cent or more. It should be 
noted, however, that such a transaction may be characterised by the courts as an 
improper use by directors’ of their powers502.
3.2.7 Structural Factors
Structural factors likely to deter hostile bids are relatively unimportant in the UK. 
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning the presence of golden shares in some large 
UK companies. These shares allow the State to preserve control over the 
management of privatised companies, by way of conferring on the State power to 
either restrict shareholdings or veto the disposal of material assets. However, this 
pre-bid defence is not as widely used in the UK as in France. Indeed, the number 
of golden shares held by the UK government in privatised companies has reduced 
over the years . There are currently 24 companies with golden shares, including 
BAE systems, Rolls-Royce, British Energy pic504. It should be noted in this 
respect that the UK government’s golden share in BAA505, which conferred on 
the Secretary of State for Transport power to veto the acquisition of more than 
fifteen per cent of the voting shares, has been ruled illegal by the ECJ506. This is 
because the share in question restricted the free movement of capital. However,
498 Such clauses allow the co-contractor to terminate the contract upon a change of control. These
are usually found in contracts with strong intuitus personae, such as loan agreements, which would
discourage a potential offeror where the amount of the loan is significant.
499 These are likely to reduce the offeree board’s hostility to an unsolicited takeover.
500 M. A. Weinberg and M. V. Blank (1979), supra n 457, p. 600.
501 These are principally acquisitions and disposals; see Listing Rules, Ch. 10.
502 See e. g. below die Land Securities Investment Company/Savoy Hotel Company case.
503 ‘Golden Shares’, ECJ Press release No. 24, July 3,2001, available at europa website.
504 J. Morris ‘Golden Shares: Getting Tarnished?’ (2003) 14 P.L.C. 14, p. 14.
505 i. e. the airport operator.
506 Commission o f the European Communities v United Kingdom [2003] 2 C. M. L. Rev. 19.
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the share in question restricted the free movement of capital. However, the latter 
ruling by no means amounts to a complete ban on all forms of golden shares. 
Indeed, the UK remains free to adopt such shares provided that they are limited in 
time and scope, and that they relate to industries of national interest. It should be 
added that, these shares do not contravene the Listing Rules’ requirement that a 
company seeking a listing provide in its articles that its shares are freely
C A T
transferable . For third-party approvals to share transfers are admitted in the UK 
when such approvals are contemplated by the law, as in the case of golden 
shares508.
The foregoing demonstrates that directors of listed companies have a wide range 
of devices at their disposal to deter takeover bids, and the general company law is 
not particularly effective to reduce directors’ discretion in this area. However, the 
Listing Rules and the UK institutions’ policies on such issues as pre-emption 
rights, non-voting shares, and share buy-backs have all served to limit the use of 
pre-bid defences in the UK.
3.3 Regulation of Post-Bid Defences
As far as post-bid defences are concerned, the present policy in the UK is to 
sideline the incumbent management in the takeover process. This policy is 
embodied in General Principle 7509 of the Code, which is referred to as the ‘ no 
frustrating action’ rule. The latter reads
'At no time after a bona fide offer has been communicated to the board o f the offeree company, 
or after the board o f the offeree company has reason to believe that a bona fide offer might be 
imminent, may any action be taken by the board o f the offeree company in relation to the affairs 
o f the company, without the approval o f the shareholders in general meeting, which could 
effectively result in any bona fide o^fer being frustrated or in the shareholders being denied an 
opportunity to decide on its merits'
507 Listing Rules, Ch. 3, r. 3.15.
508 G. A. Ferrarini, ‘Share Ownership, Takeover Law and the Contestability of Corporate Control’, 
Company Law Reform in OECD Countries - A Comparative Outlook of Current Trends (2001), p.
8, available at SSRN website.
509 Hereafter GP 7.
510 This rule was first laid down in 1968 and it was subject to minor amendments in the subsequent 
editions of the Code. For instance, in 1969, the expression 'shall any action be taken by the board o f 
the offeree company’ had been replaced by the expression 'shall any action be taken by the board o f 
the offeree company in relation to the affairs o f the company’. The rationale behind such amendment 
was that the fact that the wording of the original rule had also covered market purchases undertaken
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It should be emphasised that the fact that the Code applies ex post does not mean 
that post-bid defences will no longer be subject to the common law fiduciary 
rules. However, given that the Code contains stronger rules, there is rarely a need 
in the UK to resort to the common law to restrain post-bid defences511. 
Furthermore, a minority shareholder might find it difficult to pursue litigation 
during a takeover bid. This is because litigation is expensive and an uncertain way 
of monitoring boards512. Moreover, the courts are reluctant to interfere with the 
takeover process, as they think that litigation is not an appropriate mechanism for 
resolving disputes within companies which are subject to public markets . 
Without prejudice to the latter remarks, however, if the offeree directors take, for 
instance, one of the post-bid defensive measures mentioned in Rule 21 without 
resorting to shareholder approval, they may be sued on the ground of improper 
purpose, in addition to being subject to the Code’s sanctions514.
3.3.1 Meaning of the ‘No Frustrating Action9 Rule
GP 7 prohibits action by the offeree board which is capable of frustrating an offer, 
unless shareholders in general meeting approve such action. Thus, the Code views 
the offeree shareholders as the ultimate persons to determine the success of a bid 
independently of management515. In other words, the Code’s approach toward 
post-bid defences is permeated by the notion of shareholder sovereignty. The 
rationale underlying the latter approach is two-fold: First, shareholders are the 
owners of the company, and accordingly, they must decide the company’s 
ultimate fate. Secondly, given the potential for conflict of interest, it is risky to 
allow the offeree management to interpose itself between the offeror and the 
shareholders of the offeree company. The latter rationale demonstrates that the 
Code is very sceptical about deferring decisions about the ultimate best interests
by a director was considered to go beyond the purpose of the Code. Subsequently, in 1976, the word 
Us imminent’ was replaced by the word ‘might be imminent’.
511 P. L. Davies, ‘Defensive Measures: The Anglo-American Approach’, in K. J. Hopt and E. 
Wymeersch (eds), European Takeovers: Law and Practice (London, 1992), p. 209.
512 P. L. Davies (2000), supra n 435, p. 10.
513 C. Bradley, ‘Corporate Control: Markets and Rules’ (1990) 53 Modem L. Rev. 170, p. 179.
514 Compliance with the shareholder approval requirement will, however, prevent a post-bid action 
from being in breach of the fiduciary rules.
515 T. Ogowewo, ‘The Underlying Themes of Tender Offer Regulation in the United Kingdom and 
the United States of America’ (1996) J. Bus. L. 463, p. 478.
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of the offeree company and its shareholders to management. It should be noted in 
this respect that GP is an effect-based rule. As a result, whether the purpose or 
intention of the offeree directors was to frustrate the offer is irrelevant. Indeed, the 
Panel stated that the essential test to evaluate a post-bid action is whether the 
action taken by the board ‘could effectively result in [...] any [...] offer being 
frustrated9516.
GP 7 is supplemented by a number of rules which expressly prohibit the use of 
some defences which would render the offeree company less attractive or less 
vulnerable, unless they are approved by offeree shareholders. The most important 
of these is Rule 21, which presents a list of defences which can only be deployed 
upon shareholder approval. These include the sale or acquisition of assets; the 
issue of authorised but unissued shares; the transfer or sale of treasury shares; and 
the conclusion of contracts otherwise than in the ordinary course of business. 
Another rule supplementing GP 7 is Rule 37.3, which prohibits the offeree 
company from redeeming or purchasing its own shares without shareholder 
approval517.
It should be noted the list in Rule 21 is in no way exhaustive518. In other words, 
the ‘no frustrating action’ rule covers any possible defensive tactic which could 
have the effect of frustrating an ongoing bona fide offer. Thus, for instance, the 
offeree board cannot pay an abnormal interim dividend, except with the Panel’s 
consent, if  such payment amounts to a disposal of assets of a material amount519. 
This is intended to preclude the offeree board from depleting cash, which would 
result in the offeror paying too high a price for the remaining assets. This 
technique is illustrated by Charter Consolidateds hostile bid for Anderson 
Strathclyde. This bid was at a price which included the payment of dividend. 
Anderson’s defence strategy included plans to pay a second interim dividend. 
However, the Panel refused to allow Anderson to pay the latter type of dividend, 
on the grounds that the effect would have been to take the amount of the dividend
516 Panel Statement of May 9, 1989 on Consolidated Gold Fields, p. 12.
517 Code, r.21(l)(a).
518 Consolidated Gold Field pic., supra n 515, p.6.
519 Note that the term ‘material amount’ is defined as equating to 10 per cent or more of the value of
the company’s gross assets; see Note 2 on r.21 of the Code.
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out of Anderson and to frustrate Charter’s bid. Another post-bid action likely to 
be viewed as frustrating action is the increase of directors’ emoluments to a level 
which would be regarded as abnormal520.
A number of criticisms deserve to be made, however, against the formulation of 
Rule 21: First, it is difficult to determine when an offer will be deemed to be 
‘imminent’. Secondly, the definition of what constitutes ‘the ordinary course of 
business’ is problematic. Much will depend on the nature of the business 
considered. The latter problem is evidenced by Burton Group's bid for the shares 
of Debenhams pic. In this case, Burton appealed against the Panel Executive’s 
ruling, which found that the variations introduced by Debenhams into its contracts 
with a number of ‘shop-in-shop’ concessionaires during the course of Burton’s 
offer did not constitute a breach of Rule 21 of the Code. Following Burton’s 
appeal, the full Panel held that the extent and timing of the contract variations in 
question were affected by the existence of the pre-bid speculation and of the offer 
itself, and that they could not therefore be held without qualification to have been 
made in the ordinary course of business521.
In support of the ‘no frustrating action’ rule, the Code places further restrictions 
upon the directors faced with a bid. First and foremost, as seen above, the 
directors are required to circulate their views on the offer and to provide 
shareholders with all the necessary information upon which an adequate decision 
can be made . Secondly, the Code requires directors to act only in their capacity 
as directors524. However, directors can have regard to their personal shareholdings 
where there are competing offers for the offeree company. This is illustrated by 
Re a Company (N° 008699 o f 198&525. In this case, competing bids were made for
520 Code, Note 6 on r.21(l).
521 Panel Statement of July 25, 1985. In the event, the Panel concluded that the variations were not 
so material to the offer as to constitute a breach of the Code.
522 Code, r.25(l) and 25(2). The Code’s requirement that the offeree board must recommend either 
acceptance or rejection of a bid seems to come into conflict with the American federal law, which 
confer directors a legal right to express no opinion, so long as they provide reasons for their 
position; see Y. F. Danziger, ‘Directors and Takeovers: The Right of Target Companies’ Directors 
to Stay Silent Upon a Bid’ (1984) 5 Co. Law. 213, p. 213.
523 Code, GP 4, r.3(l), and r.23.
524 Code, GP 9.
525 [1986] B.C.L.C. 382 (Ch.).
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a company526 and its directors proposed to exercise their rights as shareholders to 
accept the lower bid. Hoffman J held
4Fairness cannot require more o f the directors than to give the shareholders sufficient 
information and advice to enable them to reach a properly informed decision’.
3.3.2 Rationale of the ‘No Frustrating Action9 Rule
The Code differs sharply from US state takeover law on managerial defensive 
tactics, where offeree boards can use an array of post-bid defences without 
resorting to shareholder approval. It is far from certain what the policy reasons 
were behind the adoption of the 4no frustrating action’ rule in the UK. Some of 
the features of the bids preceding the adoption of the Code no doubt contributed 
to the adoption of this rule. It is suggested below that a number of other factors 
might also have contributed to the Code’s policy in relation to post-bid defences. 
These include the then industrial policy; the composition of the City working 
party; and the Report of the Jenkins Committee.
i) Features of the bids preceding the adoption of the Code
Examples of attempts to thwart unsolicited bids date back to the 1950s. The 
leading example is provided by the case of Land Securities Investment 
Company/Savoy Hotel Company527. In this case, Land Securities made a hostile 
bid to acquire Savoy Hotel. The bidder’s aim was to get possession of the 
Berkeley Hotel, which was owned by the Savoy Hotel, and to use the site for 
offices. The board of the Savoy Hotel transferred the Berkeley Hotel to a new 
company they set up for the occasion. Effective voting control of the new 
company was vested in the trustees of the Savoy Hotel’s staff, and the trustees 
included the chairman of the Savoy Hotel board. The new company leased back 
the Berkeley Hotel to the Savoy Hotel, with a condition that the former could not 
be used otherwise than as a hotel without the new company’s consent. Mr
526 Note that the company in question was a private company.
527 Note that, although this case involved a post-bid action, die validity of the latter was judged upon 
by the courts, by reference to directors’ fiduciary duties. For the Code was not adopted yet at the time 
of this case.
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Holland, Q.C. reported that, although the directors of the Savoy Hotel exercised 
their power to dispose of the Berkeley Hotel in the bona fide belief that the 
alternative use planned by the bidder would not be in the company’s interest, the 
powers had been exercised ‘in order to render irrevocable for all time the policy 
view o f  the present board*, so that never after could the shareholders ‘alter the 
decision o f  their present board as to the present or future use o f  the property o f  
the company*52*. Similarly, in 1958, in the case of Reynolds Metal and Tube 
Investments Inc./British Aluminium, the board of British Aluminium, which was 
subject to Reynolds Metal’s bid, issued Alcoa, a friendly third-party, one-third of 
British Aluminium’s then outstanding shares . In so doing, the offeree board did 
not obtain the approval of its existing shareholders and thus provoked hostile 
opposition from merchant banks and securities professionals. The above cases 
constituted examples of contests for corporate control, where the offeree boards 
deployed post-bid measures which had undesirable effects.
ii) Report of the Company Law Committee
In 1959, the then President of the Board of Trade appointed a Committee, under 
the chairmanship of Lord Jenkins530, to, inter alia, ‘consider in the light o f  
modern conditions and practices, including the practice o f  takeover bids, what 
should be the duties o f  directors and the rights o f  shareholders; and generally to 
recommend what changes in the law are desirable*. The Committee produced a 
Report531 in 1962, which recommended, inter alia, that directors should not be 
allowed to issue shares or to dispose of the whole, or substantially the whole, of 
the assets of the company without the approval of shareholders . In particular, 
the Report admitted that takeovers were ‘an essential feature o f  economic growth 
and development*, and its drafters therefore ‘tried to avoid, as fa r  as possible, 
placing obstacles in the way o f  honest and fairly conducted takeover
528 L. C. B. Gower, ‘Corporate Control: The Battle for Berkeley’ (1955) 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1176, p.
1185.
529 Note that these cases took place before the Companies Act required shareholder approval for the
issue of shares.
530 Hereafter the Jenkins Committee.
531 Report of the Company Law Committee (London: H.M.S.O., 1962) (hereafter the Jenkins
Report).
532 Jenkins Report, paras 122(h) and (e), respectively. Note, however, that such recommendations
were made independently of the existence of an on-going takeover bid.
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transactions'533. Since defensive measures constitute obstacles to the fulfilment of 
takeover bids, it is fair to assume that the Committee was not in favour of post-bid 
defensive tactics. In turn, it is believed that the drafters of the Code were 
influenced by the recommendations embodied in this Report in drafting the 
neutrality rule.
iii) Industrial policy
Another factor which might have led to the adoption of the ‘no frustrating action’ 
rule is the then Labour government’s policy to encourage the reorganisation of the 
British industrial structure through mergers and takeovers. Indeed, the view was 
widespread that UK firms suffered a handicap of inadequate size to compete 
effectively on world markets534. To promote its policy, the government set up in 
1966 the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation535. The latter was intended to 
encourage mergers in industries it determined to be too fragmented536. To this end, 
it was empowered to do almost anything ‘ calculated to facilitate the discharge o f  
its functions'. Its powers included, inter alia, the acquisition, holding and disposal 
of securities, and the making of loans and giving guarantees. As a result of this 
policy, the period between 1960-70 was a period of great activity in the field of 
mergers and takeovers. Indeed, there had been between 600 and 1000 acquisitions 
by listed companies each year during that period. The IRC had a decisive role in 
some of the largest acquisitions of the period, including the merger of GEC first 
with AEI in 1967, and subsequently with English Electric in 1968.
It should be noted, however, that the government’s policy inevitably tended to 
create monopolistic conditions in a number of domestic British markets. What 
was surprising is that, although the government had the power to prohibit a 
merger under the then Monopolies and Mergers Act of 1965, that power was 
seldom used. Indeed, between July 1965 and April 1969, only 10 of the 350 
mergers falling within the scope of the merger legislation had been referred to the
533 Ibid, para 265.
534 Note that only as late as 1969 did Britain have an electrical manufacturing company large enough
to compete with the then electrical giants of Germany or the US.
535 Hereafter the IRC.
536 For this purpose, £150m was made available to the IRC to help suitable firms to merge.
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then Monopolies and Mergers Commission. For instance, following its decision 
not to refer the GEC-AEI merger to the latter Commission, the Board of Trade 
stated that the merger would provide 'real benefits to UK’s international 
competitiveness’. This demonstrates that, despite the creation of monopolistic 
conditions, the government was intended to give pre-eminence to its policy of 
‘rationalisation’ of the UK industry. As a result, it is suggested that the then 
industrial policy in the UK might have been instrumental in shaping the neutrality 
rule. For the government might have thought that such rule would serve to speed 
up the process of restructuration of UK companies.
iv) Composition of the City Working Party
In the summer of 1967, the Governor of the Bank of England reconvened the City 
Working Party that had drawn up the Notes and the Revised Notes , and 
entrusted them with the drafting of the Code. The Working Party organised a 
drafting committee, which did most of the work. This committee consisted of 
personalities who had all been involved in takeover battles. For instance, one of 
them was a partner in Rothschilds, a family bank which was the controversial 
advisers of Richard Thomas & Baldwins for their bid on the shares of Whitehead 
Iron & Steel538. Another worked for Morgan Grenfell, which had stood behind 
Aberdare in its battle for Metal Industries539. Another member of this committee 
worked as a solicitor at a prominent law firm, where he thoroughly dealt with 
takeover tactics, in particular through his involvement in the GEC/AEI bid540. 
Thus, all members of this committee were previously involved in takeover battles 
and they frequently stood on the side of the bidder. As a result, they had to cope 
with various defensive tactics deployed by offeree boards, in order to pave the
way for their clients’ success. It is therefore suggested that, in drafting the
neutrality rule, these men might have been influenced by their previous
involvement in fiercely fought takeover battles.
537 The participating bodies were the Issuing Houses Association, the Accepting Houses Committee, 
the Association of Investment Trusts, the British Insurance Association, the Committee of London 
Clearing Bankers, the NAPF, and the London Stock Exchange. Note, however, that the CBI was 
represented for the first time.
[1963].
539 [1968].
540 [1967].
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It is true that these men were not free from interference. The draft they prepared 
was subsequently scrutinised by the full working party. It is suggested, however, 
that the very bodies composing the full Working Party were also in favour of the 
neutrality rule. Indeed, Bebchuk and Ferrell (1999) argue that the reasons why the 
Code went in such a different direction than the US lies in the fact that those 
responsible for the Code gave less weight to managerial interests because of the 
close connection at least some of them had with the interests of shareholders541. 
This holds true for a great number of organisations which made up the full 
Working Party. For instance, the NAPF, which is eager to increase the return on 
their clients’ investment. It is suggested that even the Confederation of British 
Industry must have been, at the time, in favour of the neutrality rule, bearing in 
mind the then desire of the British industry to acquire large scale, in order to cope 
with the potential effects of the EC upon competition.
3.3.3 Permissible Post-Bid Defences
The following is an overview of the permissible post-bid defences. As we shall 
see below, the ‘no frustrating action’ rule considerably reduces the number of 
defences available to offeree boards faced with a bid.
i) Post-bid defences explicitly permitted by the Code to be taken 
without shareholder approval
The Code authorises actions referred to in Rule 21 to be taken without 
shareholder approval where they are conducted in pursuance of a contract entered 
into earlier542. This refers to obligations undertaken by the company towards third 
parties and aims at ensuring the certainty of law in contractual relations543. Thus, 
a contract entered into prior to the bid, and which organises defensive measures, 
is binding for the offeree company and the offeree board must execute its terms544. 
This can be illustrated by the case of John Crowther Group pic. In this case, 
options to subscribe for new Crowther shares were granted by the board to two of
541L. A Bebchuk and A Ferrell, ‘Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers 
from Takeovers’ (1999) 99 Col. L. Rev. 1168, p. 1193.
542 Code, r.21.
543 G. O Barboutis (1999), supra n 449, p. 42.
544 Ibid, p. 49.
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its directors two days before the announcement that the company was in talks 
which might lead to an offer. The Panel held that this should not be regarded as a 
breach of Rule 21, on the grounds that the directors became entitled to the options 
under the terms of their employment contracts545. It should be noted that the Panel 
may consent to an action taken without shareholder approval even in 
circumstances where a formal contract has not been entered into, provided there is 
an obligation or other special circumstance, or where this is acceptable to the 
offeror546.
ii) Disclosure of favourable information of a financial nature
Offeree directors who are faced with a bid may disclose favourable information of 
a financial nature. Indeed, the financial argument is statistically the most common 
and the most successful tool547. To this end, offeree directors may point out that 
they anticipate increased sales and profits in case the takeover attempt fails. In 
doing so, however, they must use every endeavour to prevent the creation of a 
false market in the shares of the offeree company548 . This is because the 
disclosure of false favourable information may cause the market price of the 
offeree’s shares to rise, and accordingly, convince the offeree shareholders to 
retain their shares. Thus, market transparency constitutes a fundamental 
protection for shareholders and others who deal in the UK securities markets549.
A widely used defence strategy of a financial nature consists of issuing profit 
forecasts. The issue of a profit forecast considerably in excess of the profits for 
the previous year may convince the offeree shareholders that their company is 
worth much more than the offer, and they may thus reject the offer. Or forecasts 
may result in an increased offer being made by the offeror. The same holds true of 
a revaluation of assets, which is effected when the early-published value of the 
offeree’s assets is not adequately stated550. The Code sets out, very stringent
545 Panel Statement of May 24, 1988.
546 Code, Note 1 on r.21.
547 A. Paul (1993), supra n 474, p. 142.
548 Code, GP 6.
549 Panel Statement of July 17, 2003 on Cor diant Communications Group pic.
550 Note that, in the early 1970s, it was common for assets to be stated at depreciated cost in
financial accounts. Over the years, however, many companies have decided to review their asset
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requirements in relation to both profit forecasts and asset valuations, given the 
latter’s critical bearing on a bid’s outcome. As far as asset valuations are 
concerned, the Code requires that the latter be supported by an independent valuer 
and that the basis of valuation be clearly stated551. As far as profit forecasts are 
concerned, the Code requires them to present the highest standards of accuracy, 
and to include the assumptions552 upon which the directors have based them553. 
The latter assumptions are intended to help shareholders to form a view as to the 
reasonableness and reliability of the forecast. However, in practice it is unusual 
for the assumptions to cause be particularly informative554. It should further be 
noted in this respect the directors have sole responsibility for making the forecast. 
This is logical since the directors are in a best position to determine the likely 
profits. However, since the forecasts depends upon subjective judgments, the 
Listing Rules require them to be reported on by the auditors and by the sponsor, 
as to whether the profit forecast has been compiled by the directors after due and 
careful enquiry555. For instance, in The Morgan Crucible Company Pic v Hill 
Samuel Bank Limited and Others, the bidder, Morgan Crucible, claimed that the 
profit forecast put forward by the offeree company, First Castle Electronics pic, 
and on which the merchant bank, Hill Samuel, had commented was misleading 
and inaccurate556.
Another widely used defence strategy of a financial nature is the payment of 
increased dividends557. This technique was for instance used in 1982 by Croda 
International against the hostile bid by Burmah Oil. The latter eventually lost the 
battle following an over-generous dividend policy taken up by the offeree 
company to defend itself against Burmah’s bid558.
values periodically and incorporate them in the balance sheet; see T. E. Cooke, Mergers and 
Acquisitions (Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 233-234.
551 Code, r.29. Note that the basis of valuation depends on the type of asset.
552 Note that these must be readily understandable by investors, and be specific and precise; see 
Listing Rules, Ch. 12, r. 12(27).
553 Code, r.28(l) and (2), respectively.
554 Especially when they say e. g. that there will be no change in current inflation or in exchange 
rates; see B. Morgan, ‘Profit Forecasts and Asset Valuations’, in (eds) M. Button and S. Bolton, A 
Practitioner’s Guide to the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers' (Woking: City and Financial 
Publishing, 1997), p. 185.
555 Listing Rules, Ch. 2,2(19) and Ch. 12, r. 12(24).
556 [1991] 1 All E.R. 148.
557 Code, Note 3 on r.21(l).
558 ‘Croda Goes 37% Down in the Face’, Evening Standard, March 31, 1992.
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iii) Criticism of the offer or the offeror
Once faced with a bid, offeree directors must obtain competent and independent 
financial advice on the merits of the offer, which they must subsequently circulate 
to the shareholders with their own recommendation559. The latter need not be 
favourable and the offeree directors may for instance argue that the consideration 
offered is worth less than it appears to be560. Indeed, the offeree directors may 
warn their shareholders that the value of the offeror’s securities is likely to be 
depressed, if the bid succeeds, by the action of former offeree shareholders 
wishing to dispose of the offeror’s securities they have received561. It should be 
noted, however, that the directors must prepare their recommendation with the 
highest standards of care and accuracy, as if  it were a prospectus562. The 
effectiveness of this defence is limited, however. For the offeree directors may 
find themselves forced to recommend the bid, if the offeror produces a more 
attractive offer by either revising it or introducing a cash alternative. Offeree 
directors may also try to persuade their shareholders that the offeror is unsuitable 
to manage the offeree’s business more effectively than the incumbent 
management. In this regard, they may point out to the poor past performance 
results of the offeror, if there are any, in operating its own business, or to the 
inexperience of the offeror in the type of business activities that the offeree 
company is involved in.
iv) Search for a white knight
This defence consists of soliciting a competing bid from an alternative offeror. 
The offeree company’s desire to seek a white knight may be based on two 
grounds, these being the possibility that an auction would ensure that control of 
the company is transferred to the highest bidder, and the possibility that the 
competing offeror’s plans for the offeree company offer a better outcome for the 
‘stakeholders’. Although the Code does not expressly regulate this defence, the
559 Code, GP4.
560 Note, however, that this argument can only be put forward in the context of a share-exchange
offer.
561 M. A. Weinberg and M. V. Blank (1979), supra n 457, p. 610.
562 Code, GP 5 and Code, r.l9(l).
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requirement that all offers be kept open for a minimum of twenty-one days after 
their initial posting demonstrates that the Code encourages auctions by giving 
potential bidders time to assess the offeree company and launch their bids.
The problem with such defence is that there may not be another offeror willing to 
make an offer for the offeree company. Furthermore, the offeree directors may 
claim to be initiating an auction to the benefit of shareholders when, in fact, they 
are using this defence to protect their own position. Indeed, the white knight may 
have promised to retain the management or to present it with some other personal 
benefits564. Such outcome is likely to be mitigated, however, by a number of 
market-related factors. The first such factor is that, if the offeree directors agree to 
be taken by a friendly predator rather than the unwelcome original offeror, they 
will have to justify to their shareholders why they prefer the white knight’s offer 
to the original offeror’s offer. Another such factor is that shareholders will 
probably accept the offer of the white knight only if the latter is willing to pay a 
higher premium than the original offeror. It should be added that the Code’s 
requirement that directors furnish any information given to a preferred offeror 
equally and as promptly to a less welcome potential offeror also serves to mitigate 
the above outcome565.
Before turning to the next type of post-bid defensive measure, it should be 
emphasised that, all the permissible post-bid defences that we have described thus 
far are permitted precisely because they do not take the ultimate decision out of 
the hands of offeree shareholders.
v) Reference to the regulatory authorities
This defence consists of lobbying anti-trust or similar authorities with a view to 
convincing the latter to block the bid. Referrals to such authorities are not, as a 
rule, considered as frustrating actions. For instance, the offeree directors may 
encourage the Office of Fair Trading to refer a bid to the Competition
563 Code, r.31(1).
564 L. A. Bebchuk (1982), supra n 5, p. 1055.
565 Code, r.20(2).
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Commission, where the offer creates a merger situation qualifying for 
investigation according to the provisions of the Fair Trading Act of 1973. Since 
the Competition Commission usually reports within six months following the 
referral of a bid, the offeror may well withdraw its offer in the meantime. 
Similarly, the offeree directors may apply to the European Commission where the 
offer leads to a dominant position, which is sanctioned by the competition rules 
embodied in the EC Treaty566.
It should be noted, however, that a referral to the anti-trust authorities would not 
necessarily deter an offeror from pursuing its bid. For the Panel normally grants 
consent to the making of a new offer in less than twelve months where the 
previous offer lapses as a result of a reference to such regulatory bodies 
Furthermore, GP 7 and Rule 21 continue to operate during the reference568, which 
facilitates the offeror’s activity. This can be illustrated by the case of GKN 
Ltd/Miles Druce&Co. Ltd569. In this case, following referral of the bid to the 
European Commission and the latter’s decision not to initiate proceedings, GKN 
decided to renew its offer. At the same time, GKN requested the Panel that it 
prevents the board of Miles Druce from challenging the decision of the 
Commission before the ECJ without the approval of its shareholders in general 
meeting, on the grounds that this could effectively result in the frustration of 
GKN’s offer.
Another regulatory authority which may be relevant in the context of takeover 
bids, and which may be referred to by the offeree directors, is the insurance 
regulatory bodies. This can be illustrated by the case of Hoylake/BAT Industries 
pic570. In this case, Hoylake made an offer for the shares of BAT Industries, 
which indirectly owned Farmers Inc. The offer was conditional upon the offeror 
obtaining all necessary regulatory approvals which, because of Farmers, included 
approval by the insurance regulatory bodies in some nine States of the US where
566 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 24/12/2002, OJ C
325/33, art. 82. See also Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 18/07/2003, OJ C
169/36, s.5, art. ID-51.
567 Code, r.35(l).
568 Note 1 on r. 12 of the Code.
569 Panel Statement of March 26, 1974 on Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds Ltd/Miles Druce&Co. Ltd.
570 Panel Statement of September 15, 1989 on BAT Industries.
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Farmers was authorised to carry on business. The offeree company participated in 
the public regulatory process and in litigation initiated by the offeror to challenge 
the validity of that process. Hoylake submitted that the board of BAT sought to 
frustrate the offer, inter alia, by intervening in Hoylake’s legal action against the 
insurance regulatory bodies. The Panel rejected Hoylake’s argument, and held 
that it would be ‘slow to characterise conduct in regulatory proceedings as
en 1
frustrating action’ .
vi) Other permissible post-bid defences
Other post-bid defences include the appeal to offeree shareholders to consider the 
loyal service of offeree managers and employees in making their decision. This 
defence is of limited value, however. For it is unlikely that the offeree 
shareholders will forego the takeover premium on the grounds that the offer 
negatively impacts upon other constituencies. Another post-bid defence consists 
of encouraging friendly third parties to sell part of their shares in the offeror, with 
a view to depressing the market price of the offeror’s shares. This defence is 
particularly useful in the event of a share-exchange bid. Moreover, the offeree 
board may encourage friendly investors to purchase offeree shares in the 
market572. Indeed, from the perspective of the offeror, a material holding by 
persons hostile to its offer could seriously jeopardise the success of its offer, as 
this would reduce the number of shares held by ‘willing sellers’ that it might 
otherwise purchase. Such persons must, however, be cautious not to cross the 
thirty per cent threshold, which would compel them to make a cash offer . The 
only way by which the offeror could counteract such defensive market purchases 
would be to buy in the market itself. However, if the offer is a share-exchange 
offer, then such defensive market purchases would oblige the offeror to make a 
cash offer.
571 Note, however, that the Panel further held that, in an appropriate case, involvement in a 
regulatory process could amount to ‘frustrating action’; see ibid, p. 13.
572 Note, however, that the offeree company cannot provide financial assistance for the acquisition of 
its shares; see CA 1985, s. 151.
573 Code, r.37(l). Furthermore, they must disclose their dealings pursuant to Rule 8 of the Code if 
they fall within the definition o f ‘associates’; see Code, Definitions.
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Conclusion
The foregoing indicates that the UK regulatory framework is very restrictive 
toward post-bid defensive measures. Indeed, offeree companies in the UK can 
take only a limited number of post-bid measures. The only real defence seems to 
be to win the argument on value. However, the fact that the latter is no impossible 
task has been evidenced by the initial attempt by Blue Circle Industries, the UK 
cement-maker, to defeat a £3 billion hostile bid from French rival Lafarge in 
2000574. In this case, the offeree board convinced shareholders that the offer price 
was inadequate; that it undervalued the offeree company; and that Lafarge had not 
yet arranged financing for the deal. Another example is provided by the resistance 
by Wolverhampton & Dudley Breweries against a £457 million hostile bid from 
Pubmistress in 2001, whereby the offeree board convinced the offeree 
shareholders to reject the bid in return for a share buyback supported by a loan 
from Barclays.
It should further be noted that, despite the Code’s rigorous approach toward post­
bid measures, market research indicates that, as a general guide, medium to large 
companies spend approximately one per cent of their market capitalisation to 
defend a hostile bid, and that advisory expenses can reach up to five per cent of 
the value of a hostile bid575. To reduce such expenses, some companies are even 
taking out hostile takeover insurance. It is by no means suggested, however, that 
the post-bid defences permissible in the UK are not worth their cost. On the 
contrary, the use of such defences results in the dissemination of a great deal of 
information about the offeree company, which benefits the offeree shareholders. 
It is nevertheless suggested that the Code should perhaps set a limit to advisory 
expenses and regulate the use by offeree companies of hostile takeover 
insurances.
574 ‘Lafarge's Bid for Blue Circle Rejected’, Cement Americas, March 2000, available at Lexis-Nexis 
Executive. At the same time, the offeree company made an early announcement of its 1999 results, 
which were higher than the forecast at the time of its profits warning in October 1999; see ‘BCI 
Builds Foundation for its Defence: Cement Maker Kicks off Fight Against Lafarge with Early 
Results’, The Financial Times, February 22, 2000. Note, however, that Lafarge, who was left with a 
substantial shareholding, was subsequently able to negotiate a recommended offer.
575 J. Hayes, ‘Hostile Takeovers: Planning for Defence Costs’ (2003) 14 P.L.C. 6, p. 6.
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In contrast to post-bid defences, companies in the UK seem to have a large 
number of pre-bid defences at their disposal. However, such defences are also 
subject to restrictions. The latter are mainly to be found in general company law. 
However, as seen above, in particular the common law is rather weak to prevent 
the use of detrimental pre-bid defences. This does not mean, however, that any 
pre-bid defence may accordingly be used in the UK. This is because such 
defences are further subject to the stock exchange rules, which contain additional 
restrictions designed to protect the shareholders. More importantly, as seen in the 
chapter on the ownership structure of listed companies and the market for 
corporate control in the UK and France, pre-bid defences are increasingly subject 
to the scrutiny of institutional investors.
107
Chapter 4 The Regulation of Defensive Measures in France
Introduction
Potential offeree companies in France have a large number of pre-bid defences at 
their disposal. In contrast, they have little room for manoeuvre during the 
currency of an offer. Indeed, the offeree board is severely constrained in adopting 
defensive measures following the filing of an offer. Indeed, other than the reform 
in 1989, which allowed the offeree board to issue shares during the course of an 
offer, no major reform has occurred with a view to facilitating the recourse by 
companies to post-bid defensive measures. It has therefore been argued that, 
whilst the company law requires the directors to run the company, the regulation 
of takeovers confines them to a role of provisional administrator576.
This chapter provides an overview of the defence mechanisms available to 
companies listed in France. Section I examines the principles governing directors’ 
actions both prior to and during a bid. Section II describes the permissible pre-bid 
defences. Finally, Section III describes the rules governing post-bid defences and 
the permissible post-bid defences.
4.1 Principles Governing Directors’ Actions
This Section first describes the general company law provisions governing both 
pre-bid and post-bid defences. This author has focused in the chapter on the 
regulation of defensive measures in the UK on the bona fide and proper purpose 
tests, which form part of directors’ common law fiduciary duties. In France, the 
company law does not impose fiduciary duties upon the directors. The absence in 
France of a legal fiduciary duty may seem odd, since the French usually pride 
themselves ‘for relying on principles and leaving it to English purists to look for
c n n
regulations' . Wymeersch (2003) argues that the rationale behind the absence of
576 A. Viandier, ‘Riglementation des Offres Publiques et Droit des Socidtds: L’Experience Franfaise’ 
(1993) Bull. Joly Bourse 7, p. 13.
577 A. Tunc, ‘The Fiduciary Duties of a Dominant Shareholder’ in C. M. Schmitthoff and F.
Wooldridge (eds), Groups o f Companies (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1991), p. 3.
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a legal fiduciary duty in France may be that, until recently, there was less 
sensitivity in France, as well as in other European continental jurisdictions, to 
issues of personal conflict of interest, due to the predominance of controlling, 
especially family holdings in many listed companies578.
However, the French legal writing often mentions the existence of such duties. 
For instance, Schmidt (2000) refers to directors’ fiduciary duty when speaking of 
directors’ conflicts of interests. He describes the latter as encompassing every 
situation where a director chooses to exercise his powers in contravention of the 
collective interest, to either satisfy a personal interest which is external to the 
company, or concede himself an advantage in the company to the detriment of the 
shareholders. He argues that such conflict can be resolved in favour of the proper 
functioning of the company, if and only if the director places his fiduciary duty 
before any other consideration579. Other scholars also recognise the existence of a 
fiduciary duty, though they recognise such duty to exist as between the 
shareholders of the company rather than as a duty of the directors towards the 
shareholders580. On the other hand, the French Supreme Court held in a number of 
cases that directors owe a duty of loyalty to the company. For instance, in one 
case, the director of a company, who resigned with a view to creating a rival 
company, was held liable by the Supreme Court on the grounds that he was bound 
by a duty of loyalty to his company581. More importantly for our purposes, the 
Court held in another case that the directors owe a duty of loyalty to the 
shareholders582. In that case, the director of a company was negotiating the sale of 
the company with an outsider. Meantime, a minority shareholder asked the 
director to find a purchaser for his shares. The director agreed to buy the 
minority’s shares himself. However, the director paid a low price to the minority 
and subsequently resold the purchased shares to the outsider at a significantly 
higher price. The Supreme Court held the director liable on the basis of his duty 
of loyalty to the shareholder.
578 E. Wymeersch (2003), supra n 44, p. 583.
579 D. Schmidt, ‘Les Conflits d’Interets dans la Soci6t6 Anonyme: Protegomdnes’ (2000) Bull. Joly
Soc. 9, p. 24.
580 See e.g. E. Wymeersch (2003), supra n 44, p. 581.
581 Cass. Com. 24 February 1998 (1998) Bull. Joly, p. 813.
582 Cass. Com., 27 February 1996, Vilgrain d  Mme Alary (1996) JCP 6d. E., 22664, p. 838, note
Ghestin.
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Despite the absence of a legal fiduciary duty, the latter defences are subject to 
numerous statutory rules. Indeed, there are several legal rules that directors must 
comply with in the performance of their duties, such as the rule requiring 
directors to refrain from taking any action which would be contrary to the best 
interests of the company583. Indeed, the company’s interest is a fundamental 
concept of French company law and is omnipresent in the Code of Commerce584. 
However, this concept has not been clearly defined either by the legislators or the 
courts. Attempts to define it have been made by a number of scholars, such as 
Faugerolas (2003) who defines it as the collective interest of the shareholders in
COC
the proper functioning of the company . The application of this concept in the 
context of pre-bid defences can be exemplified as follows: if, for instance, the 
purpose of a non-preemptive share issue is found to be to introduce into the share 
capital of a company a shareholder friendly to the incumbent management, rather 
than to obtain financial aid, it is obvious that the real purpose of such issue is 
different from that sought for. In such a case, the decision to issue shares will 
likely be against the interests of the company and it will be possible to invoke the 
concept of the abus de majorite to nullify such decision. According to a well- 
known formula of the French Supreme Court, there is abus de majorite whenever 
a resolution 'is taken contrary to the general interest and with the sole view to
fo/ m
favour the members o f  the majority at the expense o f  the minority ’ . This can be
C07
illustrated by the case of Marret v. SA Champagne Giesler et autres . In this 
case, the French Supreme Court nullified the transfer by a parent company of the 
shares it held in its subsidiary to a SCA, on the grounds that the resolution was 
taken against the interests of the company, with the sole aim to favour the 
members of the majority at the expense of the minority. This is because the 
commandite of the SCA was the controlling shareholder of the parent company
583 This concept is to be found in art. 1848 of the Civil Code, which states that the director can take 
all acts of management in the interests of the company.
584 L. Faugerolas, ‘Impact of Take-overs and their Regulation on French Company Law and 
Practice’ in K. J. Hopt and E. Wymeersch (eds), Capital Markets and Company Law (OUP, 2003), 
p. 328.
385 Ibid, p. 328.
586 Cass, com., 18 April 1961, Ste des Anciens Etablissements Piquard Freres et Durey Sohy reunis 
c/Schumann et autres (1961) D., p. 661.
587 Cass, com., 24 January 1995, No. 185 P (1995) Bull. Joly 321.
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and the interposition of the SCA between the parent company and its subsidiary 
turned the latter into an ‘empty shell’588.
There are other legal rules which deal with the directors’ conflicts of interest, 
such as the rules mandating the disclosure of conflicts of interest and specific 
approval procedures involving the disinterested directors 589 , or the rule 
prohibiting directors from taking loans out of company funds590. The latter is 
referred to as the abus de credit or abus de biens sociaux591. For instance, large 
severance payments are considered in France as being at odds with the directors’ 
obligation to act in the interests of the company, and may therefore constitute an 
abus de biens sociaux. It is further suggested that the broader concept of the abus 
de pouvoirs, which is embodied in the Code of Commerce 592 , probably 
encompasses the UK bona fide and proper purpose doctrines. In other words, this 
author believes that the concept of the abus de pouvoir performs the same 
function in France as the bona fide and proper purpose tests in the UK.
Non-compliance with the above rules will likely give rise to directors’ civil 
liability. Action for such liability may be brought by the company or its
C Q 'l
shareholders acting derivatively . Derivative actions are rare, however, given 
that any benefit from such actions accrues solely to the company594. Shareholders 
may further sue the directors directly where they consider they have suffered a 
personal prejudice595. More importantly, some offences give rise to directors’ 
criminal liability. For instance, the abus de biens sociaux represents the most 
frequently invoked and effectively enforced criminal offence in French company 
law.
588 Note that this defence was also used in the Mutuelle du Mans Assurance-Vie et autres c/Ste OCP 
case, where the main assets of a listed company -  OCP -  were transferred to two SCAs, which were 
the subsidiaries of OCP; see supra n 216.
589 Code of Commerce, arts L. 225-38 to L. 225-43.
590 Code of Commerce, art. L. 225-43.
591 i.e. the use by a manager of the credit or the assets of the company for his personal purposes; see 
Code of Commerce, art. L. 242-6(3).
592 Code of Commerce, art. L. 242-6(4).
593 Derivative actions are regulated by art. 1843-5 of the Civil Code.
594 M. Cozian, A. Viandier and F. Deboissy, Droit des Sociites (Paris: Litec, 2002), p. 168.
595 J. P. Le Gall and P. Morel, French Company Law (1992), p. 144.
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4.2 Permissible Pre-Bid Defences
The following describes only the pre-bid defences whose use is restricted by 
statutory and/or stock exchange rules, or by judicial decisions.
4.2.1 Disclosure
The disclosure requirements embodied in the law may act as a pre-bid defence. 
Indeed, the French law imposes a number of disclosure requirements upon 
crossing certain thresholds596. Non-compliance with the latter results in the 
automatic deprivation of the voting rights of the undisclosed shares for a period of 
two years following their notification597. In addition, voting rights may be totally 
or partially suspended for up to five years by the commercial court if, upon 
request of the company, its shareholders or the AMF, the circumstances are 
shown to have warranted such penalty598. Companies may further stipulate in 
their articles of association an obligation for shareholders to transform their bearer 
shares into registered shares599 where they cross a certain percentage of the 
capital600. More importantly, companies may opt for the so-called system of 
‘identifiable bearer securities’ 601, which allows companies to find out the 
identities of the holders of bearer securities as well as the number of securities 
held by each of them, by making a request to the institution authorised to keep the 
list of shareholders. This system is particularly useful since most companies listed 
in France use bearer shares. The TPI regime combines the speed with which 
negotiations are carried out, which is associated with bearer securities and the 
communication between the shareholders and the issuer, which is associated with 
registered securities602. It should be noted, however, that the TPI regime has two
596 e.g. Code of Commerce, art. L. 233-7 and Cob Regs, r.17. Note that the thresholds are
determined by reference to the voting rights where the number of voting rights does not correspond
to the number of shares.
597 Code of Commerce, art. L. 233-14.
598 D. Berger, ‘Guidelines for Mergers and Acquisitions in France’ (1991) 11 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus.
484, p. 515.
599 Note that, since 1984, securities issued in France are no longer evidenced by paper certificates.
600 T. Vassogne, ‘Defenses Anti-OPA’ (1998) 57 Banque et Droit 27, p. 27.
601 i. e. titres & porteur identifiables (hereafter the TPI). This regime was introduced by the Law No.
87-416 of 17 June 1987, and is now regulated by art. L. 228-2 of the Code of Commerce.
602 Note that the Law of 2001 (Law No. 2001-420 of 15 March 2001, JO 16 May, p. 7776) has
supplemented the above regime by allowing issuers to require any holder of registered securities that
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major shortcomings: First, it can only prove effective if it is being used in a 
permanent fashion. However, its cost is likely to induce the issuer to limit its 
research to shareholders holding over a certain percentage of the shares or voting 
rights . Secondly, this regime removes the anonymous nature of the societe 
anonyme by turning it into a societe relativement anonymem .
4.2.2 Non-Voting Preference Shares, Voting Caps, Investment 
and Voting Certificates, and Shares with Double Voting 
Rights
In principle, French law is dominated by the ‘one share, one vote’ principle605. 
However, the law allows companies to deviate from the latter in a number of 
ways: First, a company may issue non-voting 606 preference shares 607 to 
shareholders who have no affiliation with the management and who are therefore 
likely to sell their shares to whomever is willing to pay a control premium. These 
shares thus serve to raise equity without diluting the voting rights. Non-voting 
preference shares may indeed be financially attractive to shareholders without 
management affiliation, as such shares have priority in terms of receiving 
dividends over the ordinary shares, and they involve minimum dividend 
streams608. By providing such shareholders with non-voting preference shares, a 
company may deprive potential offerors of the support of the shareholders most 
likely to accept their offer609. However, only companies that have made 
distributable profits during the two fiscal years preceding the date of the proposed 
issue are allowed to issue non-voting preference shares610 and the number of such
they believe is a mere intermediary to disclose the identities of the beneficial owners; see Code of 
Commerce, art. L. 228-2.
603 T. Bonneau and L. Faugdrolas, Les Offres Publiques (Paris: EFE, 1999), p. 94.
604 D. Bureau, ‘La Loi Relative aux Nouvelles Regulations Economiques: Aspects de Droit des 
Societes’ (2001) Bull. Joly Soc. 553, p. 585.
605 Code of Commerce, art. L. 225-122.
606 Code of Commerce, art. L. 228-12.
607 Code of Commerce, art. L. 225-126.
608 Indeed, the dividend cannot be lower than the first dividend. Nor can it be lower than 7,5 per cent
of the paid amount of the capital represented by the non-voting preference shares; see Code of
Commerce, art. L. 228-13.
609 K. Byttebier, ‘Protective and Defensive Measures Against Hostile Takeovers’ in E. Wymeersch 
(ed.), Further Perspectives in Financial Integration in Europe (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1994), p. 
186.
610 Code of Commerce, art. L. 225-126.
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shares cannot exceed one-fourth of the capital611. Furthermore, if the holders of 
such shares do not receive a dividend over three consecutive years, then they 
regain their voting rights until the close of the first fiscal year during which their 
dividend is paid .
Secondly, a company may provide in its articles for voting caps. As early as 1989, 
the AMF proposed that companies should include in their articles a standard 
clause which would automatically invalidate the cap if the offeror receives 
acceptances for more than fifty per cent of the shares613. This proposal is 
reminiscent of the breakthrough rule embodied in the Directive on takeover bids, 
which will be examined in the chapter on the comparative analysis of the UK and 
French regimes as regards the issues of defensive measures and equality in the 
context of takeover bids. An alternative proposal was made by Schmidt (1994), 
who suggested that the offeror should be allowed to make an offer conditional 
upon the removal of the voting cap by a resolution of shareholders in general 
meeting. Pursuant to his proposal, the shareholders would vote in favour of the 
removal only if they wish to accept the offer614. Another proposal was put 
forward by Bonneau and Faugerolas (1999) who suggested that the minority 
shareholders of a company which provides for a voting cap should be allowed to 
exercise their sell-out rights, given that the cap involves a substantial modification 
to the company’s articles of association615. The latter scholars also noted, 
however, that it was questionable whether the AMF could trace any controlling 
shareholder(s) on whom to impose a buy-out offer, given that companies which 
adopt such caps do not usually have a controlling shareholder(s)616.
In spite of the above-mentioned alternative proposals, most companies have in 
practice complied with the AMF’s proposal, though they set a higher threshold to 
remove the cap than that proposed by the AMF. For instance, in 1992, BSN 
Danone provided in its articles for a voting cap, which limited the voting rights of
611 Code of Commerce, art. L. 228-12.
612 Code of Commerce, art. L. 228-14..
613 Annual Report COB 1989, p. 124 and Annual Report COB 1993, p. 51.
614 D. Schmidt, ‘Plafonnement du droit de vote et OPA’ (1994)44 RD bancaire et bourse 151, p.
152.
615 T. Bonneau and L. Faugerolas (1999), supra n 603, p. 106.
616 Ibid, p. 106.
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shareholders to six per cent617. Such cap was to become ineffective, however, if 
the offeror received at least ninety per cent of the shares. The latter figure was 
judged to be too high by the AMF. As a result, BSN Danone lowered it so that the 
cap would become ineffective upon receipt of two-thirds of the offeree’s voting 
rights.
Thirdly, a company may split shares into investment and voting certificates618. 
This technique is peculiar to France and serves to keep voting control in the hands 
of the noyau dur, in an attempt to deny foreign acquirers to have a say in the 
running of French listed companies. The ICs represent the pecuniary rights, are 
transferable619, and are entirely deprived of the ajfectio societatis. The VCs, on 
the other hand, represent the other rights attaching to shares, and are transferable 
only to the holder of an IC or if accompanied by an IC 62°. It should be noted, 
however, that such certificates cannot represent more than one-fourth of the 
issuer’s share capital.
A final defence which deviates from the ‘one-share-one-vote’ principle, and 
which is commonly used in France, is the provision of double voting rights to
ffy iloyal shareholders . An analysis of 156 companies in 1999 showed that 68 per 
cent of them had a regime of double voting rights . However, to qualify for 
double voting rights, the shares must be fully paid up and be registered for at least 
two years in the name of the same holder623. Companies may provide in their 
articles for a period longer than two years in order for the shares to qualify for 
double voting rights, though listed companies are not allowed to provide for 
periods longer than four years624. Double voting shares are likely to render the 
acquisition of control in a company longer, given that the offeror will need to 
either hold shares for at least two years until they qualify for double voting
617 Note that the ceiling was raised to 12 per cent in the event of double voting rights; see ibid, p. 
104.
618 Code of Commerce, art. L. 228-30 to L. 228-35. Hereafter the IC and the VC, respectively.
619 Code of Commerce, art. L. 228-30.
620 Code of Commerce, art. L. 228-30.
621 Code of Commerce, art. L. 225-123.
622 C. Van der Elst (2000), supra n 311, p. 30.
623 Code of Commerce, art. L. 225-123.
624 J-J. Daigre, D. Bompoint and F. Basdevant, ‘La Prise de Controle Rampante’ (2000) 6 Cahiers 
dr. entrepr. 1, p. 8.
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rights . This is because the transfer of double voting shares results in the loss of 
the double voting rights. It should be added that this technique might even be 
resorted to at the last minute, in case of imminent threat, by way of a general 
meeting decision. This is because the period of two years, which is necessary for 
the shares to qualify for double voting rights, is calculated by reference to the date 
when a person registers in the company’s share registry and not by reference to 
the date when the general meeting takes a decision in this direction626.
It should be noted, however, that market forces seem to induce French companies 
to eliminate double voting rights. Indeed, a number of companies such as Vivendi 
have recently eliminated a long-standing policy of double voting rights. This was 
prompted by the objections of both French and international investors to a 
shareholder resolution in 2000, which permitted Vivendi to make the voting 
power of blocks above two per cent contingent on the level of voting turnout. 
Given Vivendi’s historical thirty per cent voting turnout, such resolution would 
prevent blockholders from exercising influence on the company. Opposition to 
double voting shares is also echoed by the French Commission on Corporate 
Governance, which takes the view that companies should eradicate such shares, 
which can be used in a manner contrary to the spirit of responsible corporate
627governance .
The foregoing indicates that, by issuing shares with double voting rights to a core 
of loyal shareholders, and at the same time by reinforcing the company’s equity 
by issuing non-voting preference shares and/or investment certificates, the 
management of a company may well entrench itself.
4.2.3 Issue of Authorised but Unissued Shares
French companies may also issue securities to a core of friendly shareholders. 
Such securities can take the form of securities which over time lead to the
625 J. Charbit, ‘France’ in J. C. F. Lufkin and D. Gallagher (eds), International Corporate 
Governance (Euromoney Books, 1990), p. 103.
626 R. Vatinet, ‘Les Defenses Anti-OPA’ (1987) 105 Rev. Soc. 539, p. 555.
627 Recommendations on Corporate Governance (1998), supra n 391, p. 6.
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ownership of shares or voting rights by their holders, with the understanding that 
they will not come into play unless a hostile bid is declared628. The latter type of 
securities constitute an effective defence for the issuer, as they allow their holders 
to convert them into equity subsequent to a hostile bid629. Such conversion would 
dilute the offeror’s stake and increase the costs of its offer. The issue of such 
securities necessitates, however, that the existing shareholders waive their pre­
emption rights in favour of the holders of such securities630. It should be noted in 
this respect that this technique will not necessarily guarantee the loyalty of the 
core of friendly shareholders. For the latter may be tempted to sell their shares to 
a hostile offeror. To remedy this risk, companies usually combine this technique 
with the use of shareholder agreements.
4.2.4 Share Buy-Backs
Another pre-bid defence at the disposal of French listed companies consists of 
purchasing their own shares. Until recently, as a general rule, the purchase by a 
company of its own shares was prohibited, except under limited circumstances 
and under very strict conditions631. This was due to the perception in France of 
the share capital as a guarantee of the company’s creditors.
However, in 1998, the Esambert Report632 suggested to reform this area of 
company law, on the grounds that the above perception had become obsolete and 
that the exceptions under the old regime were insufficient for a dynamic financial 
market. The Report further noted that this defence is frequently used in the US. 
The Report advised, however, that the reform should be made within a legislative 
and regulatory framework which would dissipate the dangers of a sheer 
liberalisation633. Following the reform634, the emphasis changed from that of
628 Code of Commerce, art. L. 228-91 to L. 228-97.
629 It should be noted, however, that the rules on capital formation embodied in the Second Company 
Law Directive make it difficult to issue securities at a discount so as to dilute the capital of the 
offeror; see G. A. Ferrarini (2001), supra n 508, pp. 13-14.
630 Code of Commerce, art. L. 228-92.
631 Law of 1966, art. 217.
632 Rapport Esambert sur le Rachatpar les Societis de leurs Propres Actions (January, 1998), 
available at AMF website.
633 J. J. Daigre ‘Le Rachat par les Soci6t6s de leurs Propres Actions: Presentation et Commentaire du
Rapport de M. Esambert’ (1998) 65 RD bancaire et bourse 3, p. 3.
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635
636
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638
639
640
641
642
643
prohibition to that of authorisation. The essence of the reform consists of allowing 
companies to carry out share buy-backs for economic and financial management
file #
purposes , which as a result allows companies to hold shares in treasury. This 
permits companies to take out their ‘dormant funds’ and to increase the latter’s 
profitability, with a view to protecting themselves against the risk of hostile 
takeovers636.
Share buy-backs must, however, meet certain requirements: First and foremost, 
the ordinary general meeting must authorise the board to carry out such 
purchases and the duration of the period for which the authorisation is given 
cannot exceed eighteen months638. In addition, such purchases cannot exceed ten 
per cent of the capital . When determining whether the company has crossed the 
ten per cent threshold, not only the shares held directly by the company but also 
the shares held by third parties acting on behalf of the company and the shares 
held by the subsidiaries are to be taken into account. Furthermore, the shares so 
purchased must be held in registered form, and the company must file a 
prospectus with the AMF640. Moreover, the company must set up a reserve, other 
than the legal reserve, of an amount at least equal to the value of the shares held 
by the company, and the purchase cannot result in the amount of the company’s 
equity becoming less than the amount of its share capital, increased by any non 
distributable reserves641. It should further be noted that the shares so purchased 
lose their voting rights, their right to dividend, and their pre-emption rights642. 
The 1998 reform has been successful and listed companies increasingly carry out 
share buy-backs. There have been seven since January 2003, against two in 2002 
and six in 1998643.
Law No. 98-546 of 2 July 1998, JO of 3 July 1998, p. 10127.
Code of Commerce, L.225- 209.
H. Vauplane, M. Germain and J. P. Bomet (2001), supra n 129, p. 817.
The shares purchased may be sold, exchanged or cancelled.
Code of Commerce, L.225- 209.
Code of Commerce, L.225- 209.
Code of Commerce, L.225- 210.
Code of Commerce, L.225- 210.
Code of Commerce, L.225- 210.
‘A Paris, les Soci6t6s Cot6es Prennent la Clef des Champs’, La Tribune, August 6,2003.
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An alternative defence to share buy-backs consists of the purchase by a subsidiary 
of shares in its parent company, at the request of the latter644. This technique 
allows a company to indirectly become its own shareholder by holding its shares 
through its subsidiaries. Prior to the Law of 1989, such shares were allowed to be 
voted up to a limit of ten per cent of the votes of all shareholders present or 
represented at the general meeting645. This, in turn, enabled the management of 
prospective offeree companies to effectively lock up a portion of their capital646. 
The Law of 1989 deprived, however, these shares from their voting rights647 and 
thus rendered it more difficult to lock up a listed company for the benefit of the 
incumbent management. Henceforth, the only benefit arising out of this pre-bid 
defence is to have a smaller number of outstanding capital that the hostile bidder 
may acquire. At the same time, however, the holding by a subsidiary of shares in 
its parent may facilitate the acquisition by the offeror of control of the parent, 
given that the threshold to acquire control of the latter will be reduced648.
It should be noted that the AMF does not support the practice of companies 
holding shares in the capital of their parents, on the grounds that this results in 
having an imaginary capital and superficial general meetings. Furthermore, in the 
AMF’s view, this practice serves to protect the management team in place649. The 
latter criticisms should not be of great concern, however, since very few French 
companies currently resort to this practice650. For instance, Suez owns 8 per cent 
of its shares through its subsidiaries Societe Generate de Belgique and Groupe 
Victoire.
644 This defence is referred to in France as the ‘auto-controle’.
645 Law of 1966, art. 359-1.
646 A. Marquardt, ‘Tender Offers in France: The New Rules’ (1990) I.F.L.Rev. 35, p. 36.
647 Code of Commerce, art. L. 233-31.
648 ‘Mesures Anti-OPA: De la Panoplie k la Mise en GEuvre’, 541 Option Finance 31, March 29, 
1999, p. 32.
649 Annual Report COB 1989, p. 88.
650 B. Mojuyd (2000), supra n 366, p. 84.
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4.2.5 Cross Shareholdings
Cross-shareholdings in large groups serve to perpetuate control within the 
corporate sector651. Such shareholdings have always been an attribute of the 
French takeover regime. The rationale behind their creation was to prevent 
foreign companies holding large stakes in French companies which were 
privatised in 1986. However, a study conducted in 2001 on ten privatised 
companies shows that this technique has not been able to really prevent the 
increase of foreign presence in French capitalism652. This is because, over the past 
decade or so, companies have been unwinding their traditional cross­
shareholdings. As a result, directors of many large listed companies can no longer 
rely on the support of a hard core of stable French shareholders. Furthermore, the 
Commission on Corporate Governance has stated that this practice ‘runs counter 
to openness and independent decision-making’, except in cases where cross 
shareholdings are the result of strategic alliances653.
Under the French law, a company cannot own more than ten per cent of the 
capital of another company if the latter holds more than ten per cent of the capital 
of the former654. If a company holds more than ten per cent of the capital of 
another company, which in turn holds more than ten per cent of the capital of the 
former, one of the two must agree to sell its interest in the other company. In case 
of disagreement, the company holding the smaller interest must sell its 
shareholding within one year following the notification made by the other 
company655. The ten per cent threshold is likely to induce a potential offeree 
company to purchase as quickly as possible a stake of more than ten per cent in 
the capital of a potential offeror in order to subsequently invoke to its own benefit 
the rule on cross shareholdings. If the interconnected interests are equal, each 
company must reduce its interest in the capital of the other to, at most, ten per 
cent656. Pending such reduction, shares in excess of the ten per cent threshold are
651 J. Franks and C. Mayer (1997), supra n 235, p. 295.
632 L. Bloch and E. Kremp (2001), supra n 138,p. 106.
653 Recommendations on Corporate Governance (1998), supra n 390, p. 9.
654 Code of Commerce, art. L. 233-29.
655 Code of Commerce, art. L. 233-29.
656 Code of Commerce, art. L. 233-29.
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deprived of their voting rights657. It should be noted, however, that the rule only 
concerns direct cross shareholdings and does not apply to indirect shareholdings 
in the subsidiaries of friendly companies. Thus, company A and company B may 
hold only nine per cent in the capital of each other, but each of them may hold a 
greater percentage of shareholding in the subsidiary of the other658.
Another pre-bid defence which is closely associated with cross shareholdings is 
the pacman defence659. It is still questionable, however, whether an offeree 
company may legally resort to this defence in France. This is because the rule on 
cross shareholdings should prevent the offeree company from launching a 
counter-bid on the original bidder where the latter already holds more than ten per 
cent in the capital of the offeree company660. This defence has nevertheless been 
used in 1999 by Societe Elf Aquitaine, in its battle against TotalFina. In this case, 
TotalFina’s offer had closed before Elf made a counter-bid. However, at the time 
Elf filed its counter bid, it was still unclear how many shareholders had tendered 
their shares in favour of TotalFina’s offer and thus whether TotalFina’s offer 
could result in TotalFina owning more than ten per cent of Elf. Subsequently, the 
parties settled, and the AMF did not have to judge upon the validity of this 
defence in France.
Legal scholars have continued the debate, however, as to the validity of the 
pacman defence in France. Some interpret the rule on cross shareholdings as 
prohibiting any acquisition whatsoever of shares in excess of the ten per cent 
threshold. This view is held by Viandier, who anticipates that, if the pacman 
defence is used again in the future, the courts are likely to invalidate it on the 
grounds that it falls foul of the rule on cross shareholdings661. Others interpret the 
rule on cross shareholdings as not prohibiting any acquisition per se but rather as 
requiring the immediate disposal of the shares in excess of the ten per cent
657 Code of Commerce, art. L. 233-29.
658 R. Vatinet (1987), supra n 626, p. 550.
659 i.e. when the offeree company launches a counter offer over the offeror company.
660 Also note that there may be circumstances where the pacman defence can simply not be 
implemented legally. This is particularly the case where the offeror cannot be taken over simply 
because it is a societe en commandite par actions’, see D. Carreau and J. Y. Martin, ‘Les Moyens de 
Defense Anti-OPA en France-2* partie’ (1990) 510 Banque 1032, p. 1033.
6611 am indebted to Professor Alain Viandier at the University of Paris V for his valuable comments 
on this point during my interview with him in January 2003.
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threshold. This view is held by Daigre, who argues that requiring the company 
holding the smaller interest to regularise its situation within one year renders the 
pacman defence consistent with the rule on cross shareholdings662. He further 
argues that the AMF has no authority to judge upon the validity of this defence in 
France and therefore supports the AMF for not having done so during the 
TotalFina/Elf battle. In his view, the AMF would have committed an abus de 
pouvoir had it acted otherwise during the latter battle. For, his argument goes, this 
is a matter for company law and therefore falls outside the scope of the AMF’s 
activities.
4.2.6 Societes en Commandite par Actions
Another pre-bid defence, which is peculiar to France and which has no equivalent
(\f\Xin the UK, concerns the use of societes en commandite par actions . Since the 
early 1980s, SCAs664 have been enjoying a revival in France. This is because this 
technique allows a considerable amount of outside capital to be raised while 
keeping the running of the company in the hands of a few members665. Indeed, in 
a SCA, there are two types of members. On the one hand, there are the 
commanditaires whose liability for the debts is limited to the amount of their 
contributions, whose shares are freely transferable as in a public limited 
company666, but who are deprived of the management powers667. On the other 
hand, there are the commandites who are individually liable for the whole of the 
debts without limitation, whose shares are transferable only with the consent of all 
the other commandites, and who have the exclusive power to manage the SCA. 
Thus, an offeror who acquires the majority of the capital in a SCA cannot acquire 
the right to control the latter. As a result, transforming a public limited company 
into a SCA may be an effective means to prevent hostile offers. For the prospect 
of becoming a commanditaire without a say in the running of the SCA is likely to
662 1 am indebted to Professor Jean-Jacques Daigre at the University of Paris I for his valuable 
comments on this point during my interview with him in January 2003.
663 Hereafter the SCA.
664 Code of Commerce, art. L. 226-1 to 226-14.
665 J. P. Le Gall and P. Morel (1992), supra n 595, p. 22.
666 Hereafter the SA.
667 A. Perrier and R. Scacchi, Strategies Anti-OPA (Paris: Economica, 1995), p. 43.
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be unattractive for potential offerors668. It should be added in this respect that 
such transformation requires a two-thirds majority of the votes at the 
shareholders’ extraordinary meeeting, with the unanimous consent of the 
prospective commandites.
It should be noted, however, that although the AMF does not oppose the listing of 
an already existing SCA provided shareholders are adequately informed that they 
will have reduced rights in comparison with those in a public limited company, it 
is more reluctant to approve the transformation of a public limited company into a 
SCA669. The authorities have become less reticent, however, following the reform 
of 1989, which introduced the right of the minority to exercise their sell-out rights 
upon transformation of a public limited company into a SCA670. This right has 
been conferred on the minority on the grounds that such transformation alters the 
original articles of association to a significant extent671. It should further be added 
that such transformation may be characterised as an abus de majorite by the
fk77courts, which would then nullify the resolution taken to that effect . For instance, 
the Paris Tribunal of Commerce nullified the transformation of Sidef Conforama 
into a SCA, on the grounds that this constituted an abus de majorite on the part of 
the designated commandite.
4.2.7 Other Permissible Pre-Bid Defences
Other widely used pre-bid defences in France include the distribution of 
exceptional dividends and the payment by a company to its loyal shareholders of
f i n ' l
so-called loyalty premium dividends . In order to receive the latter, shares must 
have been registered for at least two years in the name of the same holder. In 
addition, shareholders in extraordinary general meeting must approve a resolution 
taken to that effect. However, the number of shares eligible for the increased
668 Ch. Gavalda, ’Commentaire de la Loi du 2 Aofit 1989 Concemant P Amelioration de la 
Transparence et de la Securite du Marche Financier’ (1990) Rev. Soc. 1, p. 19.
669 T. Bonneau and L. Faugerolas (1999), supra n 603, p. 108.
670 CMF regs, r.5-6-5.
671 Annual Report COB, 1988, p. 18.
672 T. com. Paris, 29 June 1981; see (1982) Rev. Soc., p. 791.
673 Code of Commerce, art. L. 232-14. Note that the Commission on Corporate Governance is also 
against ‘loyalty premium’ dividend payments; see Recommendations on Corporate Governance 
(1998), supra n 390, p. 7.
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dividend cannot exceed, for the same shareholder, 0.5 per cent of the company’s 
share capital. The use of loyalty premium dividends may act as a deterrent for 
potential offerors, for the transfer of shares eligible for the increased dividend 
results in the loss of the right to a premium. However, the 0.5 per cent ceiling 
threshold is likely to discourage shareholders owning more than 0.5 per cent of 
the capital, since they will only be partially rewarded.
Another widely used pre-bid defence by French listed companies is the creation 
of a hard core through shareholder agreements. The latter are very common in 
French listed companies and often have a significant influence on the outcome of 
an offer674. This is because such agreements usually involve the granting by 
offeree shareholders of pre-emption rights to each other, which restricts the free 
transferability of their shares. The French law requires any clause of such 
agreement which includes preferential conditions for the sale or acquisition of 
shares, such as pre-emption rights, or put and call options, and which concerns at 
least 0.5 per cent of the share capital or voting rights of the issuer to be notified to 
the AMF675. The choice of 0.5 per cent as a threshold results from the legislator’s 
desire to publicise a maximum number of shareholder agreements, and at the
f.n(L
same time to exclude those which do not affect the course of offers . The 0.5 per 
cent threshold is also in line with the minimum disclosure threshold that French 
listed companies may stipulate pursuant to the Code of Commerce677. Non- 
compliance with the obligation to disclose results in the suspension of the clause 
and the release of the parties to the agreement from their commitment during the 
course of an offer. The latter sanction, which has been provided by the Law of 
2001, has caused furore amongst legal practitioners. For, in the latter’s view, this 
sanction ignores the French principle pursuant to which 7e contrat est la loi des 
parties'61*.
674 V. M6dail and P. Vergnole, ‘La Riforme des Offres Publiques par la Loi sur les NRE’ (2001) 
Bull. Joly soc. 766, p. 767.
675 Code of Commerce, art. L. 233-11. Note that agreements which are outside the scope of this rule 
need nevertheless be disclosed if they may have an incidence on the outcome of an offer; see COB 
regs, r.4.
V. M6dail and P. Vergnole (2001), supra n 674, p. 767.
677 Code of Commerce, art. L. 233-7.
678 1 am indebted to Ms Anne M arshal at the law firm Auguste & Debouzy for her valuable 
comments on this point.
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4.2.8 Structural Factors
Unlike in the UK, there are a great number of structural factors in France, which 
may act as a deterrent to hostile offerors. For instance, most listed companies in 
France resort to pyramid structures, which result in very low liquidity for all the 
companies involved . Indeed, a study in 1997 shows that the number of groups 
have exploded in France, from 1,300 in 1980 to 6,700 in 1995680. More important, 
the French State is traditionally heavily involved in the ownership and 
management of large public companies through golden shares681. The latter were 
first introduced in the wake of the privatisations in 1986682, with a view to 
protecting the national interests in newly privatised companies operating in 
strategic sectors. The Law of 1993 further extended the prerogatives attaching to 
such shares, by conferring on the Minister of Economy power to appoint 
representatives to the board of directors; to veto the sale of assets or their granting 
as a guarantee; and to approve the crossing of certain thresholds of the capital or 
the voting rights. Although the latter power constitutes a departure from the stock 
exchange rule which prohibits transfer clauses , it has been justified in view of
SO A
the objectives pursued by the issuance of such shares . It should be noted, 
however, that, as seen in the chapter on the ownership structure of listed 
companies and the market for corporate control in the UK and France, the use of 
golden shares by the French government has been rendered more difficult by the
679 J. G. Garcia, ‘Freeing Europe’s Corporates from Minority Control’ (2002) 21 1.F.L.Rev., p. 13. A 
pyramid can be defined as a group structure characterized by a more or less long chain of control 
using several holding companies. The ultimate shareholders control each company in the chain by 
majority or controlling minority interests, leaving minority shareholders at each level. The result is 
that the ultimate shareholders may control the whole chain up to and including the company at the 
bottom on the basis of a small total investment; see Report o f the High Level Group o f Company 
Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe (November, 2002), 
p. 98, available at europa website.
L. Bloch and E. Kremp (2001), supra n 138, p. 106.
681 These were issued following the introduction of the Privatisation Law No. 86-912 of 6 August 
1986, as amended by the Law No. 93-923 of 19 July 1993.
682 Law of 1986, art. 10, as modified by the Law of 1993.
683 COB regs, r.4. See also article P 1-1-17 of Book II: Specific Rules Applicable to the French 
Regulated Markets. Note that Book II contains non-harmonised market rules and will soon be 
replaced by Book I, which contains harmonised market rules. Chapter 6 of Book I will contain rules 
for the listing of securities.
684 L. Richer and A. Viandier, ‘La loi de Privatisation’ (1993) 281 JCP, dd. E, 1445, pp. 450-451.
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ECJ’s landmark judgment on the French government’s golden share in Societe 
Elf-Aquitaine685.
It should be added that French companies have at their disposal another tool,
which is closely associated with the golden shares. This consists of the creation of
a noyau dur within the privatised companies, by selling the formerly state-owned
shares to investors chosen by the State. The idea behind this tool is, as in the case
of golden shares, to keep privatised companies nationally ‘anchored’686. This
defence was initially created in view of the fact that, under the Law of 1986,
golden shares used to automatically transform into ordinary shares after a period
of five years following their issuance 687 . According to data during the
privatisations of 1993, participants to the hard core were compelled to retain all of
the shares issued for a period of at least three months. At the end of this period,
they were compelled to keep eighty per cent of the shares issued for a period of at
least twenty-one months (BNP) or fifteen months (Rhone-Poulenc) and, at the end
of the latter period, agree to a mutual pre-emption right for the subsequent three
years (BNP et Rhone-Poulenc). As a result, participants to the hard core were
allowed to freely dispose of their shares only after five years following the date of 
688issuance .
Another barrier difficult to surmount by foreign bidders relates to the power of 
chairmans/CEOs in French listed public sector companies. Most of these PDGs 
have been educated in two elite state schools, namely the Ecole Nationale 
d’Administration and the Ecole Polytechnique. Indeed, graduates of the latter 
schools represent fifty per cent of the management of the 200 most important 
national companies690. Furthermore, according to a survey conducted in 1997, 
more than one out of two managers of CAC40 companies is enarque or
685 Commission CE c/Ripubliquefrangaise, supra n 383, pp. 430-435.
686 K. Lannoo, ‘A European Perspective on Corporate Governance’ (1999) 37 JCMC 269, p. 291.
687 As seen above, this is no longer the case since the Law of 1993.
688 D. Carreau and R. Treuhold, ‘Privatisations, Droit Boursier, et Pratiques des Marches’ (1994) 1 
Rev. Soc. 1, p. 9.
689 Referred to in France as Prdsidents-Directeurs G6n6raux (hereafter the PDGs).
690 23 per cent for Ena and 27 per cent for Polytechnique; see G. Carminatti-Marchand and M. 
Paquerot, ‘The Elite and their Boards of Directors’ (2001), p. 9, available at SSRN.
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polytechnicien691. The particularity of these graduates is that, because they are 
appointed by the State and removable only by the State, they do not see 
themselves as accountable to the shareholders but rather to the State692. In other 
words, they think more of national progress than of shareholder profit 
maximisation693. As a result, it is very difficult for a foreign bidder to take over a 
listed public sector company where the PDG opposes its bid, even if shareholders 
would gain more from such bid. The cumulative effect of these structural factors 
is that relatively few listed companies in France are vulnerable to hostile bids694.
As the foregoing indicates, French listed companies may use various mechanisms 
to deter an offer. Indeed, UK-US funds are mostly worried about the double 
voting rights, the cross shareholdings, the noyaux durs, the golden shares, and the 
strong power of the PDG s 695. After the offer commences, however, French 
directors’margin of manoeuvre reduces to a significant extent.
4.3 Regulation of Post-Bid Defences
The following gives an overview of the rules governing post-bid defensive 
measures and the permissible post-bid defences.
4.3.1 Rules Governing Post-Bid Defences
Principles governing post-bid defences are to be found primarily in the COB’s 
Regulation No. 2002-04. In particular, Rule 4 of the latter reads
691 ‘Gouvemement d’Entreprise: le CAC 40 Fait de la Resistance’ (1997) 468 Option Finance 17, p. 
17.
692 See e. g. the $4 billion loss incurred by the state-owned bank Credit Lyonnais. Indeed, the then 
PDG of the bank, who was appointed by the socialist government, had not disclosed the tactics the 
bank undertook in the real estate market throughout Europe. However, nobody checked his 
management, as he was a former member of the socialist government; see B. Mojuy6 (2000), supra 
n 366, pp. 90-91.
693 M. J. Roe (2002), supra n 308, p. 125.
694 J. Epstein, J. Swank and S. Deparis-Maze, ‘France’ (1992) I.F.L.Rev., p. 2.
695 Les Criteres d ’Investissement (1998), supra n 329, p. 24.
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'During the course o f an offer, every person must act in accordance with the fair game o f bids 
and overbids, the equality o f treatment and o f information o f the holders o f securities o f the 
companies concerned, the transparency and the integrity o f the market, the honesty in the 
transactions and the competition
Thus, the rule enumerates a number of principles that the offeree company must 
observe during the course of an offer. The rule further contains an obligation of 
notification imposed upon the offeree company, in the following terms:
‘I f  the offeree company decides to take non-routine managerial actions other than those 
explicitly authorised by the general meeting o f shareholders conveyed during the course o f the 
offer, the offeree directors must notify the AMF with a view to allowing the latter to ensure the 
information o f the public and to make known its reservations, i f  there are any*.
For the purpose of clarity, it is suggested to examine the two parts of the rule 
separately.
i) Principles enumerated in Rule 4
Two remarks deserve to be made as regards the first part of the Rule: First, there 
is no judicial decision in France illustrating the scope of the principles 
enumerated in Rule 4696. Secondly, the list is not exhaustive. Indeed, another 
principle that the offeree company must observe in the course of an offer is that 
the offeree board must act in conformity with the interests of the company. The 
latter principle was expressly mentioned in the previous COB’s Regulation, but 
has been subsequently removed. This is because the concept of the corporate 
interest belongs to company law and therefore has no place within the stock 
exchange regulation. The removal of the concept of the corporate interest was 
further viewed by some commentators as satisfactory due to the difficulty to 
define such concept697. Indeed, the French company law has long denied equating 
the interests of the company with those of the shareholders. It has instead 
endorsed an institutional approach of the company and viewed the interests of the 
latter as transcending those of the shareholders. In Fruehauf, the Court of Appeal 
held that the interests of the company cannot be identified with those of its
696 1 am indebted to Professor Alain Viandier for his valuable comments on this point during my 
interview with him in January 2003.
697 ‘Ofifre Publique-Riglement COB’ (2002) 83 Banque et Droit 31, p. 32. On the difficulties to 
define this concept, see the chapter on the comparative analysis of the UK and French regimes 
as regards the issues of defensive measures and equality in the context of takeover bids.
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shareholders, and the Court even employed the term ‘general interest’ to 
designate the interests of the company698. The lack of a clear definition of what 
constitutes the interests of the company may be seen as a loophole, which could 
be exploited by offeree companies to ward off hostile bids. However, as far as the 
legal doctrine is concerned, Viandier (2000) argues that the interests of the 
company and those of the offeree shareholders should be regarded as being the 
same in the context of post-bid defences. For, in his view, control belongs to 
offeree shareholders and the latter have the right to sell it699.
In spite of its removal from the COB’s Regulation, offeree directors must still 
comply with the principle of corporate interest whilst taking post-bid defences700. 
Thus, if an action taken by the offeree board during the course of an offer is 
contrary to the interests of the company, then that action will be contrary to 
company law. As a result, such action will likely be invalidated by the courts, 
even if it has been notified to the AMF by the offeree directors701. Furthermore, 
the offeree directors may be held liable for abus de pouvoir702 or for abus de 
biens sociauxm .
ii) Obligation of notification embodied in Rule 4
As seen above, the second part of Rule 4 of the COB’s Regulation 2002-04 
imposes an obligation of notification upon the offeree company in cases where it 
decides to take non-routine managerial actions other than those explicitly 
authorised by the general meeting of shareholders. Such actions have been 
defined by the doctrine and the courts as actions which significantly modify the
698 CA, Paris, Fruehauf, 22 May 1965 (1968) D., p. 147.
699 A. Viandier, ‘Le Droit des Soci6t6s h l’Epreuve des Offres Publiques’ (2000) Rev. JP comm. 243, 
pp. 251-252.
00 S. Nonorgue ‘L’Apport Partiel d’Actif, Technique de Defense Anti-OPA’ (2002) Bull. Joly 
Bourse 397, p. 407.
7011 am indebted to Professor Alain Viandier for his valuable comments on this point during my 
interview with him in January 2003.
702 ‘OPA: Quels Droits Pour la Soci6t6 Cible?’, 474 Option Finance, November 10, 1997, p. 28.
703 e.g. Cass. Crim., 10 July 1995, 4 JCP 6d. G, p. 47, where the French Supreme Court confirmed a 
decision by the Court of Appeal, which held the PDG of a company liable for abus de biens sociaux 
and for abus de pouvoirs, on the grounds that he used his powers to organize a merger which was 
contrary to the interests of the company and advantageous for himself and the companies in which 
he had interests.
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composition of the balance sheet of the company, which fall within the powers of 
the board of directors, and which have an exceptional and non-repetitive nature.
At first sight, Rule 4 does not seem to prohibit acts other than those of ordinary 
management which have not been approved by shareholders in general meeting. 
Instead, it seems to stipulate a mere obligation to inform the AMF of such acts704. 
Thus, unlike GP 7 of the UK Code, Rule 4 does not contain a clear-cut ‘no 
frustrating action’ rule. Nor does the COB’s Regulation offer a list of defences 
whose use is prohibited during the course of an offer. All Rule 4 does is to impose 
an obligation of notification. This author suggests that, the reason behind the 
absence of a clear-cut ‘no frustrating action’ rule in France probably lies in the 
fact that the French experience is short of hostile takeovers. In addition, given that 
conflicts of interests in France mostly arise as between controlling and non- 
controlling shareholders, the regulators may not have felt the need to place much 
emphasis on the regulation of post-bid defences.
In spite of the absence of a clear-cut ‘no frustrating action’ rule, the interpretation 
of Rule 4 is quite different for two reasons: First, the offeree directors must at all 
times observe the principles enumerated in Rule 4, as well as other principles 
such as the principle of the interests of the company. Indeed, Daigre argues that if, 
for instance, an offeree company rushes to dispose of a major or a strategic asset 
in the face of a bid, this would be regarded as contrary to the interests of the 
company705. This can be illustrated by the Benedictine case of 1998. In this case, 
the offeree company was willing to trigger a clause which conferred on a third 
party an option on the most advantageous assets of the company in the event of a 
change of majority holding. The AMF held that 'this type o f  clause was designed
7 (\fkto impede tender offers and therefore the normal operation o f  the markef .
Secondly, although the AMF has no power to force the offeree company to 
renounce to its proposed action707, it has power to issue reservations where it
704 L. Faugfrolas (2003), supra n 584, p. 332.
705 1 am indebted to Professor Jean-Jacques Daigre for his valuable comments on this point during 
my interview with him in January 2003.
7 L. Faugdrolas (2003), supra n 584, pp. 336-337.
707 H. Vauplane, M. Germain and J. P. Bomet (2001), supra n 129, p. 743.
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believes that the action jeopardises the course of the offer708 . The AMF’s 
reservations have a powerful effect, as the offeree company would fear the impact 
of such reservations upon its share price. Furthermore, in the unlikely event that 
the offeree company would ignore the AMF’s reservations and would proceed 
with its proposed action, there are a number of devices at the AMF’s disposal 
which are likely to deter the offeree company from doing so. Indeed, the AMF 
has power to issue injunctions and/or order pecuniary sanctions, though the 
pecuniary sanctions are minor and thus unlikely to deter offeree companies. The 
AMF has also power to request the courts to issue an injunction. Furthermore, the 
courts may nullify the disputed action and incur the civil and/or criminal liability 
of the offeree directors, at the request of a shareholder, who would claim that the 
offeree company has acted in breach of company law709, or at the request of the 
offeror who would claim that the offeree company has acted in breach of the 
principle of fair competition embodied in Rule 4 of the COB’s Regulation.
As a result of the above-mentioned reasons, Rule 4 is seen as tantamount to 
prohibiting the offeree board from performing any acts that go beyond ordinary 
management if such acts have not been approved by shareholders in general 
meeting710. Indeed, Rule 4 has always been interpreted by the offeree directors as 
prohibiting post-bid defences other than those authorised by shareholders in
71 1general meeting . It is noteworthy in this respect that the early discussions 
leading to the reform of the COB’s Regulation considered, albeit unsuccessfully, 
to reinforce this restrictive approach, in that the new rule would read
‘ Where the managers o f the companies concerned decide to take non-routine managerial 
actions, they must inform the AMF, with a view to allowing the latter to ensure that the proposed 
actions do not jeopardise the general principles governing tender offers and to guarantee the 
information o f the public’.
The above version of Rule 4 would oblige the offeree board to obtain a ‘nothing 
hinders’ from the AMF before adopting any non-routine post-bid managerial
708 For an illustration of such reservations, see below the AMF’s recent reservation about Aventis’ 
notification to issue share warrants during the course of Sanofi’s hostile takeover bid.
709 The plaintiff may e. g. claim that the company has breached the principle of the interests of the 
company.
710 L. Faugdrolas (2003), supra n 584, p. 332.
711 A. Viandier (1990), supra n 95, p. 299.
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action, and would allow the AMF to veto any action that would violate the 
principles contained in this rule712.
It should be noted that, by not requiring notification for actions authorised by the 
general meeting, Rule 4 confirms the sovereignty of the general meeting and 
demonstrates that the AMF refuses to impede measures decided by the general 
meeting. It should be noted in this respect that the ability of the general meeting 
to take defensive measures in the face of a bid has been facilitated by the Law of 
1997713, which has increased the offer period714. Such increase arose out of the 
desire of the then President of the Republic to render French companies less 
vulnerable to takeovers715. Indeed, the unofficial commentaries accompanying 
this reform stated that the purpose of the reform was to allow companies more 
time to organise their defence716. Prior to this reform, it was almost impossible for 
companies to convene a general meeting during the course of an offer and their 
situation was held by the then market authorities to be too disadvantageous in 
comparison with other European jurisdictions. Henceforth, offeree companies 
have more time to establish a dialogue with their shareholders with a view to 
proposing them a defence plan.
It should finally be noted that, despite the rigorous interpretation by legal scholars 
of Rule 4 and the fact that offeree companies in France abide by such 
interpretation, as evidenced by the absence of regulatory and/or judicial decisions 
pointing to the contrary view, it is suggested that ‘theoretically’717 there is room 
in France for offeree companies to take post-bid defences without shareholder 
approval. This suggestion is based on Rule 5-2-9 of the CMF’s Regulation. The 
latter authorises the offeror to renounce to its offer, inter alia, where the offeree 
company takes measures which are likely to change its substance. Most legal 
scholars view this rule as no more than a faculty conferred on the offeror in 
exchange for the faculty conferred on the offeree board to resort to the general 
meeting during the course of an offer. It is suggested, however, that, this rule
712 A. Viandier (2000), supra n 699, p. 249.
713 Order of 27 March 1997.
714 ‘OPA: Quels Droits Pour la Soci6t6 Cible?’, supra n 701, p. 28.
715 A. Viandier, ‘La Riforme du Droit des Offres Publiques’ (1997) 6 RJDA 499, p. 499.
716 Ibid, p. 501.
717 This is because no use of Rule 5-2-9 has been made thus far in the context of defensive measures.
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provides offeree directors with a way round the application of Rule 4 of the 
COB’s Regulation718. This is because Rule 5-2-9 does not explicitly refer to 
decisions taken by the general meeting whilst describing the circumstances which 
would allow the offeror to withdraw its offer. Instead, the rule simply refers to 
decisions taken by ‘the offeree company’. It should be emphasised in this respect 
that it is not suggested that Rule 5-2-9 contradicts Rule 4. Instead, it is suggested 
that Rule 5-2-9 theoretically allows an offeree company to take post-bid actions 
without shareholder approval, even if  the proposed action has been notified to the 
AMF and even if the latter has issued reservations. It is true that, as noted above, 
it would be unwise for an offeree company not to take the AMF’s reservations 
into account and to proceed with its proposed action. For such course of action 
would not only be badly received by the market but would also possibly trigger 
the AMF’s above-mentioned powers. It is suggested that the AMF’s new General 
Regulation should either amend Rule 5-2-9 with a view to making it clear that the 
term ‘offeree company’ does indeed refer to the general meeting of shareholders, 
or at least establish a linkage between Rule 5-2-9 and Rule 4 of the COB’s 
Regulation.
4.3.2 Permissible Post-Bid Defences 
i) Post-bid defences expressly permitted by Rule 4
Rule 4 explicitly allows an offeree board to issue shares during the course of an 
offer. This measure would allow the offeree board to potentially increase the costs 
of an unsolicited offer, by increasing the number of shares outstanding. For the 
offeror may not have enough resources to pay for the additional shares resulting 
from the issue. To do so, however, the offeree board must be expressly authorised 
by a resolution of the extraordinary meeting, for a term not exceeding one year, to 
make use, after a takeover has been made, of a delegation of authority to increase 
the capital719.
718 Although most scholars fiercely oppose this view, a small number of them support it; see e. g. A. 
Viandier (2000), supra n 699, p. 250, where he makes a a contrario interpretation of Rule 5-2-9 to 
come to this conclusion.
7,9 Code of Commerce, art. L. 225-129.
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The effectiveness of this defence is limited, however. For on the one hand the 
issue must take into account shareholders’ pre-emption rights720. As a result, the 
rule does not allow the offeree board to use its delegated power in favour of a 
‘white knight’721. Furthermore, even if shareholders do not invoke their pre­
emption rights by individually waiving them722, there is a risk that the issue will 
open up even wider share acquisition possibilities to the offeror. Indeed, 
individual shareholders may well transfer their pre-emption rights for the benefit 
of the assailant rather than for the benefit of the white knight. It should be added 
that institutional investors are not in favour of the use of a delegated authority to 
issue shares. Indeed, the new French corporate governance principles recommend 
that companies cease in future to submit to the extraordinary meeting a resolution 
expressly permitting the use of delegations of authority to increase the capital 
after a takeover offer has been made . Moreover, nothing guarantees that 
friendly third parties will subscribe to newly issued shares.
Another post-bid defence explicitly allowed by Rule 4, and which also requires 
prior authorisation, is share buy-backs724. However, the AMF allows the latter 
only if the offer is a cash offer and the buy-backs are in connection with an 
existing share repurchase programme, which has already been put into effect. 
Thus, the offeree board cannot avail itself of a prior authorisation if the share buy­
back has not been partly enforced yet.
720 Any clause otherwise stipulated will be deemed null and void; see Code of Commerce, art. L. 
225-132.
721 See below for this defence.
722 Code of Commerce, art. L. 225-132.
723 Principes de Gouvernement d ’Entreprise (2004), Consolidation des Rapports Conjoints des 
Rapports Vidnot I (1995), Vidnot II (1999), et Bouton (2002), p. 8, available at http://www.pans- 
europlace.net.
724 Such course of action was implicitly prohibited under the old COB’s Regulation No. 89-03, 
which prohibited offeree companies from increasing their treasury shares or the shares held by their 
subsidiaries in their capital during the currency of an offer.
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Search for a white knight
The AMF has several times declared that it favours takeovers being fought out on 
the market, if necessary by having white knights come in and offer better prices725. 
The courts share the AMF’s view and state that
‘I f  it is legitimate for a company to defend itself against an unwelcome bid, it has to do so 
openly, by respecting the interests o f the shareholders as soon as the offer period starts. I f  the 
offeree company wishes to impede the hostile offer, it has to make a counter ojger and cannot 
engage in illegal acts which wouldjeopardise the interests o f all shareholders'
The white knight defence is subject to certain requirements, however. Indeed, 
where the original offer is a cash offer, the AMF requires the competing offer to
777represent a price at least two per cent higher than that of the original offer . 
Where the original offer is a share exchange offer, the AMF requires the 
competing offer to propose changes which significantly improve the original offer. 
The competing offer may have the same price as the original offer, however, if 
the AMF feels that the minimum level set by the initial offeror is inappropriately 
high728 and the competing offer omits such condition729. In spite of the latter 
requirements, the competing offeror’s chances of success are high in France. This 
is because tenders filed by shareholders in response to the initial offer are 
automatically cancelled upon the announcement of a competing offer . By 
rendering the position of the previous offeror precarious, this provision not only 
allows the offeree shareholders to accept the superior terms of a competing offer 
but also removes the potential for coercion by the original offeror.
The effectiveness of the white knight defence is limited, however, in two respects: 
First, as seen above, the offeree company cannot issue additional shares or sell the 
shares held by its subsidiary in its capital in favour of a white knight in the course
725 E. Wymeersch, ‘Problems of the Regulation of Takeover Bids in Western Europe: A 
Comparative Survey’ in K. J. Hopt and E. Wymeersch (eds), European Takeovers: Law and 
Practice (Butterworths, 1992), p. 127.
726 CA, Paris 10 March 1992, Perrier (1992) Rev. Soc., p. 345.
727 CMF regs, r.5-2-6.
728 Note that, since the Law of 2001, the offeror who conditions its offer to the obtaining of a 
minimum percentage of shares is henceforth bound by this threshold and thus cannot renounce to 
such threshold in view of the results.
729 CMF regs, r.5-2-6.
730 CMF regs, r.5-2-7.
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of an offer. This prohibition resulted from the Perrier case731, where during the 
course of a hostile offer by Nestle on the shares of Exor, a French holding 
company that owned 28.8 per cent of Perrier, SPG -  a strategic asset of Exor and 
a wholly owned subsidiary of Perrier- decided to sell to Saint-Louis the shares it 
held in the capital of Perrier. The Paris Tribunal of Commerce held that any 
operation on the shares of Perrier must be assimilated to an operation on the 
shares of Exor, and that the sale, which was realised during the course of Nestle’s 
offer, could not be regarded as a routine managerial action. This is because such 
sale would re-activate, in favour of Saint-Louis, the voting rights attaching to the 
shares held by SPG in the capital of Perrier. The problem was further exacerbated 
by the fact that Saint-Louis had declared acting in concert with Exor. As a result, 
the Tribunal held that the sale by an offeree company of the shares held by its 
subsidiary in its capital in favour of another company during the course of an 
offer does not constitute a routine managerial action and that such sale would 
therefore be nullified, on the grounds that it constitutes a blatant breach of the 
letter and the spirit of the takeover regulation732.
It is noteworthy in this respect that the Tribunal based its decision on Rule 3 of 
the old COB’s Regulation No. 89-03733. The latter merely prohibited the increase 
by a subsidiary of the shares it held in the capital of its parent during the course of 
an offer and did not expressly prohibit the sale of such shares. However, the 
Tribunal made an extensive interpretation of this provision, by relying on an 
earlier ruling of the president of the Paris Tribunal of Commerce734, whereby it 
was held that the sale of such shares to third parties during the course of a hostile 
bid would modify the situation which existed at the beginning of the hostile bid 
and would seem linked to the immediate preoccupations of the directors. Thus, in 
the Perrier case, the Paris Tribunal of Commerce relied on the spirit of the 
takeover regulation.
731 T. com. Paris, 16 March 1992, SA Demilac et autre c/ SPG et Saint-Louis (1992) Bull. Joly soc. 
526. Hereafter the Perrier case.
732 Note, however, that the shares held by subsidiaries in the capital of their parents may be tendered 
to the initial offeror or to a competing offeror.
733 Now Rule 4 of the new COB’s Regulation.
734 T. com. Paris, 30 August 1989, Cie Financiere de Suez/Cie Industrielle (1990) JCP, 6d. E. 15677.
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Secondly, the regulations require the equal treatment of competing offerors735, 
which constitutes another limit to the effectiveness of the white knight defence. 
This can be illustrated by the Mutuelle du Mans v. OCP case736. In this case, Gehe 
made a hostile bid on the shares of OCP, a public limited company whose 
principal assets were situated in two SCAs, which were wholly-owned 
subsidiaries of OCP. Since a bid on the shares of OCP would not allow the offeror
7 * 1 7
to control the subsidiaries , the commandites of the subsidiaries undertook to 
sell to the offeror the majority of their shares. Following the admissibility of 
Gehe’s offer, an offeree shareholder challenged the AMF’s admissibility decision, 
on the grounds that the above undertakings conferred on the offeror a decisive 
advantage over any competing offeror and thus breached the principle of equal 
treatment of competing offerors. The Paris Court of Appeal quashed the AMF’s 
admissibility decision on the grounds that, although the undertakings were 
necessary for the success of the offer on the shares of OCP, they had the effect of 
preventing the operation of the principle of competition .
Similarly, in the Sanofi-Synthdlabo/Aventis/Novartis battle, Aventis notified the 
AMF, in the course of Sanofi’s bid, of its intention to issue share warrants to all
n'XQ
its shareholders , as insurance against the risk of Sanofi losing its US patent 
protection on Plavix, which is Sanofi’s second-biggest selling drug. In the view of 
Aventis, the loss of such patent would significantly reduce the value of the offeror 
company, which in turn would adversely affect the shareholders of Aventis. 
Indeed, it was thought that the urgency of Sanofi’s hostile bid reflected its desire 
to use its highly valued securities to obtain control of Aventis before the 
forthcoming court challenge over its patent on Plavix740. The AMF viewed the 
issue of share warrants as an indirect means to unilaterally increase the offer price,
735 CMF regs, r.5-1-1 and COB Regs, r.4.
736 CA, Paris, 27 April 1993 (1993) Rev. JP comm., p. 204; note Goyet.
737 This is because the subsidiaries were structured as SCAs.
738 Note, however, that, in CA, Paris, 27 Octobre 1993, Balland (Sucrerie-Raffinerie de Chalon-sur 
Saone), the Paris Court of Appeal held, in relation to an irrevocable covenant which related to a 
mere 10 per cent of the capital, that it was not of a nature to make the acquisition of control of the 
offeree company impossible by a competing offeror; see Les Echos, December 30, 1993.
739 Note that Aventis was ready to do so by resorting to its shareholders’ approval in general meeting.
740 ‘Sanofi is in a Hurry to Take Over Aventis’, The Financial Times, January 27,2004.
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something which jeopardises the offeror’s freedom to decide whether or not 
increase the offer price741. As a result, the AMF held
‘Although we acknowledge that offeree shareholders are free to take post-bid defensive
measures, we cannot accept clauses which are designed to privilege one o f the competing
742offerors, at the expense o f the other’
The principle of equal treatment of competing offerors does not prejudice, 
however, the execution of agreements which were entered into prior to the 
commencing of an offer and which are likely to render the offeree company less 
attractive. This is evidenced by a decision of the Paris Tribunal of Commerce743, 
whereby the competing bidder applied to the courts for the nullification of the 
option to buy the assets of the offeree company, which was conferred on the 
initial bidder before the takeover was launched. The Tribunal held
'Under the present stock exchange regulations, the exchange authorities have rightly considered 
that the publication o f [...] a competing bid, does not affect irrevocable covenants subscribed 
before the takeover was launched’.
The rationale underlying the above decision is that the offeree board takes no 
action when the beneficiary of the call option exercises his right744. It should be 
noted, however, that such agreements will be valid if and only if the beneficiary 
pays an equitable price, the public is duly informed, the agreement is not entered 
into with a desire to impede a hostile bid, and the option does not in practice 
prevent the operation of the principle of competition745.
It should finally be added that, until recently, the AMF rendered offeree 
companies’ search for a white knight more difficult, by restricting offerors’ ability 
to subject their offer to the receipt of satisfactory approvals by the competition 
authorities. This had the effect of reducing the class of potential offerors. 
However, as will be seen below, offerors are no longer prevented from 
conditioning their offer on the receipt of such approvals.
741 Note that the AMF decided so even though Aventis had informed the AMF that the issue would
become null and void should a rival bid occur.
742 AMF’s Press Release, April 23,2004, available on AMF website.
743 T. com. Paris, 28 July 1986 (1987) Rev. Soc., p. 58, note J. J. Daigre.
744 E. Wymeersch, ‘Les Defenses Anti-OPA Aprds la Treizteme Directive’ (2000), p. 15, available
at http://www.law.ugent.be/fli/WPAVP2000-pdf/WP2000-01 *.pdf.
745 T. Bonneau and L. Faug^rolas (1999), supra n 603, pp. 109-110.
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iii) O ther permissible post-bid defences
The offeree board may always try ‘to win the argument’. It may do so in its 
motivated opinion on the merits or demerits of the offer for the offeree company 
and its shareholders that the regulations require it to issue746. In doing so, 
however, the offeree board must exercise ‘particular prudence’747.
The offeree board may also encourage friendly investors to purchase offeree 
shares on the market. However, shareholders holding at least five per cent of the 
shares or voting rights must report to Euronext-Paris SA any transaction carried 
out in the shares or voting rights of the offeree company748. The same requirement 
applies to any person acquiring shares representing 0.5 per cent or more of the 
shares or voting rights of the offeree company following the filing of the offer749.
The offeree board may also refer a bid to antitrust authorities. It should be noted, 
in this regard, that until recently the French regulations did not permit the offeror 
to condition its offer to the receipt of satisfactory approvals by the competition 
authorities, on the grounds that this was contrary to the principle of irrevocability 
of offers. Thus, an offeror whose offer was referred to such authorities could 
pursue its offer and continue to acquire the offeree shares. The only restriction 
imposed upon the offeror was the deprivation of its voting rights750. This 
approach caused significant problems, in particular in cases where the 
competition authorities ruled against the offer subsequent to the announcement of 
the results of the offer by the AMF. This was evidenced by the cases of 
Schneider/Legrand and TetraLaval/Sidel, following which the AMF introduced a 
new exception to the principle of irrevocability of offers . Henceforth, the 
offeror may condition its offer to the publication of a positive finding by the end
746 COB regs, r.12.
747 COB regs, r.7.
748 COB regs,r.l7.
749 COB regs, r.17.
750 Even then, the offeror would keep its voting rights provided voting was necessary to save the 
value of its investment and provided it obtained the AMF’s consent.
751 CMF regs, r.5-1-4.
752 The other exceptions to the irrevocability principle are the vote of the general meeting, and linked 
offers; see CMF regs, r.5-1-5, and r.5-1-3-2, respectively.
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of the Phase I review753. For instance, in 2003, the Canadian aluminium group 
Alcan made an offer for the shares of French aluminium company Pechiney 
conditional upon approval at the end of phase I investigation by the competition 
authorities in the EU and in the U S754. On the other hand, the offer will 
automatically lapse if either the French Minister of Economy refers the matter to 
the French Competition Council755, or if the European Commission decides to 
launch a Phase II investigation, or if the antitrust authorities of the US or a MS of 
the EU decide to launch the equivalent to a Phase II review.
Finally, the offeree board may appeal to the courts in order to delay the bid and 
thus in the meantime convince the offeree shareholders about the merits of their 
own strategy. This defence has recently been used by Aventis in its attempt to 
thwart the hostile bid by its rival Sanofi. Indeed, Aventis filed an appeal against 
the AMF’s approval of Sanofi’s bid, arguing that the latter breached the principle 
of equality, as well as the principle of transparency and integrity of the market. It 
should be noted, however, that the French courts have only overruled two bid 
approvals so far, once for Gehe’s purchase of OCP in 1993, and a second time for 
Schneider’s takeover approach for Legrand in 2001756.
Conclusion
As the foregoing indicates, offeree boards in France must remain neutral in the 
face of a bid and they can only take actions provided they obtain shareholders’ 
authorisation during the course of the bid. This, however, results from the market 
practice, and not from a clear-cut prohibition. As a result, it is difficult to 
determine which post-bid actions are prohibited and which are not. The problem 
is further exacerbated by the fact that there are no judicial decisions on this 
subject. Due to the absence of a clear-cut prohibition, some companies have even 
attempted to get round Rule 4 of the COB’s Regulation. For instance, when 
Casino became subject to a hostile bid by Promodes, it proceeded to the
753 CMF regs, r.5-1-3-3.
754 ‘Alcan Confiant dans le Feu Vert de Bruxelles’, Le Figaro, July 23,2003.
755 This is the equivalent to a Phase II investigation.
756 ‘Sanofi Confident Despite Aventis Appeal’, The Financial Times, February 23, 2004.
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acquisition of a number of companies soon after Promodes filed its offer with the
7^ 7AMF . It should further be added that, France has thus far not experienced a 
significant hostile takeover from a foreign company, such as the $175 billion- 
worth takeover of Mannesmann by Vodaphone. It is indeed suggested that a 
takeover along the latter lines could create panic on the part of the AMF and/or 
the courts, which may loosen their hitherto rigorous stance vis-a-vis post-bid 
defensive measures.
On the other hand, there are a number of definitional problems which are likely to 
give rise to ambiguities in the area of post-bid defences. For instance, offeree 
directors faced with a bid must comply with the principle of the interests of the 
company. However, the absence of a clear definition of what constitutes the 
interests of the company constitutes a loophole, which may be exploited by 
offeree boards to defeat hostile bids. Another ambiguity relates to whether the 
concept of ‘non-routine managerial actions’, which have only been defined by the 
doctrine and the courts, mean the same as the concept of ‘acts which are likely to 
modify the substance of the offeree company’, which are referred to in Rule 5-2-9 
of the CMF’s General Regulation.
It should be noted, however, that the issue of post-bid defences is not as relevant 
in France as in the UK. This is because the French experience is short of hostile 
takeovers. This is mainly due to the fact that most French companies, like their 
counterparts elsewhere in the Continent, rely upon a variety of pre-bid defences. 
Indeed, listed companies in France have a wide array of pre-bid defences at their 
disposal.
757 H. de Vauplane, ‘Chronique Financtere et Bourstere’ (1997) 56 Banque et Droit 29, p. 29.
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Chapter 5 The Principle Of Equality of Shareholders and the 
Protection of the Minority Under the UK Takeover 
Regime 
Introduction
The principle of equality of shareholders, in its broadest sense, would mean that 
offers should be made to no fewer than all of the offeree’s shares; that all 
shareholders who tender their shares to the offeror be paid the same price; that the 
offeror be precluded from dealing in the shares of the offeree company if  there are 
special favourable conditions attached which are not made available to all 
shareholders; that the offeror be precluded from buying shares outside the offer at 
above the offer price; that all non-tendering shareholders be subsequently 
permitted to sell their shares to the offeror at the offer price; and that shareholders 
should have the right to exit the company if control of the company changes.
The Code comes very close to achieving this form of equality758. Indeed, General 
Principle 1 of the Code requires all shareholders of the same class of an offeree 
company to be treated similarly by the offeror. This principle is the cornerstone of 
the Code and 'runs through and covers the whole Code’ . GP 1 is supplemented
by rules which regulate numerous situations which might otherwise result in an 
unequal treatment of offeree shareholders. By its strong emphasis on equality, the 
Code substantially differs from the regulation in the US, where there is greater
If* 1scope for unequal treatment of shareholders . The rationale behind the Code’s 
strict regulation of the offeror lies in the Code’s neutrality requirement . Indeed, 
as we have already seen, the latter requirement precludes offeree boards of UK 
listed companies from implementing US-style post bid defensive measures, which 
are inter alia intended to drive the offer price. By strictly regulating the offeror, 
the Code substitutes the rules on equality for the inability of offeree boards in the
758 D. A. DeMott (1983), supra n 51, p. 983.
759 Hereafter GP 1.
760 Panel Statement of 2 April 1971 on Adepton Ltd. and William Hudson Ltd.
761 On the scope of the equality principle in the US, see R. Sappideen (1986), supra n 23.
762 C. Kirchner and R. W. Painter, ‘European Takeover Law-Towards a European Modified 
Business Judgment Rule for Takeover Law’ (2000) 1 EBOR 353, p. 387.
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UK to act on behalf of shareholders to improve the terms of an offer763. In other 
words, the Code’s rules on equality act as substitutes for US-style post-bid 
defences in order to increase shareholder value.
This chapter examines the provisions of the Code which are designed to ensure 
equal treatment of offeree shareholders. Section I describes the circumstances 
where the principle of equality operates. Section II describes the concepts which 
increase the potential for achieving equality. Section III identifies the rationales 
underlying the principle of equality.
5.1 Scope of the Operation of the Equality Principle
The following examines the operation of the principle of equality within the offer; 
as between accepting shareholders and shareholders who sell outside the offer; 
and in circumstances where control is either acquired in the market or transferred 
from an already existing controlling shareholder.
5.1.1 Operation of the Principle Within the Offer
The Code contains numerous provisions designed to ensure that shareholders are 
treated equally within an offer. First and foremost, the Code reflects a general 
dislike of offerors gaining control without giving all shareholders an exit 
possibility. This is evidenced by the fact that the Code requires a bid to be made 
for all the shares of an offeree company. The Code does allow partial bids764, 
however, albeit with prior consent of the Panel . It should be noted in this 
respect that the first edition of the Code had stated that partial offers were
*7 fk ( \undesirable . This negative approach toward partial offers was based on the idea 
that effective control of a company is a matter for decision by all shareholders 767.
763 G. A. Ferrarini (2001), supra n 508, p. 20.
764 i.e. offers for less than 100 per cent of the voting rights in the offeree company not already held 
by the offeror.
765 Code, r.36. On partial bids, see the chapter on the comparative analysis of the UK and French 
regimes as regards the issues of defensive measures and equality in the context of takeover bids.
76 The 1968 Code, r.26. See also the 1959 Notes, r.(vii), which reflected the same concern for 
partial offers.
R. Sappideen (1986), supra n 23, p. 293.
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The Code has subsequently shifted to a more flexible approach and partial 
offers are no longer labelled as undesirable. This shift in policy is due to the use 
of partial offers in other countries and the sound reasons, such as limited funding, 
some offerors may have for making them. Despite the change of policy, however, 
according to a study by Ashurst Morris Crisp in July 2003, partial offers are less 
common than full offers. There has indeed been a paucity of partial offers in 
recent years769.
Secondly, the Code requires the offeror to offer the same terms to all the offeree 
shareholders770. In other words, the offeror is prohibited from offering special
771terms to some shareholders who deal with it within the bid , which would give 
these shareholders an advantage over others and/or provide them with an 
inducement to accept the offer. By way of example, the offeror cannot offer 
shares with preferential rights, as a consideration for its offer, to some 
shareholders, who would in return agree to sell their shares in response to the 
general offer772. The Code does allow some special arrangements, however, 
provided certain requirements are met. These include, inter alia, arrangements 
whereby the offeror sells some of the offeree’s assets to an offeree shareholder at 
a price lower than the real value of the assets773; and arrangements whereby the 
offeror remunerates an offeree shareholder for the part he has played in promoting 
the offer774.
768 This change in approach occurred with the 1976 amendment of the Code; see the 1976 Code, r.27.
769 Indeed, there have only been 4 partial offers since 2000 to date. These were, inter alia, Halifax 
Group pic against St James’ Place Capital pic (up to 60 per cent); ZOO Hotels pic against Groucho 
Club London pic (up to 29%); Folkes Holdings Limited against Folkes Group pic (up to 75.1 per 
cent of the voting shares and up to 49.2 per cent of the non-voting shares); and Carnival Corporation 
against P&O Princess Cruises pic (up to 20 per cent); see http://www.ashursts.com/pubs/pdf' 
2618.pdf.
770 Code, r.16. This rule goes back to the first edition of the Code; see the 1968 Code, r.32.
771 Note that Rule 16 also prohibits the offeror from offering special terms to some shareholders who 
deal with it outside the bid. Indeed, prior to the adoption of Rule 16, it was quite common for the 
offeror to persuade major shareholders to sell their shares prior to the bid, with the promise of 
supplementary payments if the offeror would subsequently pay more under a general offer for the 
offeree company. This arrangement allowed such shareholders to be protected against both the 
prospects of selling out at too low a price and of the bid failing, with a resulting sharp fall in the 
value of the shares; see ‘Second Stage Evidence’, Vol. 1, Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, The 
Financial Institutions Directorate of the Commission of the European Communities (January, 1979), 
p. 18. This situation is now explicitly prohibited by Note 1 on r. 16 of the Code.
72 Note that, although the sale by the favoured shareholder occurs in response to the general offer, 
the special terms are necessarily outside the public offer.
773 Code, Note 2 on r.16.
774 Code, Note 3 on r.16.
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The latter type of arrangement can be illustrated by the case of Mooloya 
Investments/Customagic115. In this case, an agreement was entered into between 
the offeror, Mooloya, and a shareholder of and consultant to the offeree company, 
Customagic. Under this agreement, Customagic contracted to influence certain 
shareholders, in return for a remuneration to be made by Mooloya. The Panel 
considered the remuneration to be in breach of the Code, on the grounds that it 
was an increased price paid to Customagic for its own shares and those it 
controlled already. For, in the view of the Panel, the sequence of events suggested 
that Customagic was *unwilling to cooperate in furthering the offer unless it 
received a substantial procurement fe e \  It should be noted, however, that where 
two or more persons come together to form a consortium on such terms that each 
of them can properly be considered to be a joint offeror, Rule 16 will not be 
breached if one or more of them is already a shareholder in the offeree 
company776. The rationale behind this qualification to Rule 16, which results from 
the Panel’s rulings, is to allow management buy-outs, which would otherwise be
777prohibited to the potential detriment of existing offeree shareholders . I t  should 
further be added that, where the offeror revises the terms of its offer, all 
shareholders who had already accepted the original offer must have access to the
77 ftrevised terms .
Another provision which is closely related to Rule 16 is that prohibiting the 
offeror from furnishing information to some shareholders which is not made 
available to all shareholders779. Indeed, the equal treatment of shareholders within 
the offer cannot be guaranteed without also ensuring equality of information 
supplied to the offeree shareholders. This provision does not prevent, however, 
meetings of representatives of the offeror with shareholders of the offeree
775 Panel Statement of 6 July 1978.
776 This was the case in Canary Wharf Group pic, where the largest shareholder in the offeree 
company, who was at the same time a joint offeror, was accorded a special class of shares with 
preferential rights as to income and capital not accorded to the shares held by other members of the 
bidding consortium or to ordinary shares held by others in the bidding company, including former 
Canary Wharf shareholders. In the event, however, the Panel considered that the preferential rights 
in the bid vehicle to be attached to the largest shareholder’s shares were not incompatible with his 
status as joint offeror. They are therefore not to be regarded as special treatment to him qua 
shareholder contrary to Rule 16; see Panel Statement of November 21, 2003, pp. 7-8.
777 Ibid, pp. 3-4.
778 Code, r.32(3). Note that this requirement goes back to the Jenkins Report; see paras 265 to 294.
779 Code, r.20(l).
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company to take place during the offer period, provided that no material new
7o n
information is revealed . Nor does this provision prevent meetings with the 
offeree’s employees in their capacity as such781.
Thirdly, where there is more than one class of equity share capital, the offeror 
must make a comparable offer for each class . The rationale underlying the 
requirement for a ‘comparable’ offer -  rather than for an ‘identical’ offer -  is that 
some classes of shares such as non-voting ordinary shares usually trade at a price 
lower than that of voting shares. As a result, any offer for them will usually be 
made for a price less than that for the voting shares. This shows that the Code 
takes the market reality into account in determining the price of different classes 
of equity share capital. The Code sets down a method of assessing the 
comparability, referred to as the ‘six months average ratio’, pursuant to which the 
ratio of the values of the offers for the two classes should normally equal the 
average of the ratios of the Stock Exchange middle market quotations of the two 
classes over the six months before the offer period . The use of this ratio can 
produce some odd results, however, in that the difference between the prices of 
the two classes of shares may be affected by rumours of a takeover bid Indeed, 
the possibility of an offer is likely to drive up the price of the voting shares 
compared with the other classes of shares. The difference between the prices of 
the two classes of shares may also be affected by the offeror’s purchases. Indeed, 
the offeror who is seeking to gain control will likely purchase voting shares in 
preference to limited voting or non-voting shares.
Furthermore, where an offer is made for a company’s equity share capital and 
there are rights outstanding to subscribe for or purchase that company’s equity 
share capital, the offeror must make an appropriate offer or proposal to the 
holders of such rights784. This requirement is intended to ensure that the interests 
of holders of such securities and rights are safeguarded. The ‘appropriate offer’ is 
an offer to acquire securities giving access to the capital at a price equal to their
780 Code, Note 3 on r.20(l).
781 However, the Panel must be consulted if any employees hold a significant block of shares; see
ibid.
782 Code, r.l4(l).
783 Code, Note 1 on r.14.
784 Code, r.l5(a).
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intrinsic value at the time of the offer. The ‘appropriate proposal’ is a proposal to 
exchange the securities of the offeree company which give access at a later date to 
the capital with the securities issued by the offeror.
5.1.2 Operation of the Principle as Between Shareholders
Selling Within the Offer and Shareholders Selling Outside 
the Offer
In pursuit of its philosophy of ensuring shareholder equality, the Code further 
attempts to remove any discrepancy between the price received by shareholders 
who accept the offer and that received by shareholders who sell to the offeror 
outside the offer785. The Code does so in a number of ways: First, it constrains the 
offeror in its choice as to the amount of the consideration offered. The latter shall 
be no less favourable than the highest price paid by the offeror for the acquisition 
of shares in the offeree company within the three-month period prior to the
•IQf.
commencement of the offer period . Thus, although the Code does not prevent 
the bidder from acquiring as many shares as it wishes in the pre-bid period, it 
nevertheless requires the offer price to be compatible with the price paid for the 
pre-bid purchases. This Rule is essentially a reflection of GP 1 of the Code787 and 
ensures fair and equal treatment of all shareholders in the distribution of the bonus 
paid for the acquisition of a controlling position in the offeree company. The 
offeror is, however, free to choose the type of consideration offered. In other 
words, the offeror need not make a cash offer even if the pre-bid purchases had 
been for cash . However, any securities offered as consideration must, at the 
date of the announcement of the firm intention to make an offer, have a value at 
least equal to the highest price paid in the pre-bid period.
The Code further requires the offeror, and the persons acting in concert with it, 
who purchases offeree shares, which are the subject of the offer, during the offer
785 i.e. in the market or by private treaty.
786 Code, r.6(l). Note that, prior to a Panel Statement of 17 December 1987, Rule 6(1) required such 
matching only when an offer was reasonably in contemplation. This caused uncertainty, however, 
for companies and their advisers, and their difficulties became more acute as a result of the sharp 
falls in the share market in October 1987; see G. K. Morse, ‘Changes to the City Code Rule on 
Fixing the Price of an Offer-From the General to the Specific’ (1988) J. Bus. L., pp. 164-165.
787 Panel Statement of March 3,2003 on Six Continents plc/Capital Management and Invetsment 
pic, p. 2.
88 Code, Note 3 on r.6.
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period at above the offer price, whether in the market or by private treaty, to 
increase its offer to not less than the highest price it paid for the shares so 
acquired and to make this increased price available to all shareholders who have 
already accepted the offer . The Panel has no jurisdiction to set an adjusted price 
where for some reason the market price is inappropriate790. It should be noted in 
this respect that this requirement goes back to the first edition of the Code791. The 
original rule was not, however, one of absolute equality but rather of fair 
treatment. For it required the offeror to pay an increased price equal to the 
weighted average closing prices of the offeree shares on the stock exchange over 
a certain period of time before the date when the offeree shares were purchased 
above the offer price. However, the weighted average probably was not limited to 
purchases above the offer price, and probably also included purchases below the 
offer price. As a result, the original rule resulted in a fair treatment only, rather 
than in an absolute equality. In other words, the offeror received the benefit of 
such lower sales in determining the weighted average price.
Secondly, the Code constrains the offeror in its choice as to the nature of the 
consideration offered. The Code does so by requiring a cash offer or cash 
alternative at not less than the highest price in circumstances where the offeror 
purchases for cash offeree shares carrying ten per cent792 or more of the voting
•IQ'*
rights during the offer period or in the year prior to its commencement . Prior to 
the adoption of Rule 11, it was common for offerors to make a share-exchange 
offer while securing control through cash purchases in the market, and then to
789 Code, r.6(2)(a). Note, however, that this increased price cannot be passed on to people who have 
sold their shares to the offeror through the market or otherwise at less than this price.
790 Contr. this with Code, r.6(l), which gives the Panel such discretion in the context of purchases 
made prior to the offer. Thus, the Panel probably thinks that, without a discretion, equality would 
come at too high a price in the context of pre-bid purchases, and thus attempts to reduce the offeror’s 
costs.
791 Note, however, that even before the adoption of the Code, the Revised Notes stated that an 
offeror who publishes his terms and who subsequently acquires effective control by buying, in the 
market or otherwise, should without delay revise his existing offer or make a formal offer to all 
uncommitted shareholders at a fair price, having regard to the prices paid in the market. The test was 
not one of absolute equality, but of fair treatment for the uncommitted shareholders; see R. 
Pennington, ‘Takeover Bids in the UK’ (1969) 17 Am. J. of Compar. L. 159, pp. 171-172.
792 Note that, prior to 1989, this figure was 15 per cent; see the 1971 Code, r.29A. The change 
intended to reduce the potential for inequality of treatment in share-exchange offers if cash 
purchases take place; see D. Hayton, ‘The City Code in 1989: Creativity and its Limits’ (1990) 11 
Co. Law. 98, p. 101.
793 Code, r. 11(1). Note, however, that a cash requirement is not required if the Panel consents to it.
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adjust the offer terms upwards in shares794. The latter course of action provided 
offerors with the opportunity to obtain their objective without having to pay cash 
to all the offeree shareholders. At the same time, share-exchange offers were 
favoured by the offeree shareholders, for such offers allowed them to defer their 
capital gains tax liability, which was introduced in 1965 . However, the problem
was that it was impossible to value the shares offered as a consideration where the 
offeror’s shares were novel and thus their value was speculative, or where the 
offeror was smaller in size than the offeree company. The latter can be illustrated 
by the case of Adepton Ltd. and William Hudson Ltd. In this case, the net assets 
value of the offeror was £2,205,000 whereas that of the offeree company was 
£8,814,000796. In such cases, it was unfair to offer securities to the offeree 
shareholders, who were coerced into accepting securities about which they had 
doubts regarding their long-term value. Hence the Panel stated in its 1970/1 report
‘At times [...] the technique appeared [...] to be in breach o f General Principle 8797 which 
requires all shareholders o f the same class to be treated similarly by an offeror company. The 
breach appeared all the more grave when the offeror succeeded in buying control o f the offeree 
company in the market while shareholders were still digesting the offer document with the result 
that, frequently, the more experienced or better advised investors were found to have realised 
their investment for cash while the remainder had to be content with the offer o f less marketable 
paper ’.
The Panel was not, however, prepared to intervene in such cases unless there were 
special circumstances, like in the case of Adepton/ William Hudson798. After the 
announcement of its share-exchange offer799, Adepton pursued an aggressive 
buying of William Hudson’s shares in the market and, in a few days, secured 
forty-one per cent of the offeree’s shares. William Hudson claimed that 
Adepton’s offer should be underwritten for cash. The Panel accepted such claim 
on the following grounds:
794 T. Hadden, Company Law and Capitalism (London: Butterworth, 2nd ed., 1977), p. 384.
795 Panel Statement of April 21, 1972 on Morgan-Grampian Ltd /  Haymarket Publishing Group 
Ltd! Daltons Weekly Ltd, where the Panel held that ‘the MG offer was the more valuable o f the two 
offers and it contained the capital gains tax advantage which the Panel considered was a factor the 
board was entitled to take into account’.
796 Panel Statement on Adepton Ltd. and William Hudson Ltd', see supra n 759.
797 Now GP 1.
798 Panel Statement on Adepton Ltd. and William Hudson Ltd', see supra n 759.
799 The consideration offered in this case was convertible unsecured loan stock of Adepton.
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‘While theoretically all shareholders have a similar chance to sell, in practice this similarity 
may be more theoretical than real. Normally it will be only the knowledgeable shareholders who 
are close to the market who will have the option o f selling in the market [...] By the time the 
small shareholder has received his advice, the offeror may well have withdrawn from the market 
and the market price o f the shares will have fallen accordingly’.
In another case, where the offeror purchased twenty-five per cent of the offeree’s 
shares from a single seller for cash after making a share-exchange offer, the Panel 
ruled that such purchase constituted a breach of GP 8800 and held that ‘paper bids 
which are not underwritten for cash are in their nature much subject to market 
fluctuations and the Panel feels that it must apply GP 8 strictly in such cases ’801.
As a result of the above cases, Rule 11(1) was introduced in 1971. It should be 
emphasised that Rule 11 does not require an offer, but stipulates that, if an offer is 
made, that offer must be in cash or accompanied by a cash alternative. The Rule 
also envisages a cash offer or a cash alternative to be made in circumstances 
where the Panel considers it necessary to secure equal treatment of the offeree 
shareholders802, irrespective of whether the ten per cent threshold is crossed. Such 
circumstances include cases where the sellers are either directors of the offeror or 
offeree companies or otherwise closely connected with them803. It should be 
added that an offeror who falls within the scope of Rule 6(2) will also fall within 
the scope of Rule 11, if it reaches the ten per cent threshold. As a result, Rule 11 
supplements Rule 6, albeit in a way which has more far-reaching effects on the 
offeror804. It is believed, however, that, despite Rule 11(1), the Code falls short of 
full equality. Indeed, it is suggested that the latter can only be attained by 
stipulating that all offers must be in cash or accompanied by a cash alternative, 
without setting a particular threshold. For this would be the only way to ensure 
that those shareholders who receive cash by selling outside the offer will not 
obtain superior terms than the shareholders selling within the share-exchange 
offer.
800 Now GP 1. The Panel ruled so, as only the single seller had its shares bought for cash at a price 
above the market price.
801 Panel Statement of 24 March 1970 on Trafalgar House Investments Ltd /  The Cementation 
Company Ltd.
802 Code, r.ll(l)(c).
803 Code, Note 4 on r. 11(1).
804 On the far-reaching effects of the cash requirement on the offeror, see below.
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Even though GP 1 requires equality of treatment, until recently, the Code did not 
require the offeror, who would purchase shares in exchange for securities during 
the course of its cash offer, to make a share-exchange offer805. This is not 
surprising, as it was assumed that offeree shareholders generally prefer cash806. 
There may be cases, however, where such assumption may prove false. Indeed, 
the offeree shareholders may prefer to receive the offeror’s securities rather than 
cash, in order to defer any liability to capital gains tax. It should be noted in this 
respect that the offeree shareholders receiving cash may not always be able to 
purchase the offeror’s securities on the same terms as those received by the 
shareholders who sold to the offeror outside the offer. This is because the market 
in the offeror’s securities may be illiquid, or the offeror’s securities may be 
expensive. In any event, the market impact of significant buy orders is likely to 
cause an increase in the price of the offeror’s securities . As a result, the Code
O A Q
introduced in 2002 a compulsory share offer regime . Pursuant to the latter, if 
the offeror who purchases shares carrying ten per cent or more of the offeree’s 
voting rights, in exchange for securities, in the three months prior to the 
commencement of and during the offer period, he will need to make a share- 
exchange offer809. However, the Code requires the offeror to make a cash offer or 
to provide a cash alternative in addition to offering shares, unless the securities
O 1 A
received by the vendor include shares to which selling restrictions are attached . 
Such selling restrictions include the holding of the securities received as 
consideration until the offer lapses or until the offer consideration is posted to 
accepting shareholders.
805 The position was different in a mandatory bid, however, where the Code says that ‘where there 
have been significant acquisitions in exchange for securities, GP 1 may be relevant and such 
securities may be required to be offered to all shareholders. A cash offer will also be required. The 
Panel should be consulted in such cases'', see Note 1 on r.9(5).
806 T. I. Ogowewo, ‘New Takeover Code Rules on Exchange Offers and Auctions’ (2002) 23 Co. 
Law. 186, p. 187.
807 Purchases by the Offeror o f Shares in the Offeree in Exchange for Securities, Consultation Paper, 
PCP6 (October 2001), para 2.1.6, available at Takeover Panel website.
808 Response Statements 6, 7, and 8 and Code Amendments (February, 2002), available at Takeover 
Panel website.
809 The number of securities offered to accepting offeree shareholders for each offeree share held by 
them is equal to the number of securities issued to the vendor of the triggering stake for each of his 
offeree shares; see Note 1 on r.l 1(2).
810 Code, r.l 1(2).
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The Panel has no discretion to waive Rule 11(1) or Rule 11(2), but it has 
discretion to agree an adjusted price lower than the highest price paid in both 
cases. Factors which the Panel takes into account in exercising its discretion 
include the size and timing of the relevant purchases; the attitude of the offeree 
board; whether shares have been purchased at high prices from ‘insiders’811; and 
the number of shares purchased in the preceding twelve months812. The rationale 
behind the Panel’s discretion under this Rule, as opposed to Rule 6(2)(a), is that 
whereas the latter only relates to prices paid during the offer period, Rule 11 also 
relates to the highest price paid in the twelve months period preceding the offer. 
Due to the expanded time span under Rule 11, there is therefore a greater need for 
some discretion to be vested in the Panel. An example of where the Panel uses its 
discretion can be illustrated by the case of Hillsdown Holdings pic / S & W
o\'i
Berisford pic  . In this case, the Panel noted that the crossing of the ten per cent 
threshold was totally inadvertent814. The Panel further noted that the scale of the 
excess was small, some 0.2 per cent voting equivalent. As a result, the Panel 
concluded that to apply Rule 11 strictly in this case would involve so 
disproportionate an effective penalty on Hillsdown as to be in conflict with the 
spirit of the Code.
It should be added that, despite its virtues to ensure equality, Rule 11(1) may 
operate to tie the hands of some offerors, in particular in a competitive offer 
situation. For this rule is likely to favour offerors who have ready access to cash. 
It may be argued that the rule should not operate to curb meritorious offers, as an 
offeror would, in such a case, be able to obtain suitable underwriting. 
Underwriting is a contract by which a lead underwriter, which is typically an 
investment bank, agrees to purchase the offeree shares at the underpinning price. 
The lead underwriter lays off all or part of its risk by arranging sub-underwriting 
for all or part of the acquisition. Underwriters do, however, receive a fee for their
services. This fee is a standard fee and not a fee which varies with risk815. It
consists of two per cent of the gross proceeds of the issue for thirty days and a
811 e.g. directors or other persons closely connected with the offeror or the offeree company.
812 Code, Note on r.l 1(3).
813 Panel Statement of 8 May 1986 on Hillsdown Holdings pic /  S&W Berisford pic.
814 Note that the Code held so by reference to Rule 29A of the 1971 edition of the Code.
815 Underwriting Services forShare Offers (1999), supra n 463, p. 9.
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further 0.125 per cent for each additional seven-day period816. Consequences of 
Rule 11 from the point of view of the offeror are exacerbated by the fact that, as a 
general rule, if an offer has become or is declared unconditional as to acceptances, 
all alternative offers817, including cash alternative offers, must remain open for 
acceptance for not less than fourteen days after the date on which it would 
otherwise have expired818. This is likely to stretch out the underwriting period and 
increase underwriting costs. For the amount of fee payable to underwriters 
depends on the risk borne by them, which in turn depends on the length of the 
offer period. The Code recognises the costs of underwriting in such circumstances 
and mitigates the offeror’s costs by allowing it to limit its cash underwritten
O I Q
alternative . This shows that the Panel here thinks that equality would come at 
too high a price if the offeror is not allowed to do so, and thus attempts to reduce 
the offeror’s costs. However, the offeror is allowed to limit its cash underwritten 
alternative only where the value of the alternative is, at the time of announcement, 
more than half the maximum value of the offer .
5.1.3 Operation of the Principle Upon Acquisitions or Transfers 
of Control
It is a fundamental principle of the Code that a shareholder should have the right
O A  1
to exit the company if control of the company changes . Control changes may 
occur upon an acquisition of control or upon a transfer of control. The former 
involves situations where control was not previously held by any shareholder and 
a person acquires control of the company through purchases in the market. The 
latter involves situations where control was previously held by a shareholder and 
a person acquires control by private treaty. The Code ensures equality upon both 
types of control changes, by way of a mandatory bid requirement. The latter is
816 Note that although these figures concern circumstances where the offeror finances its share- 
exchange offer by way of an underwritten rights issue, the same figures apply in the context of cash 
underpinnings in acquisitions.
817 Panel Statement of 27 May 1977 on BRTLtd/Andre Silentblc Ltd. In the event, the Panel asked 
BTR to reopen its share alternative for 14 days and to afford to those who had already accepted cash 
for their Silentbloc shares the opportunity to switch to the share alternative.
818 Code, r.33(2).
819 Contr. this with the fact that, under the mandatory bid rule, the offeror has no option to shut off a 
cash underwritten alternative earlier than the period it stated in writing; see Code, Note 2 on r.33(2).
820 Code, r.33(2).
821 J. H. Farrar (1998), supra n 411, pp. 594-595.
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intended to prevent the acquisition or transfer of effective control at inflated 
prices without offering the same terms to all shareholders822.
i) History of the mandatory bid rule
The early editions of the Code sought to promote shareholder equality by 
requiring the offeree directors, related persons, or shareholders who transfer 
‘effective control’ not to sell unless the buyer undertook to extend a comparable 
offer to the remaining shareholders . However, this approach proved difficult in 
that it demanded that the Panel determine in each case whether or not ‘effective 
control’ was actually transferred824. Furthermore, the above rule only applied 
upon a transfer of control from an already existing controlling shareholder, but 
not upon an acquisition of control through purchases in the market. Indeed, in 
Ozalid’s offer for Venesta International’s shares, Ozalid made a share-exchange 
offer for the issued share capital of Venesta . Shortly after, Norcros announced a 
competing offer, with the support of the Venesta board. Meantime, a shareholder 
in Venesta, Consolidated Signal, which was concerned that the competing offer 
was inadequate, conducted a heavy purchasing in the market and succeeded to 
frustrate Norcros’s offer. Venesta appealed to the Panel on the grounds that the 
purchaser of shares in the market who, whether in a offer situation or not, had as 
its objective obtaining control of a company must, if it did by such purchases 
obtain control, make an offer for the remaining shares. In the view of Venesta, ‘to 
stop at the purchase o f  fifty-one per cent would inevitably result in the forty-nine 
per cent minority shareholders being left, so to speak, out in the cold’, and would 
neglect the Code’s requirement that all shareholders be treated equally. Venesta 
particularly referred to shareholders who had accepted Norcros’s offer and who 
were therefore unable to sell their shares in the market during the time when 
Consolidated stood in the market. In the event, the Panel rejected Venesta’s 
argument on the following grounds:
822 j  Tridimas, ‘Self-Regulation and Investor Protection in the UK: The Takeover Panel and the 
Market for Corporate Control’ (1991) 10 Civil JQ 24, p. 32.
823 The 1968 Code, r.10. Indeed, this requirement goes back to the Revised Notes.
824 To reach a decision, the Panel had to look at such factors as the ownership structure and the level 
of shareholder involvement in the relevant company.
825 Panel Statement of 6 January 1972 on Ozalid/ Norcros/ Consolidated Signal/ Venesta.
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‘Thepresent rules do not impose any obligation on an individual who has acquired control by a 
series o f purchases in the market to endeavour to obtain the remaining shares. There have been 
many cases in the past where control has been acquired in this way’
Following the above case, two rules were introduced into the Code. Each of these 
Rules described a different circumstance where an obligation to make a general 
offer would arise: Rule 35 concerned the acquisition of a forty per cent stake in
877the market ; and Rule 34 concerned the acquisition of a significant holding from 
directors or a limited number of sellers828. The rationale underlying Rule 35 was 
to prevent the acquisition of effective control through market purchases in a 
matter of days829, as illustrated by the case of Ozalid/Venesta. By adopting Rule 
35, the Code abandoned a previously fundamental principle of the Code, namely 
that the purchase of effective control through the normal operations of the market 
did not constitute a takeover within the provisions of the Code.
Unlike Rule 35, Rule 34 spoke only of selective purchases and contained no 
threshold when control was deemed to have passed. This difference between Rule 
35 and Rule 34 was not as irrational as it might seem, since the acquirer of shares 
in the market often required a higher percentage to secure control, due to the fact 
that he would likely be in conflict with the existing board830. By contrast, a board 
of directors with thirty per cent of the votes was likely to be in control and able to 
transfer control to a purchaser. Indeed, the Panel said
'In the normal case, a holding o f thirty per cent, and in many cases less than thirty per cent,
would in practice confer control and the Panel’s adoption o f this percentage as the general
831criterion for the application o f Rule 34 does usually reflect the reality o f the matter’
However, in special circumstances, the Panel decided to dis-apply the thirty per 
cent threshold of control. This can be illustrated by the case of Marc
826 The Panel stated, however, that if the aim of Consolidated Signal was to frustrate the offer, then 
the then Rule 33 (now Rule 21) would come into play.
827 The 1972 Code, r.35.
828 The 1972 Code, r.34.
829 The previous view of the Panel was that it would be impossible to acquire control of a company 
through market purchases, except over a very long period of time during which shareholders would 
be aware of what was happening and thus could take their decisions regarding their personal 
investments; see Panel Statement of 18 January 1972.
830 ‘Second Stage Evidence’ (1979), supra n 771, p. 7.
831 Panel Statement of 3 August 1973 on The Weyburn Engineering Company Ltd.
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Gregory/Greencoat Properties, where the Panel lowered the threshold on the 
following grounds:
'I f  a party seeking control were permitted to buy up to, say, 29.5 per cent o f the share capital by
selective purchases, and then, having bought 0.6 per cent o f the remaining shares in the market,
were allowed to purchase a further 9 per cent from a limited number o f sellers without incurring
.832an obligation to make a general offer, the spirit o f Rule 34 would be violated
The 1974 revision of the Code replaced the old rules by one set of 
requirements833. The effects of this change was two-fold: First, it eliminated the 
problems arising under the old rules834 from the distinction between selective 
purchases and market purchases; and, secondly, it established thirty per cent of 
the voting rights of a company as ‘effective control’ for Code purposes in 
virtually all circumstances.
ii) Current operation of the mandatory bid rule
The present Code requires that if a purchaser, including persons acting in 
concert with him, acquires effective control, he must then make a general offer for 
the outstanding shares. The rule applies regardless of whether control is acquired 
through purchases in the market, or is transferred from an already existing 
controlling shareholder. Furthermore, the term ‘acquisition’ used by the Code 
must be broadly construed so as to include the exercise of any conversion or 
subscription rights into voting shares of the company836. However, the Rule does 
not impose an obligation to make a bid merely because a person happens to hold 
thirty per cent or more of the shares837. Furthermore, a person will not be required 
to make a bid if he crosses the relevant threshold upon a company’s redemption 
or purchase of its own shares, provided he is not a director and is not acting in 
concert with a director838. Nor will he be required to make one if he crosses the 
relevant threshold upon an issue of new securities as consideration for an
832 Panel Statement of 24 July 1973 on Marc Gregory Ltd/Greencoat Properties Ltd. The Panel held
that Marc Gregory should make a general offer for the Greencoat shares.
833 The 1974 Code, r.34.
834 i.e. Rules 34 and 35 of the 1972 Code.
835 Code, r.9(l).
836 Code, Note 11 to r.9(l).
837 H. L. Fffench, International Law o f Takeovers and Mergers: The EEC, Northern Europe, and
Scandinavia (New York; London: Quorum, 1986), p. 229.
838 Code, Note 1 to r.37(l).
156
acquisition, provided there is an independent vote by shareholders in general 
meeting839. It should be noted that if effective control is transferred from the 
directors-shareholders, who already hold control in the company, then the 
directors must condition their transfer on the fulfilment by the purchaser of the 
mandatory bid obligation840. This provision constitutes an additional safeguard to 
Rule 9(1).
For the Code’s purposes, ‘effective control’ means shares carrying thirty per cent 
of the voting rights, irrespective of whether such shares do or do not in fact 
provide control. It should be noted that the Code’s adoption of thirty per cent 
threshold derives from its belief that a listed company will likely be controlled by 
persons holding less than fifty per cent of the voting rights. It should be noted in 
this respect that a proposal was made in 1989 to reduce the thirty per cent 
threshold. The Panel rejected this proposal, however, on the ground that the 
current figure 'had stood the test o f  time’m . Similarly, another proposal was 
made in 1992 to reduce the threshold to twenty per cent. This proposal was also 
rejected, however, on the grounds that other mechanisms may be more 
appropriate to protect companies from the influence of material shareholders, 
such as a clause in the articles of association requiring a shareholder who reaches 
twenty per cent level to make a bid for all the outstanding shares. This would give 
shareholders, who control the articles of association, a choice as to whether to 
adopt such a clause on a case-by-case basis842.
The mandatory bid obligation is equally applicable where a shareholder, or his 
concert parties, who already hold between thirty and fifty per cent of the voting 
rights of a company, consolidate their control by acquiring additional shares
Oi-J
which increase their percentage of the voting rights . It should be noted in this
839 Note 1 on Dispensations from Rule 9. This is referred to as the ‘whitewash’ procedure.
840 Code, r.9(6).
841 Panel Statement of 26 June 1989 on the Report o f a Panel Working Party on Takeover Rules and 
Practices.
842 A. Paul (1993), supra n 474, pp. 147-148.
843 Code, r.9(l). Note that, prior to 1998, the purchaser could purchase up to 1 per cent under this 
part of the mandatory bid rule. This threshold was removed following Re Astec (BSR) Pic [1998] 2 
BCLC 556, however. In this case, the minority could not avail themselves from the mandatory bid 
rule since the offeror had never crossed the minimum 1 per cent limit. As a result, the only means 
for the minority to exit the company was to apply for a s.459 remedy.
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respect that the obligation arises if there is any increase at all in the percentage 
level of that holding. However, if a shareholder already owns over fifty per cent, 
he can continue to acquire shares without having to make a general offer. For 
strengthening a controlling stake which is already over fifty per cent is not 
regarded as affecting the minority shareholders to the same extent as the two 
previous situations regulated by the Code844. It should be added that the rule may 
also be triggered if a person acquires statutory control of a company which owns 
more than thirty per cent of the shares in a second company, provided the 
shareholding in the second company is significant in relation to the first company 
and one of the main purposes of acquiring control of the first company was to 
secure control of the second company845. The latter can be illustrated by the case 
of British Land Company pic /  Stanhope Properties pic , where the full Panel 
dismissed an appeal by Rosehaugh against the Panel Executive’s ruling that the 
offer made by British Land for Stanhope should not trigger an offer for 
Rosehaugh’s 50 per cent share in Broadgate by application of the chain principle. 
The Panel took the view that the deadlock arrangements between Stanhope and 
Rosehaugh were such that the Panel did not consider that British Land’s offer for 
Stanhope would lead, in terms of the Code, to a change of control of Broadgate846
The bid must be made to the holders of any class of equity share capital, whether 
voting or non-voting847, and to the holders of any class of voting non-equity share 
capital in which the offeror or any other person acting in concert with it holds 
shares. If, for instance, the offeror holds both ordinary and voting preference 
shares, it must then make an offer for the preference shares as well as for the 
ordinary shares848. Thus, the scope of the mandatory bid is larger than that of the 
voluntary bid, which does not require the offeror to extend its offer to the holders 
of voting non-equity share capital. However, the offeror is not required to extend 
its offer to non-voting non-equity and to offeree shares held in treasury849.
844 J. H. Farrar (1998), supra n 411, p. 595.
845 Code, Note 8 to r.9(l). This is referred to by the Code as the ‘chain principle’.
846 Panel Statement of 7 March 1995.
847 Code, Note 8 to r.9(l).
848 Code, Note 8 to r. 9(1).
849 Note 16 tor.9(1).
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As far as the amount of the mandatory bid is concerned, this shall be no less than 
the highest price paid for the shares purchased during the offer period and within
OCA
the preceding twelve months . This prevents the offeror from offering a low 
price so as to render the offer unattractive. The Panel may, however, be prepared 
to consider a dispensation from the highest price requirement in exceptional 
circumstances851, such as the occurrence of adverse movements in the market 
between the time de facto control is acquired and the time the full offer is made. 
The latter shows that the Panel here thinks that equality would come at too high a 
price and thus attempts to reduce the offeror’s costs.
As far as the nature of the consideration of the mandatory bid is concerned, this 
must be in cash or accompanied by a cash alternative, irrespective of whether the 
shares triggering the mandatory bid rule have been purchased for cash or for a 
consideration other than cash . This allows the minority shareholders to get 
completely clear of the offeror, and this would not be achieved if the sole 
consideration consisted of the offeror’s shares. Where there have been significant 
acquisitions in exchange for securities, however, such securities may be required 
to be offered to all shareholders, in order to give effect to GP 1 of the Code .
Like voluntary bids, mandatory bids are also subject to the fifty per cent 
acceptances condition. The latter ensures that, except through a partial offer, 
effective control of an offeree company does not pass unless legal control854 also 
passes855. Weinberg (1979) criticises the fifty per cent acceptances requirement 
under the mandatory bid as being illogical. In his view,
‘Having required that an offer be made because effective control has passed, the Code 
surprisingly requires the offer to be conditional upon actual voting control passing. Small 
shareholders may, as a result, be precluded from realising their shares at the price at which 
control has passed unless the offeror is prepared to buy significant numbers o f shares in the 
market or a sufficient number o f other shareholders decide that they want to accept the offer so 
that the fifty per cent condition is satisfied^56.
850 Code, r.9(5).
851 Code, Note 3 to r.9(5). For this purpose, the Panel takes into account the same factors as it does
in connection with the cash requirement; see supra n 812 and the accompanying text.
852 Code, Note 1 to r.9(5).
853 Code, Note 1 to r.9(5). Note, however, that a cash offer will also be required.
854 i.e. a majority of votes.
855 Code, r.9(3).
856 M. A. Weinberg and M. V. Blank (1979), supra n 457, p. 152.
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As a counter-argument to the above criticism, it may be argued, however, that the 
entire group of remaining shareholders were at least given the opportunity of 
selling at the premium price, and that the scenario described by Weinberg would 
occur only because most of the remaining shareholders would have declined that 
opportunity857. Other than the fifty per cent acceptances condition, the mandatory 
bid cannot be subject to any other conditions, except with the consent of the 
Panel 858 . The rationale underlying the latter is to prevent the offeror from 
defeating the purpose of the mandatory offer rule by attaching conditions to the 
offer which would make its acceptance unattractive to offeree shareholders. 
Accordingly, if the implementation of a general offer is to be dependent upon, for 
instance, the passing of a shareholders’ resolution in general meeting, no
ocq
acquisition of shares should be made such as would trigger a mandatory offer .
The Panel has discretion to waive the mandatory bid obligation. Indeed, it would 
be inequitable to require a general offer in some cases860. However, waivers of the 
Code’s mandatory bid rule are only granted in exceptional circumstances861. Such 
circumstances include, inter alia, situations where effective control is acquired in 
the context of a rescue operation ; through inadvertent mistake, provided the 
holding is within a short period reduced to below thirty per cent by sales to 
persons unconnected with the purchaser863; on an enfranchisement of non-voting 
shares, provided the holder of such shares had no reason to believe at the time of 
acquiring the non-voting shares that enfranchisement would take place864; and 
where a person makes arrangements prior to the acquisition for the placing of 
sufficient shares to reduce his holding to below thirty per cent . Waivers are also 
available in the context of a consolidation of control. Indeed, a waiver may be 
granted where persons holding fifty per cent state in writing that they will not
857 S. Kenyon-Slade and M. Andenas (1993), supra n 59, p. 179.
858 Code, r.9(3)(a).
859 Code, r.9(3)(b). This proviso was introduced in 1972, following problems encountered in the
early 1970s, when persons triggering the mandatory bid obligation either refused to implement it or
were unable to do so.
860 ‘Second Stage Evidence’, supra n 771, p. 8.
861 Panel Statement on British Land Company plc/Stanhope Properties pic, supra n 845.
862 Code, Note 3 on Dispensations from Rule 9.
863 Code, Note 4 on Dispensations from Rule 9.
864 Code, Note 6 on Dispensations from Rule 9.
865 Code, Note 7 to r.9(l).
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accept the mandatory offer; where shares carrying fifty per cent or more of the
OiT/
voting rights are already held by one other person . It should be added that 
waivers are further available in special cases, such as the case of B.S.& W. 
Whiteley Ltd where the Panel waived the mandatory bid obligation on the grounds 
that its application ‘might have resulted in the transfer abroad o f  control o f  the
QfSl
sole manufacturer o f  electrical insulating pressboard in the UK* .
5.1.4 Sell-Out Right of the Minority
It should be mentioned that the law - but not the Code - provides the offeree 
shareholders with a further exit right. Indeed, the offeree shareholders may force 
the offeror to buy their shares where the offeror acquires ninety per cent or more 
of a company’s shares by a takeover bid868. It should be emphasised that this right 
can only be invoked following a takeover bid. The offeror is bound to buy the 
remaining ten per cent shares on the terms of the offer or on such other terms as 
may be agreed869. Thus, if the terms of the offer give shareholders a choice of 
consideration, then the offeror must offer a similar choice to the remaining 
shareholders870. Davies (1997) notes that the latter requirement has remarkable 
consequences, as it obliges the offeror to keep all cash underwritten alternatives 
open for considerably longer than is required under the Code in all cases where
871the offer has been ninety per cent successful .
5.2 Concepts Increasing the Potential for Attaining Equality
This Section briefly describes those provisions in the Code which help to achieve 
equality, by complementing the equality provisions set out in the previous 
Section.
866 Code, Note 5 on Dispensations from Rule 9.
867 Panel Statement of 2 December 1975.
868 CA 1985, S.430A.
869 CA 1985, s.430B(2).
870 CA 1985, s.430B(3).
871 P. L. Davies (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 7* ed., 2003), supra n 182, p. 745.
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5.2.1 Concept of ‘Acting in Concert’
The Code defines the concept of ‘persons acting in concert’ as *persons who, 
pursuant to an agreement or understanding, whether formal or informal, actively 
cooperate, through the acquisition by any o f them o f shares in a company, to
R7 7obtain or consolidate control o f that company ’ . This concept was introduced to
prevent certain rules of the Code, and in particular the mandatory bid rule , from 
being easily circumvented. Indeed, before the introduction of this concept, the 
offeror could conceal its purchases by ‘warehousing’874 the shares purchased 
under the names of nominees, thereby gaining control without the expense and 
formality of a general offer875.
The Code sets out a list of persons who will be presumed to be acting in concert 
unless the contrary is established, and who will therefore be required to make an 
offer. In particular, the purchaser will be presumed to act in concert with the 
seller, where he acquires slightly fewer than thirty per cent but effectively 
exercises a significant degree of control over the retained shares876. This may be 
due to the fact that the purchaser pays a very high price for the shares purchased, 
or where the seller is an insider. Furthermore, the shareholders will be presumed 
to act in concert with the directors where they seek to acquire board control 
through proposals at the general meetings. The determination as to whether a 
particular proposal is board control-seeking is carried out by reference to a list of 
factors, the key factor being the relationship between the activist shareholders and 
the proposed directors. Only if the latter factor is present that the Panel will move 
on to consider other factors. It should be emphasised that this presumption does
872 Code, Definitions.
873 Note, however, that the concept of ‘persons acting in concert’ is also relevant to the application 
of Rule 11. Indeed, the cash offer or cash alternative under Rule 11 will be set at not less than the 
highest price paid by the offeror or any person acting in concert with it, whichever is the higher.
874 The Panel has described ‘warehousing’ as 'the practice whereby a person or company (or group 
ofpersons and/or companies) accumulates, without public disclosure, a substantial block o f shares 
in a company with a view either to making a takeover offer or to selling the block to someone else 
who then makes an offer'\ see Panel Answers to DTI Inquiry of July 1974, cited in M. A. Weinberg 
and M. V. Blank (1979), supra n 457, p. 569.
875 T. Hadden (1977), supra n 794, 368.
876 Code, Note 5 to r.9(l).
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not intend to interfere with the activist shareholders’ legitimate collective action 
designed to maximise overall shareholder value877.
However, not all forms of co-operation fall within the scope of the concept of 
‘acting in concert’. Thus, the Panel will not normally regard the underwriter of a 
mandatory bid, by virtue of his underwriting alone, as being a member of a group 
acting in concert and, therefore, responsible for making the offer, in 
circumstances where the offeror is unwilling or unable to implement the offer878. 
Likewise, an agreement between a shareholder and a bank under which the 
shareholder borrows money for the acquisition of shares, which gives rise to a 
mandatory bid obligation, will not of itself fall within the scope of the mandatory 
bid rule879.
5.2.2 Rules Governing Substantial Acquisitions of Shares
In addition to removing the potential for unequal treatment of shareholders where 
a de facto control threshold of thirty per cent is transgressed, the Code also seeks 
to reduce shareholder inequality by restricting the speed at which acquirers are 
able to accumulate strategic stakes exceeding fifteen per cent of a company’s 
shares. Indeed, potential offerors may attempt to ensure the success of their offer 
by purchasing offeree shares prior to making their offer. The Code’s Rules
o o /\
Governing Substantial Acquisitions of Shares were introduced in 1980 by the 
then Council for the Securities Industry to deal with the problem of ‘market raids' ,
001
which were carried out in 1979 and 1980 . These raids involved the acquisition
877 Shareholder Activism and Acting in Concert, Panel Consultation Paper No. 10 (March, 2002), 
para 4.1, available at Takeover Panel website.
878 Code, Note to r.9(2).
879 Ibid.
880 Hereafter the SARs.
881 The example that has prompted action by the Council for the Securities Industry was the ‘dawn 
raid’ for Consolidated Goldfields by De Beers in the summer of 1980. In that case, De Beers secretly 
accumulated over 13 per cent of the company’s shares through a variety of nominee holdings. 
Indeed, each nominee purchased less than 5 per cent of the company’s shares so that no individual 
nominee would be required to disclose his stake. Having done so, they bought a further 12 per cent 
in the market in a matter of minutes by offering a 18 per cent premium over the market price. The 
main criticism of this and other raids was that the speed at which they were carried out excluded 
small shareholders from the higher price, which was snapped up by institutional shareholders 
enjoying a privileged position.
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of shares carrying up to 29.9 per cent882 of the votes of a company at a substantial 
premium over the previous market price in a very short time span.
Pursuant to the SARs, a person is precluded from acquiring, in any seven day 
period, shares carrying ten per cent or more of the voting rights of a company if 
such acquisition, when added with any existing holding, would give him between 
fifteen and thirty per cent of the voting rights of that company883. By giving 
freedom to purchase only up to 14.9 per cent of a company’s voting rights, the 
SARs slow down the acquisition process by potential acquirers. It should be 
emphasised that the SARs do not apply to a person who acquires thirty per cent or 
more of the offeree’s voting rights. For such person will be subject to Rule 5 of 
the Code and will, if appropriate, be obliged to make a mandatory bid under Rule
O Q 4
9 . Nor do the SARs apply when a person makes a tender offer. For the latter
ensures that small shareholders participate in any premium which would be 
payable in connection with the establishment or consolidation of a substantial 
minority holding in a listed company.
5.3 Rationales of the Code’s Emphasis on the Principle of 
Equality
The rationales of the Code are the equality of access to the market as between 
institutional investors and their private counterparts; the protection of the 
minority, and the prevention of the pressure to tender.
5.3.1 Equality of Access to the Market Between Institutional 
Shareholders and their Private Counterparts
One of the rationales of the Code’s provisions on equality is to ensure equal 
access to the market between institutional shareholders and their private 
counterparts885. This rationale is also referred to as the ‘public confidence in the 
market’ rationale. Indeed, by virtue of their superior experience, resources and
882 Note that an offer would be necessary at 30 per cent.
883 SARs, r. 1. However, this restriction does not apply to acquisitions from a single shareholder if it 
is the only such acquisition within any period of 7 days, nor to acquisitions made with the agreement 
of the offeree board and conditional upon the announcement of an offer; SARs, r.2.
884 SARs, Introduction, 2.
885 This aim is explicitly stated in the Hampel Report, para 5.24.
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access to management, institutional shareholders have a better opportunity to 
evaluate a company’s prospects than their private counterparts. As a result, whilst 
institutional shareholders can react rapidly and take advantage of whatever 
superior terms are available887, their private counterparts who are less informed
OOO
may not be so fortunate . Consequently, there is a risk that the private investors 
will not be treated equally.
The Code attempts to remove the above discrepancy in a number of ways, all of 
which ensure that institutional shareholders who are closer to the market enjoy no 
price advantage over their private counterparts. These include the requirement for
O O Q
equality of information for all shareholders , the mandatory bid rule, and the pro 
rata requirement in the context of partial offers, which is intended to avoid that 
large and well-informed shareholders respond promptly to first come, first served 
offers890.
5.3.2 Protection of the Minority
Another rationale of the Code’s provisions on equality is to protect the minority. 
An example of the Code’s rules on minority protection is the rule requiring the 
offeror in a voluntary bid to make a comparable offer for each class, where there
OQ1
is more than one class of equity share capital . Another such rule is that 
requiring the offeror to make an appropriate offer or proposal to the holders of 
rights to subscribe for or purchase the company’s equity share capital 892. 
However, the Code’s major contribution in this respect is the mandatory bid 
obligation. The latter encompasses two objectives at the same time: First, the 
mandatory bid rule constitutes a substitute for minority protection. Indeed, when a 
company is controlled by a new person, in circumstances where it was previously 
controlled by another person or not controlled at all, shareholders should be given
886 For more information on UK institutional investors, see the chapter on the ownership structure of 
listed companies and the market for corporate control in the UK and France.
887 B. R. Cheffins Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation (Oxford, 1997), p. 474.
888 Panel Statement on Adepton Ltd. and William Hudson Ltd.; see supra n 760.
889 Code, GP 2.
890 T. I. Ogowewo (1996), supra n 515, pp. 474-475. This requirement thus removes the pressure to 
tender hastily which might otherwise exist in partial bids.
891 Code, r. 14(1).
892 Code, r. 15(a).
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the chance to exit the company . This is because control over a company 
provides the controlling person with significant private values894. The controlling 
person may use the latter to structure dividend policies to satisfy his peculiar 
interests, or to strip the assets of the company and transfer the proceeds to 
himself, leaving the minority shareholders with an interest in a mere shell895. 
Without the mandatory bid rule, the non-controlling shareholders would have no 
chance to sell to the offeror, despite the fact that the market value of their shares 
would likely be adversely affected by the control change. This objective is all the 
more important, for UK general company law does not adequately protect the
896minority .
It should be noted that a number of scholars disagree with the first objective of the 
mandatory bid rule. Thus, Bradley (1990) argues that, even if there was no 
mandatory bid rule, minority shareholders in offeree companies would still seem 
to be in no worse position after a change of control than they were under the 
previous inefficient management. This is because, her argument goes, the offeror 
needs to increase the company’s share price, if it wishes to avoid future takeovers,
Q Q *7
which presumably benefits minority shareholders . On the other hand, other 
scholars make use of this first objective of the mandatory bid rule to justify their 
proposition that the mandatory bid rule should also apply in other circumstances, 
such as a change in the composition of the board following a successful proxy 
fight, or the death of the principal shareholder and director. For instance, 
Wymeersch (1992) argues that the latter circumstances justify the application of 
the mandatory bid rule, on the grounds that they also involve a change of control
OQQ
and may thus operate against the minority shareholders .
893 T. P. Lee, ‘Takeover Regulation in the UK’ in Hopt and Wymeersch (eds), European Takeovers: 
Law and Practice (Butterworths, 1992), p: 137.
894 This is why, in the US, the price paid in a sale-of-control transaction often exceeds the value of 
non-controlling shares by a substantial margin; see M. Kahan, ‘Sales of Corporate Control’ (1993) 9 
J. of L. Econ. & Org. 368, p. 369.
895 It should be noted, however, that a number of provisions of the CA 1985 reduce the risk posed to 
minority shareholders in an offeree company, such as ss. 125-129 which protect the holders of class 
rights from variation of their rights without their consent; or ss. 89-96 of the same Act which require 
new issues of shares to be made pro rata to existing shareholdings.
896 On the minority’s protection under UK general company law, see B. R. Cheffins (1997), supra n 
887, Ch. 10.
897 C. Bradley (1990), supra n 513, p. 182.
898 E. Wymeersch, ‘The Mandatory Bid: A Critical View’ in Hopt and Wymeersch (eds), European 
Takeovers: Law and Practice (Butterworths, 1992), p. 359.
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The second objective of the mandatory bid rule only applies in situations where 
effective control has been transferred from an already existing controlling 
shareholder. Pursuant to this objective, all shareholders, not just the old controller, 
should benefit from the premium over the market price, which is paid upon the 
passing of control899. This is because, as Andrews (1965) rightly argues, the non­
controlling shareholders are providing finance for the purchaser and their
continued ownership is what makes possible the power of the purchaser to
control. Because they may have different views as to the competence of the 
purchaser, the non-controlling shareholders should have the opportunity to sell 
their shares at the price received by the seller of control900. Indeed, and as 
Brudney (1983) notes it, the transfer of control results in a new controller- 
manager, and the minority, without its consent, is participating in a different 
enterprise901. As a result, the remaining shareholders must be offered an exit right. 
It should be added that only the second objective of the mandatory bid rule 
justifies the requirement that the non-controlling shareholders be paid the same 
price as the block-holder. Indeed, the first rationale is adequate to justify the 
payment of a fair price, but not the payment of a same price. As a result, these 
two rationales have different implications on the price of the mandatory bid.
5.3.3 Prevention of the Pressure to Tender
The element of coercion or the pressure to tender, and its ability to distort
investment decisions, is obvious in offers structured in a discriminatory manner, 
such as two-tier offers, where the bidder offers to pay a higher price for the shares 
it needs to acquire control than for those it purchases thereafter, or non-regulated 
partial offers902. Indeed, as seen in the Introduction, both types of offers distort 
shareholders’ decision-making. For, even if shareholders as a group would be
899 This premium derives from the fact that the right to control a business is seen as having a value, 
because it is the route to improved managerial control and hence to enhanced value: J. Charkham 
and A. Simpson (1999), supra n 243, pp. 91-93.
900 W. D. Andrews, ‘The Stockholder’s Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares’ (1965) 78 
Harv. L. Rev. 505, p. 521.
901 He alternatively suggests that the seller should divide the premium with the remaining 
shareholders; see V. Brudney, ‘Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and 
Reorganizations’ (1983) 71 Calif. L. Rev. 1072, pp. 1122-1126. It should be noted that Brudney’s 
argument would also apply in the context of an acquisition of control.
902 B. R. ChefFms (1997), supra n 887, p. 474.
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better off by not tendering, the coercive nature of such offers compels individual 
shareholders to tender. The Code attempts to eliminate coercion in relation to 
discriminatory offers by prohibiting two-tier offers and by subjecting partial 
offers to stringent requirements, including the consent of the Panel903 ; the 
obligation to scale down acceptances proportionately if too many are received904; 
and the requirement for an approval of shareholders holding fifty per cent of the 
voting rights not held by the offeror and persons acting in concert with it where 
the partial offer could result in the offeror holding shares carrying thirty per cent 
or more of the offeree’s voting rights905. The latter requirement ensures that a 
partial offer will be successful only if the majority of the offeree shareholders 
indeed prefer it to succeed. It should be noted in this respect that the shareholders 
who vote to disapprove the partial offer do not lose their ability to tender their 
shares if the partial offer is on the whole approved.
It should be noted, however, that coercion also exists in relation to full offers. For, 
as explained in the Introduction, the pressure to tender stems from the differential 
between the price offered and the post-takeover value of minority shares. In other 
words, the ultimate factor contributing toward coercion is the threat of retaining 
devalued minority shares. Accordingly, even in the context of a full offer, 
shareholders are captured by a ‘prisoner's dilemma’ that a majority of the 
shareholders will in fact tender and that the non-tendering shareholders will be 
locked into minority status. As a result, the assurance that a shareholder who 
tenders will not be relegated to minority status in no way reduces the threat of 
holding devalued minority shares if he does not tender906.
The Code attempts to eliminate coercion in relation to full offers by requiring that 
the offer which has become or is declared unconditional as to acceptances remain 
open for acceptance for not less than fourteen days after the date on which it 
would otherwise have expired907. The latter requirement ensures that shareholders 
are given the opportunity to tender once it is clear that the offer has succeeded and
903 Code, r.36(l).
904 Code, r.36(7).
905 Code, r.36(5).
906 L. A. Bebchuk (1988), supra n 48, pp. 917-922.
907 Code, r.31(4). This rule goes back to the Jenkins Report; see para 285.
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the offeror has acquired de jure control. As a result, this requirement removes the 
fear of offeree shareholders who consider an offer inadequate but are afraid of 
being locked into the minority status if the offer is declared unconditional. The 
latter assurance is all the more important in the event that the offer is accepted by 
the holders of less than ninety per cent of the shares, as the remaining minority 
cannot avail themselves of the sell-out right908. As a result of this provision, a 
shareholder who doubts the value of a bid may leave his final decision to the end 
of the offer period and thus see how others are reacting and whether he is likely to 
find himself in a minority position if he does not accept. If he accepts within the 
fourteen-day limit, he will receive the highest price previously paid909. Bebchuk 
(1985) argues that Rule 31(4) of the Code is in accordance with his proposal 
pursuant to which an offer should only go through if the offeror receives the 
approval of a majority of the shareholders who are tendering their shares910. In his 
view, shareholders who express a preference for the bid’s success should tender 
their shares in the first round, and those who express a preference for the bid’s 
failure should hold out in that round911. If the offeror fails to receive the above 
approval, he should be prevented from obtaining a controlling participation912. 
The Code’s requirement turns the first round into the equivalent of an approval 
vote, since a shareholder’s decision whether to tender in the first round matters 
only if his decision proves pivotal in order for the bid to meet the fifty per cent 
acceptances condition and thus to succeed.
Conclusion
The foregoing indicates that the Code is permeated by a philosophy of fairness to 
offeree shareholders. To this end, the Code strictly regulates the offeror’s 
behaviour in the context of voluntary offers, by imposing strict limitations upon 
the offeror’s ability to determine the scope of its offer and to set the offer price.
For instance, the Code requires the offeror to bid for all the shares of the offeree
908 CA 1985, S.430A.
909 ‘The City Code Completes its Takeover Code’, The Times, January 5, 1968.
910 L. A. Bebchuk (1988), supra n 48, pp. 931-933.
911 L. A. Bebchuk (1985), supra n 49, p. 1798.
912 Bebchuk further proposes that an offeror who, in case he is rejected, would like to keep the
option of acquiring a non-controlling minority interest, could include in its offer a second request for
permission to do so; see L. A. Bebchuk (1988), supra n 48, p. 932.
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company and to determine the offer price by reference to the purchases made
prior to the offer. In addition, the Code requires the offeror to increase its offer
price in the event that it purchases shares in the market or otherwise during the
course of its offer. The Code’s major contribution in ensuring equality is its
mandatory bid rule. The latter constitutes the strongest expression of the equality
principle. It should be noted that many European countries have been and still are
inspired by the egalitarian rules of the Code, and their takeover laws or
01 ^regulations contain rules which are in essence similar to those of the Code .
However, the Code goes much further than its European counterparts in its 
endeavours to protect offeree shareholders. Indeed, apart from ensuring equality, 
the Code further attempts to remove shareholders’ pressure to tender. To this end, 
the Code contains a number of mechanisms, the most important of which is Rule 
31(4). Indeed, as seen above, the latter ensures that shareholders are given the 
opportunity to tender once it is clear that the offeror has acquired de jure control.
913 For an overview of the takeover regulations prevailing in other European MS, see V. de Beaufort, 
Les OP A en Europe (Economica, 2001); G. Lekkas, L ‘Harmonisation du Droit des Ojfres Publiques 
et la Protection de ITnvestisseur (Paris; L.G.D.J, 2001); and E. Wymeersch, ‘Problems of the 
Regulation of Takeover Bids in Western Europe: A Comparative Survey’ in Hopt and Wymeersch 
(eds), European Takeovers: Law and Practice (Butterworths, 1992).
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Chapter 6 The Principle of Equality of Shareholders and the 
Protection of the Minority Under the French 
Takeover Regime 
Introduction
Like in the UK, the principle of equality in France requires that all shareholders 
be treated alike, and that an operation which would otherwise concern a limited 
number of shareholders be extended to all shareholders under the same terms914. 
The rationale behind the adoption of the principle is no different than that in the 
UK. It is intended to ensure that all shareholders have an equal opportunity to 
decide on the merits of an offer and, accordingly, to decide whether or not accept 
it. Indeed, the minority should not be condemned to remain in a company which 
is no longer the same and where they risk being in a hostile environment, with a 
reduced patrimony915 . The principle is also intended to ensure that all 
shareholders have an opportunity to share in the control premium916.
The principle of equality is omnipresent in the French takeover regime. This is 
evidenced by the AMF’s regulations. Indeed, the CMF’s General Regulation 
provides that its provisions relating to takeovers are aimed at ‘ensuring that 
participants to an offer comply with the principle o f  equal treatment o f offeree
017shareholders* . Likewise, the COB’s Regulation 2002-04 stipulates that ‘every 
person must act in accordance with the principle o f  equal treatment o f
Q I O
shareholders o f  the companies concerned" . To ensure compliance with the 
principle, the latter regulations contain a number of mechanisms designed to 
ensure equal treatment of offeree shareholders. This is all the more important, for 
the French market is characterised by a concentration of ownership and control, 
where most listed companies are controlled by large blockholders. Such a share 
ownership structure could easily prevent the development of the French market,
914 D. Schmidt and C. Baj, ‘Reflexions sur les Effets de l’Action de Concert’ (1991) 27 RD bancaire 
182, p. 187.
915 A. Couret, ‘Cession des Societes Cot£es et Protection des Minoritaires’ (1992) Bull. Joly 363, p.
364.
916 A. Petitpierre-Sauvain, ‘L’Egalite des Actionnaires dans L’Offre Publique d’Achat’ (1991) 5 RD 
aff. int. 645, p. 646.
917 CMFregs, r.5-1-1.
918 COB regs, r.4.
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should new minority shareholders fear investing in companies with large 
blockholders. However, as will be seen below, the minority find that their 
interests are largely taken into account, along with those of the block-holders919.
This chapter provides an overview of the equality rules under the French takeover 
regime. Section I analyses the operation of the principle amongst shareholders 
selling within the bid. Section II analyses the operation of the principle as 
between the shareholders who sell within the bid and shareholders who sell 
outside the bid920. Finally, Section III analyses the operation of the principle in 
circumstances where control is acquired in the market, and where control is 
transferred from an already existing controlling shareholder.
6.1 Operation of the Principle Within the Offer
The French regulations ensure that shareholders selling within the offer are 
treated equally. The main provision demonstrating the latter is Rule 5-1-2 of the 
CMF’s General Regulation, which requires the offeror in a voluntary offer to bid 
for all the equity shares, whether voting or non-voting, and all the securities
QO1giving access to the shares or the voting rights of the offeree company .
It should be noted that, prior to the reform of 1992, the offeror could limit its offer 
to only two-thirds of the shares of the offeree company. The rationale behind the 
choice of the two-thirds threshold was that it was sufficient to enable the offeror 
to alter the company’s articles of association. At the same time, this threshold 
constituted a compromise between the advocates of a full bid and the advocates of 
a limited bid, who were reluctant to make takeovers too burdensome. However, as 
stated above, under the present regime, the offeror must bid for all the shares of 
the offeree company, including those without voting rights. The offeror must 
further bid for the securities which give access at a later date to the equity or the 
voting rights.
919 J. M. Garrido and A. Rojo, ‘Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: Solution or 
Problem?’ in Hopt and Wymeersch (eds), Capital Markets and Company Law (OUP, 2003), p. 433,
920 i. e. in die market or by private treaty,
921 These encompass convertible, exchangeable, or reimbursable bonds; and bonds with warrants to 
buy shares or investment certificates.
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Despite the requirement to bid for all the shares of an offeree company, the 
regulations also allow partial bids, albeit restrictively. Indeed, partial offers are 
permitted for only up to ten per cent of the offeree’s voting shares or voting 
rights. In determining this threshold, the voting shares and/or the voting rights 
already held by the offeror are taken into account922. It should be noted, however, 
that this restricted approach toward partial bids may be circumvented in the 
context of a share-exchange offer, by using certificats de valeur garantie923. The 
latter is a negotiable, publicly quoted security which guarantees its holder a future 
cash payment, provided at a specified future date the market value of specified 
reference securities, which constitute the consideration in the share-exchange 
offer, is lower than a pre-determined value. In the event that the reference 
securities are those of the offeree company, the CVGs act as an incentive for the 
offeree shareholders to retain their shares, and as an opportunity for the offeror to 
defer part of the acquisition of the offeree’s shares. The CVG holders will be 
entitled to sell their offeree shares at the pre-determined price, if the market price 
of the offeree shares falls, at a certain future date, below the pre-determined 
level924. Given that the offeror is not obliged to purchase the offeree shares so 
long as the market price of the offeree shares does not fall below the pre­
determined level, this technique allows the offeror to effect a partial offer above 
the ten per cent threshold. In view of its advantages for the offeror, the CVGs 
have become well-established tools in French takeovers.
Another provision ensuring equal treatment of shareholders in the context of 
voluntary offers is the rule which requires the offer price to be the same for all 
shareholders of the same class. Thus, the Code prevents the offeror from creating 
a price discrepancy amongst the shareholders of a same class on the basis of the 
number of shares they bring to the offer925. The regulation allows, however, the 
offeror to set a different price where this is justified by the nature of the share in 
question. Thus, non-voting shares may not be offered the same price as voting
922 CMF regs, r.5-3-2.
923 Hereafter the CVGs.
924 Public Takeovers in France (2003), supra n 216, p. 18.
925 P. Didier, ‘L’Egalit6 des Actionnaires: Mythe ou Rialit6’ (1994) 5 Cahiers dr. entrepr. 18, p. 23.
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shares. This is in line with the fact that the law resolves different situations in a 
different fashion926.
The regulation further guarantees the equal treatment of shareholders as far as 
access to information relating to the offer is concerned. Ensuring this duty lies
Q77with the AMF, and several of its regulations contain provisions relating to 
information. It should be noted, however, that the French regulations do not 
contain an express prohibition along the lines of Rule 16 of the Code, which 
prohibits agreements which favour some but not all shareholders. The regulations 
merely require such agreements to be disclosed to the companies concerned, to 
the AMF, and to the public, where the clauses of such agreements may bear an
07 ftimpact on the evaluation of the offer or on its outcome . However, give that 
such agreements are likely to breach the equality of offeree shareholders, the 
AMF may issue an injunction against the offeror, with a view to compelling him 
to restore equality. Moreover, the Paris Court of Appeal may nullify such 
agreements, at the request of a shareholder.
6.2 Operation of the Principle as Between Shareholders
Selling Within the Offer and Shareholders Selling Outside the 
Offer
Under the French regime, there is a fundamental difference between cash offers 
and share exchange offers in terms of the offeror’s ability to deal in the shares of 
the offeree company during the offer period. Indeed, whilst dealings in the shares 
of the offeree company are allowed in the context of a cash offer, the offeror is 
prohibited from carrying out such dealings in the context of a share-exchange 
offer929. The rationale behind this prohibition is to ensure equality between the 
offeree shareholders. Indeed, had such dealings been allowed during the currency 
of a share-exchange offer, shareholders selling outside the bid would receive cash 
whereas those accepting the share-exchange offer would have to content 
themselves with the offeror’s securities. It is suggested that the latter argument is
926 A. Viandier (1999), supra n 224, pp. 314-315.
927 In particular Regulation No. 2002-04 of the COB.
928 COB regs, r.5.
929 CMF regs, r.5-2-12.
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not very convincing. For it could be refuted by a provision along the lines of Rule 
11 of the Code, which requires the offeror to provide a cash alternative if it 
purchases shares outside the bid during its share-exchange offer.
As far as the ability of the offeror to deal in the shares of the offeree company 
during a cash offer is concerned, the latter is not without limits: First, in order for 
the offeror to do so, it must have no right to withdraw its offer if it does not obtain 
a minimum number of shares930 . The latter requirement probably aims at 
preventing situations whereby the offeror would accumulate a significant amount 
of offeree shares outside the bid and would subsequently withdraw its offer upon 
the acquisition of, say, less than ninety per cent of the acceptances. Such an 
outcome would leave the offeror with a significant amount of shares in the offeree 
company and prejudice the offeree shareholders, who would have lost their 
chance to exit the company in which they may no longer wish to stay. 
Furthermore, the market value of the shares of the shareholders who have 
accepted the bid would probably decrease following the offeror’s withdrawal. At 
the same time, the shareholders who have sold their shares to the offeror outside 
the bid would probably be better off, since it is likely that the market value of 
their shares was high at the time they sold their shares to the offeror.
Secondly, all dealings in the shares of the offeree company must be carried out
Q'i 1
through the market . In other words, the regulation does not allow the offeror to 
purchase offeree shares by private treaty during the currency of its cash offer. The 
rationale behind this restriction is to ensure market integrity, by avoiding 
purchases during the bid at preferential conditions932. The application of this rule 
can be illustrated by the case of Schneider/ Telemecanique. In this case, Schneider 
made a hostile bid on the shares of Telemecanique, which is a listed company. 
Subsequently, Framatome -  a white knight - decided to acquire the shares of 
Cofitel, which is the unlisted subsidiary of Telemecanique. Cofitel had an option 
to buy ten per cent of the shares of Telemecanique. Thus, the acquisition of 
control in Cofitel would allow Framatome to also acquire control in
930 CMFregs, r.5-2-11.
931 CMF regs, r.5-1-11.
932 M-J. Vanel, ‘Investor Protection in the Context of Public Offerings’ (2001), available at
http://www.amf.france.org/styles/default/documents/general/3903_l.pdf.
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Telemecanique. Schneider disputed the purchase by Framatome of Cofitel shares, 
on the grounds that such purchase amounted to an indirect acquisition of control 
in the offeree company whilst the regulation strictly prohibits any acquisition 
outside the market during the course of a cash offer. The Court of Appeal held 
that the acquisition of majority control in an unlisted company whose sole object 
was to hold securities issued by the listed company, which was subject to a hostile 
cash bid, amounted to the acquisition outside the market of the shares of the listed
933company .
Thirdly, if the offeror conducts market purchases at a price above the offer price, 
the latter is automatically increased by at least two per cent, even if the price paid 
for the shares purchased in the market is lower than the two per cent threshold, 
and even if the amount of shares acquired at above the offer price is trivial. The 
latter provision aims at providing a minimum degree of protection to the 
shareholders who have already accepted the bid. At the same time, however, this 
rule creates a price discrepancy between the shareholders who have sold outside 
the bid and the shareholders who have accepted the bid, to the detriment of the 
former. Furthermore, if the price paid for the shares acquired in the market is 
higher than a hundred and two per cent of the offer price, then the offeror must 
increase its offer price to the level of the actual price paid for the shares so 
acquired, irrespective of the number of shares it acquired in the market934. The 
raison d ’etre of the latter requirement is to remove the inequality of price which 
would otherwise arise between the selling and the accepting shareholders935. It 
should further be noted that during the period between the end of the bid and the 
publication of its outcome by the AMF, the offeror and the persons acting in 
concert with it are prohibited from purchasing the offeree shares at above the 
offer price936.
933 CA Paris, 18 March 1988, Cofitel c/Telemecanique electrique et autres (1989) D., p. 359.
934 CMF regs, r. 5-2-11. Note that prior to the Law of 1989, the offeror could acquire offeree shares in 
the market at above the offer price without having to subsequently raise the latter, so long as the 
purchase price did not exceed five percent of the offer price; see M-C. Robert, ‘The 
Internationalization of the Markets and the Experience of the French COB With Mergers and 
Acquisitions’ in Hopt and Wymeersch (eds), European Takeovers: Law and Practice (Butterworths, 
1992), p. 406.
935 P. Didier (1994), supra n 925, p. 23.
936 CMFregs, r.5-2-11.
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Despite the above safeguards, the French regulation seems to present a major 
shortcoming: the regulation does not rigorously deal with the pre-bid purchases, 
save for disclosure requirements. Indeed, the regulation does not require a linkage 
between the price paid for the shares purchased prior to the offer and the offer 
price. This demonstrates that the French regulation only partly removes the price 
discrimination between the shareholders who have accepted the bid and those 
who have sold outside the bid. Viandier argues, however, that the AMF’s power 
to control the price acts as a substitute for the non-regulation of pre-bid purchases. 
Indeed, if an offeror purchases a block of shares prior to its offer at say £10 per 
share, and it subsequently sets the offer price at only £8 per share, it is likely that 
the AMF would refuse to approve the offer document. This would, in turn, 
compel the offeror to increase the offer price. However, if  the same offeror 
purchases a handful of shares prior to its offer at £10 per share, even if it 
subsequently sets the offer price at £8 per share, the AMF would still approve the 
offer document. For, in the latter case, the principle of equality of shareholders 
would not be breached by the sale of a handful of shares prior to the offer at a 
price above the offer price937. It should also be noted, in this respect, that where 
the offeror already holds, directly or indirectly, alone or in concert with others, 
the majority control of the offeree company, the AMF requires the offer price not 
to be lower than the average market price during the sixty market days preceding 
the publication of the offer document . The latter rule constitutes yet another 
example of the AMF’s power to control the offer price. However, given that it 
operates only in circumstances where the offeror is a majority controller, it is 
believed that it cannot be seen as a substitute for the absence of the regulation of 
pre-bid purchases.
6.3 Operation of the Principle Upon Acquisitions or Transfers 
of Control
Even prior to the reform of 1989, there was a type of mandatory bid requirement 
in France. Indeed, a person who would acquire a control block of shares in a listed
937 1 am indebted to Professor Alain Viandier at the University of Paris V for his valuable comments
on this point during my interview with him in January 2003.
938 CMF regs, r.5-3-4. See also Paris, 13 November 2001, No. 2001/13003 and 2001/13157, Consorts
Koering, ADAMet autres c/Ste Expand et autres (2002) RTD com., p. 127.
177
company from an identified seller was required, except in limited circumstances, 
to offer the other shareholders the opportunity to sell their shares at the same price 
as that paid to the seller, during what was called a maintien de cours939. The latter 
came under much criticism, however, in two respects: First, there was no 
regulatory definition of a control block940, as a result of which the stock exchange 
authorities had to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a control block was 
actually acquired. This inevitably resulted in an uncertainty. In determining 
whether a control block was actually acquired, the then Chambre syndicate took 
into account the price at which the sale was realised, the total number of shares of 
the company concerned, the distribution of the capital in the public, and the 
number of shares the acquirer already held in the company. As a result of the 
latter method, the Chambre could decide that a control block was acquired even 
in circumstances where a fraction lower than the majority of the capital was 
acquired, in particular where the capital of a company was dispersed941. Secondly, 
the old rule was applicable only where purchases were made from identified 
sellers by private treaty, and not where purchases were made in the market942. In 
other words, the old rule required a mandatory bid only upon a transfer of control 
from an already existing controller, but not upon an acquisition of control through 
purchases in the market, where control was not previously held by any 
shareholder. Consequently, the Law of 1989 abolished the maintien de cours and 
provided for two alternative procedures, namely the mandatory bid and the price 
guarantee procedure. The applicability of the latter depends on whether the one- 
third or the fifty per cent threshold is crossed, and on whether the shares are 
purchased in the market or from an identified seller943. The Law of 1989 further 
introduced the sell-out right in favour of the minority. Before proceeding to the 
analysis of these three procedures, it must be emphasised that they have all been
939 This was introduced following the acquisition of control of Antar by Elf and the acquisition of 
control of Bon Marche by the brothers Willot. In the latter cases, the minority shareholders claimed 
that they were prejudiced by the latter acquisitions and that they should benefit from the control 
premium, which derived from the difference of price between the price of the sale of the control block 
and the market value of the shares at the time of the sale.
940 D. Berger, ‘Guidelines for Mergers and Acquisitions in France’ (1991) 11 Nw. J. Int.l L. & Bus.
484, p. 519.
941 COB Report (1978), p. 90.
942 Indeed, it was because of this limited application of the maintien de cours that the COB issued the 
above-mentioned General Decision, with a view to applying the latter to control blocs acquired 
outside the market; see A. Viandier (1999), supra n 224, pp. 370-371.
943 J. Epstein and S. Deparis-Maze, ‘French Takeovers: Control and Concert’ (1991) I.F.L.Rev. 30, p.
30.
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introduced to allow the minority to exit the company where dealings in the shares 
of their company affect the structure of share ownership in that company944.
6.3.1 Mandatory Bid
i) Rationale and operation of the rule
The rationale of the mandatory bid is two-fold: First, all shareholders must be 
offered a right to exit the company upon a change of control945. This is because, 
in the AMF’s view, in the absence of a mandatory bid rule, a person might 
purchase enough shares in the market or by private treaty to acquire control of a 
company, without the remaining shareholders being able to benefit from the 
guarantees offered by the procedure of takeovers946. This would destabilize 
companies and breach the principle of equal treatment of shareholders947. 
Secondly, all shareholders must share in the control premium.
It should be noted that, before the reform of 1992, the mandatory bid obligation 
was limited to two-thirds of the offeree company948. At the time, it was believed 
that the two-third limit allowed companies to prevent creeping acquisitions of 
control, and at the same time allowed purchasers to keep their resources while 
obtaining effectively unlimited control. This is because, under French company 
law, a shareholder with 66.66 per cent of the voting rights can approve even the 
most significant corporate transactions, such as mergers or liquidations, in the 
face of the minority’s opposition949. This limited bid angered all market
944 L. Faug^rolas, ‘La Protection des Minoritaires dans le Titre V du Riglement Gdn6ral du Conseil 
des Marches Financiers’, in Droit Bancaire et Financier-Melanges AEDBF-France, t. II (Paris: 
Banque 6diteur, 1999), pp. 202-203.
945 F. Peltier and M-N. Domp6, Le Droit des Marches Financiers (PUF, 1998), p. 98. Note that a 
number of legal scholars argue that the mandatory bid rule breaches a fundamental principle of the 
French law, namely the freedom to purchase or to sell; see e. g. C. Baj, ‘La CessibilitS du Droit de 
Vote’ (1996) 4 Cahiers dr. entrepr. 16, p. 16.
946 COB Report (1989), 162.
947 Bull. COB (1992), p. 14.
948 The choice of sixty-six per cent as the triggering threshold constituted a compromise between the 
proponents of a mandatory offer on the totality of the shares and those in favour of an offer on fifty 
per cent plus one of the shares; see Bull. COB (1992), p. 14.
49 J. Epstein, J. Swank and S. Deparis-Maze, ‘France’ (1992) I.F.L.Rev., p. 2.
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participants, however950. For it had been used to circumvent the application of the 
price guarantee procedure951. Indeed, bidders were taking all possible safeguards 
to avoid the application of the latter procedure, as they would then be obliged to 
bid for all the remaining shares instead of a mere sixty-six per cent under the 
limited mandatory bid rule. However, in some instances, the AMF did intervene 
to prevent the circumvention of the application of the price guarantee procedure 
and required the offeror to file a price guarantee procedure in lieu o f  a mandatory 
bid on two-thirds952. Following the reform of 1992, the mandatory bid related to a 
hundred per cent of the outstanding shares. By enabling all shareholders of the 
offeree company to sell their shares to the offeror, this reform had the merit of 
removing an enduring source of litigation .
Under the current regime, the mandatory bid obligation can be triggered by either 
of the following: where a person acting alone or in concert with others acquires 
one-third of the voting shares or the voting rights of a listed company954, or where 
a person acting alone or in concert with others already holding directly or 
indirectly between one-third and one-half of the voting shares or the voting rights 
of such a company increases its holding by over two per cent in less than twelve 
consecutive months955. Upon crossing one of the two thresholds, the purchaser 
must file an offer with the AMF for the purchase without condition of all the 
voting equity share capital956 and the securities giving access at a later date to 
voting shares or voting rights, which will be tendered by the offeree’s 
shareholders. Two remarks must be made in this regard: First, non-voting shares 
and rights to acquire at a later date shares or voting rights are not taken into 
account in determining whether the one-third or the two per cent threshold has 
been crossed957. Secondly, the mandatory bid obligation will be triggered upon 
crossing the one-third or the two per cent threshold of either the voting shares or
950 A. Hirsch and G. Hertig, ‘Comments on Defensive Measures, the Regulation of Multinational
Offerings and Mandatory Bids’ in Hopt and Wymeersch (eds), European Takeovers: Law and
Practice (Butterworths, 1992), pp. 435-436.
951 For this procedure, see below.
952 COB Report (1991), p. 56.
953 A. Viandier, ‘Droit de la Bourse’ (1992) 29 JCP 359, p. 359.
954 CMF regs, r.5-5-2.
955 CMF regs, r.5-5-4.
956 CMF regs, r.5-5-1 expressly states that the equity shares referred to in the chapter relating to the
mandatory bid mean voting equity shares.
957 CMF regs, r.5-5-1.
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the voting rights. Such an alternative is indeed necessary due to the discrepancy
QCQ
which often exists in France between the shares and the voting rights .
The rule may be triggered not only by the acquisition stricto sensu but also by the 
conversion of bonds into shares; the obtaining of double voting rights; the 
subscription to an issue of shares; the granting by the company of bonus shares; 
the reduction of the total number of voting rights; or the acquisition of the control 
of an unlisted company which itself holds directly or indirectly more than one- 
third of the shares or the voting rights of a listed company, provided the main 
assets of the newly controlled company consist of the shares or the voting rights 
of the listed company959. The latter qualification means that where a person 
acquires, say, a thirty-two per cent stake in an unlisted company which in turn 
owns thirty-four per cent of a listed company, that person will not be obliged to 
make an offer for the listed subsidiary, so long as the parent’s shareholding in the 
listed subsidiary does not constitute an essential part of the parent’s assets960. It 
should be noted, however, that the AMF may authorise the crossing of the one- 
third threshold, without obliging the acquirer to make a bid, if the shares in excess 
of the threshold represent less than three per cent of the total number of shares or 
voting rights of the issuer, and the purchaser undertakes to resell the excess shares 
or voting rights within six months961.
As far as the price of the mandatory offer is concerned, the French regulation 
leaves its determination to the offeror’s discretion. Thus, unlike in the UK, there 
is no highest price rule regarding mandatory offers. At first sight, it may be 
thought that this might lead the offeror to propose a low price with a view to 
discouraging the sellers and thus lowering the costs of its mandatory bid. 
However, as seen in the chapter on the UK and French regulatory framework 
concerning the regulation of takeovers, the terms of the offer must be acceptable 
to the AMF. Indeed, the AMF may compel the offeror to revise its offer price962 if 
it considers that the offer may prejudice the principles embodied in its regulations,
958 L. Faug6rolas (1999), supra n 944, p. 203.
959 CMF regs, r.5-5-3. This shows that the French regulations accept the ‘chain principle’ in some
cases.
960 J. Epstein and S. Deparis-Maze (1991), supra n 943, p. 12.
961 CMGregs, r.5-5-3-1.
962 CMF regs, r.5-1-9.
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and in particular the principle of equality of shareholders . Aware of the 
likelihood of the above opportunism on the part of the offeror, the AMF in 
practice requires the price of the mandatory bid to equal the highest price paid by 
the offeror for its purchases which triggered the mandatory bid obligation964.
The AMF has power to dispense the acquirer of effective control from the 
mandatory bid obligation965 . The rationale behind such power is that the 
mandatory bid obligation contravenes the freedom of contract principle, for the 
sake of ensuring the equality of shareholders. It is therefore believed that the 
mandatory bid rule should be supplemented by a corrective principle, namely the 
principle of equity966. The latter principle in no way departs from the principle of 
equality967, but simply aims at correcting the rigidity of the quantitative criteria, 
which trigger an obligation which has severe implications968. In other words, the 
AMF believes that the imposition of a mandatory bid in all circumstances would 
constitute a cumbersome and disproportionate remedy to protect the minority. It 
should be noted, however, that the AMF has discretion whether to grant or deny a 
dispensation. In other words, a dispensation is never acquired as of right, but is 
subject to the AMF’s approval. In deciding whether to grant or deny a 
dispensation, the AMF examines such factors as the circumstances in which the 
threshold is crossed, or the structure of the share ownership in the company in 
question969. The AMF generally tries to strike a balance between the interests of 
the minority and the imperatives of economic reorganisations970.
963 CMF regs, r.5.1.1, and COB regs, r.4.
964 A. Couret (1992), supra n 915, p. 370.
965 In 2002, the CMF took 39 decisions to dispense acquirers from the mandatory bid obligation. The 
grounds for taking these decisions were as follows: transfer of the shares or voting rights of the issuer 
between companies or persons belonging to the same group (14); holding of the majority of the voting 
rights of the company by the acquirer (11); subscription by die acquirer to an issue of shares made by 
a company in financial difficulty (7); reduction of die total number of the shares or the voting rights of 
the issuer (4); combination of a merger or a contribution in kind with an agreement entered into by the 
shareholders of the companies concerned (2); merger or a contribution in kind (1); see CMF, Annual 
Report 2002, p. 25.
966 CA, Paris, H., 20 February 1998, Compagnie Generate des Eaux/Havas (1998) 51 RTD com. 379, 
pp. 383-384; note N. Rontchevsky.
7 T. Bonneau and L. Fauggrolas (1999), supra n 603, p. 69.
968 Compagnie Generate des Eaux/Havas (1998), supra n 966.
969 CMF regs, r.5-5-6.
970 J. P. LeGall and P. Morel (1992), supra n 595, p. 191.
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Circumstances where the AMF may grant a dispensation at the request of the 
person crossing the threshold include, inter alia, cases where the crossing of the 
threshold results from a merger or a contribution in kind, subject to approval by 
shareholders in general meeting971; a combination of the latter operation with an 
agreement entered into by the shareholders of the companies concerned, which 
amounts to a concerted action972; and a subscription of shares in the context of a 
capital increase made by a company in financial difficulty, subject to approval by 
shareholders in general meeting . The latter situations deserve to be dispensed, 
as the interests of the shareholders have already been taken into account by 
another mechanism, namely the general meeting which has been conveyed to rule 
upon the particular operation. It is therefore believed that the AMF should not 
interfere with shareholders’ decision. Other circumstances include the reduction 
of the total number of shares or voting rights of the issuer974; the transfer of the 
shares or voting rights of the issuer between companies or persons belonging to 
the same group975; and the holding of the majority of the voting rights of the
07  f\company by the acquirer or by a third party . The latter situations deserve to be 
dispensed because the existing shareholder base has not changed.
It should be noted that, in view of numerous grounds for dispensation, it may be 
questionable whether the minority actually have a ‘right to exit’ the company in 
the event of a change of control. However, both the AMF and the Paris Court of 
Appeal usually require the acquirer of effective control to make a bid where the 
market is illiquid977. Thus, the latter authorities attach a high value to the liquidity 
of the market. Frison-Roche (1998) argues that, although there is no autonomous
971 CMFregs, r.5-5-7(c).
972 CMF regs, r.5-5-7(d).
973 CMF regs, r.5-5-7(b).
974 CMF regs, r.5-5-7(e). The reduction may result from a reduction of capital, a share buy-back, or an 
increase by a subsidiary of the percentage of the shares it holds in its parent company.
975 CMF regs, r.5-5-7(g). See e.g. CA Paris, 19 March 2002, Tharreau c/Tharreau, (2002) 3 RD 
bancaire et financier 148.
976 CMF regs, r.5-5-7(f). The Paris CA held that the majority control means the holding of more than 
fifty per cent of the voting rights of a company; see CA Paris, le Ch., section CBV, 24 June 1991 
(1991) JCP 6d. E, t. n, p. 215.
977 See e. g. Com., 6 May 1996, Caves de Roquefort (1996) Rev. Soc., p. 803, note P. Le Cannu, 
where the court held that Rule 5-5-2 of the CMF’s General Regulation is intended to allow the 
minority shareholder, whose share lost its liquidity on a market which became narrow by the relative 
weight of the majority shareholder(s), to exit the company under normal conditions of price; see L. 
Faug6rolas (1999), supra n 943, p. 212.
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right to exit, there is a right to the liquidity of the shares, whose breach results in
0751the right to exit the company .
Where the acquirer of control fails to comply with his obligation to make an offer 
and where there is no ground for dispensation, the voting rights attaching to his 
shares in excess of the threshold will be suspended for a period of two years. 
Furthermore, such person will likely face a pecuniary sanction. This can be 
illustrated by the case of HFP/Hubert Industries. In this case, HFP acquired 
control of Hubert Industries, as a result of which it had to make an offer at the 
price of FF 97.55 per share. In order to avoid the costs associated with the 
mandatory bid, HFP proposed an alternative financial arrangement to the minority 
shareholders, pursuant to which they would abstain from bringing their shares to 
the mandatory bid in return for a payment of FF 45 per share. The AMF objected 
to such arrangement and imposed a pecuniary sanction against HFP. It should be 
added that failure to comply with the mandatory bid obligation may also result in 
the nullification of the transaction by the courts, on the grounds that the 
transaction contravened the AMF’s regulations.
ii) Concept of acting in concert
The AMF ascribes a major role to the concept of ‘acting in concert’, which serves 
to prevent the circumvention of the mandatory bid rule by way of secret 
alliances979. This concept, which was introduced into the French law by the Law 
of 1989980, is defined more narrowly in France than in the UK981. Indeed, under 
the French takeover regime, persons acting in concert are those who have entered 
into a binding agreement, written or verbal, with a view to purchasing or selling 
voting rights982, or to exercising voting rights either in the boardroom or in the
978 M-A Frison-Roche, ‘La Prise de Controle et les Int^rets des Associds Minoritaires’ (1998) Rev. JP 
com, No. sp6c. 94, p. 98.
979 Note that this concept is also used for the purpose of determining whether the threshold triggering 
the price guarantee procedure is reached, and whether certain thresholds triggering disclosure 
requirements are reached.
980 OJ No C 162, 6.6.1996, p.5; with explanatory memorandum, COM(95) 655 final.
981 For the definition of the ‘concert party’ under the UK regime, see the chapter on the principle of 
equality of shareholders and the protection of the minority under the UK takeover regime.
9 This encompasses agreements obliging a party not to sell his shares before a specified date or 
before the approval of the other party. However, an acquisition or a sale agreed and executed
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general meeting, in order to implement a common strategy vis-a-vis the offeree
983company .
Agreements which are likely to be viewed as ‘concerted action’ and thus likely to 
trigger the mandatory bid rule include agreements which require the parties to 
concert in advance on all important decisions in order to reach a uniform vote 
within the corporate organs984. However, agreements entered into with a view to 
exercising voting rights for only a specific matter, such as the composition of the 
board of directors, will not trigger the mandatory bid rule. For the objective of the 
latter type of agreements is merely to design the composition of a corporate
QOf
organ, rather than to implement a common corporate strategy . Nor will the 
mandatory bid rule be triggered if the acquirer of the one-third threshold declares 
acting in concert with other shareholders who already hold, alone or in concert, 
the majority of the offeree company’s share capital or the voting rights, provided
Q O /r
the latter shareholders continue to be the predominant shareholders .
It should be noted in this respect that, prior to 1998, the AMF used to think that
‘the objective of implementing a common strategy vis-a-vis the offeree company’,
set out at the end of the definition, only applied to agreements entered into to
exercise voting rights, and not to agreements entered into to purchase or sell 
Q£7
voting rights . This view was also shared by the doctrine. For instance, Daigre 
(1999) argued that the above objective was required only for the second part of 
the definition. For, in his view, the type of agreements referred to in the first part 
of the definition were characterised by their ability to be executed instantaneously 
whilst the type of agreements referred to in the second part of the definition were
instantaneously between a seller-shareholder and his acquirer would not fall within the statutory 
definition. Nor would agreements whose purpose is merely to determine the conditions of an 
acquisition or a sale fall within the latter definition.
983 Code of Commerce, art. L. 233-10.
984 Decision CBV No. 92-1988 of 17 July 1992, Safic Alcan.
985 D. Schmidt and C. Baj (1991), supra n 914, p. 91.
986 CMF regs, r.5-5-5.
987 J-J. Daigre, ‘De l’Action de Concert-Aprfcs la Decision du CMF du 13 Novembre 1998’ (1999) 72 
RD bancaire 56, p. 56.
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characterised by their successive execution988. A Decree in 1998 made it clear, 
however, that the above objective applies to both parts of the definition989.
Despite the 1998 reform, the statutory definition of the concept of ‘concert party’ 
still meets criticism. A major criticism relates to the fact that a single definition is 
used for two different objectives, namely the promotion of the transparency of the 
securities markets through mandatory disclosures of shareholdings, on the one 
hand, and the protection of the minority through mandatory bids in the event of 
control changes, on the other990. Opponents of the statutory definition recommend 
a broad definition for the former objective and thus agree with the existing 
definition. However, they argue that the latter objective deserves a narrower 
definition than the existing one. This is because, in their view, the objective of 
protecting the minority should not deter legitimate activity in the financial 
markets991. In support of their view, they point out to the UK Code, which 
requires the parties to actively co-operate, acquire shares and intend to obtain or 
consolidate control of the offeree company, in addition to reaching an agreement 
or understanding, in order to characterise an agrement as concerted action992.
6.3.2 Price Guarantee Procedure
The French regulation contains a special tender offer procedure for the event that 
the acquirer acquires a block carrying a majority of the shares or the voting rights 
in a listed company from a shareholder who already holds, alone or in concert 
with others, such block.
i) Rationale
At first sight, the sale of a control block by a controlling shareholder may not 
seem to affect the corporate organisation. For neither the company nor the
988 Ibid, p. 57.
989 Decision No. 198 01041 of 13 November 1998 on Bouygues-Bollore.
990 ‘Hard Cases, Bad Law and Perrier’, Mergers & Acquisitions International, June 1, 1992, p. 3, 
available at Lexis-Nexis Executive.
991 Ibid, p. 4.
992 Code, Notes on r.9(l).
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minority are involved in this transaction. The company remains the same and thus 
the protection of the minority may not seem necessary. When one takes a closer 
look, however, it appears that there has indeed been a reorganisation of the 
company and that the situation of the minority has indeed been affected993. This is 
because, at the time the minority shareholders participated in the investment 
contract, they probably expected the controlling shareholder(s) to run the 
company in a certain fashion. The sale of control has however breached the 
minority’s expectation and the minority should therefore be able to exit the 
company. Indeed, as the courts put it, this procedure is necessary to ‘avoid that 
shareholders become prisoners [...] o f  the strongest'994. Frison-Roche (1998) 
argues that this procedure further protects the financial market’s ability to 
anticipate what the outcome of investing in a company with an already existing 
controller will be995.
Without prejudice to the above rationale, the question remains as to why the AMF 
does not regulate the acquisition of a control block from an identified seller within 
the framework of the mandatory bid. The answers to the latter question are 
probably two-fold: First, the price guarantee procedure was the first mechanism 
set up by the then market authorities to give an exit right to the minority. In other 
words, this procedure was introduced prior to the mandatory bid procedure and 
even prior to the regulation of takeovers in general996. Secondly, this procedure 
presents undeniable advantages compared to the mandatory bid, such as 
flexibility, the rapidity of transaction, and the absence of bidding and of price 
modulation997. In particular the absence of bidding allows the offeror to best 
adjust its estimates of the costs of acquiring control998. This is because the sale of 
a control block is definitive in that the seller of control will not be freed from its 
contractual obligation, should a competing bid arise999.
993 M-A Frison-Roche (1998), supra n 978, p. 95.
994 Ord. r£f., T. com. Paris, 19 October 1995, Nouvelles Frontieres Internationales', see ibid, p. 97.
995 Ibid, p. 98.
996 See supra n 939 and the accompanying text for the maintien de cours.
997 L. Faug6rolas (2003), supra n 584, p. 334. For the absence of price modulation, see below.
998 J. P. Deschanel, ‘Fixation du Prix des Offres Publiques’ in J. Stoufflet and J. P. Deschanel (eds), 
Etudes sur le Cours de Bourse (Economica, 1997), p. 245.
999 Note, however, that in CA, Paris, Mutuelle du Mans v. OCP, pp. 157-162, the Paris CA held that 
the seller of a control block could always sell his controlling shares in the event of a subsequent cash 
offer, on the grounds that the specific objectives of the procedure of takeovers - namely the protection
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It is suggested, however, that the French regulation would do better to integrate 
this procedure within the mandatory bid rule. Indeed, it is believed that the 
minority cannot be said to be in greater danger in the context of an acquisition of 
a control block from an identified seller than in the context of an acquisition of 
effective control in the market or otherwise, or in the context of an acquisition of 
a control block in the market. Furthermore, such a course of action would not 
only simplify the French regulation but also remove the discrepancy between the 
price of the price guarantee procedure and that of the mandatory bid 1000. 
Moreover, the fact that the AMF has power to place this procedure under the 
mandatory bid regime demonstrates that such integration is feasible. Indeed, the 
AMF has discretion to use such power under two circumstances: First, where the 
controlling block has been acquired from persons who had not previously held the 
majority of the voting rights of the company1001; and secondly, where the 
transaction is accompanied by closely related elements, which are likely to affect 
the equality between the price paid for the control block and that paid to the 
minority1002, such as the creation of a pension scheme in favour of the seller of the 
control bloc to offset the low price paid by the acquirer of control.
ii) Operation of the rule
Under the French regulation, if a person, or a group acting in concert, acquires 
shares from one or more identified sellers and thereafter holds more than fifty per 
cent of the shares or the voting rights of a listed company, that person or group 
must file a price guarantee procedure1003. In determining whether the fifty per 
cent threshold has been crossed, the shares or the voting rights which are already 
held by the acquirer are taken into account. As a result, the acquirer will be 
deemed to have acquired a control block even though the transaction would
of the interests of the minority and the transparency of the market - require the holding back of certain 
principles, such as the principle of the binding power of contracts; see supra n 217.
Albeit probably at the expense of the more favourable price requirement under the price guarantee 
offer. For whereas the price of the latter must match that paid to the seller of control, the price under 
the mandatory bid must be determined according to the multi-criteria method.
1001 CMF regs, r.5-4-3(b).
1002 CMF regs, r.5-4-3(a).
1003 CMF regs, r.5-4-1.
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have acquired a control block even though the transaction would concern the sale 
of less than the absolute majority of the shares or the voting rights1004.
Upon acquisition of the control block, the acquirer must file a price guarantee 
procedure with the AMF1005. Subsequently, he must purchase in the market all the 
remaining shares offered to him during a minimum period of ten market days 
following the date of publication of the price guarantee procedure1006. The price 
offered to the remaining shareholders must, except in exceptional 
circumstances1007, be the same as that paid to the seller of control1008. The 
rationale underlying the latter requirement is that control is a corporate asset, 
which belongs to all the shareholders, and not just to the majority shareholder1009. 
It should be noted that the minority may receive a price higher than that paid for 
the control block so long as the acquirer of the block consents to such a course of 
action1010. For the CMF’s General Regulation merely requires the price to be ‘at 
least’ equal to that paid for the control block. It should further be noted that 
different classes of securities may not be offered the same price. Thus, the voting 
certificates will not be offered the same price as the investment certificates. Nor 
will the ordinary shares be offered the same price as the convertible bonds or 
options. This is because, like in the context of both voluntary and mandatory bids, 
the French takeover regime endorses the view that ‘a identite de situation, identity 
de traitement,m i .
It should finally be emphasised that, between one-third and fifty per cent of the 
shares or the voting rights, only the mandatory bid rule applies, irrespective of 
whether the seller is identified. In other words, where a person crosses the one- 
third, he will be subject to the mandatory bid regime even if he crosses that
1004 T. Bonneau and L. Faug6rolas (1999), supra n 603, p. 235.
1005 CMF regs, r.5-4-1.
1006 CMF regs, r.5-4-2.
1007 Indeed, in the event that the acquisition of the block includes specific warranties, or that the price
paid to the blockholder includes a deferred consideration element, then the acquirer may offer a
different price for the remaining shares.
1008 It should be noted, however, that the price paid for the control block may not reflect the reality.
This will be so where the acquirer pays a relatively low price but offers other advantages to the seller
of control.
1009 A. Viandier (2000), supra n 699, p. 248.
1010 A. Viandier (1999), supra n 224, pp. 393-394.
1011 Ibid, pp. 314-315.
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threshold by acquiring shares from an identified seller. Where a person crosses 
the fifty per cent threshold, however, the offer to be filed is either the mandatory 
bid or the price guarantee procedure, depending on whether the seller is 
identified1012. In other words, where a person crosses the fifty per cent threshold, 
he will be required to file a mandatory bid if he crosses that threshold through 
purchases in the market. That person will be required to file a price guarantee 
procedure, however, if he crosses the same threshold through purchases from 
identified seller(s).
6.4 Sell-Out Right of the Minority
The French regulation also allows the minority to request that the majority 
shareholder(s) buy out their shares1013, though the minority’s request is subject to 
the AMF’s approval1014. The French sell-out right is peculiar in two respects: 
First, the exercise of the sell-out right requires the offeror to initiate an offer, 
referred to as the ‘buy-out offer’. The latter offer is closely associated with the 
offeror’s buy-out right1015. For an offeror that wishes to exercise its buy-out right 
must first make a buy-out offer. Thus, the French sell-out and buy-out rights do 
not constitute autonomous market operations and cannot be contemplated 
independently from a buy-out offer1016. It should be noted in this respect that the 
reason for maintaining the buy-out right, in addition to the buy-out offer, lies in 
the fact that the buy-out offer never results in the acquisition of a hundred per cent 
of a company’s shares. The second peculiarity of the French sell-out right is that it 
is not limited to the take-over. Indeed, as we shall see below, the sell-out right in 
France may be exercised in circumstances where there is no takeover, but where 
some important events take place in the company, which are likely to modify the 
situation of the minority.
1012 j  Vassogne and H. Le Diascom, ‘Que Reste-t-il de la Procedure d’Acquisition d’un Bloc de 
Controle?’ (1990) 17 RD bancaire et bourse 24, p. 29.
1013 CMF regs, r.5-6-1.
1014 CMF regs, r.5-6-6. Though, as we shall see below, in one particular circumstance, the CMF is 
obliged to compel the offeror to make a buy-out offer. This reveals a contrast with the CMF’s quasi­
automatic authorisation where the offeror exercises its buy-out right.
1015 This allows the controlling shareholder to get rid of the minority and to terminate the company’s 
status as a public company. In order to exercise his buy-out right, the ninety-five per cent controlling 
shareholder must apply to the CMF to buy-out the remaining five per cent minority; see CMF regs, 
r.5-6-3.
1016 A. Viandier, ‘Le Retrait Obligatoire’ 10 (1994) RJDA 783, p. 784.
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Circumstances which allow the minority to exercise their sell-out right are as 
follows: where a public limited company re-incorporates as a SCA1017; where a 
company’s articles of association are significantly changed 1018; where a 
subsidiary merges with its parent company; where all or substantially all of a 
company’s principal assets are disposed o f1019; where a company’s business 
purpose changes; and where a company stops paying dividends for several years. 
It should be noted that the latter circumstances do not involve a change of control. 
However, the fact that the latter events change the ‘investment contract’ to a 
significant extent has led the AMF to provide the minority with an exit right, and 
hence to dis-apply the majority rule of company law, with a view to strengthening 
the protection of the minority1020. Another instance which triggers the minority’s 
sell-out right, and which is more important for our purposes, is where a person 
holds more than ninety-five per cent of the voting rights of a listed company1021. 
The rationale behind allowing the minority to invoke their sell-out rights in the 
latter instance is that the minority find themselves with a controlling shareholder 
who is vetted with full powers and who may therefore impose, without taking into 
account the interests of the minority, a reorientation of the corporate activity or a 
modification to the rights of the shareholders. The particularity of the latter 
instance is that the sell-out right is triggered where a person ‘holds’ ninety-five 
per cent of the voting rights. In other words, the sell-out right may be exercised 
irrespective of whether the relevant ninety-five per cent threshold has been 
reached following a takeover, by purchases in the market, or by private treaty 
Thus, unlike in the UK, even this instance is not limited in France to the takeover 
situation.
It should be noted that, as mentioned above, all circumstances which trigger the 
minority’s sell-out right, save for the transformation of a public limited company
1017 CMF regs, r.5-6-5.
1018 CMF regs, r.5.6.6.
1019 CMF regs, r.5.6.6. On the evaluation of the ‘principal assets’, see Decision CMF, No. 200C1593 
of 25 October 2000, La Rochette (2001) 77 Banque et Droit 32, note J-J. Daigre and H. Vauplane, p. 
34.
1020 L. Faug6rolas (2003), supra n 584, p. 331.
1021 CMF regs, r.5-6-1.
1022 Note that, since 1998, the CMF has power to compel the majority shareholder who reaches the 95 
per cent threshold to file a buy-out offer, even in the absence of an application by the minority or the 
offeror.
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into a SCA, are subject to the approval of the AMF. The latter subjects the 
minority’s application to a careful consideration as to its appropriateness. In 
particular, the AMF examines whether, in view of the characteristics of the 
market of the share concerned and the volume of the planned sale, the minority 
have the opportunity to sell their stake under normal conditions of price and of 
time limit. For instance, the presence of a liquid market which would allow the 
minority to sell their shares, or the fact that the minority shareholders had not 
tendered their shares in a prior public offer in the instance where the sell-out right 
would be triggered upon the acquisition by a person of ninety-five per cent of the 
voting rights following an offer, will likely result in the rejection of the minority’s 
application1023.
As far as the price which will be payable to the minority is concerned, the price is 
set by the offeror on a discretionary basis, albeit under the AMF’s control. Thus, 
the minority plays no role in determining the price and the only remedy available 
to them, where they find the price unsatisfactory, is to bring an action against the 
AMF’s decision to approve the buy-out offer, which is a prerequisite for the 
exercise of the sell-out right1024. To determine the price, the offeror must evaluate 
the shares according to objective methods and by taking into account, according 
to an appropriate weighting, the value of the company’s assets, its profits, its 
market value, its working capital, the existence of subsidiaries, and the future 
prospects of the company1025. The price set by the offeror, as well as the choice 
and weighting of the criteria, are subsequently scrutinised by the AMF. A number 
of judicial rulings have laid down the criteria to be taken into consideration by the 
AMF during its scrutiny. Thus, in 1991, the Paris Court of Appeal held that the 
AMF must ensure that the price offered is 'not likely to harm the interest o f the 
minority shareholders' 1026. The same Court held in another case in 1992 that the 
AMF must assess whether the controlling shareholder determined the price 
according to objective and multiple criteria, such as the share price, the net assets,
1023 J. P. LeGall and P. Morel (1992), supra n 595, p. 191.
1024 A. Viandier (1999), supra n 224, p. 457.
1025 CMF regs, r.5-7-1. Note that the nature of the securities is also taken into account in determining 
the price. Thus, ordinary shares will not be offered the same price as investment certificates.
1026 CA Paris 18 April 1991 (1991) Rev. Soc. 765, comment by D. Carreau and D. Martin.
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and the amount of dividends paid by the company1027. The AMF must also take 
into account the characteristics of the company as well as the particular event 
which triggered the exercise of the sell-out right. For instance, a controlling 
shareholder holding ninety-five per cent of the voting rights of a company will be 
better placed to impose its view of the ‘equitable price’ than a controlling 
shareholder who has transformed a public limited company into a SCA. Without 
prejudice to the above, it should be noted that the AMF usually requires the price 
to be paid to the minority not to be less than the average market price for the last
1 (\0 ftsixty trading days preceding the filing of the buy-out offer
It should further be added that, if the sell-out right is exercised following the 
acquisition by a person of ninety-five per cent of the voting rights upon a share- 
exchange offer, then the AMF considers that the value of the securities remitted in 
exchange in the context of the share exchange offer cannot in itself be a yardstick 
for pricing the buy-out offer1029. In other words, in this instance, the price will 
still be determined on the basis of the criteria listed above. It is suggested that this 
approach of the AMF indicates a contrario that if the sell-out right is exercised 
following the acquisition by a person of ninety-five per cent of the voting rights 
upon a cash offer, then it is likely that the AMF will consider the cash 
consideration offered in the context of the cash offer as a yardstick for pricing the 
buy-out offer.
It should finally be added that the French sell-out right presents two major 
shortcomings: First, whereas non-compliance with the obligation to make a 
mandatory bid results in the loss of the voting rights attaching to the shares in 
excess of the threshold, no such sanction is available where the controlling 
shareholder refuses to make a buy-out offer, which is a pre-requisite under the 
French takeover regime in order for the minority to be able to exercise their sell­
out right. However, in such a case, the President of the AMF may apply to the 
President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Paris for an injunction
1027 CA Paris, 8 July 1992 (1992) BRDA, p. 14.
1028 A. Viandier (1999), supra n 224, p. 458.
1029 J. Palmer,B. Basuyaux, R. Thaeter, M. Arnold, M. van den Wall Bake, and J. Broekhuis 
‘Squeezing-out Minority Shareholders After a Successful Public Offer’ (2004), p. 46, available at 
http://www.practicallaw.com/jsp/binaryContent. jsp?item=: 1457245&tab=3.
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compelling the controlling shareholder to make a buy-out offer. Furthermore, the 
controlling shareholder may be held liable to pay damages to the minority if he 
voluntarily delays the making of such offer1030. Secondly, there is a risk of abus 
of this procedure by the minority. Indeed, the latter could ‘prevent the execution 
o f a transaction which is vital for the company with the sole objective to favour 
their own interests at the expense o f all the other shareholders'™1. This would be 
unfortunate, for the likelihood of an abus de minorite might reduce a company’s 
willingness to take investment decisions such as those that trigger the sell-out 
right. It is believed, however, that such risk is mitigated by the AMF’s discretion 
in allowing the minority to invoke their sell-out right. Indeed, as seen above, the 
presence of a liquid market will likely result in the rejection of the minority’s 
application.
Conclusion
As the foregoing indicates, the French regime contains many provisions designed 
to ensure the equal treatment of offeree shareholders. Some of these provisions 
suggest a very strict approach to equality. These include the rule permitting partial 
offers for only up to ten per cent of the capital of a company; the rule prohibiting 
the offeror from purchasing offeree shares in the market during the currency of a 
share exchange offer; the rule prohibiting the offeror from purchasing shares by 
private treaty during the currency of an offer; and the numerous grounds allowing 
the minority to invoke their sell-out rights.
At the same time, however, the French regulation falls short of ensuring equality 
in two respects: First, as seen above, the French regulation does not regulate the 
impact of pre-bid purchases upon the offer price. The non-regulation of pre-bid 
purchases results in a partial removal of the price discrimination between 
shareholders who sell within the bid and those who sell outside the bid. Secondly, 
as seen above, whilst the acquisition of effective control triggers the mandatory
1030 See e.g. CA, Paris, 5 February 2002, SA Parjhal c/Ste Viel et Cie Finance, 20 JCP 2002, p. 787.
In this case, the minority claimed damages on the grounds that they were prevented from reinvesting, 
in the market, the consideration they were supposed to receive upon the exercise of their sell-out right, 
and that they were thus prevented from realising financial returns on such consideration.
1031 Cass. com. 15 July 1992, arret Six (1992) D., J. 279, note Le Diascom.
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bid rule, the acquisition of a control block from an identified seller triggers the so- 
called price guarantee procedure. It is believed that the existence of different 
mechanisms governing the acquisition of effective control on the one hand, and 
the acquisition of a control bloc on the other, is not efficient. It is therefore 
suggested that the price guarantee procedure should be brought within the 
framework of the mandatory bid rule, with a view to simplifying the takeover 
regulation. It should further be added that, by not providing a provision similar to 
Rule 31(4) of the Code, the French regulation presents a major shortcoming in its 
attempt to prevent shareholder coercion. Indeed, it is believed that other 
provisions of the French regulation, which are designed to ensure uncoerced 
decision-making by offeree shareholders, are not adequate to act as substitutes for 
the lack of a rule similar to Rule 31(4) of the Code.
195
Chapter 7 A Comparative Analysis of the UK and French 
Regimes as Regards the Issues of Defensive 
Measures and Equality in the Context of Takeover 
Bids
Introduction
This chapter describes the differences between the UK and French takeover 
regimes as regards the topics discussed in earlier chapters. Section I examines the 
differences in relation to the role of the offeree board both prior to and during a 
bid. Section II examines the differences concerning the equal treatment and 
protection of offeree shareholders. It should be noted that this chapter also refers 
to the Directive on takeover bids, where relevant.
7.1 A Comparative Analysis of the UK and French Regimes as 
Regards the Role of the Offeree Board
The issue of defensive measures constitute a topic where more differences exist 
between the UK and France as compared to the issue of equality, which will be 
discussed in the following section. These differences relate to both pre-bid and 
post-bid defences. In some cases, there seem to be exact parallels between the two 
takeover regimes. For instance, the new French rules on share buy-backs seem 
very similar to those in the UK. The same holds true for the disclosure 
requirements. This is not surprising since both countries must abide by 
Community law in respect of the latter defences. Indeed, as Aidan (2002) rightly 
put it, it is now established that the Community law will become the main source 
of regulation of the law of financial markets1032. Despite the latter remark, 
however, there are a number of significant differences as to the regulation of 
some defences.
1032 P. Aidan, ‘La Communautarisation du Droit des Marches Financiers’ (2002) Bull. Joly Bourse 81,
p. 81.
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7.1.1 Doctrinal Differences as to Pre-Bid Defences
1033
1034
1035
1036
1037
As far as pre-bid defences are concerned, both jurisdictions regulate the latter 
mainly pursuant to company law. Despite the latter, however, there are a number 
of differences in relation to the rules governing such defences: First, whereas UK 
company law regulates such defences mainly by reference to judicially- 
formulated fiduciary duties, French company law does so by reference to legal
i nilrules embodied in the statutes and in particular in the Code of Commerce 
Indeed, as seen in the chapter on the regulation of defensive measures in France, 
although a number of French legal scholars and court decisions refer to the 
doctrine of fiduciary duties, this doctrine is not widely recognised in French law. 
Instead, the French courts judge upon the validity of pre-bid defences mostly by 
reference to statutory concepts, such as the principle of the interests of the 
company 1034 or the concept of the abus de biens sociaux, which are both 
embodied in statutes1035. Thus, the French courts usually make use of legislative 
provisions to regulate directors’ actions prior to the bid.
As mentioned earlier, the rationale behind the absence of a legal fiduciary duty in 
France is believed to derive from the fact that, until recently, there was less 
sensitivity in France to the conflicts of interests of directors, due to the 
predominance of controlling, especially family holdings in many listed 
companies1036. Tunc (1982) argues that the absence of a broad and philosophical 
foundation to the French statutory rules governing directors’ action is a serious 
lacuna of French law. In his view, this prevents these statutory rules from having 
a positive expression of their raison d ’etre and embracing the various aspects of 
the behaviour expected from a director1037. It should be noted, however, that, the 
UK has also had to multiply legislative measures, due to the insufficiency of the 
doctrine of fiduciary duties to prevent all abuses. This in turn has brought the UK 
takeover regime closer to its French counterpart. The UK legislative measures are, 
however, inspired by a philosophy slightly different from that prevailing in
e.g. Code of Commerce, art. L. 242-6, which regulates the abus de pouvoir.
Civil Code, arts 1832 and 1833.
Code of Commerce, art. L. 225-43.
E. Wymeersch (2003), supra n 44, p. 583.
A. Tunc, ‘French Lawyer Looks at British Company Law’ (1982) 45 Modem L. Rev. 1, p. 13.
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France. Indeed, whilst French law contains a greater number of imperative rules, 
legislative measures in the UK, other than those prohibiting loans to directors, 
mainly rely on disclosure or, at most, on approval by shareholders in general 
meeting1038.
Secondly, in addition to common and statutory company law, the UK further 
relies on self-regulatory rules, and in particular on the UK Listing Rules, to 
regulate pre-bid defences. For instance, the rule that requires listed companies to 
seek prior approval of their shareholders in general meeting where they decide to 
carry out significant transactions 1039 constitutes an additional hurdle for 
companies wishing to ward off potential offerors by way of pre-bid defences. No 
such governance obligation on listed companies exists in France. Thirdly, whilst 
in France the breach by directors of the statutory rules will often incur their 
criminal liability1040, the breach by directors of their fiduciary duties will rarely 
incur their criminal liability in the UK1041. Indeed, unlike the French law which 
often relies on criminal law, the UK usually relies on civil law to enforce 
directors’ duties. It should finally be added that the main difference between the 
two jurisdictions in the context of pre-bid defences probably lies in the fact that 
the power of institutional shareholders prevents listed companies in the UK from 
adopting pre-bid defences. Indeed, a lot of inhibitions in the UK result from 
shareholder opposition rather than regulation. By contrast, institutional 
shareholders in France are not as powerful as in the UK, though, as seen above, a 
culture of shareholder activism is developing in France, albeit timidly.
Before turning to the comparative analysis of selected pre-bid defences, it is 
suggested to examine what impact the Directive on takeover bids will likely have 
on the UK and French pre-bid defences. Pursuant to the Directive’s break through 
rule, restrictions on the right of ownership which may prevent the offeror from 
acquiring securities of the offeree company, such as the imposition of a ceiling on 
shareholdings or the right for the company or other holders of securities to veto
1038 Ibid, pp. 13-14.
1039 Listing Rules, Ch. 10.
1040 See Code of Commerce, art. L. 242-6, which lists a number of offences which give rise to 
directors’ criminal liability.
1041 This will be so, for instance, where a director breaches s.330 of the CA 1985, which restricts 
loans to directors.
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any transfer of shares, shall be rendered unenforceable against the offeror during 
the period for acceptance of the bid1042. In addition, restrictions on voting rights, 
such as limits on voting rights and deferral of voting rights shall cease to have 
effect when the general meeting decides on post-bid defensive measures1043. The 
same applies to shares with multiple voting rights1044. The break through rule 
further authorises the offeror who manages to hold seventy-five per cent of the 
voting securities of the offeree company following the bid to break through any 
such restrictions, extraordinary rights of shareholders 1045 , or multiple-vote 
securities at the first general meeting following the closure of the bid, whereby 
the offeror is likely to amend the articles of association or remove or appoint 
board members1046. The latter is intended to dismantle, if the bid is successful, at 
least some of the most common pre-bid defensive measures that can be regarded 
as hindering bids1047. It is noteworthy in this respect that the latter rule is 
reminiscent of the AMF’s proposal in 1989 with respect to voting caps, pursuant 
to which companies should include in their articles a standard clause which would 
automatically invalidate the cap if the offeror receives acceptances for more than 
fifty per cent of the shares1048.
The rationale behind the break through rule is to eradicate national barriers to a 
control transfer. Indeed, this rule would have the effect of enfranchising 
overnight, as regards the sale of control, shares with limited or no voting rights, as 
well as shares with multiple voting rights, in UK or French listed companies. By 
doing so, the rule would reduce the substantial differences between the takeover 
defences based on EU company law1049, and would redefine the very concept of 
ownership in the takeover context1050. However, the potential effects of the
1042 Directive, r.ll(2).
1043 Directive, r.ll(3).
1044 Directive, r. 11(3).
1045 e. g. concerning the appointment or removal of board members provided for in the offeree’s 
articles of association.
1046 Directive, r.l 1(4).
1047 B. Dauner Lieb and M. Lamandini, ‘The New Proposal of a Directive on Company Law 
Concerning Takeover Bids and the Achievement of a Level Playing Field’ (2002), p. 3, available at 
europa website.
1048 Annual Report COB 1989, p. 124 and Annual Report COB 1993, p. 51.
1049 G. Hertig and J. A. McCahery, ‘Company and Takeover Law Reforms in Europe: Misguided 
Harmonization Efforts or Regulatory Competition?’ (2003), p. 4, available at SSRN website.
1050 J. McCahery, L. Renneboog , P. Ritter and S. Haller, ‘The Economics of the Proposed European 
Takeover Directive’ (2003), p. 81, available at http://www.vwl.uni- mannheim.de/hellwig/sascha/
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Directive’s break through rule are muted by the fact that MS are allowed to opt 
out from the rule.
7.1.2 Technical Differences as to Pre-Bid Defences
It should be noted that the following is a comparative overview of only those pre­
bid defences where substantial differences exist between the UK and France, and 
of those defences which only exist in one jurisdiction, such as the French SCAs. 
Thus, the following excludes the pre-bid defences whose use is subject to similar 
restrictions in both jurisdictions. This is not surprising since some pre-bid 
defences are to some extent governed by Community law1051.
i) Nature of the shares
In France, most listed companies use bearer shares, which make it more difficult 
for potential offerors to identify the shareholders relevant to a bid campaign. In 
the UK, however, all of a company’s issued shares are registered1052. As a result, 
it is easier in the UK to mount a takeover over the heads of the incumbent 
management, since the offeror can easily identify the offeree shareholders by 
examining the company’s share registry. It should be noted, however, that the UK 
law offers something similar to bearer shares by providing that a company may 
issue, with respect to a fully paid share, a warrant stating that the bearer is entitled 
to the shares specified in it1053. The issue of share warrants is, however, relatively 
uncommon in the UK.
pics/CEPS_report_on_EU_takeover_regulation.pdf.
51 See e. g. art. 23 of the Second Company Law Directive, which requires MS to prohibit 
companies from making loans or granting guarantees in order to cause or facilitate the subscription 
or purchase of their shares by a third party or a shareholder. For the implementation of this rule in 
the UK and France, see CA, s. 151 and Code of Commerce, art. L. 225-216, respectively.
1052 CA, s.361.
1053 CA, s. 188. Note, however, that the holder of a share warrant typically has fewer rights than a 
registered holder.
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Non-voting shares and shares with double voting rights
Non-voting preference shares are used in both jurisdictions. However, probably 
because of its relatively frequent use, this pre-bid defence is subject to stringent 
rules in France. Thus, only companies that have made distributable profits during 
the two fiscal years preceding the date of the proposed issuance are allowed to 
issue such shares1054. Furthermore, the number of such shares cannot exceed one- 
fourth of the capital1055. Moreover, holders of preference shares who have not 
been offered a dividend over three consecutive years regain their voting rights 
until the close of the first fiscal year during which their dividend is paid1056. There 
are no such restrictions as regards the use of this pre-bid defence in the UK. This 
is because it was thought that the legislative abolition of non-voting shares would 
simply encourage alternative methods of vesting control in the holders of 
particular shares or classes of shares1057. This should not be of concern, however, 
since very few UK listed companies use such shares. This is evidenced by the fact 
that 'there have been no instances in recent years o f  a company seeking a listing 
for a new class o f  non-voting capital' 1058. Indeed, the powerful institutional 
shareholders in the UK have always lobbied against the use of non-voting shares. 
Given that institutional investors are the largest category of shareholders in UK 
listed companies, they have thus far successfully prevented these companies from 
adopting this pre-bid defence. Such shares exist in a few large UK businesses 
though, including the investment bank Schroders, the brewer Young & Co’s, and 
the newspaper group Daily Mail & General Trust1059.
Likewise, companies in both jurisdictions are allowed to issue shares with double 
voting rights. As in the case of non-voting shares, French listed companies use 
this defence more often than their UK counterparts. Indeed, an analysis of 156 
companies in 1999 shows that 68 per cent of companies in France have a regime
1054 Code of Commerce, art. L. 225-126.
1055 Code of Commerce, art. L. 228-12.
1056 Code of Commerce, art. L. 228-14..
1057 Jenkins Report, para 136.
1058 M. A. Weinberg and M. V. Blank, Weinberg and Blank on Take-overs and Mergers (London: 
Sweet and Maxwell, 5* ed, 1989), para 3-805.
1059 ‘John Laing Gives Shareholders the Vote’, The Financial Times, March 24, 2000.
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of double voting rights1060. Probably because of their frequent use, double voting 
shares are also subject to stringent requirements. Indeed, only shares which are 
registered for at least two years in the name of the same holder are eligible for 
double voting rights1061. At first sight, the latter requirement seems to make it 
more difficult for shareholders to obtain double voting rights. Indeed, in the UK, 
shareholders can obtain double voting rights immediately following an issue of 
shares to which double voting rights are attached, or by inserting a clause in the 
articles of association. As a result, they need not wait for the expiry of a certain 
period of time to avail themselves of double voting shares. The above requirement 
in France makes double voting shares a stronger pre-bid defence for the offeree 
company, however, as it prevents potential offerors from gaining real control in 
the offeree company for a period of at least two years. This is because, upon 
transfer, the shares lose their double voting rights. Thus, the offeror will not 
obtain double voting rights upon acquisition of the offeree shares to which they 
are attached. He will need to wait for a minimum period of two years before 
becoming eligible for double voting rights. Seen from this perspective, the French 
rule seems to act as a stronger deterrent for potential offerors.
iii) Share buy-backs
Listed companies in both the UK and France are allowed to purchase their own 
shares. This is not surprising, since this pre-bid defence is governed by 
Community law. However, whilst the UK law does not put a limit on the amount 
of shares that can be purchased, the maximum percentage of shares that 
companies listed in France may purchase is only ten per cent of the capital. 
Furthermore, in both countries, companies are allowed to hold the repurchased 
shares in treasury provided the aggregate nominal value of the treasury shares do 
not exceed ten per cent of the nominal value of the issued share capital of the 
company1062. There are, however, a number of differences between the two 
regimes as to the rules governing treasury shares. Indeed, in the UK, if the 
maximum ten per cent threshold is exceeded at any time, the excess shall be
C. Van Der Elst (2003), supra n 311, p. 30.
Code of Commerce, art. L. 225-123.
The Companies (Acquisition of Own Shares) (Treasury Shares) Regulations 2003.
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automatically cancelled. In France, however, shares in excess of the ten per cent 
threshold are not automatically cancelled. Instead, they may be kept for a period 
of one year, following which they must be either sold or cancelled1063. In the 
meantime, the shares are, however, deprived of their voting rights. Furthermore, 
in the UK, only listed companies are able to hold treasury shares whilst in France 
both listed and unlisted companies may hold treasury shares. It should be noted in 
this respect that, although the approach of both jurisdictions vis-a-vis treasury 
shares is in conformity with the Second Company Law Directive1064, the Winter 
Proposal on a Modem Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe 
suggests that holding shares in treasury should be allowed within the limits of the 
distributable reserves, without limiting it to an entirely arbitrary percentage of 
legal capital like the ten per cent limit1065.
Another difference which is closely related to share buy-backs, is that the UK law 
prohibits subsidiaries from holding shares in the capital of their parents1066. Even 
the Companies Regulations 2003 did not relax this prohibition1067. The UK’s 
approach vis-a-vis this defence differs from the French law where a subsidiary 
can hold up to ten per cent of the capital of its parent, though the shares held by 
the subsidiary do not carry voting rights1068. It should be noted in this regard that 
some of the post-bid defences which are prohibited in France, and which have no 
equivalence in the UK, derive from this permissive approach of the French law 
vis-a-vis the above defence. This is the case for the French rules according to 
which subsidiaries cannot increase the shares they hold in the capital of their 
parents, or sell such shares to a third party during the currency of an offer.
1063 Code of Commerce, art. L. 225-214.
1064 Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 on coordination of safeguards which, 
for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of 
companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the 
formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, 
with a view to making such safeguards equivalent; OJ L 026, 31/01/1977 P. 0001 -  0013, as 
amended by Council Directive 92/101/EEC of 23 November 1992, art. 19(l)(b).
1065 Report o f the High Level Group o f Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework 
for Company Law in Europe (2002), supra n 679, pp. 84-85.
1066 CA, s.23.
1067 Treasury Shares (2001), supra n 483, p. 10.
1068 Code of Commerce, art. L. 233-31.
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iv) Cross shareholdings
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1070
Cross shareholdings are not regulated in the UK, on the grounds that any such 
provision would necessarily be complex and arbitrary1069. It is believed that the 
non-regulation of such shareholdings in the UK should not be of concern, given 
that they are rarely used by companies listed therein. By contrast, cross­
shareholdings are regulated in a quite detailed manner in France. Indeed, the law 
prohibits a company from holding more than ten per cent of the capital of another 
company if the latter holds more than ten per cent of the capital of the former1070. 
The French law also regulates the consequences of excessing the stipulated 
threshold. The rationale behind such detailed regulation probably lies in the fact 
that this defence is commonly used in France. Indeed, such shareholdings have 
always been an attribute of the French takeover regime. It is suggested that a 
statutory provision along the lines of the French law would be useful in the UK, at 
least for listed companies where large family shareholdings still prevail.
7.1.3 Doctrinal Differences as to Post-Bid Defences
As far as post-bid defences are concerned, both jurisdictions seem to be in line as 
regards the approach taken towards such defences. In other words, both seem to 
prohibit ex ante frustrating action without the consent of shareholders. However, 
whereas this prohibition is made explicit in the Code, this approach vis-a-vis post­
defences stems in France from the market practice. Indeed, the French takeover 
regulations do not contain a clear-cut ‘no frustrating action’ rule, such as GP 7 of 
the Code. Nor do the French regulations provide a list of actions which can only 
be taken upon shareholder approval, such as that embodied in Rule 21 of the Code. 
Instead, the French regulation stipulates a mere obligation of notification. 
However, the latter obligation has always been interpreted by the offeree directors 
as prohibiting post-bid defences other than those authorised by shareholders in 
general meeting. As a result of the neutrality rule prevailing in both jurisdictions, 
the board of an offeree company which strongly opposes a bid may only resort to 
one or more of the following: search for a white knight; use of its delegated
Jenkins Report, para 153.
Code of Commerce, art. L. 233-29.
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authority to increase capital or to carry out share buy-backs; appeal to regulatory 
authorities or to courts; or appeal to the general meeting to authorise defensive 
action.
Both jurisdictions’ approach towards post-bid defences is in conformity with the 
Directive, which also contains a neutrality rule. Indeed, the Directive provides 
that the board of an offeree company must refrain from taking any defensive 
measures that may result in the frustration of a bid, unless it has the prior 
authorisation of the general meeting of shareholders for the purpose1071. The 
objective of this rule is 'to limit the powers o f the board o f  the offeree company to 
engage in operations o f  an exceptional nature without unduly hindering the 
offeree company to carry out its normal business activities'1072. In particular, 
unless authorised by the general meeting, the offeree board cannot decide to issue 
voting securities or securities that confer the right to subscribe to such securities, 
such as warrants and convertible bonds. However, the ‘no frustrating action’ rule 
in the Code is broader than that embodied in the Directive. This is evidenced by 
the fact that, whilst the Code prohibits a wide range of measures by referring to 
the concept of ‘contracts otherwise than in the ordinary course o f  business'1013, 
the latter concept is absent in the Directive1074. More important for our purposes, 
the potential effects of the Directive’s neutrality rule are muted by the fact that 
MS are allowed to opt out from the rule. During the negotiations preceding the 
adoption of the Directive, the UK Takeover Panel had noted that it saw little 
benefit in a Directive that would weaken the neutrality rule and hence allow 
offeree boards to frustrate offers against the wishes of their shareholders1075.
1071 Directive, r.9(2).
1072 Directive, Recital No. 16.
1073 Code, r.21(l)(e).
1074 It should be noted in this respect that the original 1989 Directive had contained a concept similar 
to that of the Code, namely ‘ transactions which do not have the character o f current operations 
concluded under normal conditions'. This language was, however, subsequently dropped from the 
later versions of the Directive.
1075 The Takeover Panel, 2003 Annual Report, 2003/15, p. 3.
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7.1.4 Technical Differences as to Post-Bid Defences
The first technical difference relates to the fact that, as noted above, whilst the 
City Code contains a clear-cut prohibition of frustrating action and a non- 
exhaustive list of forbidden acts, the COB’s Regulation No. 2002-04 merely 
contains an obligation for the offeree board to inform the AMF of its acts other 
than those which have been accomplished in the ordinary course of business and 
other than those which have been approved by shareholders in general meeting 
during the course of the offer. As suggested earlier, the reason behind the absence 
of a clear-cut ‘no frustrating action’ rule in France probably lies in the fact that 
France has not experienced many hostile bids. In addition, given that conflicts of 
interests in France mostly arise as between controlling and non-controlling 
shareholders, the regulators probably did not feel the need to place much 
emphasis on the regulation of post-bid defences. As a result, the French provision 
seems ‘milder’ than that of the City Code. However, as mentioned earlier, French 
listed companies have thus far viewed the above obligation of notification as if it 
were a prohibition.
In addition to the obligation of notification, Rule 4 of the COB’s Regulation 
contains a series of principles to be observed by the parties during the course of 
an offer, such as the equality of treatment and of information of the shareholders 
of the companies concerned, the transparency and the integrity of the market, and 
the honesty in the transactions and the competition. The existence of principles 
rather than concrete rules, such as Rule 21 of the Code, is believed to be 
advantageous by some scholars, who argue that the principles embodied in Rule 4 
have the advantage of conferring a greater discretion on the AMF1076. It should be 
noted, however, that most of the principles embodied in Rule 4 are aimed at 
solving the conflicts of interests as between the offeror and the offeree 
shareholders, rather than those as between the management and the offeree 
shareholders. It is therefore suggested that it would be preferable if Rule 4 of the 
COB’s Regulation had contained a clear and separate ‘no frustrating action’ rule.
1076 This view is shared by Professor Thierry Bonneau at the University of Paris II, to whom I am 
indebted for his valuable comments during my interview with him in January 2003.
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It should also be noted in this respect that, as mentioned in the chapter on the 
regulation of defensive measures in France, there are additional principles that the 
offeree boards in France must observe during the course of an offer, such as the 
principle of the interests of the company. The problem with the latter principle, 
however, is that the French view of the interests of the company is in sharp 
contrast with that in the UK. Indeed, the Code narrowly focuses on the protection 
of shareholders’ short-term financial interests during a takeover b id1077. By 
contrast, for many years, the institutional theory has had the upper hand in 
France1078. Pursuant to this theory, the corporate interest is the superior interest of 
the legal entity itself pursuing its own objects as distinct from those of its 
stakeholders, but which corresponds to their common general interest, which is to 
ensure the prosperity and continuity of the enterprise. Foster (2000) argues that 
the pre-eminence of the institutional theory in France is no accident and derives 
from specifically French conditions. In his view, commerce in France has 
historically been less well regarded and has not had the same importance as in the 
UK. As a result, his argument goes, the statement in France that the ‘action o f  the 
directors must be inspired by the sole concern o f the interest o f the company is 
quite different from any equivalent sentiment concerning the ‘interest of the 
company’ in UK law1079.
That the principle of the interests of the company has a different meaning in 
France than in the UK has significant implications. Indeed, given that the 
corporate interest encompasses in France the interests of constituencies other than 
shareholders, there is a risk that some post-bid defences might withstand the 
neutrality test, though there is no judicial decision to date confirming this view. 
Such risk has been highlighted by the CLR, which, in its support for the UK’s 
enlightened shareholder value, said
1077 Note that, although, as seen in the chapter on the regulation of defensive measures in the UK, the 
CLR has opted for the enlightened shareholder value approach of the company, the CLR’s 
endorsement of this approach is limited, as no proposal has been made to deal with the Code’s 
narrow focus on the protection of shareholders’ short-term financial interests during a takeover bid; 
see J. Armour, S. Deakin and S. Konzelmann (2002), supra n 472, p. 9.
1078 See e. g. Principes de Gouvernement d'Entreprise (2004), supra n 723, p. 5.
1079 N. H. D. Foster, ‘Company Law Theory in Comparative Perspective: England and France’
(2000) 48 A.J.C.L. 573, pp. 599-600.
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‘Attempting to graft continental stakeholder model o f directors’ duties into the very different 
cultural and politico-economic environment o f the UK would give rise to risks o f reduced 
accountability*1080.
It should be added in this respect, however, that Foster (2000) notes the recent 
trend in France towards contractualisation. In support of his view, he particularly 
refers to the Marini Report, which rejects the highly regulated model of the 
institutional company in favour of a more contractual approach in which the 
shareholders would be much freer to determine the rules and procedures of the 
company1081. This trend indicates that there may eventually be a convergence 
between the UK and France as regards the meaning of the ‘interests of the 
company’.
Without prejudice to the above trend, it should be noted that the Directive 
stipulates that the offeree company’s employees, or their representatives, should 
be given an opportunity to state their views on the foreseeable effects of the bid 
on employment . However, the latter provision in no way suggests that the 
offeree directors may take post-bid defences on the basis of the offeree’s 
employees’ interests. Indeed, although the High Level Group expressly 
acknowledged that the interests of the employees might be at stake in the context 
of a takeover bid, they nevertheless believed that ‘this in itself does not justify 
measures by the board which deny shareholders the opportunity to successfully 
tender their shares to a bidder who is willing to buy their shares’
The second technical difference as regards post-bid defences in the UK and 
France relates to the fact that there are a number of rules in the French regulation, 
which seem to undermine the impact of the neutrality rule. First and foremost, 
whilst the neutrality rule begins in the UK from the moment the board has reasons 
to believe that a bona fide offer is imminent, the French regulation imposes this 
rule from the day the prospectus is filed with the AMF1084. One might argue that
1080 Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Developing the Framework (2000), supra
n 453, p. 28.
1081N. H. D. Foster (2000), supra n 1079, pp. 599-600.
1082 Directive, Recital, No. 23.
1083 Report o f the High Level Group o f Company Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover Bids in
the European Union (January, 2002), p. 16, available at europa website.
1084 COB regs, r.2.
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the French rule is an objective one1085 and therefore preferable to the Code’s rule, 
on the grounds that it is easily understood by the markets and applied by the 
courts. Indeed, it is not easy to prove that an offeree board had reason to believe 
that an offer was imminent. It is suggested, however, that the French rule is 
actually more lenient than the Code’s rule in that it allows the board of an offeree 
company to have access to information regarding the imminent presentation of a 
bid and thus rapidly organise a defensive tactic1086. This type of risk does not 
exist in the UK. Secondly, the length of the minimum offer period in France is 
likely to facilitate the convening of a general meeting to decide upon defensive 
measures during the course of an offer. This is because whilst the City Code 
requires all offers to be kept open for a minimum of twenty-one days after their 
initial posting1087, the minimum offer period is twenty-five days in France1088.
7.2 A Comparative Analysis of the UK and French Regimes as 
Regards Equality and Protection of Offeree Shareholders
The equality of shareholders constitutes both the Code’s and the French 
regulations’ cornerstone. However, there are significant differences between the 
two jurisdictions as to the rationale underlying some mechanisms designed to 
ensure equality. This in turn results in a number of technical differences as 
regards the operation of such mechanisms.
7.2.1 Rationale and Significance of Doctrinal Differences as to 
Equality
As seen in earlier chapters on equality, both the UK and French takeover regimes 
contain provisions to ensure equal treatment of shareholders in the context of 
voluntary and mandatory bids. Likewise, both jurisdictions provide mechanisms 
to prevent shareholder coercion. On a closer analysis, however, differences
1085 Note that the Directive also provides for an objective rule, as it requires the neutrality rule to 
operate from the time the offeree board receives the information and until the result of the bid is 
made public or the bid lapses, unless the MS decide to provide for an earlier stage; see r.9(2).
1086 P. C&mara, ‘Defensive Measures Adopted by the Board: Current European Trends’, Company 
Law Reform in OECD Countries-A Comparative Outlook of Current Trends (2000), p. 7, available 
at OECD website.
1087 Code, r.31(l).
1088 CMF regs, r.5-2-2.
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emerge between the UK and France with respect to the rationales underlying 
these provisions and mechanisms. This stems from the fact that the UK and 
France have a different share ownership structure. Indeed, whereas most UK 
listed companies have a dispersed ownership, French listed firms usually have a 
concentrated ownership, whereby minority shareholders are under a constant 
threat of being oppressed by the majority. This in turn has implications as to the 
relevance of some equality provisions or mechanisms over others.
The difference of rationale underlying the equality provisions in the UK and 
France can be illustrated by the French price guarantee procedure. Indeed, the 
French regulation provides a special tender offer, referred to as the price 
guarantee procedure, for the event that, within the listed company, there is already 
a shareholder acting alone or in concert holding a majority of voting rights or 
capital and that majority shareholder decides to sell his shares. In other words, the 
French regulation offers an additional exit right in favour of the minority to be 
exercised at a most significant level of acquiring control. This procedure is similar 
to the mandatory bid procedure in that it potentially allows all shareholders to 
leave the company at the same price as that paid to the majority shareholder1089. 
As seen in the chapter on the principle of equality of shareholders and the 
protection of the minority under the French takeover regime, this procedure was 
introduced before the mandatory bid procedure. The rationale behind the 
upholding of this procedure is mainly historical1090. However, the price guarantee 
procedure still represents the most frequently invoked procedure in France.
It is suggested, however, that the very fact that the French regulations impose a 
type of mandatory bid upon crossing the fifty per cent threshold should be seen in 
the context of the concentrated share ownership structure in France1091. Indeed, 
most French listed companies have controlling owners and control changes 
usually occur as a result of private negotiations between the acquirer and the 
controlling shareholder(s). Such negotiations confer on the acquirer more than
1089 CMFregs, r.5-4-1.
1090 art. 201 of the General Regulation of the Chambre syndicate des agents de change, and the 
General Decision of February 27, 1973 of the COB.
1091 It is noteworthy that, prior to the reform of 1998, the mandatory bid rule also regulated the 
acquisition by a person, acting alone or in concert with others, of more than fifty per cent of the 
shares or the voting rights in a listed company.
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fifty per cent of the voting rights of the company. The ensuing offer -  namely the 
price guarantee procedure - is just a formality to withdraw the company from the 
exchange. In other words, the price guarantee procedure is used in France mostly 
as a means to de-list a company, rather than as a means to effect a change of 
control. This explains the fact that the price guarantee procedure is more often 
invoked in France than the mandatory bid stricto sensu. By allowing all 
shareholders to leave the company at the same price as the previous 
blockholder1092, the price guarantee procedure aims at solving the main conflicts 
of interests in France, namely that between controlling and minority shareholders, 
which are likely to arise as a result of the above-mentioned private negotiations.
As far as the UK is concerned, the Code does not regulate the crossing of fifty per 
cent threshold. For strengthening a controlling stake which is already over fifty 
per cent is not regarded by the Code as affecting the minority shareholders to the 
same extent as the crossing of thirty per cent threshold or the consolidation of 
control, which are regulated by the Code1093. Furthermore, as seen in the chapter 
on the ownership structure of listed companies and the market for corporate 
control in the UK and France, full majority control in UK listed companies is very 
rare. As a result, it is unlikely in the UK for a person to acquire fifty per cent of a 
company’s voting rights from a previous blockholder. The absence of a price 
guarantee procedure in the UK does not mean, however, that the UK does not 
regulate the transfer of a control bloc from an identified seller. Indeed, as seen in 
earlier chapters on equality, the UK mandatory rule also applies when effective 
control is transferred from an already existing controlling shareholder, and not 
only when effective control is acquired through purchases in the market. In 
particular, Rule 9(1) regulates the transfer of control from a director. The 
difference is, however, that the Code regulates such transfers of control only 
when they confer on the transferee effective control, and not majority control.
The difference of rationale underlying the equality provisions in the UK and 
France can also be illustrated by the sell-out right. Indeed, the rationale 
underlying the sell-out right in the UK is to balance the buy-out right conferred on
CMF regs, r.5-4-1.
J. H. Farrar (1998), supra n 411, p. 595.
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the offeror. In other words, the UK sell-out right is a way of rendering an 
expropriation right conferred on the offeror acceptable. On the other hand, the 
French sell-out right is part of a broader theory about the ‘investment contract’. 
This in turn impacts upon the scope of the sell-out right in these two countries. 
For instance, the UK sell-out right is very take-over specific in that it is applicable 
only following a takeover bid. By contrast, the French sell-out right may be 
exercised irrespective of a takeover bid. Indeed, the French sell-out right is 
exercisable in a wide range of circumstances, in particular in circumstances which 
do not involve a change of control but which nevertheless significantly alter the 
‘investment contract’. The latter include circumstances where the controlling 
shareholder proposes significant changes to the company’s articles of 
association1094; or decides to change the business purpose; or decides not to pay 
dividends for several years. The different rationale behind the French sell-out 
right probably also explains the discretion of the AMF as to whether or not to 
impose the majority shareholder(s) to make a buy-out offer. Indeed, whereas the 
controlling shareholder in the UK is obliged to purchase the shares of the minority 
who exercise their sell-out right, the controlling shareholder in France is required 
to do so only if the AMF decides so. For instance, as seen in the chapter on the 
principle of equality of shareholders and the protection of the minority under the 
French takeover regime, the AMF is unlikely to impose such obligation upon the 
majority shareholder(s) if the market in the shares of the offeree company is 
liquid.
It should be noted in this respect that the French approach of protecting the 
minority in the event of changes to the investment contract, which do not involve 
changes in control, has also inspired a number of rules in the UK, which are not 
related to the sell-out right. Indeed, such approach lies behind the UK Listing 
Rules’ requirement for shareholder approval in the context of ‘Class One’ 
transactions1095. It is suggested that this approach also lies behind the UK Listing 
Review’s recent proposal to require shareholder approval as a general rule before 
de-listing. Indeed, under the current UK de-listing regime, minority shareholders 
are not adequately protected, as they may be forced to sell their shares at a price
CMF regs, r.5.6.6.
Listing Rules, Ch. 10.
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they consider to be unfairly low, or to hold unlisted securities. This is of particular 
concern where there has been no compulsory acquisition of minority shares or 
where there has been no formal offer. The UK Listing Review proposes that an 
issuer willing to de-list voluntarily should obtain the prior approval of seventy- 
five per cent of its shareholders in general meeting1096. However, the proposal 
falls short of providing the minority with a right to be bought-out1097.
It should be added that the relatively narrow scope of the sell-out right in the UK 
is partially1098 compensated by the Code’s requirement that all offers remain open 
for acceptance for not less than fourteen days after the date on which it would 
otherwise have expired1099. Indeed, due to the existence of the latter rule, minority 
shareholders in the UK rarely invoke their statutory sell-out rights. This is 
because, by allowing the offeree shareholders to invoke it upon the acquisition by 
the offeror of fifty per cent of the acceptances - rather than ninety per cent of the 
voting rights of the offeree company - the Code’s rule constitutes a stronger 
minority protection rule than the statutory sell-out right.
7.2.2 Technical Differences as to Voluntary Bids
Although both jurisdictions require the offeror to bid for all voting and non-voting 
equity share capital during the course of a voluntary offer, there are a number of 
substantial differences as to the scope of this requirement: First, whereas the UK 
rule requires an ‘appropriate’ offer to be made to the holders of convertible 
securities, subscription rights, and options1100, if there are any, the French rule 
requires the extension of the same offer to the latter holders. Indeed, the French 
regulation requires the offeror to extend its offer to the holders of securities which 
give access to the capital or the voting rights, if there are any1101. Given that an 
‘appropriate’ offer is not the same as the ‘offer’ itself, it is suggested that the 
French rule is more protective of offeree shareholders.
1096 Review o f the Listing Regime (2003), supra n 282, p. 53.
1097 Note that this proposal will probably take effect towards the end of 2004; see FSA Statement,
Proposals to De-list, July 30, 2004, available at FSA website.
1098 This is because Rule 31(4) of the Code still operates only in a takeover bid.
1099 Code, r.31(4).
1100 e. g. convertible bonds, subscription rights, warrants, and call options.
1101 CMF regs, r.5-1-2.
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Secondly, as far as the impact of pre-bid purchases are concerned, both 
jurisdictions require such purchases to be disclosed. However, only the UK 
adheres to a strict equal treatment philosophy by requiring the voluntary bid to 
have no less favourable terms than those offered for the shares acquired during 
the three months prior to the bid. The Panel may even extend this requirement 
beyond the three-month period, if it considers this is necessary to preserve the 
equal treatment of shareholders as to the offer price. The absence of such 
provision in France creates a potential for price discrimination between 
shareholders selling before the bid and the accepting shareholders. Furthermore, 
additional self-regulatory rules apply in the UK to curb so-called dawn raids. 
Indeed, the Code’s SARs seek to slow down the acquisition process, and thus to 
reduce shareholder inequality, by limiting acquisitions of shares to ten per cent 
over a period of seven days if such acquisitions would result in the acquirer 
holding more than fifteen per cent but less than thirty per cent1102. By contrast, 
France provides no rules analogous to the SARs.
Thirdly, as far as purchases made during the bid are concerned, whereas the UK 
regime allows the offeror to deal freely in the offeree company’s shares during the 
course of a cash or a share-exchange offer, the French regime allows such 
dealings only during the course of a cash offer1103. The Code’s more liberal 
approach lies in the unexpressed but fundamental principle of the Code that it is 
undesirable to fetter the market by imposing any bar on market dealings by the 
parties to a bid, subject to certain requirements1104. Accordingly, in the UK, the 
parties remain free, following the announcement of a share-exchange offer, to 
deal in the offeree company’s shares.
By preventing shareholders selling in the market from receiving cash whilst the 
shareholders accepting the share-exchange offer are left with the offeror’s 
securities, the above French rule seems to constitute a stronger minority 
protection rule than the Code’s rule. However, the Code ensures that the 
accepting shareholders are treated equally, by compelling the offeror to provide a
SARs, r.l.
CMF regs, r.5-2-11.
T. Hadden (1977), supra n 794, p. 379.
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cash alternative where it purchases shares in the market during the course of its 
share-exchange offer, no matter how small its purchase is. As a result of the latter 
rule, the Code completely offsets the potential for inequality between 
shareholders selling in the market and those accepting the share-exchange offer. 
Furthermore, it is believed that the UK rule has the advantage over the French 
rule of distributing cash to shareholders in a share-exchange offer, bearing in 
mind that cash payments are shareholders’ favourite payment method.
Finally, the Code’s requirement that all offers be conditional on over fifty per cent 
acceptances ensures that, except through a partial offer, effective control of an 
offeree company does not pass unless legal control also passes. The fifty per cent 
requirement further ensures that the offeror offer a price sufficient to obtain the 
majority of the voting rights1105. The French regulation does not contain such 
requirement. Indeed, the CMF’s Regulation merely allows the offeror to stipulate 
a minimum acceptance percentage in its offer document1106. The rationale behind 
the absence of a fifty per cent requirement in France probably lies in the AMF’s 
price approval role, which ensures that the offer price cannot be very low. In other 
words, an offeror in France cannot offer a very low price and expect that at least 
effective control would pass to him with such low offer price. For the AMF would 
refuse to approve an offer document which contains a poor offer price. Thus, due 
to the price approval power of the AMF, it is unlikely for unsophisticated 
shareholders to be coerced into accepting such poor offers. It should be noted, 
however, that the price approval role of the AMF only partly acts as a substitute 
in France for the absence of the fifty per cent requirement. This is because, even 
assuming that the offeror offers a reasonable price, the absence of the fifty per 
cent requirement makes it easier for offerors to take over a company than in the 
UK, as their bid can succeed even with a less than fifty per cent share capital of 
the offeree company.
The foregoing indicates that, as far as voluntary offers are concerned, the UK 
overall seems to better protect shareholders than France. This is because a number
1105 G. Ferrarini, ‘Shareholder Value and the Modernisation of European Corporate Law’, in Hopt 
and Wymeersch (eds), Capital Markets and Company Law (OUP, 2003), p. 253.
1106 CMF regs, r.5-1-3-1.
215
of crucial safeguards embodied in the Code, such as the rule governing pre-bid 
purchases and the fifty per cent acceptances requirement, are absent in the French 
takeover regulation. On the other hand, the UK takeover regime manages to 
ensure such equality without hindering the normal operation of the market, as 
shown by its liberal approach towards share dealings made during the course of 
an offer.
7.2.3 Technical Differences as to Mandatory Bids
In both the UK and France, the transfer of de facto control triggers an obligation 
upon the transferee to make a bid for the relevant listed company. Without 
prejudice to the latter, however, there are substantial differences between the two 
jurisdictions as regards the regulation of mandatory bids: First, unlike in the UK, 
transferees in France are not required to extend the mandatory bid to the holders 
of non-voting equity share capital1107. Furthermore, although the French rule 
requires the mandatory bid to also be extended to the holders of securities which 
give access at a later date to the shares or the voting rights, it does not require the 
bid to be extended to the holders of non-equity. In contrast, Rule 9 of the Code 
also extends the bid obligation to the holders of voting non-equity share capital, 
though provided the acquirer or the persons acting in concert with him hold shares 
therein. As a result, the scope of the UK mandatory bid rule is wider than that of 
the French rule.
Secondly, although both countries require a bid upon consolidation of control, 
whilst the French regime requires a bid upon acquisition of a two per cent stake 
following the crossing of the one-third threshold, the Code requires a bid from 
each acquisition onwards, no matter how little it is1108. Thus, the Code is more 
rigorous in this respect. Furthermore, the French regime requires a mandatory bid 
upon consolidation of control only if such consolidation occurs in less than twelve 
‘consecutive months’. This suggests that, if the acquirer increases his holding by
1107 This is because Rule 5-5-1 of the CMF’s Regulation expressly states that the equity shares 
referred to in the chapter relating to the mandatory bid mean voting equity shares.
1108 Code, r.9(l)(b).
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two per cent but does so with a one-month interval1109, he will not be obliged to 
make a bid1110. This demonstrates that the French regime is more lenient in this 
respect than the Code, which does not quality the consolidation of control in 
terms of the time limit.
Thirdly, as far as the price of the mandatory bid is concerned, the UK regime
stresses equal treatment by requiring the highest price at which the acquirer had
acquired his shares during the twelve preceding months. In other words, the
minority shareholders in the UK are offered the maximum acquisition price. In
contrast, the French regime contains no price condition. However, as in the case
of voluntary bids, the AMF controls whether the offer has a fair chance to succeed
at the proposed price1111. This prevents the offeror from setting an offer price well
below the private transfer price, which would render the mandatory bid
1110completely unattractive . Thus, although the regulation contains no price 
condition, the bidder’s freedom to set the price of the mandatory bid is far from 
being unrestricted. In practice, the AMF insists on the offeror to take the transfer 
price as the basis for its mandatory bid.
It is suggested, however, that the French regime would do better to expressly 
contain a highest price requirement, which offers the double benefit of allowing 
the minority shareholders to fully share in the premium paid by the acquirer, 
while at the same time providing the offeror with the certainty that it will not have 
to pay more under the mandatory bid than it was willing to pay in the preceding 
period and as a result allowing him to determine the maximum price it is prepared
1113to acquire all the securities of a company . It is believed that the AMF’s 
General Regulation will introduce such requirement, in order to render the French 
regime compatible with the Directive on takeover bids. Indeed, the latter defines 
the equitable price to be paid in the case of a mandatory bid as being the highest
1109 i. e. if the acquirer purchases, say, 1 per cent at a particular month, then makes no purchases at 
all the following month, and then purchases another 1 per cent the following month.
1110 G. Lekkas (2001), supra n 913, p. 346.
1111 CMF regs, r.5-1-9.
1112 J. Wouters, ‘Towards a Level Playing Field for Takeovers in the EC? An Analysis of the 
Proposed Thirteenth Directive in Light of American Experiences’ (1993) CMLR 30 C.M.L.Rev. 267,
p. 281.
113 Report o f the High Level Group o f Company Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover Bids in 
the European Union (2002), supra n 1083, p. 50.
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price paid for the same securities by the offeror over a period of between six and 
twelve months prior to the bid1114.
It should be added in relation to the price of mandatory offers that, unlike in 
France, the mandatory bid in the UK must be in cash or accompanied by a cash 
alternative. The absence of such provision in France constitutes a major 
shortcoming. For, in some cases, such as where the shares offered in exchange are 
issued by a company which is also controlled by the offeror, the minority 
shareholder will be prevented from truly exiting the company. It should be noted, 
however, that, as in the case of the highest price requirement, the AMF’s General 
Regulation will likely introduce a cash requirement in the French mandatory bid 
rule, in order to be compatible with the Directive. This is because the latter 
requires a cash alternative. However, the Directive requires a cash alternative if 
the consideration does not consist of liquid securities admitted to trading on a 
regulated market1115. Thus, the Directive’s cash requirement is more lenient than 
that under the Code. Indeed, by preventing the offeror from offering securities 
which are not easily marketable, the Directive presents a compromise that 
protects offeree shareholders without making large takeovers more difficult1116. It 
should be noted that the Directive’s lack of a stringent cash requirement is 
unfortunate. This view is shared by the Federation of European Securities 
Exchanges that have criticised the Directive’s cash requirement rule, on the 
grounds that the liquidity in the markets varies very much security by security and 
payment in listed securities of one company may be quite different from payment 
in the securities of another company in view of the current and future market 
conditions1117. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the Directive does not 
define what constitutes ‘liquid securities’. It should be added that the Directive 
also requires the offeror to offer a cash alternative where, over a period beginning 
at least six months before the bid is made and ending when the offer closes for
1114 Directive, r.5(4).
1115 Directive, r.5(5).
1,16 J. Harris, ‘Common Position Adopted on Takeover Directive’ (2001) 22 Co. Law. 88, p. 88.
1117 European Parliament Legal Affairs Committee Meeting on the Proposed Takeover Directive, 
Speaking Notes, Paul Arlman (January, 2003), p. 4, available at europa website.
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acceptance, it has purchased in cash securities which carry more than five per cent 
of the voting rights of the offeree company1118.
Finally, whereas the success of the mandatory bid in the UK is conditional on the 
receipt of over fifty per cent acceptances, there is no such requirement in France. 
The absence of a fifty per cent condition means that an offeror in France could 
ensure that a mandatory bid will be unsuccessful by making its bid conditional on 
the receipt of acceptances from no less than a hundred per cent of the shares to 
which the bid relates, as the offeror is allowed to stipulate a minimum acceptance 
percentage in its offer document. An acceptance level of a hundred per cent is 
simply untenable and yet the offeror would have fulfilled the mandatory bid 
obligation under the French regulation1119.
The foregoing indicates that, as far as mandatory bids are concerned, both 
jurisdictions seem to provide similar safeguards, though the UK regime seems to 
be slightly more protective of offeree shareholders, in particular due to the 
absence in France of a cash requirement and a fifty per cent condition in the 
context of mandatory bids. It should be borne in mind, however, that the French 
takeover regime was the first takeover regime in Europe to introduce the concept 
of mandatory bid. Indeed, as seen in the chapter on the principle of equality of 
shareholders and the protection of the minority under the French takeover regime, 
the French takeover regulator had introduced the so-called maintien de cours1120, 
which is a type of mandatory bid, long before the introduction of the mandatory 
bid stricto sensu. Pursuant to this procedure, minority shareholders of companies 
listed on the French stock exchange were able to sell their shares for the same 
price as that paid to the controlling shareholder, following the private acquisition 
by a person of a control block of shares1121. This indicates that the protection of 
the minority has long been a major concern for French takeover regulators.
1118 Directive, r.5(5).
1119 S. Kenyon-Slade and M. Andenas (1993), supra n 59, p. 182. Note that this problem is 
exacerbated by the fact that the Directive contains no such requirement either.
1120 This is the predecessor of the price guarantee procedure.
1121 Note that the ‘maintien de cours’ did not apply where the purchase of a control bloc was made 
via purchases in the market.
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7.2.4 Differences as to Mechanisms Designed to Prevent the 
Pressure to Tender
There are also differences between the two jurisdictions as to the availability and 
scope of mechanisms designed to prevent shareholder coercion: First and 
foremost, unlike in the UK, there is no requirement in France that an offer which 
has become or is declared unconditional as to acceptances remain open for 
acceptance for not less than fourteen days after the date on which it would 
otherwise have expired1122. As a result of this provision, a shareholder in the UK 
who doubts the value of a bid may leave his final decision to the end of the offer 
period and thus see how others are reacting and whether he is likely to find 
himself in a minority position if he does not accept. If he accepts within the 
fourteen-day limit, he will be able to tender his shares on the same terms as the 
accepting shareholders1123. By allowing hitherto dissenting shareholders to accept 
the offer on the same terms, the UK provision reduces offeree shareholders’ 
pressure to tender. This provision is particularly important where the offeror 
receives between fifty and ninety per cent of the acceptances following its bid. 
For this provision allows the non-tendering shareholders to realise that they risk 
being relegated to the minority status without the protection of section 430A of 
the CA 19851124, should they continue to reject the bid1125.
The lack of a Rule similar to Rule 31(4) of the Code does not suggest, however, 
that the French regulation does not attempt to prevent shareholder coercion. On 
the contrary, some French provisions go even farther than the Code in promoting 
uncoerced shareholder decision-making and may act as substitutes to Rule 31(4) 
of the Code. Indeed, whilst shareholders in the UK can withdraw their 
acceptances only after the expiration of a twenty-one day period after the first 
closing date of the initial offer, if the offer has not by such date become or been
1176declared unconditional as to acceptances , shareholders in France have the right
1122 Code, r.31(4).
1,23 ‘The City Code Completes its Takeover Code’, The Times, January 5,1968. Note that if 
dissenting shareholders do not accept the bid within this 14-day limit and if the offeror manages to 
receive 90 per cent of the acceptances after the closing of its offer, then the offeror may exercise its 
buy-out right to buy the remaining 10 per cent shares, pursuant to s.429 of the CA 1985.
11 For this section only applies to a minority of ten per cent or less.
1,25 A. Johnston (1980), supra n 62, p. 248.
1126 Code, r.34.
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to withdraw their acceptances up to the last day of an offer1127. Likewise, tenders 
filed by shareholders in response to an initial offer are automatically cancelled 
upon the announcement of a competing offer1128. The latter provisions not only 
allow the offeree shareholders to accept the superior terms of a competing offer 
but also remove the potential for coercion by the original offeror. It should be 
noted in this respect that it is questionable whether the French sell-out right may 
act as a substitute to Rule 31(4) of the Code. This is because the French sell-out 
right is exercisable following an offer1129 if and only if the offeror holds ninety- 
five per cent of the voting rights of the offeree company. This threshold is even 
higher than that under the CA 1985.
Finally, although both jurisdictions allow the offeror to make a partial bid, there 
are significant differences between the two countries as to the scope of the latter. 
Under the UK regime, it is possible to make a partial offer for even more than 
fifty per cent of the shares of a company, provided the offeror obtains the Panel’s 
consent1130 and affirmative shareholder approval from over fifty per cent of the
1 1 3 1  1 1 3 3offeree’s voting rights , excluding shares held by it or its concert parties 
Thus, partial offers in the UK may provide the offeror de facto or even de jure 
control of an offeree company. This shows that the Code recognises that, subject 
to certain safeguards, partial offers may well be unobjectionable. In particular, 
partial offers which are directed at acquiring a stake below thirty per cent of an
1 1 33offeree’s voting rights normally receive the Panel’s consent . This is because, 
in the latter case, ‘control’ as defined by the Code will not have passed and the 
acquirer could in any event have proceeded unhindered via market purchases or 
private acquisitions. It may seem surprising that the Panel’s consent is still 
required in the event of a partial offer aiming at less than thirty per cent of a
1127 CMF regs, r.5-2-1.
1128 CMF regs, r.5-2-7.
1129 Note that other instances triggering the sell-out right in France do not involve a takeover context.
1130 Note, however, that consent will normally be refused if the offeror or its concert parties have 
acquired, selectively or in significant numbers, shares in the offeree company during the twelve 
months preceding the application for consent, or if shares have been purchased at any time after the 
partial offer was reasonably in contemplation; Code, r. 36(2).
131 This approval requirement may, however, be waived by the Panel if over fifty per cent of the 
voting rights of the offeree company are held by one shareholder.
1132 Note that the 1976 edition of the Code further required that offers which would result in the 
offeror holding between thirty and fifty per cent of a company’s voting rights be permitted only if 
recommended by the board of the offeree company. The latter requirement was abolished in 1981.
1133 Code, r. 36(1).
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company’s voting rights. Ffrench (1986) argues that this is probably due to the 
fact that the Panel wishes to exercise a degree of supervision over offer 
documents by ensuring that they are properly prepared and dispatched and that all 
shareholders are treated equally1134.
In France, however, the regulation allows the offeror to make a partial offer for 
only up to ten per cent of the voting shares or the voting rights of a company1135. 
By restricting the scope of partial offers, the French regulation seems to be more 
protective of shareholders. It is suggested that the French approach toward partial 
offers is unfortunate. This is because some French listed companies may be 
shielded from full offers due to their enormous size1136. Indeed, the only way to 
make the managers of such companies vulnerable to the constraints of the market 
for corporate control is probably via partial offers. It should further be noted that 
the French regulation presents two major shortcomings in this respect: First, a 
partial offer may be followed by a general offer. Because successive offers result 
in the acquisition of control of an offeree company by phases, this is likely to 
prejudice the equal treatment of offeree shareholders, in particular as far as the 
price offered during successive offers is concerned. Secondly, whereas the Code 
requires acceptances to be scaled down proportionately if  too many are
1117received , no such provision exists in France. This is unfortunate, since the 
latter requirement is necessary to prevent acquisitions from only selected persons 
and thus to ensure equality of treatment1138.
The foregoing suggests that the UK fares better than France in alleviating the 
impact of coercion on shareholders’ decision-making, which is inherent in 
takeovers. For it is believed that the absence in France of a rule similar to Rule 
31(4) of the Code cannot be compensated by other mechanisms which are present 
in the French regulation.
1134 H. L. Ffrench (1986), supra n 837, p. 258.
1135 CMF regs, r.5-3-2.
1,36 T. I. Ogowewo, The Market for Corporate Control and the Investments and Securities Act 1999 
(BIICL, 2002), p. 34
1137 Code, r. 36(7). This has been so since the original Notes', see r. (vii).
1138 R. Sappideen (1986), supra n 23, p. 298.
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Conclusion
As far as the defensive measures are concerned, both the UK and France have 
endorsed the view that, in the event of a change of control, solely the shareholders 
must have the power to decide the company’s fate. However, as seen above, 
certain principles and rules embodied in the French law and regulations are likely 
to undermine the impact of the neutrality rule. This holds true for the concept of 
the interests of the company, the starting date of the neutrality rule, and the length 
of the offer period. It should be borne in mind, however, that the issue of post-bid 
defences arises less in France than in the UK. This is because listed companies in 
France have a wide variety of pre-bid defences at their disposal, which render 
them less vulnerable to hostile takeovers. Indeed, due to such pre-bid defences, 
French listed companies have not experienced hostile takeovers to the same extent 
as UK listed companies have. The tendency in France has therefore usually been 
towards friendly deals. As far as the UK is concerned, listed companies therein 
rarely resort to pre-bid defences, due to the stringent stock exchange rules 
restricting their use and the power of institutional investors, who view some of 
these defences as likely to deter value-enhancing takeovers.
It should be noted, however, that the increasing role of both domestic and foreign 
institutional shareholders will eventually result in a weakening of both pre-bid 
and post-bid defences in France. For instance, empirical evidence suggests that 
there is a movement in France away from the ‘stakeholder’ view of the company 
in view of the need to respond to the demands of foreign pension funds, which are 
heavily present in the French market. Indeed, French listed companies are 
increasingly referring to the concept of ‘creation of shareholder value’. According 
to a study by the AMF, 21 out of 40 CAC40 companies refer to the latter concept 
in their annual reports. For instance, Credit Commercial France expressly states in 
its annual reports that their central objective is to ‘create value for shareholders 
hy increasing the return on shares9. Similarly, Vivendi talks about its ‘permanent 
quest o f creation o f  value9. Equally, the LVMH Group has recently announced 
that they have brought about ‘a series o f fundamental changes to increase
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shareholder value,1139. The latter examples suggest that French listed companies 
will no longer take pre-bid or post-defences by reference to the interests of 
stakeholders other than shareholders.
As far as the equal treatment of offeree shareholders is concerned, although both 
the UK and French takeover regimes contain provisions to ensure equality, the 
doctrines underlying these provisions are quite different in these two jurisdictions. 
This is particularly the case for the sell-out right in France, which even applies in 
the event of changes to the company’s business or its legal structure. Furthermore, 
certain mechanisms in the French regulation, such as the price guarantee 
procedure, have no equivalent in the UK. As seen above, this mainly derives from 
the pre-eminence of different conflicts of interests in the UK and France. In most 
respects, the UK regime seems to better protect offeree shareholders. This holds 
true for such issues as the impact of pre-bid purchases upon the offer price and the 
uncoerced decision-making by offeree shareholders. The existence of stricter 
equality rules in the UK lies behind the existence of a stricter neutrality rule 
therein.
1139 Creation de Valeur Actionnariale (2000), supra n 354, p. 66.
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Conclusion and Future Possibilities
The foregoing analysis indicates that there are some major differences between 
the UK and French takeover regimes with respect to the regulatory framework, 
the equal treatment of shareholders, and the role of the offeree board both prior to 
and during takeover bids. As far as the regulatory framework is concerned, whilst 
the Panel is non-statutory, the AMF is statutory; the French authorities have more 
discretion, especially regarding price, than their UK counterparts; and challenges 
to the regulatory authority’s decisions are more common in France than in the 
UK.
As far as the equal treatment of shareholders is concerned, there are a number of 
substantial differences as to equality between the two jurisdictions. Indeed, 
although both jurisdictions provide mechanisms to protect the minority and to 
prevent shareholder coercion, the doctrines underlying some of these mechanisms 
are different in the UK and France. This difference in the doctrines is mostly due 
to the different share ownership structure prevailing in these countries. Indeed, the 
degree of concentration of share ownership and the identity of shareholders, as 
well as the operation of the market for corporate control, vary quite markedly in 
the UK and France. Whilst firms in France present a more concentrated 
ownership structure, shareholdings in the UK are often widely dispersed and in 
the hands of institutional shareholders. Due to such doctrinal differences, the 
scope of certain mechanisms, such as the minority’s sell-out right, is wider in 
France than in the UK. Furthermore, some mechanisms are more frequently used 
in France over others, such as the more frequent use in France of the price 
guarantee procedure as compared to the mandatory bid stricto sensu.
As far as the role of the offeree board in the context of takeover bids is concerned, 
on the one hand, there are a number of differences in terms of the concepts used 
to regulate pre-bid defences. Indeed, whereas UK company law regulates such 
defences mainly by reference to judicially formulated fiduciary duties and self- 
regulatory rules, French company law does so by reference to legal rules 
embodied in the statutes. On the other hand, although both jurisdictions seem to
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prohibit ex ante frustrating action without the consent of offeree shareholders, this 
prohibition is made explicit in the Code. By contrast, such prohibition stems in 
France from the market practice.
The existence of a number of variations in the regulation of takeovers in the UK 
and France should also be placed in a broader context. Such variations indeed 
exist throughout Europe and, as seen in the Introduction, this has been the main 
motive behind the adoption of the Directive on takeover bids. As far as the 
Commission’s objective of protecting the investors is concerned, the Directive’s 
minority protection rules seem to ensure a substantial harmonisation of this aspect 
of takeover law. However, as described in the chapter on the comparative analysis 
of the UK and French regimes as regards the issues of defensive measures and 
equality in the context of takeover bids, some of the Directive’s substantive 
provisions relating to equality are less protective of offeree shareholders than the 
equality rules in the UK, and therefore undermine the effectiveness of the 
Directive from the viewpoint of shareholder protection. This is particularly the 
case for the absence of a mandatory cash requirement in the context of mandatory 
bids; the absence of a requirement that all offers be conditional on over fifty per 
cent acceptances; and the absence of a requirement that an offer which has 
become or is declared unconditional as to acceptances remain open for acceptance 
for a certain period of time after the date on which it would otherwise have 
expired.
As far as the Commission’s objective of ‘europeanisation’ of firms is concerned, 
the Directive is unlikely to bring about a substantial harmonisation. This is 
because, as seen in the chapter on the comparative analysis of the UK and French 
regimes as regards the issues of defensive measures and equality in the context of 
takeover bids, the Directive makes compliance with crucial clauses, such as the 
neutrality and the break through rules, optional1140. Thus, MS are entitled to 
decide whether to impose the neutrality and/or the break through rule on 
companies which have their registered offices within their territories. By making 
articles 9 and 11 optional, the Directive fails to create the hoped-for level playing
1,40 Directive, art. 12.
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field for takeovers in Europe. This is unfortunate, for currently there is no ‘level 
playing field’ for takeovers throughout the EU, due to either the different level of 
capitalisation of national markets, or to company law provisions, which may 
ensure that the control of a company remains in the hands of ‘friendly’ 
shareholders 1141. Indeed, the market for corporate control through hostile 
takeovers operates in Europe on only a very limited basis and the takeover 
activity is concentrated in a few Member States, and in particular in the UK. It is 
also unfortunate that, unlike the Portuguese proposal1142, the Directive does not 
require the opting-out regime to be subject to discussion, every two years, in a 
general meeting of shareholders. Such a clause would serve to put some pressure 
on the management of companies and thus help to speed up the process of de 
facto harmonisation. The only requirement that the Directive contains in this 
respect is the rule which stipulates that companies whose securities are admitted 
to trading on a regulated market in a MS must regularly present their defensive 
structures and mechanisms in reports to general meetings of shareholders, with a 
view to rendering such structures and mechanisms transparent1143.
It should be noted in this respect, however, that an opt-out decision by most MS 
from the break through rule should not be of great concern. Indeed, studies have 
shown that only a small number of companies would be affected by the break 
through rule, had all European MS opted into the rule. This is because most 
companies in continental MS have other structures in place, which are not 
covered by the break through rule and which are designed to defeat takeover bids. 
Indeed, Bennedsen and Nielsen (2002), who have identified which firms within 
the EU would be affected by the break through rule, have shown that, out of 1,035 
European listed companies with dual class share structures, only three to five per 
cent would face a direct loss of control after the introduction of the break through 
ru le1144. Pursuant to their study, these companies are mainly in Denmark, 
Germany, Italy and Sweden1145.
1141 e. g. disproportionate voting rights enjoyed by certain categories of shares.
1142 ‘Portugal Presents Alternative Solution for Embattled EU Takeover Directive’, World Markets 
Analysis, May 22, 2003, available at Lexis-Nexis Executive.
1143 Directive, Recital No. 18.
1144 It should be noted, however, that between twenty and thirty-one of these firms belong to the
group of largest European firms; see M. Bennedsen and K. Nielsen, ‘The Impact of a Break-
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As far as the UK and France are concerned, it is believed that both countries will 
likely decide to retain the neutrality rule, since both countries already have such a 
rule in their takeover regulations. Indeed, the UK contains a clear-cut prohibition 
of post-bid defensive measures. Similarly, offeree directors of companies listed in 
France have always interpreted the French regulations as prohibiting post-bid 
defences, other than those authorised by shareholders in general meeting, even 
though the French regulations do not contain an explicit ‘no-frustrating action’ 
rule. As a result, the decision by the UK and France of not opting out from the 
Directive’s neutrality rule will not bring about major changes to the existing 
takeover rules in the UK and France. It should be noted in this respect that this 
author believes that it is unlikely that listed companies in the UK and France will 
be allowed to benefit from the reciprocity rule1146 and thus to opt out from the 
neutrality rule, should they become subject to a hostile bid from a company based 
in another MS or in a non-EU jurisdiction that permits post-bid defensive 
measures. This is because Rule 12(3) of the Directive provides that MS may 
dispense companies which ‘apply’ Rule 9 from ‘applying’ Rule 9 if they become 
subject to an offer made by a company which does not ‘apply’ the same Rule as 
they do. The use of the word ‘apply’ in the latter Rule suggests, in this author’s 
view, that the individual company opt-out under the Directive applies only to 
rules into which the individual company has voluntarily opted, and not to rules 
into which the individual company has involuntarily opted. If the latter 
interpretation of Rule 12(3) proves correct, listed companies in the UK and 
France will not be able to opt out from the neutrality rule, should they become 
subject to a hostile bid from US companies where offeree boards can use an array 
of post-bid defences without resorting to shareholder approval1147.
Through Rule on European Firms’ (2002), p. 19, available at 
http://www.cebr.dk/upload/dp 1002.pdf.
114 For instance, the Wallenberg family in Sweden owns only 7 per cent of Ericsson, but they 
nevertheless control the company because one class of shares carries 1000 times the voting rights of 
another class; see ‘Lowest Common Denominator’, The Economist, November 29, 2003.
1146 Directive, art. 12(3).
1147 At the time of writing, it is not known whether the UK or France will exercise the MS option in 
favour of allowing a UK or French offeree company to dis-apply the neutrality rule, if they are faced 
by an offeror that does not apply the neutrality rule as the UK or French offeree does.
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On the other hand, it is believed that both countries will likely opt out from the 
break through rule, since the latter has no equivalent in the UK and France. A 
decision by France to opt out would not be surprising. For, unlike in the UK, 
many companies listed therein have different company and/or capital structures. 
Such structures are even supported by the French government, which is keen on 
helping French companies to defeat takeovers from foreign predators and thus 
creating national champions. Even in the UK, where most listed companies have a 
unitary share structure, some companies still present a dual share structure. 
Indeed, 23.91 per cent of listed firms in the UK have dual class shares1148. 
Companies in the UK with dual class shares include Shell, British Airways, 
Unilever and Cadbury Schweppes1149. It is further believed that the UK would not 
like the idea of being the sole MS not to opt out from the break through rule, 
given that all continental MS will most probably opt out from the latter rule. 
Indeed, particularly in the Scandinavian MS, voting rights are usually attributed 
with a multiple of a hundred, or even a thousand1150.
One might ask whether individual companies in the UK or France would decide 
to voluntarily opt back into the break through rule. Indeed, a MS that decides to 
opt out from the break through rule must nevertheless allow companies registered 
in its territory to opt back into the latter rule, should such companies wish to do 
so1151. It is suggested that individual companies would consider doing so where 
they have a one-share-one-vote structure. Since most UK listed companies have 
such share structure, they would have nothing to lose from such opt-in. Such 
companies would even gain by opting in, as they may be entitled to benefit from 
the reciprocity rule, which is described below1152. Secondly, companies which 
have pre-bid defences not covered by the Directive would also consider opting
1,48 Note that this figure does not distinguish whether one of the classes consists of multiple voting 
shares or of non-voting preference shares; see J. McCahery, L. Renneboog, P. Ritter and S. Haller 
(2003), supra n 1050, p. 20.
1149 M. Bennedsen and K. Nielsen (2002), supra n 1144, Appendix, Table A.I.
1150 E. Wymeersch, ‘Convergence or Divergence in Corporate Governance Patterns in Western 
Europe?’ in J. McCahery, P. Moerland, T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneboog (eds), Corporate 
Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity (OUP, 2002), p. 242.
1151 Directive, art. 12(2). Note that the same applies to the neutrality rule.
1152 At the time of writing, it is not known whether the UK or France will exercise the MS option in 
favour of allowing a UK or French offeree company that has chosen to opt back into the break 
through rule the power to dis-apply the latter rule, if they are faced by an offeror that does not apply 
the break through rule as the UK or French offeree does.
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into the break through rule. Indeed, the break through rule leaves untouched a 
great number of pre-bid defences, such as non-voting shares, pyramids, cross-
1 1 c i
shareholdings, and golden shares . As a result, companies with such defences 
would remain bid-proof even they were to opt into the break through rule. 
Similarly, blockholder controlled companies would also continue to be shielded 
from hostile bids, though they would be able to bid for the control of widely held 
companies using the break through rule1154. Since most listed companies in 
France are controlled by blockholders and since pyramid structures are widely 
available therein, it is fair to assume that French companies would still be 
protected from hostile bids, should they decide to opt into the break through rule.
Against this background and given that the Directive does not ensure a level 
playing field throughout Europe, one might ask whether a Directive was 
necessary at all? This author believes that some legal harmonisation is necessary 
to at least ensure the orderly conduct of takeover bids throughout Europe. The rest, 
however, can and should be left to the market forces, which will continue their de 
facto harmonisation. In other words, this author believes that, despite the optional 
nature of the Directive’s Rules 9 and 11, changes in the field of takeovers will 
occur via the operation of market forces1155. As a result, this author does not 
believe that strict legal harmonisation is a sine qua non tool to bring about 
harmonisation of European takeovers regimes. This is evidenced by the fact that 
European MS had already embraced rules ensuring the equality of shareholders 
even prior to the Directive. In particular, the mandatory bid requirement was 
introduced into continental European takeover laws and codes, even prior to the 
adoption of the Directive. Even the German Takeover Act contains such 
requirement despite the fact that Germany has a far-reaching group law 1156. 
Likewise, the neutrality principle had been taken up by nearly all continental 
European countries’ laws or codes on takeovers, prior to the adoption of the
1,53 Note, however, that the ECJ’s recent golden share cases referred to in the chapter on the 
ownership structure of listed companies and the market for corporate control in the UK and France 
will certainly restrict the freedom of governments to do the defensive job on management’s behalf.
1154 M. Becht, ‘Reciprocity in Takeovers’ (2003), pp. 6-8, available at SSRN website.
1155 This is also evidenced by the anti-insider dealing laws that leading European exchanges had 
introduced in advance of the Community’s legislation.
1156 K. J. Hopt, ‘Common Principles of Corporate Governance in Europe?’ in B. S. Markesinis (ed.), 
The Coming Together o f the Common Law and the Civil Law (Oxford: Hart, 2000), p. 112.
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Directive1157. Moreover, in many MS, pre-bid defences have been subject to
major legal changes. This has been the case in France where, in 1985 and 1987,
cross-shareholdings were reduced to ten per cent, both in the parent-subsidiary
1 1relationship and between independent enterprises . This has also been the case 
in Germany, where multiple voting rights and voting caps have become illegal 
following the enactment in 1998 of the German Control and Transparency Law.
Despite MS’ efforts to bring their regulation in line with market demands, some 
of the factors which inhibit takeovers cannot be eliminated by legislation of any 
kind, since they are extra-legal. These are path-dependent differences in corporate 
governance that are deeply embedded in a country’s tradition, history, and 
culture1159. Our comparison of the UK and French takeover regimes indeed 
contains examples of such factors. For instance, in France, the number of 
potential offeree companies is restricted, as important companies may not be 
structured as a public limited company. In addition, there is a revival of obsolete 
corporate forms, and in particular of the SCAs, partly because of fears of hostile 
takeovers. Furthermore, the widespread use of bearer shares complicates 
shareholder identification and delays takeovers1160. Moreover, unlike in the UK 
where most of the large companies have their equity shares listed on the exchange 
and their shareholdings widely dispersed, many listed companies in France are 
owned and managed by families, or influenced by the State through golden shares 
or noyawc durs. Hopt (2000) argues that such path-dependent differences would 
not change or change very slowly, given that any changes to these are bound to 
affect vested rights and interests1161.
However, companies are voluntarily removing some of the obstacles to takeovers, 
in the absence of any law or regulation. This voluntary process is evidenced by
1157Ibid,p. 111.
1158 E. Wymeersch, ‘The Regulation of Takeover Bids in a Comparative Perspective’ in Buxbaum, 
Hertig, Hirsch and Hopt (eds), European Economic and Business Law (Walter de Gruyter, 1996), p. 
309.
1159 K. J. Hopt (2000), supra n 1156, p.l 18.
1160 J. Wouters (1993), supra n 1112, p. 271. Note that the DTI noted that the use of bearer shares is 
deeply entrenched in the commercial culture of other MS and the anonymity such shares give is 
highly valued therein; see T. Boyle, ‘Barriers to Contested Takeovers in the European Community’ 
(1991) 12 Co. Law. 163, p. 166.
1,61 K. J. Hopt (2000), supra n 1156, p. 131.
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the fact that several companies both in the UK and France have enfranchised their
non-voting shares. In particular, in the UK, throughout the 1990s, many
companies with separate voting and non-voting share classes unified their capital
structure and endorsed the ‘one-share-one-vote’ approach1162. Likewise, many
companies in France have abolished their double voting rights. This is fortunate,
since the use of dual class share structures put companies in MS that prohibit such
structures at a disadvantage. On the other hand, offeree managements are
increasingly refraining from resorting to post-bid defences. This is so even in
countries such as Germany where post-bid defences are more easily used. Indeed,
during Vodaphone’s hostile bid for Mannesmann, the offeree board did not resort
to any frustrating action. The only means by which the Mannessmann board
defended itself was to argue the merits of its strategy against the Vodaphone 
1 1alternative . The above examples indicate that market-induced reforms actually 
constitute a stronger force for convergence than explicit efforts at 
harmonisation1164.
The rationale underlying this voluntary process is the increasing competition 
among European exchanges and the increasing share of foreign institutional 
investors in continental capital markets. Indeed, companies have become aware 
that investors are increasingly attracted to exchanges which better protect 
shareholders’ interests. Indeed, when a jurisdiction’s laws or regulations offer 
substantial scope for self-serving managerial conduct, the shares of companies 
incorporated in that jurisdiction usually trade at a substantial discount1165. Such an 
outcome worries managers, as poor share price performance is likely to lead to a 
hostile takeover bid or to an appeal by institutional investors asking the managers 
to resign1166. As a result, companies have become aware that they will benefit 
from a higher premium in their share price and secure a lower cost of capital only 
if they take into account investors’ concerns. As Mayer (2003) rightly put it
1162 J. Palmer, ‘Why EU Takeover Plans Would Freeze Europe’s Markets’ (2002) 21 1.F.L.Rev., 
p. 15.
163 J. N. Gordon, ‘An International Relations Perspective on the Convergence of Corporate 
Governance: German Shareholder Capitalism and the European Union, 1990-2000’ (2003), p. 35, 
available at SSRN website.
1164 Ibid, p. 35.
1165 B. R. Cheffins (1997), supra n 887, p. 445.
1,66 Ibid, p. 445.
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‘Strengthen investor protection and financial development will follow. This will promote 
external finance, which will accelerate economic growth,1167.
As a result of this voluntary process, this author believes that even the above- 
mentioned path-differences between the UK and France will likely be eliminated 
over time by the capital markets. It is further believed that market forces will over 
time transform the takeover regimes of all continental European countries along 
the lines of that of the UK. This in turn will render the Directive’s break through 
and neutrality rules irrelevant. Until this occurs, the UK could actually become 
the leading jurisdiction for European incorporations, given the high level of
11 Aftprotection afforded to shareholders in the UK . Indeed, the Code fosters a 
balance of power between the offeree management and the offeror by imposing a 
strict neutrality rule upon the former and by severely restricting the conduct of the 
latter1169.
It should be noted, however, that such de facto harmonisation in the field of 
takeovers will certainly not happen overnight, mostly due to the concentrated 
ownership structure of most listed companies in continental Europe. As Becht 
(2003) rightly puts it, widely held companies arise ‘naturally’ over time1170. The 
process is further complicated by the fact that ten new countries with developing 
capital markets have joined the EU on the 1st of May 2004. It is too early to 
predict whether the entry of these ten countries will significantly delay the 
process of de facto harmonisation in the field of takeovers throughout Europe. 
However, it is believed that, by 2011 -  which is the date when the Commission 
will re-examine the Directive and re-evaluate the control structures and barriers to 
takeovers that are not covered by the Directive1171 -  at least some of these 
structures and barriers will have disappeared.
1167 C. Mayer, ‘Corporate Governance: A Policy for Europe’ (2003), p. 1, available at 
http://www.sgvs.ch/ documents/Congres 2003/papers jahrestagung 2003/ Colin- Corporate%20 
Govemance%20A%20Policy%20for%20Europe. pdf.
1168 G. Hertig and J. A. McCahery (2003), supra n 1049, p. 10.
1,69 C. Kirchner and R. W. Painter, ‘European Takeover Law-Towards a European Modified 
Business Judgment Rule for Takeover Law’ (2000) 2 EBOR 353, p. 357-358.
1170 M. Becht (2003), supra n 1154, p. 13.
1171 Directive, art. 20.
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